Gender Differences in Earnings and Occupational Attainment in Europe by Chzhen, Yekaterina
 Gender Differences in Earnings and 
Occupational Attainment in Europe 
 
 
 
Yekaterina Chzhen 
 
PhD 
University of York 
Department of Social Policy and Social Work 
September 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite significant increases in female labour market participation and educational 
achievement in the EU in recent decades, women still trail men in terms of 
employment rates, earnings and occupational attainment. This thesis is about the 
interplay between the characteristics of individuals associated with productivity, 
labour market returns to these characteristics, and country-level work/family 
reconciliation policies in influencing female employment and gender inequalities in 
the labour market in the enlarged EU. It explores variations in the ways EU member 
states support individuals in combining work and family life and the extent to which 
these policies promote gender equality in the labour market in terms of pay and 
occupational attainment. The approach of the thesis is quantitative and comparative, 
based on the secondary analysis of micro social datasets and comparable policy 
indicators, using advanced statistical techniques. It is also multi-disciplinary, 
drawing on the literature and methods from the fields of labour economics and 
comparative social policy. 
 
Results from the study suggest that the existing work-family reconciliation policies 
in the EU have not caught up sufficiently with the dramatic advances in women’s 
labour market position. To various extents, they retain elements of the traditional 
male breadwinner model. Even in the Nordic countries, which rank highest on most 
measures of gender equity in work/family reconciliation policies, women tend to 
earn less than men, on average, and to work in a narrower range of occupations than 
their male counterparts. At the other extreme, Eastern-European and Mediterranean 
countries tend to have more traditional gender-role attitudes and a policy 
environment less compatible with the dual-earner/dual-carer model of the family. 
However, women who work, particularly those who work full-time, typically enjoy 
more equality with men in terms of their wages and occupational attainment.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Gender equality is one of the fundamental rights and common values of the European 
Union. According to Article 23 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: “equality 
between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work 
and pay” (2000, p.13). Despite significant increases in female labour market 
participation and educational achievement in the EU in recent decades, women still 
trail men in terms of employment rates, earnings and occupational attainment 
(European Commission, 2010). Gendered division of labour in households, with men 
as primary earners and women as carers and secondary earners, may partly account 
for perpetuating these gender inequalities.  
 
This thesis is about the interplay between the characteristics of individuals associated 
with productivity, labour market returns to these characteristics, and country-level 
work/family reconciliation policies in influencing female employment and gender 
inequalities in the labour market in the enlarged EU. It seeks to explore variations in 
the ways EU member states support individuals in combining work and family life 
and the extent to which these policies promote gender equality in the labour market 
in terms of pay and occupational attainment. It investigates the hypothesis that by 
helping parents combine paid work with caring for children, work-family 
reconciliation policies may have the potential to reduce the negative consequences of 
motherhood for women’s careers.  
 
The approach of the thesis is quantitative and comparative, based on the secondary 
analysis of micro social datasets and comparable policy indicators, using advanced 
statistical techniques. It is also multi-disciplinary, drawing on the literature and 
methods from the fields of labour economics and comparative social policy. The 
thesis makes an original contribution to the comparative welfare state research area 
by examining the cross-country variation in work/family reconciliation policies and 
gender-role attitudes, and by analysing individual level determinants of gender wage 
gaps and occupational gender segregation in the enlarged EU.  
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This introductory chapter states the research questions of the thesis; overviews the 
structure of the study; and briefly discusses the data sources, sample restrictions and 
country choice. 
 
Objectives of the thesis 
To achieve its overall aim, the study has four broad research questions: 
• What kind of relationship is there between work/family reconciliation 
policies and gender inequality in the labour market?  
• To what extent is recent motherhood related with activity transitions from 
full-time work and, indirectly, with occupational downgrading?  
• In what measure are gender wage gaps across the distribution due to gender 
differences in the distribution of individual characteristics and the returns to 
these characteristics? What would the gender wage gaps be if all women 
worked full-time? 
• How does occupational gender segregation vary across the EU?  
 
In addressing the first research question, the thesis focuses on the relationship 
between work/family reconciliation policies and prevailing gender-role attitudes on 
the one hand and female labour supply and gender inequality in the labour market on 
the other. The study investigates variation in the generosity, duration and gender 
neutrality of parenthood leave schemes; availability and affordability of childcare for 
pre-school children; gender neutrality of tax/benefit systems in relation to secondary 
earners in couples; and prevailing gender-role attitudes across 25 European countries, 
including the new EU accession states. The purpose of the analysis is to create a 
composite indicator of work/family reconciliation policies which is relevant not only 
to female participation but also to gender inequality in the labour market in terms of 
gender wage gaps and occupational segregation. Furthermore, the study explores 
associations between the constructed summary index and female employment rates, 
average gender wage gaps, and occupational segregation.  
 
To address the second research question, the thesis analyses the association between 
recent childbirth and the relative risks of switching to part-time, inactivity or 
unemployment for full-time working women in a comparative perspective, using 
16 
 
 
micro-level longitudinal data. At the same time, it investigates the relationship 
between major transitions in working hours and the risk of occupational 
downgrading, separately for men and women. This helps clarify if the risk of 
switching from longer to shorter hours after childbirth could lead to concurrent 
occupational downgrading for women. Furthermore, gender differences in the risk of 
occupational downgrading upon switching from full-time to part-time work are 
investigated. 
 
With respect to the third research question, the study examines the differences in the 
hourly earnings distributions of men and women working full-time, as well as the 
determinants of full-time work for women. The investigation focuses on Britain and 
five other EU countries that have diverse work/family reconciliation policies and 
different levels of earnings inequality (Italy, Spain, France, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic). Since female employment rates and the shares of full-time employment 
vary considerably across the EU, in order to make the cross-country results 
comparable this study examines gender wage gaps in the earnings distributions both 
before and after accounting for women’s unequal probability of working full-time. 
The study seeks to reveal to what extent the separate contributions of differences in 
productive characteristics and differences in returns to these characteristics to the 
overall gender gap in the distribution of earnings differ across countries with diverse 
work/family reconciliation policies.   
 
To tackle the fourth research question, the study investigates gender differences in 
occupational attainment in 25 European countries and the extent to which the cross-
national variation in occupational gender segregation is related to differences in other 
macro-level factors. As the female labour force participation rate (particularly that of 
mothers) has been the recent focus of comparative research on work-family 
reconciliation policies, there has been less comparative research into the types of 
paid jobs that men and women do. This thesis seeks to identify an index measure of 
occupational gender segregation that is most suitable for cross-country comparative 
research and explore the patterns of variation in the index across the 25 studied 
countries.  
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Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of a literature review chapter, four empirical chapters addressing 
the research questions outlined above, and the conclusion chapter which draws the 
main findings together. Each of the research chapters presents findings from original 
complex statistical analyses. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews comparative literature on the welfare state and work-family 
reconciliation policies in Europe, thus placing the thesis in a theoretical context and 
demonstrating how it seeks to address the research gaps in the literature. It begins by 
highlighting the milestones reached in comparative welfare state research from 
gender-blind analysis of welfare regimes, to its feminist critiques, and the new 
gender regime typologies. It then reviews the relatively scarce welfare state literature 
focusing on new EU accession states and emphasizes the need to include these 
countries in the mainstream European comparative research.  
 
Chapter 3 then reviews the work-family reconciliation policies and attitudes to 
gendered division of labour in 25 European countries. In doing so, it sets the policy 
context for multivariate research presented in the following chapters. It then goes on 
to construct a combined indicator of work-family reconciliation policies and gender-
role attitudes and analyse its bivariate relationships with female participation rates, 
gender wage gaps and occupational segregation. 
 
Chapter 4 examines labour market and occupational transitions of men and women in 
13 European countries. It starts by reviewing the available literature on the timing of 
women’s return to work after childbirth and the research on part-time work and 
occupational downgrading. By considering both the activity changes associated with 
the birth of a new child and occupational downgrading (by skill and/or occupational 
wage) concurrent with transitions from full-time to part-time work for both men and 
women in the same study, this chapter aims to fill the gap in the comparative 
literature.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the differences in the log hourly wage distributions of men and 
women working full-time in Britain, Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech 
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Republic. It first studies the determinants of women’s participation in full-time work 
and discusses the differences in earnings potential between full-time women and all 
women. The gender wage gaps that would be observed if all women worked full-
time are then simulated. After that the chapter goes on to analyse the gender 
differences in the distribution of personal characteristics and the returns to these 
characteristics among full-time workers in the studied countries. Simulating the 
counterfactual distribution of full-time gender wage gaps, it shows the gender wage 
gaps that would be observed if women had their own distribution of characteristics, 
but were rewarded for them like men.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the differences in occupational distributions of men and women 
in 25 European countries and studies the cross-national variation in occupational 
gender segregation levels using index measures and log-linear methods. After 
discussing recent research on occupational gender segregation, it proceeds to review 
the relevant economic and sociological theories of segregation as well as 
measurement issues in segregation studies. The chapter ranks the studied countries 
based on the chosen indices of segregation and discusses the pattern of cross-country 
variation with respect to the work/family reconciliation policies analyses in Chapter 
3. Substantial levels of occupational gender segregation are found in all 25 countries. 
It then explores the extent to which differences in part-time work rates and the 
education levels of the labour force account for the cross-national variation in the 
association between occupation and sex, using log-linear modelling. 
 
Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the main findings across all the chapters, 
reiterates the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis to existing research, 
states the overall limitations of the study, considers the policy implications of the 
thesis and suggests possible directions for further research.  
 
Overall, this thesis concludes that the existing work-family reconciliation policies in 
the EU have not caught up with the dramatic advances in women’s labour market 
position, as they retain elements of the traditional male breadwinner model to 
varying extents. In order to achieve gender equality in the labour market with respect 
to not only employment levels, but also pay and job status, employment and family 
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policies need to explicitly promote a dual-earner/dual-carer model of the family in 
which both men and women do unpaid caring and paid labour market work. 
Otherwise, women have to face a trade-off between having children and pursuing a 
career, which results either in the situation of low employment and low fertility (e.g. 
Southern-European countries) or in the scenario of relatively high employment and 
fertility combined with relatively high levels of occupational segregation and gender 
wage gaps (e.g. Scandinavian countries).  
 
Data sources and subjects of study 
This thesis relies on a variety of micro-level secondary data sources that provide 
comparable data for the studied countries. The 2007 round of the EU Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is used to study gender differences in 
earnings and occupational attainment. The in-depth study of gender differences in 
earnings distributions in Chapter 5 uses data for Britain from the British Household 
Panel Survey. Data on gender-role attitudes are taken from the 1999 wave of the 
European Values Study (EVS). Data on labour market activity changes and 
occupational transitions (see Chapter 4) are taken from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) 1994-2001.  
 
The thesis also draws on a range of sources of macro-level statistics. Data on family 
policy indicators, such as duration and generosity of maternity, paternity and parental 
leave, government spending on childcare and early education services, and childcare 
costs for model families are taken from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Family Database. The statistics on childcare enrolment 
rates are derived from the EU-SILC individual database. This provides a more 
harmonised set of statistics than can be obtained from the OECD. The indicators of 
gender neutrality of tax/benefit systems are computed using the OECD Tax/Benefit 
Calculator.    
 
Combining detailed micro-level analysis of individual labour market transitions, 
earnings and occupational attainment with aggregate analysis of the cross-national 
variation, the subjects of this study are both individuals and countries. The micro-
level analysis focuses on prime-age individuals 25 to 55 years old. From the cross-
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country comparative perspective, the focus is on the EU-25. Other industrialised 
countries are excluded for data reasons (e.g. they are not covered by the EU-SILC 
and the EVS) and because they are not covered by the common EU legal frameworks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
 
The dramatic increases in female achievements in education and employment in 
industrialised countries over the course of the 20th century have been largely 
unaccompanied by reforms in family policy. In countries with under-developed 
work-family reconciliation institutions, there is an apparent trade-off between having 
children and pursuing a career, resulting in low fertility and low female employment 
(Esping-Andersen, 2009). However, although work-family reconciliation policies 
have the potential to increase the female labour supply, they may not necessarily 
improve the quality of women’s employment or promote gender equality in terms of 
pay and occupational attainment.  
 
This chapter reviews comparative literature on the welfare state and work-family 
reconciliation policies in Europe, in order to place the thesis in a theoretical context 
and demonstrate how it contributes to progress in the field. In the next two sections, 
the chapter highlights milestones in comparative welfare state research: from gender-
blind analysis of welfare regimes to the new typologies that place family, and 
policies supporting female employment, at the heart of the analysis. The chapter then 
reviews the welfare state literature focusing on new EU accession states and 
emphasizes the need to include these countries in mainstream European comparative 
research. The last section summarises the literature review. The chapter concludes 
that the existing welfare state typologies are not ideally suited to the study of gender 
inequality in the labour market as they focus on female employment at the expense 
of other types of gender inequality such as wage gaps and occupational segregation.  
 
Comparative welfare state research: mainstream1 and feminist typologies 
It is well documented that advanced economies differ in the way they organise the 
distribution of welfare between the state, the market and the family (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Lewis, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Korpi, 2000).  
Yet, until the late 1980s, comparative welfare state research mostly focused on 
differences in social spending. In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-
                                               
1
 Similarly to Orloff (2009), the term ‘mainstream’ is used here to refer to welfare state scholarship 
that is not gender-nuanced and assumes that all actors have a typical male life course. 
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Andersen (1990) shifted the focus of comparative welfare state research to social 
citizenship rights2 and the extent to which they allowed individuals to be independent 
from the labour market. 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) clustered 18 OECD countries on three dimensions with 
respect to social provision: state-market relations, stratification, and social 
citizenship rights, including de-commodification of labour. De-commodification is 
“the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable 
standard of living independently of market participation” (1990, p.37). The liberal 
regime is characterised by a low level of de-commodification, with targeted means-
tested benefits, modest social insurance or modest universal transfers. The corporatist 
welfare state, in contrast, serves to preserve the existing status and class differentials 
with little income redistribution and, therefore, minimal de-commodification. The 
family is assumed to be the main provider of care and “the state will only interfere 
when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted” (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, p.27). At the same time, the social-democratic welfare state emphasises de-
commodification and universalism, with extensive social services provision by the 
state. Thus, the role of the family is only explained in the corporatist regime, but not 
in the other two (Gerhard et al., 2005, p.4) Ferrera (1996) later proposed 
distinguishing the ‘Latin rim’ Mediterranean European countries as a distinct 
southern cluster with polarised social protection, exceptions to institutional 
corporatism in healthcare, a mix between public and private provision, and the 
persistence of clientelism in the distribution of cash subsidies.   
 
Feminist scholars have critiqued mainstream comparative research on the welfare 
state, including Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regimes theory, on the grounds 
that it lacks a gender dimension (Lewis, 1992; O'Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993; 
Sainsbury, 1994). While maintaining gender neutrality in its discourse, mainstream 
comparative welfare state research implicitly treats the male worker as the universal 
worker and citizen. Thus, ‘women disappear from the analysis when they disappear 
from the labour markets’ (Lewis, 1992, p.161). Moreover, mainstream research 
focuses on the relationship between welfare and paid work to the exclusion of unpaid 
                                               
2
 Based on Marshall’s (1950) definition of social citizenship closely related to participation in paid 
work. 
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domestic work, done predominantly by women, and disregards the role of women’s 
unpaid work in the home in facilitating men’s labour market participation (Orloff, 
1993). Finally, even in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) discussion of social rights, 
references to the effects of the welfare state on gender relations and gender 
inequalities are missing (Orloff, 1993, p.309).  
 
There are two main lines of analysis by which feminist literature attempts to gender 
the welfare state. The first approach incorporates gender into the mainstream 
paradigm by analysing the differing implications of the welfare state for men and 
women (Orloff, 1993; O'Connor, 1993). The second approach develops alternative 
models to the mainstream ones (Lewis, 1992; Lewis et al., 2008). 
 
To incorporate the previously absent gender aspect into the conceptual frameworks 
of mainstream welfare regime theories based on the power resources3 approach, such 
as Esping-Andersen’s (1990), Orloff (1993) proposed two additional dimensions to 
capture the effect of state social provision on gender relations: access to paid work; 
and the capacity to form and maintain autonomous households. Access to paid work 
complements the mainstream de-commodification dimension, as it concerns the 
extent to which states encourage or inhibit female paid employment—‘the right to be 
commodified’ (Orloff, 1993, p.318). While male rights to paid work have historically 
been promoted through family wage policies, women’s right to economic 
independence from the family have never been fully endorsed. Instead, the post-
World War II workers’ movements promoted women’s right to combine paid work 
with domestic labour.  
 
With regard to the second dimension, there are two main ways for states to promote 
women’s ability to form and maintain an autonomous household, without relying on 
a male breadwinner’s income, according to Orloff (1993).  One is to ensure income 
protection for lone mothers not participating in the labour market, while the other is 
to increase work opportunities for women and reduce their domestic responsibilities. 
                                               
3
 “The power resources approach expects class to be one of the major determinants of conflicts of 
interest in Western societies, holds that inequality in the distribution of power resources is of central 
interest but assumes that the degree of inequality can vary over time and between countries, and 
accords democracy an important role in the processing of conflicts of interest” (Korpi, 1989, p.310). 
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However, both strategies face obstacles in their implementation.  The former strategy, 
pursued by welfare states to varying extents, rarely secures incomes for stay-at-home 
mothers on a par with those of non-working mothers in couple families or of wage 
earners, thus resulting in inferior levels of economic well-being for lone mother 
households. At the same time, the success of the latter strategy is curtailed by the 
existing gender inequalities in pay, as few lone mothers are able to earn sufficient 
wages in the labour market (Orloff, 1993, p.321).   
 
Similarly, O’Connor (1993) argues that the de-commodification dimension has to be 
augmented with the concept of personal autonomy. The level of personal autonomy 
depends on the services that protect individuals from unwanted dependence on either 
the family or the state. This can be tested by the extent to which public services are 
available as citizenship rights rather than as income- or means-tested benefits. In line 
with other feminist research, O’Connor argues that the de-commodification concept 
ignores the fact that not all groups are equally commodified. Since labour market 
participation is gendered due to an unequal division of unpaid domestic labour and 
caring responsibilities, policies that promote women’s participation in paid 
employment are crucial for their independence from the family and for access to the 
work-related benefits that help de-commodify their labour. Policies on childcare 
provision, maternity and parental leaves, flexibility of the working day and adult-care 
services can facilitate or hinder women’s labour market participation and, 
consequently, their achievement of personal autonomy (O'Connor, 1996). Therefore, 
a gender-sensitive analysis of labour market inequality, which is central to welfare 
state analysis, needs to account for the effects of these policies on individuals 
involved in caring work (O'Connor, 1996, p.98).  
 
A second line of feminist analysis offers a wholly different welfare state typology 
with a strong emphasis on gender, as opposed to enhancing the mainstream 
paradigms with the gender element. Lewis (1992) proposes a male-breadwinner 
typology of North-Western European welfare states in which countries are classified 
as strong, modified and weak male-breadwinner (or dual breadwinner) states. Lewis 
uses a theoretical construct of a pure male-breadwinner model as a starting point. In a 
pure breadwinner state all married women would be excluded from the labour market 
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and would depend on their husbands for taxation and social security purposes, while 
remaining fully responsible for care work in the home (1992, p.162). Britain and 
Ireland are described as strong male-breadwinner states, with low levels of female 
labour market participation and publicly funded childcare as well as minimal rights 
for working mothers, such as maternity leave, maternity pay and the right to job re-
instatement. In modified male-breadwinner countries such as France, the state 
recognises women’s roles as mothers and paid workers through high levels of public 
childcare provision and generous family benefits to compensate households for the 
cost of children. However, joint taxation and means-testing of family benefits create 
disincentives for second earners to work long hours, particularly for less educated 
women. In dual breadwinner states, such as Sweden, women are treated as ‘citizen-
workers’ with their entitlements as mothers recognized. Individual taxation, high 
levels of public childcare provision and generous job-protected parental leave make 
it easier for mothers to take up paid work and develop unbroken careers. However, a 
major weakness of this typology is that even the dual breadwinner model does not 
challenge the gendered division of unpaid domestic labour. Furthermore, although 
the typology helps predict female labour market participation rates in different male-
breadwinner economy types, it does not directly extend to other forms of gender 
inequalities in the labour market, such as occupational segregation and gender pay 
gaps.  
 
In her later work, Lewis shows that the traditional male-breadwinner model has 
declined, to be replaced by a ‘one-and-a-half’ or a ‘one-and-three-quarters’ model, 
with men working full-time and women working a variety of part-time hours while 
remaining responsible for unpaid care work (Lewis et al., 2008). In Southern Europe, 
with few part-time jobs available, women tend to choose between working full-time 
and not participating in the labour market at all, while the Scandinavian countries 
have developed a dual-earner family model. Even in Scandinavia, however, women 
are found to be working shorter hours than men, on average (2008, p.21).  
 
Although regarded as highly influential, Lewis’s typology has been critiqued by 
other feminist scholars. The male-breadwinner typology focuses on married women 
and appears to ignore the situation of unmarried women, particularly lone mothers 
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(Orloff, 1996, p.72). Poverty rates for lone mothers in the countries that Lewis 
classifies as strong male-breadwinner states, for example, vary substantially. 
Furthermore, the male-breadwinner paradigm is one-dimensional and the weak male-
breadwinner type in particular is characterised by what it is not rather than what it is 
(Sainsbury, 1994, p.154). 
 
Building upon Lewis’s model, Sainsbury (1994) proposes a two-pronged framework 
for analysing welfare states: a breadwinner model and an individual model. The 
breadwinner model is characterised by the traditional gender division of labour in the 
family (male earner and female carer) and the resulting implications for social 
welfare and taxation systems. In the individual model, on the contrary, men and 
women are all workers and carers, benefit entitlements are individual and much of 
the care work is done publicly. Each country can be situated on a continuum between 
these two opposite models. While Lewis (1992) focuses on women’s entitlements as 
wives or workers, Sainsbury also analyses their social rights as citizens and mothers. 
Examining gender differences in social rights, Sainsbury shows that the 
‘breadwinner-individual’ typology results in a different clustering of countries than 
the mainstream welfare regimes analysis would predict. For example, Sweden and 
the Netherlands (both in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) social-democratic cluster) 
occupy different points on the breadwinner-individual spectrum.  Although 
Sainsbury criticises Lewis for the one-dimensionality of her typology, it appears that 
Sainsbury’s ‘individual model’ is the mirror image of the ‘breadwinner’ model, so 
the whole paradigm is similar to Lewis’s and generates similar predictions with 
respect to female participation rates.  
 
While critiquing the mainstream comparative welfare state research, feminist 
scholars have traditionally been divided according to their preferred role of the 
welfare state in promoting gender equity. The division has been along the sameness 
versus difference lines. The ‘sameness’ (employment) approach posits that women’s 
equality to men in the labour market leads to the achievement of full citizenship 
status, while the ‘difference’ (care) perspective focuses on women’s value as carers. 
The former calls for policies that make it easier for women to fully participate in the 
labour market, while the latter emphasises recognition and reward for women’s care 
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work (Fraser, 1994). However, Kilkey (2000) argues that instead of considering paid 
work versus care giving, it is crucial to examine the policies that allow women to 
move between successive spells of paid work and care over their life time without 
being at risk of poverty. 
 
The main weakness of the feminist comparative welfare state research is that it tends 
to place women alone at the heart of the analysis. Just as the mainstream research 
criticised by feminist scholars prioritises the standard male lifecourse, feminist 
research focuses entirely on women in their roles as workers, carers, mothers and 
welfare recipients. Although some models account for the state’s role in care 
provision, none of the models discussed so far assumes that men (as husbands and 
fathers) could share the unpaid domestic and caring work in equal measure with 
women. Thus, Esping-Andersen argues that to date the changes in social behaviour 
have been limited to the masculinisation of the female life course; however, to 
achieve gender equality the male life course needs to become more feminine  (2002, 
p.70).   
 
The dual-earner/dual-carer model addresses this weakness. Crompton (1999) 
suggests a classification of models ranging from the traditional male breadwinner-
female carer model to the dual-earner/dual-carer model, with the dual-earner/female 
part-time carer and dual-earner/state-market carer models in between. According to 
Gornick and Meyers (2003), the second model applies in the UK and the Netherlands, 
where men tend to work full-time and most women combine part-time employment 
with unpaid care work in the home. The third model (dual earner/substitute carer) is 
prevalent in Nordic countries where most women work full-time, using extensive 
public childcare for their children and in the United States, where women work full-
time relying on market based childcare. Gornick and Meyers (2003, p.85) argue that 
the ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model promotes both gender equality and care-giving 
through equal involvement of men and women both in the labour market and in the 
home. The authors envision that young children would be cared for in the home, 
while older children would be cared for in public childcare and at school. The model 
allows for reduced working time for both parents to take care of their young children.   
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In response to feminist critiques, mainstream comparative welfare state research 
gradually incorporated the gender dimension (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2000). 
Esping-Andersen acknowledges the gender blindness of his original analysis in his 
later work (Esping-Andersen, 1999). In addition to de-commodification that reduces 
dependence on the market, he uses the term de-familialisation ‘to capture policies 
that lessen individuals’ reliance on the family; that maximise individuals’ command 
of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities” (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, p.45). Since a large proportion of women depend on the family for 
their welfare, women’s family obligations have to be reduced in order for them to 
command economic independence via the market. Thus, de-familialisation is a 
concept that is more relevant to women than to men. 
 
Having added a new dimension to his empirical analysis of welfare state variation, 
Esping-Andersen confirms his initial three welfare regimes typology. Gornick and 
Meyers (2003, p.23) also note that “the welfare-state principles underlying these 
clusters are highly correlated with those that shape family policy”. Thus, the social-
democratic Nordic welfare states offer the highest levels of both de-commodification 
and de-familialisation, the conservative states institutionalise the traditional male 
breadwinner model and, therefore, are highly familialist, while the liberal Anglo-
Saxon welfare states are classified as residual and non-familialist. In contrast, Lewis 
(1992) defines Britain, a liberal non-familialist welfare state according to Esping-
Andersen (1999), as a strong male-breadwinner country.  
 
Korpi (2000) includes both gender and class in his study of inequality in rich 
industrialised democracies. He develops a welfare state typology based on the 
country-level variation on two dimensions: institutional support for dual earner 
families and general (nuclear) family support. On the one hand, the dual earner 
family support component reflects the aim of the welfare state to encourage female 
labour force participation, as well as a more equal division of social care within the 
family and society at large. The general family support, on the other hand, 
presupposes a traditional gendered division of labour in the family and in society. 
Korpi uses macro-level indicators that capture these two dimensions and groups 18 
OECD countries into three ideal type models: general family support, dual earner 
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support and market oriented policies. Countries with weak institutional support for 
dual earner families and for families in general that allow market forces to influence 
gender relations are classed as the third (market-oriented) type. Korpi finds the 
lowest gender differences in labour force participation rates in dual earner support 
welfare states (Scandinavian countries) and the largest differences in general family 
support states (continental European countries), with market-oriented states (Anglo-
Saxon countries) ranking in the middle. However, Korpi does not address cross-
country variation in other aspects of labour market inequality, such as gender wage 
gaps and occupational segregation.  
 
In summary, mainstream comparative welfare state research has evolved to 
incorporate a gender dimension, but like feminist analysis, it focuses on female 
participation rates and largely ignores important gender inequalities in the labour 
market such as pay gaps and occupational gender segregation.  
 
Work/family reconciliation policies  
According to Orloff  (2009), one of the positive outcomes of the ongoing debate 
between mainstream and feminist social policy scholars has been the emphasis on the 
themes originally developed by feminist scholars, such as the role of the state in 
helping parents reconcile their work and family commitments, although the focus has 
mainly been on mothers rather than fathers. This section reviews the comparative 
literature on work-family reconciliation policies, starting with the family policies 
typology. 
 
Gauthier (1996) distinguished between four models of family policy in Europe in the 
early 1990s. Countries in the ‘pro-family/pro-natalist’ group, such as France, 
encourage families to have children by helping mothers combine child rearing and 
work through extended maternity leave and child-care provision. Countries in the 
‘pro-traditional’ group aim to preserve the traditional male-breadwinner family, 
where mothers stay at home to look after children. The model is characterised by 
cash support for families, low provision of childcare and extended maternity leave. 
Gauthier (1996) uses Germany as an example of this model. ‘Pro-egalitarian’ 
countries have gender equality as their main objective and, therefore, support 
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working parents through extended parental leave (as opposed to maternity leave) and 
leave to take care of sick children as well as extensive provision of childcare (e.g. 
Nordic countries). Finally, ‘non-interventionist’ countries, such as Britain, are based 
on the assumptions of self-sufficiency of families and unregulated labour markets. 
The state supports families in need with targeted benefits, but does not provide 
generous parental leave or childcare facilities. However, most countries have a 
mixture of these types. 
 
In her more recent work, Gauthier (2002) shows that family policies in industrialised 
countries have diverged between 1970 and 1999, and the clusters of countries 
identified in the 1990s have not been stable. All of the studied countries increased 
their support to working parents over this period by lengthening the duration of 
childcare leave, although there is considerable variation in the level of payment 
across countries (i.e. longer leave is paid in the Social-Democratic countries but not 
in Southern-European countries). Liberal countries lag behind the rest in their degree 
of support for working parents. Using the indicator of generosity of maternity leave 
(duration multiplied by percentage paid), Gauthier finds a growing dispersion across 
countries between 1972 and 1999. The liberal and social-democratic countries are 
even further apart in 1999 than in 1972, while conservative and Southern-European 
countries are clearly in the middle. However, this analysis uses only a limited range 
of family policy indicators (cash benefits and maternity leave), which may not 
adequately capture the cross-country variation in family policy.  
 
Lambert (2008) constructs an index of family policies that help women combine 
work and family life for twenty OECD countries for three periods: 1984-86, 1994-96 
and 2001-2003. The index is based on: the length and generosity of maternity and 
parental leave during the first 52 weeks after childbirth; percentage of children under 
three in publicly provided or subsidised childcare; and percentage of children 
between the age of three and school age in childcare and early education services. In 
the period 2001-2003, the index scores range from the low of 13 in the US to the 
high of 100 in Denmark, with Anglo-Saxon countries at the bottom of the league and 
Nordic countries at the top. However, this index has several weaknesses. It does not 
include a wider range of policies that may affect maternal labour supply, such as the 
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tax/benefit treatment of secondary earners in couples. Furthermore, the study 
neglects the implications of the studied maternal employment policies for gender 
equality in the home or in the labour market. Policies that help mothers reconcile the 
dual burdens of work and family do not necessarily challenge the existing gendered 
divisions of labour.  
 
Mahon (2006) argues that industrialised countries are shifting their policy focus from 
women’s roles as unpaid care-givers (the male breadwinner model) to work/family 
reconciliation policies to support mothers’ employment. The author distinguishes 
between four emerging (‘post-maternalist’) models of supporting mothers in paid 
work: the neo-liberal, the neo-familialist, third way, and egalitarian. The neo-liberal 
model, prevalent in the US, relies on low-wage care workers to provide non-parental 
care that enables mothers to participate in the labour market, while employment 
legislation ensures employment equity rights and freedom from sexual harassment in 
the workplace. The neo-familialist model, found in continental Europe, underscores 
women’s choice between staying at home as a mother and a housewife and 
participating in the labour market. It is exemplified by long childcare leave and low 
provision of public childcare facilities for pre-schoolers, inducing mothers to take 
career breaks to care for children and later return to work part-time. In contrast, the 
third way model, found in Britain and Canada, promotes mothers’ participation in 
employment through short and generous parental leaves and demand-side subsidies 
for childcare. Finally, the egalitarian model is more of an ideal or a blueprint, present 
to some extent only in Sweden and Denmark. It is exemplified by parental leave 
arrangements taken equally by mothers and fathers and accessible and affordable 
childcare facilities available to children regardless of the working status of their 
parents. Although this typology provides a useful theoretical analysis, it does not 
provide any empirical examples or explain how the post-socialist new accession 
states fit in.  
 
Gornick and Meyers (2003) produce an index of work and family reconciliation 
policies in 12 developed countries. The study focuses on two types of families: those 
with children up to the age of five and those with school-age children. Twelve 
countries are included in the comparative study: US, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, 
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Norway, Finland, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and the 
UK. The index for policies relevant to families with younger children comprises the 
indicators of childcare and early education provision, family leave policy, and 
working time regulation. Scandinavian countries rank highest on this index, followed 
by Continental countries and, finally, the three English-speaking countries. A similar 
ranking is observed for the index relevant to families with school-age children 
(including indicators of school schedules, sick-child leave, and working time 
regulation). A limitation of both of these indices is that they omit other policies that 
are likely to have an important effect on the labour supply of mothers, such as the tax 
and benefit treatment of secondary earners or the prevailing gender-role attitudes. 
The earlier study by Gornick et al. (1997) that constructs an index of policies 
supporting mothers’ employment suffers from the same weakness as it focuses on 
job protection, family leave and childcare policies only.  
 
Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2001) study the relationship between Esping-Andersen’s 
regime type, Gornick-Meyers-Ross (1997) index of policies supporting mothers’ 
employment along with labour market outcomes for women with children. They use 
data for 12 European countries from the International Social Survey Programme 
1994 ‘gender-role’ module. The study finds evidence of greater employment 
continuity for mothers in the countries that have higher levels of support for working 
mothers, regardless of the welfare regime. Similarly, earnings losses from part-time 
or discontinuous employment are found to be lower in the countries that have more 
supportive policies.  
 
The OECD (2001, p.152) constructs a similar index of work-family reconciliation 
policies. It includes childcare coverage, family leave, flexible work and voluntary 
part-time work indicators. The study finds a positive correlation (around 0.7) 
between the composite index and female employment rate (aged 30-34). This 
correlation is higher than with any of the individual indicators, which suggests that 
the combination of these policies is more important than any policy in isolation. The 
highest value of the composite index is found in Scandinavian and North American 
countries, while the scores are lowest in Southern European countries, Japan and 
Ireland. The composite index may have a methodological flaw, however, as it 
33 
 
 
includes two measures that are likely to be highly correlated with the studied 
outcome of female labour supply: flexible work and female part-time rates. 
Moreover, the female part-time rate could be considered a dependent variable on its 
own, rather than a predictor of the female participation rate. Plantenga et al. (2009) 
stress the importance of not mixing dependent and independent variables when 
constructing international indices of gender equality.  
 
Esping-Andersen (2002) suggests that ‘women-friendly’ policies that alter the 
opportunity costs of having children have the greatest potential effect on the labour 
supply of women who seek to combine their roles as mothers and workers. Thus, he 
argues that women have different preference sets (Hakim, 1991; Hakim, 1995). The 
vast majority of women prefer the dual-role of workers and mothers, unwilling to 
sacrifice motherhood for careers. Thus, they tend to concentrate in female-dominated 
jobs, such as public services, and in part-time jobs. At the same time, the diminishing 
minority of family-centred women prioritise marriage and motherhood and tend to 
work largely out of necessity, if at all. By contrast, career-centred women, also a 
minority, focus on their education and employment and become mothers only if it 
does not interfere with their careers. The problem with the ‘power of preference’ 
reasoning is that it does not challenge the gendered division of labour, assuming that 
mothers retain the primary responsibility for child care, and it does not enquire about 
the social and political origins of the expressed preferences (Orloff, 2009). 
  
However, even the most generous work/family reconciliation policy package does 
not necessarily prevent other negative trade-offs. For instance, the high birth rates 
and employment rates of women in Nordic countries are also associated with high 
levels of occupational gender segregation, whereby women concentrate in the public 
sector jobs, “a virtual female employment ghetto” (Esping-Andersen, 2002, p.75). 
Alternatively, in countries with less generous ‘women-friendly’ packages and more 
deregulated labour markets, such as the US, lower levels of occupational segregation 
go together with uneven quality of childcare and early education services, resulting 
in higher levels of child poverty and inequality. Yet, Esping-Andersen argues that it 
is important to promote ‘women-friendly’ policies, such as affordable day care and 
paid parental leave, because female employment produces increasing social returns. 
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As women in many countries represent a reserve of labour and, with increasing 
female education, also a pool of productive human capital, high female employment 
will decrease future old-age dependency ratios and reduce poverty and social 
exclusion.  
 
Few studies of work/family reconciliation policies look at gender equality outcomes 
in the labour market. Gornick and Meyers (2008) consider mothers’ earnings as a 
share of total parental earnings and fathers’ share of unpaid household work in seven 
countries (US, France, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark), but they 
do not examine any other labour market indicators of gender equality, such as 
occupational segregation or the overall gender wage gap. They find that even in 
countries with relatively generous and gender-egalitarian work-life reconciliation 
policies, mothers’ share of parental earnings is well below 50%: the share ranges 
between 32% in France and 38% in Denmark (J. C. Gornick & Meyers, 2008, p.340). 
 
However, work/family reconciliation policies rarely, if ever, have gender equality in 
the labour market as their primary goal. Instead, they often aim at increasing 
women’s labour supply, fertility and child well-being. According to Esping-
Andersen, higher maternal employment is associated with lower levels of child 
poverty and higher levels of financial sustainability of ageing populations (Esping-
Andersen, 2009, p.83). Furthermore, in countries where women are more able to 
successfully combine motherhood and careers, fertility rates tend to be higher 
(McDonald, 2000). 
 
To sum up, all of these studies indicate the importance of work-family reconciliation 
policies for the cross-country variation in female labour supply. However, they still 
overlook other forms of gender inequality in the labour market. They are also limited 
in geographical scope, excluding the new EU accession countries.  
 
New accession countries in comparative welfare state research 
There is still a relative shortage of comparative welfare state research that includes 
both old and new EU accession countries. Esping-Andersen (1996) rejected the idea 
that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries formed a separate welfare state 
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cluster, since at the time of his writing they were still in a transitional stage. However, 
more recent welfare state studies focusing on the CEE region tend to argue that post-
socialist new accession states are sufficiently similar to be treated as a separate 
welfare state regime. See Cerami (2006)  for a comprehensive overview of the post-
transition development of welfare states in CEE new accession countries.  
 
Some welfare state studies incorporate CEE countries in the mainstream comparative 
analysis. Fenger (2007) re-produces Esping-Andersen’s typology (albeit with the 
Latin rim countries as a distinct cluster) for the traditional welfare states, with post-
socialist countries forming a distinct group, using hierarchical cluster analysis with 
macro-level data on 30 European countries. The post-socialist countries are divided 
into three sub-types: 1) ‘former USSR type’ that includes the three Baltic countries 
(EU accession states) along with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine; 2) ‘post-communist 
European type’ that includes the 2004 EU accession states, such as Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics plus Bulgaria and Croatia; and 3) ’developing 
welfare state type’ that includes Georgia, Romania and Moldova. Although the 
analysis uses many variables on government expenditure, social situation (e.g. 
inequality, female participation, unemployment), and political participation and trust, 
it suffers from the same gender-blindness as Esping-Andersen’s original analysis. It 
is, therefore, not ideally suited to the study of gender inequality in the labour market 
across the EU-25.  
 
Aspalter et al. (2009) seek to explain why some of the CEE countries are more 
similar than others. They focus on pension and healthcare systems in the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, using an ideal type analysis, to show that 
these countries are returning to their common pre-socialist Bismarckian roots. 
Although these countries have elements of universality and neo-liberalism in 
addition to their basic social insurance models, they now fit in with the Continental 
European (corporatist-conservative) countries. However, this analysis is limited, only 
looking at pension and health-care systems and disregarding family and employment 
policies, amongst others. 
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In contrast, several studies focus exclusively on the variation between family polices 
in CEE countries. For instance, Rostgaard (2004) finds a divergence in family 
support policies, such as family and parental leave benefits, across the CEE countries 
at the beginning of the 21st century. Scharle (2007) examines the effect of family 
policies, such as family benefits and day care provision, on female labour supply in 
eight new and 13 old member states for the period 1995-2004. The study finds that 
although labour market conditions, such as unemployment levels, had a stronger 
effect on female labour supply in Central and Eastern Europe than work-family 
reconciliation policies during the transition period, by 2004 family policies had more 
of an impact on female participation rates across the CEE countries.   
Similarly, Saxonberg and Sirovatka (2006) investigate the variation in work-family 
reconciliation policies in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary from 
a gender-equality perspective. Examining paid family leave policies, day care 
provision and the availability of part-time work, they argue that these countries have 
been following a re-familialisation path towards the male-breadwinner model, either 
explicitly or implicitly, since their transition to a market economy. For example, the 
Czech and Slovak republics have long parental leave with low benefit rates, which 
assumes that women will leave the labour market for several years to look after their 
children, while Poland has a heavily means-tested parental leave benefit. 
Interestingly, Lück and Hofäcker (2003) find high levels of support for both female 
employment and traditional gender roles in post-socialist countries, using 
comparable cross-country data on gender-role attitudes.    
 
Pascall and Kwak (2005) also document a shift away from the dual-earner model that 
existed during the socialist period in the CEE region, but they argue that the 
emerging gender regime is more egalitarian than the traditional male breadwinner 
model. Thus, they find that gender gaps in employment, unemployment, working 
time and risk of poverty are smaller in CEE countries than in the EU-15. The only 
exception is the gender gap in political representation, which is still higher in CEE 
countries than in the EU-15. However, the authors do not provide any quantitative 
evidence on sharing of caring responsibilities within households, which makes their 
picture of emerging gender regimes somewhat incomplete. Yet, in a survey of 
working conditions in EU accession and candidate countries in 2001, Paoli and 
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Parent-Thirion (2003, p.78) find that the distribution of caring and domestic tasks 
between men and women in households is indeed more egalitarian in 12 accession 
and candidate countries than in the EU-15.   
 
Summary and conclusion 
To sum up, mainstream comparative welfare state research lacks an explicit gender 
dimension and, even in response to feminist critiques, fails to fully address the 
profound gender inequalities in the labour market. Feminist analysis highlights 
gender inequalities in receipt of social security benefits and stresses the importance 
of considering women’s multiple roles as workers, consumers, mothers, and welfare 
state clients. It brings to light the interaction between the family, the state, and the 
market as a determinant of public welfare provision. It also shifts the focus away 
from social insurance schemes, which depend on employment status, to social care 
and services. Finally, feminist research emphasises the role of familial ideologies and 
the division of unpaid domestic labour in developing social policies (Sainsbury, 1994, 
pp.151-152).  
 
However, in so far as feminist research looks at the labour market position of women, 
it focuses on female participation rates and largely neglects working hours, gender 
pay gaps and occupational segregation. Although there has been an increased interest 
in work-family reconciliation policies in comparative welfare state research, the 
indices constructed to capture the policy framework tend to focus on childcare and 
parental leave policies to the exclusion of other relevant predictors of female 
employment. This chapter concludes that the existing welfare state and work/family 
reconciliation policy typologies are not ideally suited to the study of gender 
inequality in the labour market as they focus on female employment at the expense 
of other sources of gender inequality such as wage gaps and occupational segregation. 
 
Crucially, there is still a lack of comparative welfare state research that includes new 
EU accession states. Therefore, there remains a need to devise a welfare state 
typology or ranking relevant to gender inequalities in the labour market, including 
differences in pay and occupational attainment, which covers the enlarged EU.  This 
thesis seeks to address this gap in the literature. 
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The next chapter compares the work/family reconciliation policies and prevailing 
gender-role attitudes in 25 European countries. It focuses on: parenthood leave 
provisions; childcare availability and affordability across the studied countries; 
tax/benefit rules that are likely to affect second earners in couples (who tend to be 
women); and social norms and attitudes towards the gendered division of market and 
non-market work. It then ranks the studied countries on a summary index of 
work/family reconciliation policies relevant to gender equality in the labour market 
and studies the relationship between the combined index and gender equality 
outcomes in the labour market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
Chapter 3 Work/family reconciliation policies and gender equality 
outcomes 
 
Women face different constraints to their employment across Europe. By reviewing 
the work-family reconciliation policies and attitudes to gendered division of labour in 
25 European countries, this chapter sets the policy context for empirical research 
presented in the following chapters. The chapter is organised as follows. First 
parenthood leave policies are compared; then childcare availability and affordability 
are reviewed across the studied countries, followed by a discussion of fiscal rules 
that affect second earners in couples and an analysis of social norms and attitudes 
towards gender equality in the home and in the labour market. The last section 
analyses the relationship between each of these indicators, as well as a combined 
indicator of work-family reconciliation policies, and female participation rates, 
gender wage gaps and occupational segregation indices. 
 
Job-protected parenthood leave policy designs  
This section reviews statutory maternity, paternity and parental leave policy designs 
in the EU-25, focusing on job-protected leave available to families with children. It 
analyses parental leave designs with respect to their duration, generosity and the 
extent to which they are gender egalitarian. Acting on the nexus of labour market 
(e.g. worker entitlements to leave) and family policies (childcare benefits), 
parenthood leave designs shed light on the different priorities and rationales in these 
two policy fields. The analysis in this section is based on comparable data from the 
OECD Family Database.  
 
Parenthood leave policies4 can have a profound impact on gender equality both in the 
labour market and in the home with respect to child-rearing, as they allow parents to 
return to their workplace after the period of job-protected leave and they allow both 
parents, not just mothers, to stay at home to care for their young children. The 
potential of parenthood leave policies to both increase maternal employment and 
involve fathers in care-giving explains the growing interest in maternity, paternity 
                                               
4Parenthood leave encompass maternity, paternity and parental leaves, extended child care leave and 
leave to look after a sick child (Escobedo, 1999).   
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and parental leave in the literature on the women-friendly welfare state (Ray et al., 
2010). However, in practice, the effect of parenthood leave policy designs on gender 
equality is not at all straightforward. Moss and Deven (1999, p.14) argue that simply 
having statutory provisions for parental leave available to both mothers and fathers 
does not promote gender equality; in fact, fathers’ increased take-up of parental leave 
may be an indicator of gender equality rather than its cause.  
 
The EU sets binding minimum standards for both maternity leave and parental leave 
in the member states. The maternity leave directive (Council Directive 92/85/CEE) 
sets common standards for occupational health and safety of pregnant workers and 
those who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, establishing the minimum 
of 14 weeks of statutory maternity leave for all female workers, two of which have to 
be taken before delivery. The member states have to guarantee income protection for 
at least the minimum 14-week period, which has to be at least equivalent to what the 
employee would be entitled to if taking sick leave. All of the EU-25 countries studied 
in this chapter have statutory provisions guaranteeing parental leave of at least three 
months per parent, in compliance with the 1996 Parental Leave directive (Council 
Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996)5. However, it is up to the member states to 
define by law or collective agreement whether and how much of the parental leave is 
to be paid. Thus, parental leave provisions vary substantially across the EU in terms 
of their duration, benefit structures, coverage, flexibility in use, type of entitlement 
(family or individual) and source of financing. The complexity and 
multidimensionality of parental leave policy designs severely complicate the study of 
their impact on gender equality in the labour market.   
 
The consequences of parenthood leave policies for maternal labour supply are 
ambiguous (De Henau et al., 2007; Ray et al., 2010). While paid leave schemes of 
short duration allow mothers to return to work instead of quitting the labour market, 
thus helping ensure job continuity for new mothers (Baum, 2003) and reduce the 
                                               
5
 The Directive implemented the Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by the Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the European Centre of Employers and 
Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
on 14 December 1995.  The framework agreement has been revised on 18 June 2009 to increase the 
minimum length of parental leave from three to four months, amongst other provisions, but this period 
is out of scope of the current study. 
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earnings gap between women with and without children (Waldfogel, 1998), 
compulsory paid leaves of longer duration can erode women’s human capital, reduce 
opportunities for promotion and make women more costly to hire than men (De 
Henau et al., 2007). Furthermore, in the absence of childcare facilities available after 
the end of parental leave, new mothers may still not be able to return to the labour 
market (Rubery et al., 1999). According to Gornick and Meyers (2003), generous 
family leave provisions taken up predominantly by mothers can weaken women’s 
labour market attachment and increase gender inequalities in paid and unpaid work. 
The authors argue that “government policies are needed that both enable and 
encourage fathers to share in family leave benefits” (2003, p.133). 
 
Furthermore, there is little evidence that parenthood leave policies successfully 
engage fathers in care-giving. If parental leave is an individual, non-transferable 
entitlement, both mothers and fathers can claim it, losing the entitlement if they do 
not. In contrast, parents can decide who will take the parental leave if it is a family 
entitlement (Bruning and Plantenga, 1999). Research evidence shows that fathers are 
more likely to take up paternity leave (which tends to be better paid) than parental 
leave, even if the latter is an individual, ‘use it or lose it’, entitlement; they are the 
least likely to take up parental leave if it is a family entitlement which the mother can 
take instead (Moss, 2008). Since fathers’ take-up of parental leave lags behind that of 
mothers, the net effect of parental leave schemes on gender equality is unclear (Ray 
et al., 2010). In countries with paid paternity leave, fathers tend to take it, but 
paternity leaves are usually too short (from a few days to a few weeks) to make a real 
difference to the gender division of care in the home.  
 
There is a growing interest in parenthood leave designs in comparative social policy 
literature. Some studies describe leave schemes in individual countries without 
explicitly comparing them using a common framework (see Moss & Deven, 1999; 
Kamerman & Moss, 2009). Others review statutory leave provisions in a cross-
country comparative perspective. For instance, there is a growing body of 
comparative research on the generosity of parental leave schemes in the EU (Bruning 
& Plantenga, 1999; Lohkamp-Himmighofen & Dienel, 2000; De Henau et al., 2007). 
Most of these studies measure generosity as a combination of benefit levels and 
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duration. Several studies focus on the gendered impacts of parental leave policies 
(Meulders & O'Dorchai, 2007; Moss & Korintus, 2008; De Henau et al., 2007). 
However, there is a gap in the empirical literature for a systematic enquiry into the 
extent to which parental leave schemes are egalitarian (Ray et al., 2010).  
 
Haas (2008) proposes a new typology of parental leave policies in Europe. She 
distinguishes between four models: a privatised (noninterventionist) care model, a 
family-centred care model, a market-oriented care model and a valued care model. 
The privatised care model characterises the Southern European states, where the care 
of young children is primarily a family responsibility that falls on the shoulders of 
mothers. Job protected parental leaves were introduced only as a response to the EU 
directives, with minimum possible provisions. Fathers’ take up of leave is not 
encouraged and is correspondingly low in practice. The family-centred model is 
found in continental European countries where long parental leaves encourage 
mothers to care for their young children at home and then go back to the labour force. 
Incentives for fathers to share parental leave exist, but actual take-up is very low. 
The market-oriented model, found in Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK, involves 
little state support for working parents, which is seen as employers’ responsibility. 
Finally, the value care model, prevalent in Scandinavian countries, is characterised 
by generous state support for working parents, generous parental leaves that 
encourage fathers’ take-up and accessible childcare facilities for young children. 
However, this typology does not include any of the new accession states and does not 
include any recent policy developments (since 2001).  
 
Gornick and Meyers (2003) examine the gendered structure of parental leave 
schemes in 12 countries, using a six-point “gender equality” index to compare 
parental leave policy designs using 2000-2003 data. One point is assigned to a 
country if any paid paternity leave is available, two points if fathers have non-
transferable parental leave rights, three points if benefits are wage-related at 80 per 
cent or higher, two points if benefits are wage related but at less than 80 per cent, and 
one point for flat rate paid benefits. Sweden and Norway score the maximum of 6 
points, Denmark scores 5 points, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg score 4 points 
each, Canada scores 3 points, the Netherlands, the UK and the US score 2 points 
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each, while France and Germany only score one point each. A limitation of this 
index is that it focuses on fathers’ rights to family leave rather than on the gender 
equality in leave entitlements per se. 
 
Ray et al. (2008; 2010) revise the Gornick and Meyers gender equality index and 
include a larger set of countries. They evaluate parental leave policies in 21 high-
income countries using a 15-point scale with respect to gender equality both in the 
workplace and in care-giving. They rank Sweden, Finland, Norway and Greece 
highest on both gender equality and generosity, as they have generous paid leave, 
non-transferable quotas for each parent, universal coverage, ‘financing structures that 
pool risk among many employers,’ and scheduling flexibility. However, the authors 
use ‘parental leave’ as an umbrella term for all family leave related to the care of 
young children.  
 
This section examines the duration of job-protected leave and the proportion of it that 
is paid. It uses internationally comparable data from the OECD Family Database 
Table PF7.1 (last updated in June 2009) for the period 2006/2007. It is supplemented 
with detailed information from Moss and Korintus (2008), who review maternity, 
paternity and parental leave policies in 25 industrialised countries as of 2007, 
including 21 of the countries studied in this chapter. They do not include Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg or Slovakia in their study. Information on statutory 
entitlements to parenthood leave is not sufficient to study the take-up of leave in 
practice, but accurate comparative information on take-up of parental leave by 
mothers and fathers in Europe is not available, due to the lack of consistent data 
gathering through national surveys and administrative data, different definitions of 
parental leave in various countries and the availability of extra provision through 
collective agreements (Bruning and Plantenga, 1999). Furthermore, identifying the 
eligible population to determine take-up rates is even more difficult than gathering 
data on the numbers of leave-takers (OECD, 2009). However, a systematic analysis 
of statutory parenthood leave policy designs can still provide important insights into 
the variation in different states’ involvement in the family sphere, the way in which 
labour market and family policies interact, and the extent to which maternal 
employment and fathers’ involvement in care-giving are prioritised.  
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Since parenthood leave schemes in Europe are complex and diverse, a common 
standard has to be used in order to compare them. This section uses full-time 
equivalent (FTE) paid leave as a measure of both duration and generosity of leave. It 
is calculated as the wage replacement rate multiplied by the duration of leave in 
weeks6.  This approach is used in Ray et al. (2010)  and the OECD Family Database, 
along with several simplifying rules in order to deal with the complexity and 
diversity of parenthood leave policies in various countries. For instance, if more than 
one option of leave is available, the least generous option is used. If one option offers 
a longer leave at a lower rate of pay and another option offers a shorter leave at a 
higher rate, the latter option is used. If the benefit is flat rate, the FTE amount is 
calculated as a proportion of the national average wage using the OECD Tax-Benefit 
calculator. These rules are also used here to calculate FTE leave measures using 
detailed information on parenthood leave from Moss and Korintus (2008) whenever 
the summary statistics in the OECD Family Database do not match the description of 
leave schemes in other sources. Any discrepancy between these two sources is 
reported in the notes beneath the tables. The rules for maternity and paternity leaves 
are typically straightforward, but the calculation of FTE paid parental leave is usually 
more complex. For instance, in some countries parental leave benefit is separate from 
the job-protected parental leave and parents can receive it even if both of them are 
working (e.g. in the Czech Republic). Detailed notes on statutory maternity, paternity 
and parental leave entitlements, including the level of payment, eligibility, flexibility 
in use and source of financing, summarised from Moss and Korintus (2008) and the 
OECD Family Database, are reported in Annex 3.  
 
Table  3.1 shows the amount of total and FTE paid job-protected leave available to 
couples in 25 European countries. Total parental leave (columns 5 and 6) is the total 
amount of leave available per couple: if it is an individual entitlement available to 
both mothers and fathers and it cannot be transferred from one parent to another, the 
sum of the two is reported. Thus, even if one parent forgoes his/her entitlement, the 
                                               
6
 For example, total maternity leave in Ireland is 42 weeks as of 2007/2008, but only 26 weeks of it 
are paid (at 70% of past earnings averaged over the tax year  subject to a minimum of €151.60 per  
week and a ceiling of €232.40 per week). FTE paid leave is calculated as 0.70*26=18.2. Thus, the 
minimum and the ceiling are ignored for simplicity. 
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total amount per family shows the maximum that could be taken in theory. Total 
leave and total FTE paid leave (columns 7 and 8 of Table 1; Figure 3.1) are the sum 
of total and FTE paid maternity, paternity and parental leaves available to couples, 
respectively.  
 
There is considerable variation in total duration and generosity of parenthood leave 
schemes available to couples across the studied countries. Paid maternity leave 
ranges from 9 FTE weeks in Norway to 28 weeks in Estonia. The vast majority of 
these countries have fully paid maternity leaves; the UK is the major exception with 
only 12 weeks out of 52 being FTE paid (as of 2006/2007).  
 
Paternity leave tends to be of shorter duration (between 2 days and 13 weeks), but 
most of it is usually paid. Iceland has the longest and most generous paternity leave 
provision of 13 weeks, 10 of which are FTE paid, followed by Sweden with 12 
weeks of paternity leave (9 weeks FTE). For Sweden and Norway, paternity leave 
includes the share of parental leave reserved for fathers (fathers’ quota). Notably, 
seven of the studied countries have no statutory paternity leave provisions at all: 
Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Slovakia. In practice, 
however, a couple of leave days may be given to fathers around the time of birth due 
to collective agreements or the employer’s discretion (Moss & Korintus, 2008). 
Among the countries that have statutory paternity leave provisions, two weeks of 
fully paid leave are the most common (Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France and Latvia).  
 
In contrast, parental leave provisions vary considerably in duration. Some countries 
provide job-protected parental leave until the child is three years old, although only a 
small proportion of it is paid (Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 
France, Poland and Slovakia). Others only guarantee 26 weeks, largely unpaid 
(Belgium and the UK). FTE paid parental leave ranges from none in Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK to at least 52 weeks in Sweden, 
Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania.  
 
The maximum amount of total parenthood leave available to couples varies 
substantially. FTE paid leave ranges from the low of 12 weeks in the UK to the high 
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of 113 weeks in Lithuania (Figure 3.1). Total (paid and unpaid) parenthood leave 
ranges from 42 weeks in the Netherlands and Belgium to 156 weeks7 in the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Poland and Slovakia, assuming 
that both parents take their individual non-transferable leave entitlements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7
 In these countries parental leave, taken after maternity and paternity leave, can be taken until the 
child is three years old, so the maximum amount of parenthood leave cannot exceed 156 weeks. 
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Table  3.1  Child-related employment protected leave periods available to 
couples: duration of unpaid leave and duration of the full-time 
equivalent of the leave period if paid at 100% of last earnings, 
2006/2007 (in weeks) 
 
Total 
maternity 
leave  
1) 
FTE paid 
maternity 
leave  
2) 
Paternity 
leave  
3) 
FT paid 
paternity 
leave  
4) 
Total 
parental 
leave  
5) 
FTE paid 
parental 
leave  
6) 
Total 
leave  
7) 
Total FTE 
leave  
8) 
AT 16.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 104.0 16.7 120.0 32.7 
BE 15.0 11.3 2.0 1.2 26.0 5.6 43.0 18.1 
CZ 28.0 13.7 0.0 0.0 156.0 50.3 156.0 64.0 
DE 14.0 14.0 0.0 0.0 156.0 34.8 156.0 48.8 
DK 18.0 18.0 2.0 2.0 32.0 32.0 52.0 52.0 
EE 28.0 28.0 2.0 2.0 156.0 62.0 156.0 92.0 
ES 16.0 16.0 2.0 2.0 156.0 0.0 156.0 18.0 
FI 17.5 16.9 8.0 5.7 156.0 35.8 156.0 58.4 
FR 16.0 16.0 2.0 2.0 156.0 31.1 156.0 49.1 
GR 17.0 17.0 0.4 0.4 30.0 0.0 47.4 17.4 
HU 24.0 16.8 1.0 1.0 80.0 56.0 105.0 73.8 
IE 42.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 28.0 0.0 70.0 18.2 
IS 13.0 10.4 13.0 10.4 39.0 10.4 65.0 31.2 
IT 20.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 43.0 13.0 63.0 29.0 
LT 21.0 21.0 4.0 4.0 104.0 88.3 129.0 113.3 
LU 16.0 16.0 0.4 0.4 52.0 26.0 68.4 42.4 
LV 19.0 19.0 2.0 1.6 52.0 36.4 73.0 57.0 
NL 16.0 16.0 0.4 0.4 26.0 0.0 42.4 16.4 
NO 9.0 9.0 8.0 6.0 39.0 39.0 56.0 54.0 
PL 18.0 18.0 0.0 0.0 156.0 16.1 156.0 34.1 
PT 17.0 17.0 3.0 1.0 26.0 0.0 46.0 18.0 
SE 12.0 9.6 11.7 9.3 72.0 52.8 95.7 71.7 
SI 15.0 15.0 13.0 2.8 37.0 37.0 65.0 54.8 
SK 28.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 156.0 30.7 156.0 46.1 
UK 52.0 11.5 2.0 0.3 26.0 0.0 80.0 11.8 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008). 
† There is no statutory paternity leave in Austria, but a few days of fully paid paternity leave may be 
provided through collective agreement, immediately after the birth of the child (Moss & Korintus, 
2008). 
Notes: in the UK, paid maternity leave was extended from 26 weeks to 39 weeks in April 2007.  
In Germany, parental leave is available until the child’s third birthday, but the ‘childrearing benefit’ 
paid at 67% of average earnings over the past 12 months’ is only available for 12 months (14 months 
if the father takes at least 2 months of parental leave). The FTE parental leave figure in the table 
excludes the additional 2 months of leave that depend on fathers’ take-up.  
In Norway, 8 weeks of paternity leave include 2 weeks of unpaid ‘daddy days’ and 6 weeks of fully 
paid ‘fathers’ quota’ of parental leave. Thus, parental leave in column 5 only includes the 9 weeks 
reserved for mothers and 39 weeks of family entitlement.  Optional cash-for-care scheme for parents 
of children aged 12-36 months not in full-time public childcare is not included here.  
In Portugal, paternity leave is 5 working days at 100% of earnings with no ceiling. 
In Sweden, paternity leave includes 10 days of paternity leave and 60 days of ‘fathers’ quota’ of 
parental leave, paid at 80% of earnings up to a ceiling. 
In Finland, paternity leave includes two weeks of parental leave and 12 ‘bonus’ days for fathers who 
take at least two weeks of parental leave. Parental leave includes ‘childcare leave’ with homecare 
allowance. 
In Hungary, parental leave for insured parents (GYED) is from the end of maternity leave until the 
child’s 2nd birthday, thus approximately 80 weeks, rather than 104.  
In Iceland, total parental leave of 39 weeks includes 3 months of parental leave (13 weeks, 10.4 
weeks FTE) and unpaid childcare leave of 13 weeks per parent. 
In Italy, although each parent is entitled to 6 months parental leave paid at 30% of earnings, the 
maximum per family is 10 months (43 weeks, 13 weeks FTE). 
In Portugal, ‘paternity leave’ includes 15 ‘daddy days’ of paid parental leave at 100% of earnings 
straight after maternity or paternity leave. 
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Figure 3.1 Total leave available to couples (weeks), 2006/2007 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008). 
 
Table 3.2 reports the maximum amount of leave available to mothers through 
maternity leave and parental leave assuming that they take all of the parental leave 
not reserved specifically for fathers. The pattern is very similar to the one focusing 
on total leave available for couples: in most of the studied countries paternity leave is 
negligible if available at all. Moreover, where parental leave is a family entitlement 
or individual entitlements can be easily transferred between parents, mothers can 
(and often do) take all of the parental leave. The UK still provides the shortest FTE 
paid leave and Lithuania the longest (Figure 3.2).   
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Table 3.2  Child-related employment protected leave periods available to 
mothers by duration of unpaid leave and the duration of the full-
time equivalent of the leave period if paid at 100% of last 
earnings, 2006/2007 (in weeks) 
 
Total 
maternity 
leave 
FTE paid 
maternity 
leave  
Total parental 
leave 
FTE paid 
parental leave 
Total leave 
available to 
mothers 
Total FTE 
leave 
available to 
mothers 
AT 16.0 16.0 104.0 16.7 120.0 32.7 
BE 15.0 11.3 12.0 2.6 27.0 13.9 
CZ 28.0 13.7 156.0 50.3 156.0 64.0 
DE 14.0 14.0 156.0 34.8 156.0 48.8 
DK 18.0 18.0 32.0 32.0 50.0 50.0 
EE 28.0 28.0 156.0 62.0 156.0 90.0 
ES 16.0 16.0 156.0 0.0 156.0 16.0 
FI 17.5 16.9 156.0 35.8 156.0 52.7 
FR 16.0 16.0 156.0 31.1 156.0 47.1 
GR 17.0 17.0 15.0 0.0 32.0 17.0 
HU 24.0 16.8 80.0 56.0 104.0 72.8 
IE 42.0 18.2 14.0 0.0 56.0 18.2 
IS 13.0 10.4 26.0 10.4 39.0 20.8 
IT 20.0 16.0 26.0 7.8 46.0 23.8 
LT 21.0 21.0 104.0 88.3 125.0 109.3 
LU 16.0 16.0 26.0 13.0 42.0 29.0 
LV 19.0 19.0 52.0 36.4 71.0 55.4 
NL 16.0 16.0 13.0 0.0 29.0 16.0 
NO 9.0 9.0 39.0 39.0 48.0 48.0 
PL 18.0 18.0 156.0 16.1 156.0 34.1 
PT 17.0 17.0 13.0 0.0 30.0 17.0 
SE 12.0 9.6 72.0 52.8 84.0 62.4 
SI 15.0 15.0 37.0 37.0 52.0 52.0 
SK 28.0 15.4 156.0 30.7 156.0 46.1 
UK 52.0 11.5 13.0 0.0 65.0 11.5 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008). 
Note: this assumes that mothers take all of the joint/family entitlement. 
 
Figure 3.2 Total leave available to mothers (weeks), 2006/2007 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008) 
 
Table 3.3 shows the amount of leave available to fathers through paternity leave and 
any parental leave reserved for fathers that cannot be transferred to mothers. Sweden, 
Iceland and Luxembourg provide the most generous leaves available to fathers. 
However, in Sweden and Iceland this is due to paid paternity leave, while in 
Luxembourg it is largely due to the individual entitlement to paid parental leave. The 
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distinction is important because fathers are more likely to take up paternity leave 
than parental leave (Moss, 2008). Although several countries give fathers individual 
rights to parental leave, typically unpaid, in reality it is not likely to be used.  
 
Table 3.3 Child-related employment protected leave periods available to 
fathers by duration of unpaid leave and the duration of the full-
time equivalent of the leave period if paid at 100% of last 
earnings, 2006/2007 (in weeks) 
 
Total paternity 
leave 
FTE paid 
paternity leave  
Total parental 
leave 
reserved for 
fathers 
FTE paid 
parental leave 
reserved for 
fathers 
Total leave 
reserved for 
fathers 
Total FTE 
leave 
reserved for 
fathers 
AT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
BE 2.0 1.2 12.0 2.6 14.0 3.8 
CZ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DK 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 
EE 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 
ES 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 
FI 8.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 8.0 5.7 
FR 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 
GR 0.4 0.4 15.0 0.0 15.4 0.4 
HU 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
IE 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 
IS 13.0 10.4 13.0 0.0 26.0 10.4 
IT 0.0 0.0 26.0 7.8 26.0 7.8 
LT 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 
LU 0.4 0.4 26.0 13.0 26.4 13.4 
LV 2.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.6 
NL 0.4 0.4 13.0 0.0 13.4 0.4 
NO 8.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 
PL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PT 3.0 1.0 13.0 2.1 16.0 3.1 
SE 11.7 9.3 0.0 0.0 11.7 9.3 
SI 13.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 13.0 2.8 
SK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
UK 2.0 0.3 13.0 0.0 15.0 0.3 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008). 
Fathers'  individual non-transferable entitlements only. 
 
Figure 3.3 Total leave reserved for fathers (weeks), 2006/2007 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008) 
 
Generous family leave arrangements do not necessarily entail a gender egalitarian 
distribution of entitlements between mothers and fathers, however. Information from 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 on total FTE leave available to mothers and reserved for fathers is 
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used to assess the extent to which mothers’ paid entitlements exceed fathers’ 
entitlements. The six countries with no statutory paid paternity leave or non-
transferable parental leave reserved for fathers (Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Ireland, Poland and Slovakia) can be considered the least egalitarian. Nine 
countries with mothers’ FTE entitlements exceeding fathers’ by a factor of 10 or less 
can be categorised as the most egalitarian. All the Scandinavian countries except 
Denmark, along with Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain are in this 
group. Paid provisions in Iceland are the most egalitarian, with mothers’ leave 
exceeding fathers’ by only a factor of two. The rest of the countries fall in the middle 
with mothers’ FTE leave exceeding fathers’ by a factor of between 19 (Slovenia) and 
73 (Hungary). Most of the countries in the ‘egalitarian’ group rank highly on the 
generosity and duration of fathers’ entitlements (Figure 3.3), but there are countries, 
e.g. Lithuania, where relatively generous provisions for fathers are so outstripped by 
mothers’ entitlements that they do not appear egalitarian in the provision of family 
leave. 
 
Childcare services for pre-school children 
The previous section reviewed statutory maternity, paternity and parental leave 
policy designs in the EU-25 with respect to their duration, generosity and the extent 
to which the arrangements are gender-egalitarian. This section examines the 
availability and affordability of childcare services for pre-school children, separately 
for 0-2-year-olds and those between the age of three and compulsory school age. It 
focuses on enrolment rates in formal childcare services, public spending on childcare 
and early education services and, to the extent that comparable statistics are available, 
on the costs of childcare.  
 
The availability of affordable, accessible and high-quality childcare facilities can 
promote gender equality by making it easier for women with younger children to 
participate in employment. Gornick and Meyers (2003, p.197) argue that access to 
childcare services promotes gender equality both in the labour market and in the 
home because in their absence it is mothers, and not fathers, who become detached 
from the labour market.  Unlike parenthood leave policies, affordable and accessible 
childcare services tend to have an unambiguously positive impact on mothers’ 
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attachment to the labour force. Classical labour supply theory predicts that the price 
of out-of-home childcare will affect the mother’s decision to work (D. M. Blau & 
Robins, 1988; Connelly, 1992) and to work longer hours (Powell, 1997). Blau and 
Robins (1988) find a significant negative effect of childcare cost both on family 
labour supply and demand for market child-care in the US8, while Powell (1997) 
finds a significant negative effect of childcare cost on the labour force participation 
of married mothers and their hours of work in Canada9. At the same time, access to 
publicly funded childcare is found to have a positive effect on maternal labour supply 
(Baker et al., 2008; Uunk et al., 2005).   
 
The EU recognises the importance of childcare services provision as an instrument of 
work and family life reconciliation policies. In 1992 the European Council 
recommended initiatives “to enable women and men to reconcile their occupational, 
family and upbringing responsibilities arising from the care of children” 
(Recommendation 92/241/EEC of 31 March 1992 on ‘Childcare’). The proposed 
initiatives included childcare facilities for working parents, leave for working parents, 
family friendly workplace practices, and policies to promote the equal sharing of care 
responsibilities between women and men. Furthermore, the Barcelona Council in 
2002 set explicit targets for the provision of childcare places to reach 90% of 
children between age 3 and mandatory school age and 33% of children under the age 
of 3 by 2010 in order to remove barriers to women’s participation and achieve full 
employment. These targets were later restated in the 2008-2010 employment policy 
guidelines (Council Decision 2008/618/EC).  
 
Lewis (2006, p.430) criticises the Barcelona childcare targets for their narrow focus 
on formal childcare and the explicit link to female employment levels, rather than 
equal participation of men and women in employment and care provision. However, 
the targets provide a clear benchmark for monitoring the provision of childcare 
services in each member state. It used to be difficult to monitor progress towards 
achieving the Barcelona targets due to the lack of harmonised and comparable 
                                               
8
 Estimated price elasticity of childcare for married mothers’ employment and purchasing market care 
are -0.38 and -0.34, respectively, using 1980 data.  
9
 Estimated child care price elasticities for the labour force participation and hours of work of married 
mothers in Canada  are -0.38 and -0.32, respectively, using 1988 data. 
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national statistics (Plantenga et al., 2008). However, the EU-SILC provides detailed 
harmonised data on children’s enrolment in formal and informal childcare facilities. 
Statistics from the EU-SILC have been used to calculate childcare enrolment rates in 
the EU since 2006 (Plantenga & Remery, 2009; European Commission, 2009). This 
section uses data from the 2007 round of the EU-SILC to compare formal childcare 
enrolment rates across 25 European countries. 
 
Gornick and Meyers (2003) evaluate childcare programmes in 12 countries 
according to five criteria: access and inclusiveness, affordability, quality, 
compensation of child care workforce and the compatibility of school schedules with 
standard working hours. In terms of access, they find the most extensive publicly 
supported care in Denmark, Sweden and Finland.  Although in France and Belgium 
early child care is well integrated with pre-school care, provision for very young 
children, under the age of two and a half, is limited (2003, pp.198-199).  
 
There is considerable variation in the way childcare provision is financed: direct 
provision of public child care; cost sharing with parents through co-payments; and 
alternative arrangements such as subsidies and tax credits. In Nordic countries, 
childcare is primarily provided directly, funded by taxation and moderate co-
payments (J. Gornick & Meyers, 2003, p.206). In France and Belgium, direct 
provision is also the primary financing mechanism for children between the ages of 
two and a half/three and the start of school age, free of charge to parents. However, 
parents have to pay for childcare provision for younger children and for out-of-
school-hours care, although some of these costs can be deducted from income taxes.     
 
Table 3.4 reports the use of formal childcare facilities by children aged 2 or younger 
(column 1) and those between the age of 3 and the national mandatory school age 
(column 2), using harmonised and comparable data from the EU-SILC 2007. Formal 
childcare includes early education at pre-school and compulsory school as well as 
childcare at centre-based services and at day-care centres.  
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It appears that in 2007 only six10 of the EU member states (as well as Norway and 
Iceland) had at least 33% of 0-2-year-olds in formal childcare services, thus hitting 
the Barcelona target: Spain, UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark 
(see Figure 3.4). The share of the 0-2-year-olds using formal childcare varies 
considerably across the studied countries from the low of 2% in the Czech Republic 
and Poland to the high of 70% in Denmark. The new accession countries have 
consistently lower formal childcare enrolment rates for the youngest children (0-2), 
with only Slovenia coming close to achieving the Barcelona target for this age group. 
This could be the result of relatively generous parental or childcare leave in most of 
the new accession countries11. In contrast, Scandinavian countries have noticeably 
higher enrolment rates for the youngest children. However, considerably fewer of the 
youngest children are enrolled in formal care in Finland and Norway than in 
Denmark, Sweden or Iceland. This is possibly due to the fact that Finland and 
Norway have childcare leave benefits for parents who look after their young children 
at home12. 
 
However, coverage of formal childcare does not necessarily correlate with the 
intensity of use. Both the Netherlands and the UK achieve the Barcelona target, but 
amongst 0-2-year-olds who use at least one hour a week of formal care, the average 
number of hours in formal care is 16 and 13 hours a week, respectively (Table 3.4, 
column 3). This is not surprising given the high rates of part-time employment 
amongst women in these countries. In contrast, only 2% of children aged 0-2 use 
formal childcare in Poland, but those who do spend 37 hours a week in formal 
childcare facilities, on average.  
 
                                               
10
 Interestingly, the proportion of children aged 0-2 using formal care in Portugal appears to have 
decreased from around 30% in the 2006 EU-SILC data to 22% in the 2007 data. Plantenga and 
Remery (2006) report the enrolment rate for this age group of 33% for Portugal using the EU-SILC 
2006 and note that this estimate appears too high (p.31).  
11
 Parents can take paid parental leave until the child’s third birthday in the Czech Republic (childcare 
benefit is available until the child’s fourth birthday), Estonia, Hungary, and Poland (paid for 24 
months but available until the child’s fourth birthday) (Moss & Korintus, 2008).   
12
 In Norway, parents with a child aged 12-36 months are entitled to a cash benefit conditional on not 
using formal childcare on a full-time basis. In Finland, a childcare leave with a ‘home-care’ cash 
allowance can be taken after the end of parental leave until the child’s third birthday. An unpaid 
childcare leave of 13 weeks per parent until the child’s eighth birthday is available in Iceland, while 
there is no entitlement for additional childcare leave in Denmark or Sweden (Moss & Korintus, 2008).  
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As regards the Barcelona target for children between the age of 3 and mandatory 
school age, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Denmark have at least 90% of children in this age group using formal 
childcare services. However, only five of the EU member states (plus Iceland) 
achieved both of the Barcelona targets: Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. Among children between the age of 3 and mandatory school age, the 
intensity of formal childcare use is lowest in the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, 
where children in this age group use formal childcare for only 20-22 hours a week. 
This is in line with the high female part-time rates in these countries. 
 
Table 3.4 Use of formal childcare arrangements (excluding registered 
childminders) 
 
% of children aged 
0-2 
(1) 
% of children 
between the age 
of 3 and 
mandatory school 
age 
(2) 
Average weekly 
hours in formal 
care (children 
aged 0-2) 
(3) 
Average weekly 
hours in formal 
care (children 
aged 3-school 
age) 
(4) 
Admission age to 
mandatory 
education  
(5) 
AT 6.8 75.7 [22] 24 6 
BE 40.1 98.5 30 32 6 
CZ 2.1 73.4 [-] 29 6 
DE 18.7 90.4 26 24 6 
DK 70.2 97.2 35 34 7 
EE 13.9 87.2 [38] 39 7 
ES 36.3 91.4 26 29 6 
FI 24.4 78.8 34 32 7 
FR 28.0 94.4 28 29 6 
GR 9.4 71.9 [31] 27 6 
HU 7.5 84.6 [30] 33 5 
IE 16.0 83.1 30 22 6 
IS 39.9 97.6 36 36 6 
IT 24.5 92.7 29 32 6 
LT 20.2 59.1 [4] 4 6 
LU 24.5 80.4 30 24 4 
LV 14.1 55.9 [39] 39 5 
NL 41.9 94.0 16 21 5 
NO 35.8 83.5 33 33 6 
PL 2.7 40.8 [37] 32 6 
PT 22.2 79.6 [42] 37 6 
SE 45.9 92.5 29 34 7 
SI 32.9 86.1 36 33 6 
SK 1.5 70.5 [-] 36 6 
UK 37.9 83.3 13 22 5 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
Means based on the number of cases below 50 are reported in square brackets (below 20 as [-]). 
Formal childcare: pre-school; compulsory school; centre-based child-care; day-care. 
Average weekly hours for those who use formal care for at least one hour a week. 
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Figure 3.4 Use of formal childcare arrangements (excluding professional 
childminders) 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
 
The definition of formal childcare used in evaluating progress towards the Barcelona 
targets does not include care by professional childminders. Instead, this is included 
as ‘other care’ along with care by grandparents, other relatives, friends and 
neighbours (Plantenga and Remery, 2009, p.29). However, in some countries (e.g. 
France) care by registered childminders is the main form of childcare for the 
youngest children and is counted as formal childcare in the national statistics 
(Plantenga and Remery 2009, p.31). Therefore, the remainder of this section analyses 
the use of formal childcare arrangements that include care by “professional 
childminders”13, even though the EU-SILC does not specify if the childminders are 
formally registered. Table 3.5 reports the coverage of formal childcare using this 
broader definition.  
 
In addition to the seven countries that attained the Barcelona target for the youngest 
age group (0-2) using the Eurostat definition of formal care, three more countries 
(France, Luxembourg and Slovenia) have at least 33% of children aged 0-2 in formal 
childcare, using the definition that includes professional childminders (Table 2, 
Figure 3.5). Indeed, in each of the studied countries except Denmark, the proportion 
of children aged 0-2 using formal care increases when professional childminders are 
classed as formal rather than ‘other’ care. Interestingly, using the broader definition 
makes a visible difference for Poland, where the proportion of children aged 0-2 in 
formal care increases from under 3% to 9%, but not for the Czech Republic, where 
                                               
13
 EU-SILC variable RL 050 “child care by a professional child minder at child’s home or at 
childminder’s home”. 
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the share remains stable at around 2%. This indicates that formal care for very young 
children is more widespread in Poland than the official Eurostat estimates suggest, 
although it is still very low. 
 
To allow mothers to work full-time, pre-school children may need to use formal 
childcare for at least 30 hours a week. Table 3.5 shows the proportion of children 
aged 0-2 (column 3) and those between the ages of 3 and mandatory school age 
(column 6) who use formal childcare services for 30 hours a week or more. Denmark 
(63%), Iceland (52%) and Slovenia (31%) are now the only countries that achieve 
the Barcelona target for the youngest age group. The lowest share of children aged 0-
2 using formal childcare for at least 30 hours a week is found in Austria (2%), 
Slovakia (2%), Czech Republic (0.4%) and Lithuania (0%). In Lithuania, children 
aged 0-2 use formal childcare facilities for only 4 hours a week, on average. Overall, 
countries with the higher average proportion of 0-2-year-olds in formal care tend to 
have a higher proportion of 0-2-year-olds in “longer hours” (30 hours a week or 
more) formal care, as Figure 3.6 indicates. The only exceptions are the UK, the 
Netherlands and Lithuania, where the share of children in “longer hours” formal care 
is lower than would be predicted based on their share of children in formal care 
generally. 
 
Low enrolment rates in formal childcare do not automatically imply low availability 
of childcare facilities, but there is a lack of comparable and reliable data on both 
demand and supply of formal childcare services14. However, the high proportions of 
young children using informal non-parental care in the studied countries, especially 
where enrolment rates in formal childcare are low, suggest that there is a demand for 
non-parental childcare. Informal care by relatives and friends appears to be an 
important source of non-parental care for very young children in most of the studied 
countries (Table 3.5, column 5). In nine of these countries the share of 0-2-year-olds 
who use any amount of informal care exceeds the proportion of 0-2-year-olds in 
formal care: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. The difference is the most striking in the Czech Republic: 30% 
of 0-2-year-olds use informal care, compared with just under 3% who use formal 
                                               
14
 See Immervoll and Barber (2006, p.14). 
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care. Overall, informal care is the least widespread in Scandinavian countries, where 
large proportions of young children are enrolled in formal childcare facilities.  
 
Table 3.5 Use of formal childcare arrangements (including registered 
childminders) 
 
% of children 
aged 0-2 in 
formal care 
(1) 
% of children 
between the 
age of 3 and 
mandatory 
school age in 
formal care 
(2) 
% of children 
aged 0-2 in 
formal care of 
at least 30 
hours a week 
(3) 
Average 
weekly hours 
in formal care 
(children aged 
0-2) 
(4) 
% of children 
aged 0-2 in 
informal 
childcare 
(5) 
% of children 
between the 
age of 3 and 
mandatory 
school age in 
formal care of 
at least 30 
hours a week 
(6) 
AT 10.9 78.1 2.0 19 23.4 20.1 
BE 45.0 98.5 23.6 30 19.4 66.1 
CZ 2.6 73.4 0.4 [-] 30.1 38.8 
DE 23.6 90.9 13.1 26 15.3 32.6 
DK 70.2 97.2 63.1 35 1.1 81.1 
EE 17.0 87.3 14.5 [36] 28.9 79.3 
ES 39.3 92.3 16.9 27 21.5 43.5 
FI 25.8 79.8 20.4 34 3.9 51.9 
FR 42.0 95.5 25.0 31 17.7 48.2 
GR 14.2 72.8 9.9 [33] 40.5 31.1 
HU 9.0 84.6 6.0 [29] 37.4 63.3 
IE 29.0 86.2 15.8 30 15.8 22.6 
IS 57.4 97.6 51.9  4.1 88.5 
IT 25.8 92.7 15.0 30 30.0 70.7 
LT 26.9 59.8 0.0 [4] 11.3 0.0 
LU 38.4 84.0 19.3 27 28.7 26.4 
LV 15.6 59.5 15.1 [41] 12.2 49.3 
NL 54.9 94.9 6.4 17 51.1 17.9 
NO 40.8 84.0 29.9 32 6.3 62.1 
PL 9.1 42.6 7.1 35 27.8 27.2 
PT 32.5 83.1 29.4 43 24.3 69.9 
SE 48.4 94.8 28.2 29 1.1 69.5 
SI 35.9 86.9 31.2 36 47.6 67.7 
SK 3.0 70.5 1.9 [-] 17.2 61.2 
UK 44.8 86.3 8.2 16 35.4 38.7 
Source: SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
Means based on the number of cases below 50 are reported in square brackets (below 20 as [-]). 
Formal childcare: pre-school; compulsory school; centre-based child-care; day-care; professional 
child minder. 
Average weekly hours for those who use formal care for at least one hour a week. 
Informal childcare: grandparents; other household members (not parents). 
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Figure 3.5  Use of formal childcare arrangements (including professional 
childminders) 
 
Source: SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
 
Figure 3.6  Use of formal childcare arrangements by children aged 0-2 
 
Source: SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
R=0.75 (p<0.001). 
 
However, there is no straightforward negative association between the proportions of 
0-2-year-olds using formal and informal care (Figure 3.7), because in some countries 
informal care appears to be complementary to formal childcare, rather than being a 
substitute. Thus, Figure 3.7 shows that the UK, the Netherlands and Slovenia have 
relatively high usage rates of both formal and informal childcare.  This suggests that 
formal childcare in these countries is either not accessible or affordable enough for 
mothers of young children to work full-time without having to resort to help from 
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family and friends. Indeed, Table 3.6 shows that amongst 0-2-year-olds who use any 
amount of formal childcare, 42% also use some informal care in the UK (13 hours on 
average), 56% in the Netherlands (8 hours on average) and 53% in Slovenia (13 
hours on average). In Italy and Spain formal childcare also tends to be supplemented 
with informal care by relatives and friends: 19% of 0-2-year-olds in Spain and 37% 
in Italy who use any amount of formal care also use informal care (16 hours on 
average in both countries). 
 
Figure 3.7 Use of formal and informal childcare by  children aged 0-2 
 
Source: SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
R=-0.26. 
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Table 3.6  Use of formal and informal childcare arrangements  
 
% of children aged 0-2 who 
use formal care who also use 
informal care 
Average weekly hours in 
informal care (children aged 
0-2 who use both formal and 
informal care) 
Average weekly hours in 
formal care (children aged 0-2 
who use both formal and 
informal care) 
AT [23.3] [-] [-] 
BE 20.4 [16] [23] 
CZ [-] [-] [-] 
DE 11.8 [-] [-] 
DK 0.0 [-] [-] 
EE [21.2] [-] [-] 
ES 18.8 16 22 
FI 4.8 [-] [-] 
FR 23.8 10 24 
GR [38.2] [-] [-] 
HU [56.7] [10] [32] 
IE 17.4 [-] [-] 
IS 2.6 [-] [-] 
IT 37.4 16 28 
LT [1.2] [-] [-] 
LU 29.0 [9] [26] 
LV [1.9] [-] [-] 
NL 55.5 8 15 
NO 0.0 [-] [-] 
PL [24.1] 10 37 
PT [20.4] [-] [-] 
SE 1.0 [-] [-] 
SI 52.5 13 36 
SK [-] [-] [-] 
UK 41.6 13 12 
Source: SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
Means based on the number of cases below 50 are reported in square brackets (below 20 as [-]). 
Formal childcare: pre-school; compulsory school; centre-based child-care; day-care; professional 
child minder. 
Average weekly hours for those who use formal care for at least one hour a week. 
Informal childcare: grandparents; other household members (not parents). 
 
Including care by professional childminders in the definition of formal care does not 
make much difference to the proportion of children between the age of 3 and 
mandatory school age (see Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). The same nine countries that 
attain the Barcelona target of 90% under the Eurostat definition of formal care also 
reach this target when the broader definition is used. This suggests that professional 
childminders are a more important form of non-parental childcare for the youngest 
children than for those aged three and above. 
 
Unsurprisingly, countries that spend more on childcare and early education have 
higher enrolment rates in formal childcare. Scandinavian countries spend the largest 
share of their GDP on childcare services (excluding pre-primary education): from 0.5% 
in Norway to 0.7% in Denmark, Iceland and Finland (Table 3.7, column 1). In 
contrast, Poland and Portugal spend less than 0.1% on childcare services (Figure 3.8). 
Overall, there is a positive association (R=0.64, p<0.01) between government 
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spending on childcare services and the share of 0-2-year-olds using formal childcare 
(Figure 3.9). 
 
Figure 3.8  Childcare spending as % of the GDP 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2008) Table PF10. 
Note: no information available for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Slovenia. 
 
 
Figure 3.9  Childcare spending as % of the GDP and formal childcare 
enrolment rates for 0-2-year-olds 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (Table PF10); EU-SILC 2007. 
R=0.64 (p<0.01). 
 
There is also considerable variation in the costs of childcare between the studied 
countries. Although the EU-SILC does not collect information about childcare prices, 
the OECD Family Database provides harmonised and comparable information on 
these costs for parents in most of the countries studied in this chapter. Childcare 
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fees15 for a 2-year-old range from 4% of the average wage in Hungary and Greece to 
30% in Spain and Luxembourg, reflecting the differences in the structure of the 
childcare market and the amount of government subsidies to childcare providers 
(Table 3.7, column 2; Figure 3.10). However, parents do not pay the full cost of 
childcare fees if they receive government help through cash transfers, rebates or tax 
concessions. Net childcare costs, including fees minus the value of any cash transfers, 
rebates or tax concessions (for a dual earner family with one earning 100% of the 
average wage and the other 67% of the average wage, both working full-time) 
expressed as a percentage of the average wage vary from just 1% in Estonia to 
around 44% in the UK and Ireland (Table 3.7, column 4).  Belgium and Estonia 
appear to do the most to mitigate the cost of childcare fees: parents pay only 12% 
and 15% of the childcare fees, respectively, once childcare and other benefits are 
taken into account (Table 3.7, columns 3 and 4). Unfortunately, there is no 
comparable and harmonised European statistics on the quality of childcare services 
(Plantenga & Remery, 2009, p.43). 
 
There does not appear to be any evident association between childcare fees or net 
costs and enrolment rates for pre-school children, however. Immervoll and Barber 
(2006) suggest that in the countries where very few children use formal care, low 
availability of childcare facilities is a greater problem than affordability. Indeed, in 
the four countries with fewer than 10% of children under the age of three using 
formal childcare (Figure 3.5), i.e. Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, 
fees for a 2-year-old in accredited childcare as a share of national average wage are 
also below 10% of the national average wage, some of the lowest levels across the 
studied countries (Table 3.7, column 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15
 Childcare fees are paid by parents to the childcare institution, after any government subsidies to the 
institution but before any childcare related cash benefits or tax transfers (Immervoll & Barber, 2006, 
p.11). 
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Figure 3.10  Childcare fees for a 2-year-old in accredited childcare services 
as %of average wage, 2004 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2008) Table PF12.1. 
Note: no information available for Italy or Slovenia. 
 
Figure 3.11  Net childcare costs for a dual earner family with full-time 
arrangements of 167% of the average wage, 2004 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2008) Table PF12.2. 
Note: no information available for Spain, Italy or Slovenia. 
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Table 3.7  Public spending on childcare and private costs of childcare   
 
Childcare spending 
as % GDP in 2005 
(1) 
Childcare fees per 
two-year old 
attending accredited 
early-years care and 
education services, 
2004, % of average 
wage 
(2) 
Childcare fees for 2 
children (aged 2 and 
3) in full-time 
accredited childcare 
for a dual earner 
family (with full-time 
arrangements of 
167% of AW) as % of 
AW 
(3)  
Net childcare costs for 
2 children (aged 2 
and 3) in full-time 
accredited childcare 
for a dual earner 
family (with full-time 
arrangements of 
167% of AW) as % of 
AW 
 (4) 
AT 0.3 9.6 19.1 19.1 
BE 0.2 19.7 31.6 4.7 
CZ 0.1 8.6 10.3 10.3 
DE 0.1 9.1 16.0 9.1 
DK 0.7 8.4 11.4 8.4 
EE - 7.5 8.5 1.0 
ES 0.4 30.3 -  - 
FI 0.7 7.6 9.2 9.2 
FR 0.4 25.1 16.8 14.8 
GR 0.1 4.5 8.9 6.6 
HU 0.1 4.2 8.5 8.5 
IE 0.3 24.8 49.6 44.6 
IS 0.7 12.1 24.2 20.2 
IT 0.2 - -  - 
LT - 9.7 19.4 8.0 
LU 0.4 32.4 19.1 8.5 
LV - 6.4 13.2 7.8 
NL 0.1 17.5 22.7 13.5 
NO 0.5 9.0 18.0 9.7 
PL 0.0 6.8 9.3 5.2 
PT 0.0 27.8 27.8 5.9 
SE 0.6 4.5 7.6 7.6 
SI - - -  - 
SK 0.1 5.6 11.3 11.3 
UK 0.4 24.7 47.8 43.1 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2008). Tables PF 10.1, PF 12.1, PF 12.2. 
  
 
Tax and benefit treatment of secondary earners in couple families 
The previous section considered the availability and affordability of childcare 
services for pre-school children in 25 countries. Although access to childcare 
facilities for young children makes it easier for parents to reconcile work and family 
life, the net gain from employment, as opposed to household work, also depends on 
the governing tax and benefit rules. This section reviews the main features of the tax 
and benefit systems in 25 countries that are likely to influence women’s decisions to 
take up paid work. In particular, it considers the nature of the personal income tax 
unit (family or individual); the average effective tax rate on secondary earners 
entering employment at three-quarters of average earnings or at average earnings; 
and the difference between the tax rates on secondary earners in couples, on single 
individuals and on primary earners with non-working spouses, if all of them have the 
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same level of gross earnings. Scenarios with and without dependent children are 
analysed.  
 
In spite of social attitudes changing in favour of women’s participation in paid work, 
tax and benefit systems retain past social norms about the roles of men and women, 
thus sustaining implicit gender biases. While explicitly different treatment of men 
and women in legal provisions in industrialised countries is increasingly a thing of 
the past (e.g. family tax return to be filed in husband’s name), implicit gender bias is 
still found in tax and benefit regulations that have different consequences for men 
and women, because of the prevailing social and economic behaviour (Stotsky, 1997). 
Secondary earner bias, present when lower earners within couples face higher taxes, 
is found in most European countries (Stotsky, 1997; Bettio & Verashchagina, 2009a).  
 
In so far as women in couples contribute less to household income than their partners, 
they are likely to be secondary earners. Although two-thirds of all couple households 
in the EU-SILC 2007 database have two earners, in 59% of couples (ranging from 43% 
in Slovenia to 74% in the Netherlands), on average, women do not earn at all or 
contribute to less than 45% of combined household earnings (Bettio & 
Verashchagina, 2009a, p.6). This suggests that when married women work they tend 
to earn less than their husbands. Using comparable data for Mediterranean countries, 
Nicodemo (2009a) finds considerable gender wage gaps among married adults 
(Nicodemo, 2009a). 
 
An implicit secondary earner bias is most likely to be found in joint (i.e. family-
based rather than individual) taxation systems, where both the primary and the 
secondary earner face the same marginal tax rate. In progressive tax systems this 
means that secondary earners pay a higher level of tax than they would pay as single 
earners at the same earnings level, simply as a result of joint income tax filing 
(McCaffery, 2008). This can be a disincentive for secondary earners to increase their 
working hours or to work at all (OECD, 2005). Therefore, since women in couples 
are more likely to be secondary earners than men, the type of tax unit (joint or 
individual) has implications for gender equality both in the labour market and in the 
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home16. Making the tax and benefit systems neutral with respect to secondary earners 
in couples and single individuals on the same earnings could increase married 
women’s participation rates and lead to a more equal sharing of market work 
between spouses (Jaumotte, 2003).  Indeed, it is often found that the labour supply of 
married women is more sensitive to changes in taxes and benefits than that of men 
(Meghir & Phillips, 2008). Furthermore, some groups of married women are more 
responsive to fiscal incentives in their decisions to work, such as lower educated 
women and those with young children, who are usually the least attached to the 
labour market (Bettio & Verashchagina, 2009a).  
 
In fact, since the labour supply of secondary earners is more responsive to fiscal 
incentives, economic literature on taxation argues in favour of separate and lower 
taxation of secondary earners (Apps & Rees, 2007).  Since women in couples are 
more likely to be secondary earners, Alesina and Ichino (2007) show theoretically 
that it would be optimal to have lower tax schedules for women than for men. 
Although implementing gender-specific taxation would be unrealistic in most 
countries, tax rates could be different for primary and secondary earners, defined in 
terms of their respective contributions to the total household income (Immervoll et 
al., 2008). 
 
Concern with married women facing prohibitively high marginal tax rates rose up on 
the European Community agenda in the early 1980s. In a 1984 memorandum on 
income taxation and equal treatment for men and women, the European Commission 
found that tax and benefit systems in several of the 10 member states appeared to 
have ‘an indirect adverse effect on women’s employment’ due to joint taxation17 
with progressive tax rates, allowances or tax deductions granted a priori to the 
husband, lack of tax deductions for childcare costs, loss of tax allowances when 
opting for separate taxation, women not being taxpayers in their own right, ‘the 
responsibility for the non-payment of tax by the other spouse’, and ‘limitations on 
the amount of income that can be paid to an assisting wife by a husband’ (European 
                                               
16
 Furthermore, joint tax systems are not neutral to marriage decisions, as they distort the marriage 
market (efficiency argument) and treat cohabiting and married couples unequally (equity argument); 
however, if the main equity concern is that families with the same total income pay equal taxes, only 
joint taxation systems can produce this outcome (Immervoll et al., 2008).  
17
 With income aggregation or income splitting. 
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Commission, 1984). The European Commission recommended the adoption of 
individual income tax systems or at least an option for separate taxation. Seven out of 
ten countries had a joint taxation system at the time: Belgium, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK, of which two have since switched 
to fully individual taxation (the Netherlands and the UK). Out of 25 countries studied 
in this chapter, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Czech Republic had 
joint income taxation in 2007, although several other countries had some elements of 
joint taxation in their systems or retained an option for joint filing (See Table 1, 
column 1).  
 
However, the interaction between tax and benefit systems can produce the opposite 
effect on the second earner than would be expected if only the nature of the tax unit 
were considered, because eligibility to income-tested benefits is typically assessed on 
joint family income. According to Bettio and Verashchagina (2009a), the vast 
majority of the EU member states with individual taxation systems test eligibility for 
social assistance benefits and housing benefits using family income. Moreover, 
eligibility for cash benefits for families with children usually depends on family 
income (Bradshaw & Finch, 2002). In a comprehensive evaluation of tax and benefit 
systems in 15 EU countries using EUROMOD microsimulation data for 1998, 
Immervoll et al. (2008) find that in the countries with individual income taxation, the 
effective tax rate (the proportion of gross earnings taxed away or lost to benefit 
withdrawal) faced by the second earner depends negatively on the earnings level of 
the working spouse. For example, a secondary earner married to a low-income 
spouse will face a high effective tax rate due to taxes and insurance contributions on 
gross earnings and the withdrawal of family-based means-tested benefits. At the 
same time, a secondary earner married to a high earner will be subject to a low 
effective tax rate, since each spouse’s earnings are taxed separately. In contrast, in a 
fully joint and progressive taxation system, the effective tax rate for the secondary 
earner depends positively on the earnings level of the spouse, so the higher the 
principal earner’s income, the higher the effective tax rate faced by the secondary 
earner. Thus, rather than focusing exclusively on the nature of the income tax unit, 
the entire tax and benefit system needs to be considered in the analysis of work 
incentives for potential second earners in families. 
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Table 3.8 reports average tax transfers, including social insurance contributions and 
net of benefits, as a percentage of gross earnings for two types of households with 
equal total household income: ‘single breadwinner’ households where one spouse 
earns 133% of the Average Production Wage (APW) and the other does not work 
(column 2) and ‘dual-earner’ households where each spouse earns 67% of APW 
(column 3). The calculations are based on data from the OECD Tax/Benefit models 
(OECD, 2010). These models are based on a couple with two children aged four and 
six (OECD, 2007, p.197). Given household income of 133% of APW, tax/benefit 
systems appear to treat single-breadwinner and dual-earner households equally in 
Iceland, France, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia (Figure 3.12). At the same time, 
single-breadwinner households in Germany and the Czech Republic pay somewhat 
lower taxes overall than dual-earner families on the same income. The rest of the 
studied countries have positive incentives towards equal sharing of paid work, 
privileging dual-earner households in their tax/benefit systems. The most favourable 
systems for dual-earner households are found in Sweden, Finland, Greece, Hungary 
and Ireland. The tax/benefit system in Hungary produces the largest percentage point 
difference between the tax transfers of single-breadwinner and dual-earner 
households (15ppt), while in Ireland single-breadwinner households are expected to 
pay more than three times more taxes net of benefits than dual-earner households on 
the same combined level of income (133% of APW). However, the results could be 
different if families with younger children were considered.  
 
Although there is no clear-cut correlation between the neutrality of the tax/benefit 
system with respect to single and dual-earner households and the type of income tax 
unit, countries with individual taxation appear to be more favourable to dual-earner 
households, on balance. Thus, both Germany and the Czech Republic, the two 
countries that privilege single-breadwinner households, have joint income taxation. 
Sweden, Finland, Greece, Hungary and Ireland, the countries that are most 
favourable to dual-earner households, have individual income taxation, although in 
Ireland individual taxation is optional. Most of the countries that are largely neutral 
in their treatment of single-breadwinner and dual-earner households—Iceland, 
France, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia—are individual taxation countries, with 
France being the only exception. Since cash benefits are typically assessed on total 
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family income, it is not surprising that not all individual income taxation countries 
clearly privilege dual-earners.  
 
Table 3.8 Tax treatment of couples (2007) 
 
Tax unit  
(1) 
Average tax transfers net of 
benefits for ‘single 
breadwinner’ (133-0% APW) 
households with 2 children, 
as % of gross earnings 
 (2) 
Average tax transfers net of 
benefits for ‘dual earner’ (67-
67% APW) households with 2 
children, as % of gross 
earnings 
(3) 
AT Individual 0.28 0.20 
BE Individual (option for joint) 0.31 0.28 
CZ Joint  0.13 0.14 
DE Joint  0.27 0.29 
DK Individual 0.36 0.34 
EE Individual (option for joint) 0.11 0.11 
ES Individual (option for joint) 0.17 0.13 
FI Individual 0.30 0.19 
FR Joint  0.20 0.20 
GR Individual (joint for family firms) 0.25 0.15 
HU Individual 0.32 0.17 
IE Joint (option for individual) 0.08 0.03 
IS Individual (non-wage income taxed jointly) 0.11 0.12 
IT Individual 0.24 0.17 
LT Individual 0.21 0.18 
LU Joint  0.09 0.06 
LV Individual 0.21 0.20 
NL Individual 0.33 0.27 
NO Individual (option for joint) 0.27 0.22 
PL Individual (option for joint) 0.24 0.23 
PT Joint 0.16 0.12 
SE Individual 0.28 0.19 
SI Individual 0.21 0.20 
SK Individual 0.11 0.11 
UK Individual 0.23 0.19 
Source: Column 1— OECD Family Database , “Neutrality of Tax/Benefit Systems”, last update 
10/02/2010; Bettio and Verashchagina (2009) summarising OECD 2007 country chapters and reports. 
Eurostat ‘Taxes in Europe’ Database for information on Latvia. 
Columns 2 and 3 — OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010). 
 
Figure 3.12 Average tax transfers net of benefits (2007) 
 
Source: OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010). 
Data sorted by the ratio of tax for single breadwinner households to the tax for dual-earner households. 
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Table 3.9 compares average tax rates on secondary and primary earners in families 
without children, and on single individuals with the same level of earnings. Two 
earnings levels are used: 67% of APW (columns 1-4) and 100% of APW (columns 5-
8). Columns 1 and 2 show the Average Effective Tax Rates18 (AETR) for secondary 
earners entering employment at 67% of APW, whose spouses earn 67% of APW and 
100% of APW, respectively. Similarly, columns 5 and 6 show the AETR values for 
secondary earners entering employment at 100% of APW. The AETR is calculated 
as the proportion of their earnings that goes into paying increased household taxes 
and social contributions, net of cash benefits, when they enter employment, given the 
level of earnings of the spouse (here, 67% of APW and 100% of APW). Columns 3 
and 7 show average tax rates net of transfers for single individuals earning 67% and 
100% of APW, respectively. Finally, columns 4 and 8 show average tax rates net of 
transfers for households with one earner and a non-working spouse, where the main 
earner is on 67% and 100% of APW. Cash benefits include unemployment insurance, 
unemployment assistance, housing benefits, and ‘in-work’ benefits conditional on 
employment, excluding any benefits in kind (OECD, 2007, p.189). As before, all 
calculations are based on the OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator 2010; see OECD (2007, 
pp.183-198) for the full description of the tax/benefit modelling methodology and 
assumptions. The originality of this analysis lies in the simultaneous comparison of 
tax rates on secondary earners (with spouses on different earnings), primary earners 
and single individuals, rather than the narrow focus on either secondary earners and 
single individuals, or primary and secondary earners in couples.  
 
It is important to note that while the OECD tax/benefit models express earnings 
levels in terms of the national average wage, it is likely that average earnings for 
women, particularly the group of married women with young children, are lower 
than the national average wage used in the OECD modelling. Thus, Bettio and 
Verashchagina (2009a) model fiscal outcomes for female secondary earners using 
actual average earnings (estimated from the EU-SILC 2007) in the OECD tax/benefit 
models. They define secondary earners as married women with two young children 
                                               
18
 The AETR shows the proportion of the increase of gross earnings which is lost due to taxes, social 
security contributions and benefit income withdrawal upon entering work at a specified level of 
earnings. For a secondary earner, AETR = 1-(∆Ynet)/( ∆Ygross)=1-(YnetB-YnetA)/(YgrossB-YgrossA), where 
A is the situation when only one spouse works; B is the situation when both spouses work (OECD, 
2007, p.194). 
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in households where they earn less than 45% of total market income. The study finds 
that it largely pays for secondary earners to enter paid work and that the tax rates 
they face do not correlate with the unit of income taxation, but rather with the overall 
level of taxation (Bettio, 2002, p.57). The analysis in this section is entirely based on 
the OECD tax/benefit models. Thus, it is worth bearing in mind that secondary 
earners assumed to enter work at the national average wage are likely to have a 
higher than average earnings potential for their respective group (e.g. female 
secondary earners with young children).  
 
In the majority of the studied countries, secondary earners face the highest tax rates 
when they decide to move into work at two-thirds of average earnings or at average 
earnings, when their spouse earns 67% or 100% of APW, compared with single 
individuals on the same earnings or primary earners with a non-working spouse. 
Primary earners tend to face the lowest effective tax rates because of joint income 
taxation and/or joint assessment of income for cash benefits, taking into account the 
fact that their spouse has no earned income. One of the most striking examples is the 
situation in Iceland for earners on 67% of APW: secondary earners (with spouses 
earning average wage) have 39% of their gross earnings taxed away due to higher 
household taxes and/or reduced cash benefits (i.e. housing benefit) when they enter 
employment, which is almost double the effective tax rate on single individuals (18%) 
and almost 20 times greater than the effective tax rate on primary earners with non-
working spouses (2%).  
 
Only in six countries do all three types of earners in the analysed model families face 
the same tax rates at similar earnings levels. In Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Sweden and the UK there is effectively no distinction made in the tax and benefit 
system between secondary earners (regardless of spouse’s earnings), single 
individuals and primary earners with non-working spouses, all of whom are at 67% 
of APW or 100% of APW. Although this is an otherwise diverse mix of countries, all 
of them have separate income taxation (Table 3.8). At the same time, Iceland and 
Denmark exhibit some of the highest relative burdens on secondary earners, in spite 
of separate income taxation. This appears to be largely due to eligibility to housing 
benefit being assessed on joint family income. 
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Table 3.9 also shows that in most countries the difference between taxes on 
secondary earners with spouses earning average wage and primary earners with non-
working spouses is larger than the tax burden difference between secondary earners 
and single individuals at the same gross earnings level. This is likely to be due to 
eligibility to cash benefits being assessed on joint family income and, in some 
countries, due to a dependent spouse allowance, which makes primary earners with 
non-working spouses face the lowest effective tax rates net of transfers. Furthermore, 
relative tax burdens on secondary earners in comparison with either single 
individuals or primary earners tend to be higher at lower earnings (67% of APW 
compared with 100% of APW). This shows that fiscal constraints are highest for 
secondary earners with the lowest earnings potential.  
 
Finally, in the vast majority of the studied countries the AETR for secondary earners 
does not depend on the earnings level of the spouse for the two situations considered 
here (spouse earns 67% or 100% of APW; columns 1 and 2; 5 and 6, respectively). 
However, in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the AETR is somewhat higher for 
secondary earners whose husbands earn lower wages. For instance, for a secondary 
earner entering work at 67% of APW in the Czech Republic, the AETR is 25% if the 
spouse earns 67% of APW, but only 22% if the spouse earns average wage. In both 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the difference appears to be due to lower income 
couples with a single earner being eligible for housing benefit, which is withdrawn 
when the other spouse enters employment (at 67% APW or higher). In contrast, the 
AETR values are somewhat lower for secondary earners whose spouses earn lower 
wages in Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovakia. In all of 
these countries, couples with a single earner on 67% APW are not entitled to housing 
or social assistance benefits19. This shows once again that tax burdens on secondary 
earners are influenced by a complex interplay of taxes and means-tested benefits 
even when there are no dependent children present. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19
 However, in France, a couple without children with a single earner on 67% would still be entitled 
for a small amount of in-work benefits (82 Euros per year). 
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Table 3.9 Average tax rates for secondary earners, single individuals and 
primary earners, at 67% and 100% of APW, families without 
children (2007) 
 67% APW 100% APW 
 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
67% of 
APW) 
(1) 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
100% of 
APW) 
(2) 
single 
(3)  
1st earner 
(non-
working 
spouse) 
(4) 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
67% of 
APW) 
(5) 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
100% of 
APW) 
 (6) 
single 
(7)  
 
1st earner 
(non-
working 
spouse) 
(8) 
AT 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 
BE 0.47 0.49 0.35 0.25 0.49 0.51 0.42 0.33 
CZ 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 
DE 0.48 0.50 0.36 0.24 0.49 0.51 0.42 0.32 
DK 0.50 0.48 0.35 0.28 0.48 0.48 0.40 0.35 
EE 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.16 
ES 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.17 
FI 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
FR 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.24 
GR 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
HU 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
IE 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.12 
IS 0.39 0.39 0.18 0.02 0.39 0.39 0.25 0.15 
IT 0.30 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.25 
LT 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
LU 0.23 0.29 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.17 
LV 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.26 
NL 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.34 
NO 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.27 
PL 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.28 
PT 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.17 
SE 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
SI 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.20 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.29 
SK 0.24 0.30 0.19 0.13 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.15 
UK 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit calculator (accessed on 24/04/2010). 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Relative tax burdens on secondary earners with spouses earning 
100% APW, compared with single individuals and primary 
earners with non-working spouses, families without children 
(2007) 
 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit calculator (accessed on 24/04/2010)  
Note: the value of 2nd earner/1st earner for Iceland (19.8) is truncated to 5. 
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Table 3.10 compares average tax rates for primary and secondary earners as well as 
for single individuals on the same level of earnings, in families with two children 
aged four and six. The presence of dependent children complicates the picture 
considerably. In addition to the cash benefits included in the modelling of taxes and 
benefits affecting households without children, cash benefits now also include family 
benefits and lone parent benefits, and childcare benefits for parents who look after 
their children in the home. Because these child-related benefits are typically assessed 
on joint family income and because single individuals with children are often in 
receipt of lone parent benefits, average tax rates on lone parents and on primary 
earners with non-working spouses and children are generally very low and can be 
negative (Figure 3.14). 
 
 Secondary earners face high marginal tax rates when they make a decision to enter 
employment. For secondary earners (with spouses earning average wage) moving 
into work at 67% of APW (column 2), at least half of their earnings are taxed away 
due to increased household taxes and reduced cash benefits in Denmark (53%) and 
Germany (50%), with an average tax rate across the studied countries of 31%. 
Secondary earners moving into work at low earnings (67% of APW) typically face 
lower tax rates than those entering work on average earnings, but in the vast majority 
of the studied countries the tax rates for those on 67% of APW are no more than 10 
percentage points lower than the tax rates for those on average earnings. This 
suggests that non-working parents with the lowest earnings potential face relatively 
high marginal tax rates. This is consistent with the finding in Immervoll et al. (2008) 
of substantial marriage penalties at the bottom of the earnings distribution resulting 
from family-based means-tested transfers.  
 
Focusing on AETR values for secondary earners, it appears that in the vast majority 
of the studied countries it pays for non-working parents to enter employment (AETR 
below 50%). For secondary earners entering work at two-thirds of average wage, 
whose spouses earn average wage (column 2), AETR values reach 50% of gross 
earnings only in Germany (50%) and Denmark (53%). However, since these figures 
do not take into account any childcare benefits for formal childcare or childcare costs, 
they can only be interpreted as conservative estimates. Therefore, work incentives for 
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potential second earners with dependent children are likely to be considerably 
weaker in reality. Had childcare costs been included in the simulation by the OECD 
as an implicit tax on earnings, Denmark would probably not have ranked highest on 
AETR values for second earners because childcare services for pre-school children 
are widely available and affordable (see Section 2). According to Immervoll and 
Barber (2006), without taking into account any work-related costs, even a low wage 
full-time job taken up by a married second earner increases household net incomes in 
most of the OECD countries, but including the full-time costs of childcare for 
families with children makes net gains from employment of second earners 
considerably lower, in some cases even resulting  in a net loss when the secondary 
earner takes up low-wage employment  (Immervoll & Barber, 2006).  
 
Table 3.10 also shows that the values of AETR do not vary according to the type of 
income tax unit but appear to depend on the overall level of taxation. Thus, Denmark, 
a high taxation country with individuals as tax units, has some of the highest AETR 
values for second earners entering work at 67% of APW or at average earnings, with 
spouses earning 67% or 100% of APW. At the same time, Portugal has one of the 
lowest AETR values, although families are taxed jointly. It is not surprising that 
there is no clear correlation between the type of tax unit and the effective tax rates 
faced by non-working parents, since even in individual taxation countries eligibility 
to social transfers is likely to be assessed on family income.  
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Table 3.10 Average tax rates for secondary earners, single individuals and 
primary earners at 67% and 100% of APW, families with two 
children aged 4 and 6 (2007) 
 67% APW 100% APW 
 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
67% of 
APW) 
(1) 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
100% of 
APW) 
(2) 
single 
(3)  
1st earner 
(non-
working 
spouse) 
(4) 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
67% of 
APW) 
(5) 
2nd 
earner, 
(spouse 
earns 
100% of 
APW) 
(6) 
single 
(7)  
1st earner 
(non-
working 
spouse) 
(8) 
AT 0.31 0.31 0.09 0.09 0.35 0.35 0.21 0.21 
BE 0.47 0.49 0.19 0.10 0.49 0.51 0.31 0.23 
CZ 0.38 0.35 -0.01 -0.10 0.35 0.33 0.15 0.06 
DE 0.49 0.50 0.20 0.08 0.50 0.51 0.31 0.22 
DK 0.61 0.53 -0.04 0.07 0.55 0.52 0.18 0.24 
EE 0.24 0.24 -0.03 -0.01 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.07 
ES 0.20 0.22 0.07 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.14 0.13 
FI 0.32 0.24 -0.08 0.06 0.36 0.30 0.12 0.23 
FR 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.30 0.18 0.17 
GR 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.22 
HU 0.31 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.41 0.39 0.23 0.25 
IE 0.26 0.21 -0.28 -0.21 0.26 0.29 0.00 -0.02 
IS 0.44 0.44 -0.12 -0.21 0.44 0.44 0.07 0.00 
IT 0.41 0.35 -0.02 -0.07 0.41 0.37 0.16 0.13 
LT 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.19 
LU 0.25 0.29 -0.10 -0.13 0.29 0.34 0.07 0.01 
LV 0.30 0.30 0.14 0.10 0.31 0.31 0.20 0.17 
NL 0.36 0.33 0.10 0.18 0.39 0.37 0.23 0.29 
NO 0.33 0.29 0.10 0.11 0.34 0.32 0.19 0.22 
PL 0.41 0.33 0.12 0.06 0.38 0.33 0.23 0.20 
PT 0.19 0.26 0.06 0.05 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.10 
SE 0.27 0.25 -0.07 0.12 0.29 0.28 0.11 0.20 
SI 0.57 0.40 -0.12 -0.16 0.51 0.42 0.17 0.13 
SK 0.24 0.30 0.03 -0.02 0.26 0.30 0.12 0.05 
UK 0.38 0.26 0.02 0.003 0.37 0.29 0.21 0.21 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit calculator (accessed on 24/04/2010). 
 
Figure 3.14  Average tax rates for secondary earners (with spouses earning 
average wage), single individuals and primary earners on 67% 
APW, families with two children (2007) 
 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit calculator (accessed on 24/04/2010). 
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Gender-role attitudes 
The previous section reviewed the fiscal rules that are likely to influence the labour 
supply of secondary earners in couples, who are likely to be women. This section 
looks at cultural, rather than institutional, factors that play a role in the gender 
division of labour in the labour market and in the home. It uses cross-nationally 
comparable micro data on gender-role attitudes from the European Values Study 
1999-2001 (EVS) to examine cross-country variation in prevalent social norms 
relevant to gender equality.  
 
The role of country-level gender-role attitudes in determining women’s labour 
market outcomes, in addition to the role of institutional factors such as parental leave, 
availability of formal childcare for young children and the treatment of secondary 
earners in tax/benefit systems, is increasingly acknowledged in the literature. In 
comparative studies of labour market outcomes for women, attitudes to gender 
equality can be captured as country ‘fixed effects’ (Jaumotte, 2003), but this is an 
imperfect approximation because the effects of attitudes and values may be 
confounded by the effects of policies and institutions. International values surveys, 
such as the European Values Study (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS), 
provide a wealth of comparable information on gender-role attitudes in large 
numbers of countries, allowing for a more precise estimation of the effects of 
attitudes on labour market outcomes. 
 
Fortin (2005) analyses the impact of gender-role attitudes on female employment 
rates and gender wage gaps in 25 OECD countries, using data from the WVS (1990, 
1995 and 1991). Traditional (non-egalitarian) attitudes are found to have a strong 
negative association with female employment rates and a positive association with 
gender earnings gaps. In particular, countries with higher average agreement with the 
statement that ‘scarce jobs should go to men’ have lower female employment rates 
and larger gender wage gaps, on average. Similarly, countries where a higher 
proportion of respondents agree that ‘being a housewife is fulfilling’ have lower 
female employment rates.  
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In a study of the effect of childbirth on maternal labour supply in 13 EU countries, 
using work and family history data from the ECHP for the period 1994-1999 and 
data on gender-role values from the EVS 1990/1999, Uunk et al. (2005) find that 
more egalitarian societal gender-role attitudes have a large positive effect on mothers’ 
labour supply, when the availability of public childcare is not accounted for. 
However, when public childcare provision for children aged 0-3 is controlled for, 
egalitarian gender-role values no longer have a significant effect on maternal labour 
supply. At the same time, the inclusion of gender-role attitudes does not substantially 
change the effect of public childcare provision. Thus, institutions that support female 
employment appear to mediate the effect of gender-role values. 
 
Gender-role attitudes are also used to explain the variation in labour market 
institutions in industrialised countries. Algan and Cahuc (2006) argue that ‘the male 
breadwinner cultural values’ can be used to explain the variation in the strength of 
employment protection across the OECD. Since job protection benefits insiders, who 
are predominantly men, while unemployment insurance benefits outsiders, who are 
more likely to be women, job protection policies, as opposed to unemployment 
insurance policies, are stronger in more traditional Mediterranean countries. Using 
micro data from international values surveys and macro data from the OECD, they 
establish that Protestants and non-religious people are more likely to reject traditional 
gender-role values and that labour-market institutions are influenced by the dominant 
religious and cultural values in the country. For instance, the study finds that 
respondents in Catholic countries, Buddhist countries (Japan) and Muslim countries 
(Turkey) are more likely to agree with a statement that ‘when jobs are scarce, men 
have more rights to a job than women’ than those in Protestant ones (Anglo-Saxon 
and Scandinavian countries), based on data from three waves of the WVS (1981, 
1990, 1995) in an ordered probit model with country fixed effects. As regards 
individual-level predictors, the study reports that male respondents are more likely to 
support job priority for men, especially if they are Catholic, Buddhist or Muslim, 
while women tend to reject job priority for men regardless of their religious 
affiliation. However, these findings need to be interpreted with caution given the age 
of the data source (WVS 1981-1995).  
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This section uses more recent data from the third round of the EVS (1999-2001). It is 
a large-scale cross-national and longitudinal survey on basic human values, including 
gender-role attitudes, that uses nationally representative data on adult citizens aged 
18 and older. The same questionnaire is used in all participating countries. See 
Halman (2001) for a detailed description of the EVS 1999-2001 methodology and 
questionnaire design. The survey was carried out in 1999 in 23 out of 24 countries 
studied in this section and in 2000 in Finland. Unfortunately, Norway was not 
included in this round of the EVS20.  
 
This section uses ten survey questions on gender-role attitudes that appear to be most 
relevant to the equal sharing of market and non-market work between men and 
women: 
1. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women (v99); 
2. Sharing household chores is important for a successful marriage (v143);  
3. Woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled (v149); 
4. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with 
her children as a mother who does not work (v154); 
5. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v155); 
6. A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children 
(v156); 
7. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v157); 
8. Having a job is the best way for a women to be an independent person (v158); 
9. Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income (v159); 
10. In general, fathers are as suited to look after their children as mothers (v160); 
 
Kalmijn (2003) uses questions 4 through 9 from the EVS 1999 and finds that they do 
not form a single dimension, but three separate ones. Thus, questions 4 and 5 are 
beliefs, rather than attitudes, about the consequences of women’s work on children. 
The average of the scores on these two items is used in Uunk et al. (2005) as a 
gender-role values indicator. Questions 6 and 7 are attitudes about women’s 
                                               
20
 Data from the fourth (2008) round of the EVS became available in mid-July 2010, but Britain, 
Iceland, Italy, Sweden, and Norway did not participate in the latest round. See “EVS1981-2008 – 
Participating Countries” at http://zacat.gesis.org/nesstar/docs/ZACAT_EVS%201981_2008.pdf 
(accessed on 14/08/2010). 
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traditional role as housekeepers, while questions 8 and 9 are attitudes about women’s 
economic role.  
 
Fortin (2005) finds the question ‘When jobs are scarce, men should have more right 
to a job than women’ from the World Value Surveys (WWS), identical to question 1 
above, to be the most important one in explaining cross-country differences in female 
employment rates and the gender earnings gap. Attitudes to women as housekeepers 
(question 7 here) and the perception of consequences of maternal work for children 
(question 4 here) are also found to be strong predictors of female labour supply. 
However, not only average gender-role attitudes are important, but the gender 
differences in these attitudes. Fortin finds that where more men than women think 
that ‘scarce jobs should go to men’, the gender wage gap is larger. Where fewer 
women than men respond that ‘being a housewife is fulfilling’, the gender wage gap 
is smaller.  
 
This section uses all ten items above because they all appear to be relevant to gender 
equality in the labour market, in the home or in both spheres. The items are re-coded 
into dummy variables so that 1 refers to agreement with egalitarian attitudes 
(questions 2, 4, 8, 9, 10) or disagreement with traditional attitudes (questions 1, 3, 5, 
6, 7) and 0 otherwise. Items 4-10 are originally coded on a four-point scale so that 
respondents can choose from the following options: ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, 
‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. However, in Austria, Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland, these questions have a five-point scale that includes a middle 
category ‘neither agree nor disagree’. The middle category is re-coded as zero in the 
dummy variable. Northern Ireland is excluded from the analysis because there are 
substantial differences between average attitudes in Britain and Northern Ireland21. 
Kalmijn (2003) excludes the countries that offered a middle category from the 
analysis because they are not strictly comparable with the rest. Although they are not 
                                               
21
 Out of 10 items, significant differences at conventional levels between average responses in 
Northern Ireland and Britain are found for four items (1, 4, 5 and 9). On item 1, respondents in 
Northern Ireland (76%) have more egalitarian attitudes, on average, than in Britain (64%). On item 4, 
average attitudes in Britain (56%) are more egalitarian than in Northern Ireland (45%). On item 5, 
attitudes are more egalitarian in Britain (39%), on average, than in Northern Ireland (30%). On item 9, 
attitudes in Britain (71%) are more egalitarian than in Northern Ireland (66%). 
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excluded from the analysis in this section, the results for Austria and Ireland need to 
be interpreted with caution. 
 
Items 1-3 originally have different scales than items 4-10.  Item 1 (‘when jobs are 
scarce, men have more right to a job than women’) has three categories: ‘agree’, 
‘disagree’, and ‘neither agree not disagree’. It is re-coded into a dummy variable 
where 1 indicates disagreement with the statement. Options for item 2 (‘sharing 
household chores is important for a successful marriage’) are ‘very important’, 
‘rather important’ and ‘not important’. It is re-coded into a dummy variable with 1 
indicating ‘very important’ and 0 ‘rather/not important’. Item 3 (‘woman has to have 
children to be fulfilled’) has only two categories ‘needs children’ and ‘not necessary’. 
The latter is re-coded as 1 and the former as 0.  
 
Table 3.11 displays the means of the gender role attitudes in 24 European countries 
as well as the average and the standard deviation across all countries for each 
question. The most egalitarian gender role attitudes are reported for the item ‘both 
the husband and wife should contribute to household income’ (column 10 of Table 
3.11), with 78% of respondents across all of the studied countries agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with this statement. This proportion ranges from the low of 38% in 
the Netherlands22 to the high of 93% in the Czech Republic (see Figure A 3-10). 
Notably, the wording of the question does not specify that both spouses should 
contribute to the household income equally. The most traditional gender role 
attitudes are reported for the item ‘sharing household chores is important for a 
successful marriage’ (column 7), with only 36% of respondents agreeing with this 
statement, on average. The proportion supporting this statement ranges from the 
mere 18% in Estonia to 55% in Poland (Figure A 3-7). The item ‘women need 
children in order to be fulfilled’ appears to be the most divisive across the studied 
countries, with the cross-country standard deviation of 25 percentage points (column 
2 of Table 3.11). The proportion of respondents disagreeing with this statement 
ranges from 6% in Hungary to 93% in the Netherlands (Figure A 3-2). At the same 
time, the proportion of respondents agreeing with the item ‘fathers are as suited to 
                                               
22
 The figure for the Netherlands is unrealistically low. Kalmijn (2003) suggests that the wording in 
the Dutch questionnaire implied equal contribution to household income, which resulted in relatively 
low agreement with the statement. 
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look after their children as mothers’ is the least dispersed across the studied countries 
(column 9 of Table 3.11 below), with the standard deviation of only 8 percentage 
points. It also has one of the highest averages (76%), indicating that attitudes about 
fathers’ suitability to engage in childcare are rather positive in Europe. Nevertheless, 
respondents in Nordic countries are more positive about fathers’ role in looking after 
children than in the Mediterranean or Eastern European countries (Figure A 3-9).  
 
Table 3.11 Average gender-role attitudes (EVS 1999/2000) 
 Disagree (%) Agree (%) 
 
scarce 
jobs to 
men 
(1) 
women 
need 
children 
to be 
fulfilled 
(2) 
preschool 
child 
suffers 
with 
working  
mother 
(3) 
women 
really 
want 
home 
and 
children 
(4) 
housewif
e as 
fulfilling 
as paid 
job 
(5) 
working 
mothers 
warm 
with 
children 
(6) 
very 
important 
to share 
chores 
(7) 
job best 
way to 
independ
ence for 
women 
(8) 
fathers as 
suited to 
look after 
children 
(9) 
husband
+wife 
contribute 
to HH 
income 
(10) 
AT 54.4 66.1 14.9 37.2 36.6 54.6 29.5 75.0 69.5 69.0 
BE 69.6 66.7 48.7 46.0 36.2 78.6 42.3 76.9 76.8 70.4 
CZ 65.9 55.9 52.8 27.9 23.6 80.8 23.9 75.8 67.0 92.7 
DE 56.5 46.0 33.7 56.0 57.5 67.2 20.4 81.4 73.7 73.7 
DK 89.4 20.4 82.0 81.6 45.8 86.4 40.6 84.5 84.3 68.0 
EE 75.5 25.1 34.9 32.5 41.0 70.7 17.7 78.7 69.0 82.4 
ES 62.5 51.8 54.2 53.3 46.3 76.8 36.1 81.0 74.1 83.3 
FI 83.1 87.9 59.1 50.4 19.1 94.7 28.6 63.2 86.2 71.4 
FR 68.3 32.9 43.7 34.9 37.6 77.3 39.9 83.6 79.8 81.3 
GR 72.6 24.9 21.9 35.3 58.3 75.6 43.7 82.5 63.8 87.6 
HU 66.7 5.9 37.0 29.8 38.9 77.8 41.1 72.2 70.9 89.4 
IE 77.0 84.3 51.2 45.3 27.1 70.7 53.3 55.2 68.3 63.2 
IS 94.3 64.8 66.9 38.1 35.5 85.9 44.5 45.8 84.5 63.7 
IT 56.8 43.6 18.6 32.5 45.1 64.1 28.9 77.0 68.6 80.8 
LT 63.3 31.6 28.7 6.2 21.4 76.5 25.8 76.7 82.7 89.6 
LU 64.0 62.2 32.2 44.5 35.5 75.9 36.5 83.9 78.0 54.4 
LV 69.5 9.4 24.7 33.0 60.0 75.6 26.2 85.2 72.4 88.6 
NL 83.7 93.2 54.3 65.6 48.5 81.1 32.6 60.7 77.3 37.9 
PL 47.8 30.4 23.4 25.7 39.5 54.2 54.6 76.0 85.8 87.2 
PT 59.0 32.0 27.8 47.5 49.3 67.2 23.3 78.9 68.3 88.1 
SE 93.4 75.2 62.2 59.6 49.4 84.0 52.1 83.5 91.9 89.2 
SI 67.8 62.0 53.5 35.3 45.9 82.5 35.8 79.4 84.8 91.0 
SK 54.4 54.5 36.9 38.9 29.2 81.1 30.7 74.6 66.7 88.6 
GB 63.7 79.2 53.8 55.7 38.9 73.0 50.2 64.8 71.2 70.4 
Mean 69.1 50.3 42.4 42.2 40.3 75.5 35.8 74.9 75.6 77.6 
St dev 12.5 24.8 17.1 15.4 11.1 9.4 10.7 10.0 7.8 13.7 
Source: European Values Survey 1999 (individual weights used).  
 
However, male and female respondents do not necessarily hold similar views on 
gender roles. Using data on gender-role attitudes in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Norway and Sweden for the period of early to mid-1980s, Baxter and 
Kane (1995) find that men hold less egalitarian views on gender roles than women in 
all five countries. The smallest gender differences in attitudes are found in the 
countries with the least egalitarian views overall, suggesting that women in more 
traditional societies depend on men more and, therefore, adjust their attitudes to be 
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consistent with their dependent position. However, their sample is limited to men and 
women in paid work, so the gender-role attitudes may not be typical of each 
country’s population. 
 
Table 3.12 shows the percentage points difference between average male and female 
responses in each of the studied countries. Women tend to hold more egalitarian 
gender-role attitudes than men. The biggest gender differences are observed for the 
question about the relationship of working mothers with their children (column 6): 
women are more likely to agree that ‘a working mother can establish just as warm 
and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work’ in each 
of the studied countries. The gender difference is statistically significant at 
conventional levels in 17 out of 24 countries, with the largest gender differences in 
Estonia (14 ppt) and Iceland (12 ppt). At the same time, men are significantly more 
likely to agree that fathers are as suited to look after their children as mothers 
(column 9) than women in Lithuania (11 ppt), Latvia (8 ppt), Portugal (12 ppt), and 
Slovakia (10 ppt), which possibly suggests that women in these countries discourage 
fathers from taking an equal role in childcare. In contrast, women in Iceland (14 ppt) 
and in Denmark (13 ppt) are significantly more likely to agree with this statement 
than men. This is surprising, given the relatively high take-up of paternity leave in 
these countries and perhaps indicates fathers’ ambivalence with regards to their 
childcare roles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
Table 3.12 Gender differences in attitudes to gender equality (EVS 1999) 
 
Disagree (percentage point difference between women 
and men) 
Agree (percentage point difference between women and 
men) 
 
scarce 
jobs to 
men 
(1) 
women 
need 
children 
to be 
fulfilled 
(2) 
preschool 
child 
suffers 
with 
working  
mother 
(3) 
women 
really 
want 
home 
and 
children 
(4) 
housewif
e as 
fulfilling 
as paid 
job 
(5) 
working 
mothers 
warm 
with 
children 
(6) 
very 
important 
to share 
chores 
(7) 
job best 
way to 
independ
ence for 
women 
(8) 
fathers as 
suited to 
look after 
children 
(9) 
husband
+wife 
contribute 
to HH 
income 
(10) 
AT 5.2 3.0 1.7 7.5* 8.5** 10.5*** -0.3 5.0 4.6 8.9** 
BE -5.2* 5.3* 8.4** 1.1 7.2** 6.7** -5.0* 6.0** 4.4* 12.1*** 
CZ 3.3 -3.9 10.8*** 2.5 11.8*** 6.2** 5.7** 7.5** 0.9 3.7** 
DE 9.4** 3.4 12.5*** 5.6 4.3 8.4** 3.6 4.4 -0.6 0.0 
DK 2.5 7.5** 10.9*** 1.0 2.8 3.0 2.2 1.8 13.3*** 2.8 
EE 12.8*** -6.2* 1.3 3.1 14.6*** 13.8*** 2.7 7.8** -4.7 4.0 
ES 9.0** -6.8* 0.3 -1.5 0.9 0.2 6.8* -1.7 -6.1* 0.9 
FI 9.8*** 0.5 10.9** 8.1* -0.4 4.0** 2.7 6.4* 3.0 0.6 
FR 3.8 2.8 7.8** 2.0 6.6* 7.2** 6.9** 5.1** 5.6** 1.2 
GR 16.1*** -4.8 5.3* 12.1*** 19.9*** 9.9*** 16.8*** 13.2*** -5.5 5.9** 
HU 5.2 -4.0* -4.3 -4.0 4.3 2.2 -0.7 2.8 -4.5 4.5* 
IE 2.1 7.4** 5.4 7.2* -3.3 6.1 -1.3 6.4 7.6* 5.0 
IS 1.1 8.4** 15.6*** 6.7* 1.3 12.2*** 1.7 6.3 14.3*** 8.2* 
IT 6.6** -2.9 2.1 2.5 7.2** 8.6*** 1.9 7.7*** 2.9 6.2** 
LT 23.4*** -5.9 -4.9 -0.6 1.4 3.3 9.3** 6.8 -10.7** -0.8 
LU 7.4* 5.6 10.2** 8.3* 11.2*** 6.2* 6.8* 3.2 0.5 1.2 
LV 7.0* -0.4 1.7 8.5** 6.1 8.6** 4.7 5.9* -7.9** -0.5 
NL -1.2 -0.6 19.2*** 2.2 7.2* 8.8** -3.0 0.5 11.1*** 8.2* 
PL 8.9* 6.9* 5.1 8.5** 10.0** 10.5** 6.9* 4.8 0.4 1.0 
PT 7.3 -6.8 6.1 6.0 6.0 2.3 6.6 11.4** -11.8** 5.2 
SE 5.4** 7.5** 16.2*** 7.5* 3.3 11.6*** 7.3* -0.4 6.1*** 2.5 
SI 8.7** -1.3 8.0* 7.3* 11.1** 1.4 10.5*** 4.3 -1.7 4.3* 
SK 18.7*** -3.0 2.1 2.7 7.6** 7.6** 10.5*** 3.1 -9.7*** 3.9* 
GB 6.0 2.7 14.9*** 14.1*** -4.0 7.9* -1.8 1.7 -0.1 -1.5 
Source: European Values Survey 1999 (individual weights used).  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-sample t-test with equal variances). 
 
Although all of these items refer to gender role attitudes, they do not necessarily 
form a single dimension. The studies that use gender-role attitudes as explanatory 
variables tend to follow two distinct approaches in how they deal with a large 
number of related attitude items. Some studies create summary measures of several 
related items (Baxter & Kane, 1995; Uunk et al., 2005; Stickney & Konrad, 2007), 
while others cherry-pick individual items that have the highest correlation with the 
dependent variables or otherwise appear the most relevant and drop the rest of the 
items (Algan & Cahuc, 2006; Fortin, 2005). This section follows the former 
approach in order not to discard information on any of the ten items and to produce 
meaningful indicators based on the relationships amongst them. While the 10-item 
scale in the present analysis has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=0.80), 
an iterated principal factor analysis23 produces a two-factor solution using all ten 
                                               
23
 Principal component analysis and principal factor analysis produce very similar results. 
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items. Seven items are more related to one dimension and three items to another 
(Table 3.13).  
 
Table 3.13 Iterated principal factor analysis – factor loadings (EVS 1999) 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
scarce jobs to men 0.80 0.29 
women need children to be fulfilled 0.62 -0.49 
preschool child suffers with working  mother 0.92 0.29 
women really want home and children 0.55 0.21 
housewife as fulfilling as paid job -0.20 0.38 
working mothers warm with children 0.65 0.30 
very important to share chores 0.34 -0.04 
job best way to independence for women -0.54 0.63 
fathers as suited to look after children 0.47 0.22 
husband+wife contribute to HH income -0.52 0.32 
% variance explained 0.74 0.26 
Reliability 0.77 0.57 
Source: European Values Survey 1999.   
 
The first dimension (Factor 1) can be summarised as attitudes towards gender 
equality in the home, as it refers to views about giving preference to men when jobs 
are scarce, beliefs about women’s role in childrearing and housekeeping and the 
effect of mothers’ employment on children, as well as attitudes to equal sharing of 
household chores and childcare between spouses. This factor has a high internal 
consistency of 0.77. The other dimension appears to be related to attitudes towards 
gender equality in the economic sphere. It refers to beliefs about the value of having 
a job for women and women’s role in contributing to household income (though not 
necessarily equally). Table 3.14 reports linear factor scores24 for each country for the 
‘attitudes to gender equality in the home’ and ‘attitudes to gender equality in the 
economic sphere’ dimensions. Iceland scores highest on equality in the home and 
Denmark scores highest on equality in the economic sphere. However, while Iceland 
has a negative factor score on the equality in the economic sphere dimension, 
Denmark scores highly on both dimensions. So does Sweden. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
24
 The factor score on the first dimension is highly correlated (r=0.92) with the scale produced by                                                           
averaging the country-level means for the respective 7 items, while the factor score on the second 
dimension has a lower correlation (r=0.64) with the scale produced by averaging the country-level 
means for the respective 3 items (Figure A 3-12). 
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Table 3.14 Attitudes to gender equality in the home and in the labour market 
(factor scores) 
Country Gender equality in the home Gender equality in the labour market  
AT -1.06 -1.31 
BE 0.47 0.13 
CZ 0.51 0.42 
DE -0.57 -0.03 
DK 1.31 2.43 
EE -0.23 0.74 
ES 0.33 0.65 
FI 0.79 -1.03 
FR -0.11 0.92 
GR -1.08 0.52 
HU -0.85 0.18 
IE 1.05 -1.32 
IS 2.02 -0.83 
IT -1.15 -0.65 
LT -0.74 -0.10 
LU -0.29 -0.01 
LV -1.07 0.92 
NL 1.58 -0.88 
PL -1.27 -0.69 
PT -1.21 -0.24 
SE 1.10 1.24 
SI 0.68 0.61 
SK -0.87 -0.79 
GB 0.68 -0.89 
Source: European Values Survey 1999 (individual weights used).  
 
With a few exceptions, attitudes to gender equality in the home and in the labour 
market tend to go hand in hand. Countries that exhibit more egalitarian attitudes to 
gender equality in the economic sphere tend to score higher on the equality in the 
home dimension (Figure 3.15). However, five countries do not fit this general pattern: 
Iceland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland and Britain have considerably higher 
scores on the equality in the home dimension than would be expected given their low 
scores on the equality in the economic sphere dimension. If these countries were 
excluded, there would be a high positive correlation of 0.72 (p<0.001) between the 
two dimensions across the rest of the studied countries. A closer look at the three 
items that are highly related to the equality in the economic sphere dimension reveals 
that relatively few respondents in Ireland, Iceland and Finland disagree that being a 
housewife is as fulfilling as having a paid job (Figure A 3-5) and relatively few 
respondents agree that having a job is the best way to independence for women25 
(Figure A 3-8). Respondents in Ireland and Iceland also show low average levels of 
agreement with the statement that both husbands and wives should contribute to 
                                               
25
 However, female respondents in Finland are significantly more likely to agree with this statement 
than men (see Table 2). 
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household income26 (Figure A 3-10). Although respondents in the Netherlands show 
relatively high levels of disagreement with the statement that being a housewife is as 
fulfilling as having a paid job, relatively few agree that having a job is the best way 
to independence for women and they are the least likely to agree that both the 
husband and wife should contribute to household income across the studied countries. 
At the same time, Britain has relatively low scores on ‘having a job is the best way 
for women to be an independent person’ item (Figure A 3-8), but middling scores on 
the other two items.   
Only Sweden and Denmark score high on both counts. Sweden consistently scores 
high on each of the studied items, but Denmark shows a more mixed picture. While 
only 20% of Danish respondents disagree that women need children to be fulfilled 
and only 68% agree that both husband and wife should contribute to household 
income (the fifth lowest proportion amongst the studied countries), they are some of 
the most likely to disagree that scarce jobs should go to men (Figure A 3-1), that pre-
school children suffer when their mothers work (Figure A 3-3), that women really 
want home and children (Figure A 3-4), and some of the most likely to agree that a 
working mother can establish a warm relationship with her children (Figure A 3-6) 
and that having a job is the best way to independence for women (Figure A 3-8).  
Other countries do somewhat better on the equality in the economic sphere 
dimension than on the equality in the home dimension. This is not surprising given 
that most prime-age women participate in the labour market, but they still do a 
disproportionate amount of household and caring work. For instance, although 
respondents in France have some of the highest levels of agreement that having a job 
is the best way to independence for women (Figure A 3-8), they show middling 
levels of support for each of the ‘equality in the home’ related items. At the same 
time, respondents in Austria, Slovakia, Italy and Poland have some of the most 
traditional gender-role attitudes of all, scoring low on both dimensions.  
 
Overall, the results support the finding in Algan and Cahuc (2006) that traditional 
gender-role attitudes are more prevalent in Catholic countries and least prevalent in 
Protestant or predominantly secular countries. 
                                               
26
 Although women in Iceland are more likely to agree with this statement than men, on average. 
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Figure 3.15 Attitudes to gender equality in the home and in the labour market  
 
Source: European Values Survey 1999.  
Factor scores. 
R=0.08 (R=0.72, p<0.001, if Iceland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland and Britain 
are excluded). 
 
Work/Family reconciliation policies and gender equality outcomes 
The four previous sections analysed the cross-country variation in the duration and 
generosity of parenthood leave, the availability and cost of childcare, the gender 
neutrality of the tax and benefit systems, and the extent to which prevailing gender 
role attitudes are consistent with gender equality in the home and in the economic 
sphere. This section draws the separate evidence together to analyse the relationship 
between the studied indicators and measures of gender equality in the labour market. 
Finally, it draws up a combined indicator of work-family reconciliation policies 
studied in this chapter.  
 
Table 3.15 shows the z-scores for the number of weeks of total and FTE paid 
parenthood leave available to couples. The use of z-scores provides a simple way of 
summarising comparative data while taking account of both rank order and the 
degree of dispersion (Bradshaw et al., 2007).  Figure 3.16  shows that Lithuania and 
Estonia have by far the most generous paid leave entitlements for couples, exceeding 
one and a half standard deviations above the mean. At the same time, Figure 3.17 
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shows the distribution of the z-scores for the duration of paid leave reserved for 
fathers, with Luxembourg standing out with the most generous provisions (nearly 
three standard deviations above the mean).  
 
Figure 3.16 total paid leave available to couples (weeks), 2006/2007 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17 Total paid leave reserved for fathers  
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008) 
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Table 3.15 Child-related employment protected leave periods available to 
couples: duration of total leave and duration of the full-time 
equivalent of the leave period if paid at 100% of last earnings, 
2006/2007 (weeks), z-scores 
Country 
Total leave  
 
Total FTE 
leave  
 
Total leave 
available to 
mothers  
Total FTE 
leave 
available to 
mothers  
Total leave 
reserved for 
fathers  
Total FTE 
leave 
reserved for 
fathers  
AT 0.47 -0.48 0.56 -0.37 -1.01 -0.84 
BE -1.23 -1.05 -1.22 -1.11 0.59 0.18 
CZ 1.26 0.75 1.25 0.87 -1.01 -0.84 
DE 1.26 0.15 1.25 0.27 -1.01 -0.84 
DK -1.03 0.28 -0.78 0.32 -0.79 -0.30 
EE 1.26 1.84 1.25 1.91 -0.79 -0.30 
ES 1.26 -1.05 1.25 -1.03 -0.79 -0.30 
FI 1.26 0.53 1.25 0.43 -0.10 0.70 
FR 1.26 0.16 1.25 0.20 -0.79 -0.30 
GR -1.13 -1.08 -1.12 -0.99 0.75 -0.74 
HU 0.14 1.13 0.25 1.22 -0.90 -0.57 
IE -0.63 -1.04 -0.66 -0.94 0.59 -0.84 
IS -0.74 -0.54 -0.99 -0.84 1.96 1.97 
IT -0.79 -0.62 -0.86 -0.72 1.96 1.27 
LT 0.66 2.68 0.66 2.67 -0.56 0.24 
LU -0.67 -0.10 -0.93 -0.51 2.00 2.78 
LV -0.57 0.47 -0.38 0.53 -0.79 -0.41 
NL -1.24 -1.12 -1.18 -1.03 0.52 -0.74 
NO -0.94 0.36 -0.82 0.24 -0.10 0.78 
PL 1.26 -0.42 1.25 -0.31 -1.01 -0.84 
PT -1.16 -1.05 -1.16 -0.99 0.81 0.00 
SE -0.07 1.05 -0.13 0.81 0.32 1.67 
SI -0.74 0.39 -0.74 0.40 0.47 -0.09 
SK 1.26 0.05 1.25 0.16 -1.01 -0.84 
UK -0.41 -1.30 -0.49 -1.21 0.70 -0.76 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008) 
Note: total parental leave is the leave for the entire couple, some of which may be reserved for either 
parent. 
If the parental leave entitlement is per parent per child, the maximum entitlement per family is 
reported. 
 
Figure 3.18 shows a moderately high positive correlation between the z-score for 
female labour force participation rate and the z-score for weeks of total FTE paid 
parenthood leave available to couples (R=0.52, p<0.05). However, no significant 
association is observed between the participation rate and total leave (R=0.14). This 
suggests that it is paid leave, rather than other leave, that makes it easier for women 
to take up employment. Similarly, Figure 3.19 shows a significant positive 
correlation between total FTE paid leave available to mothers and female 
participation rate (R=0.50, p<0.05), but no significant association is observed 
between participation rate and total leave available to mothers (R=0.16).  
 
Figure 3.20 reports a much weaker positive association between the female 
participation rate and weeks of FTE paid leave reserved for fathers (R=0.17). If 
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Luxembourg is excluded, the correlation rises (R=0.29), but it is still insignificant 
and lower than the association between mothers’ FTE leave and the female 
participation rate. This suggests that although fathers’ leave may be important, it is 
still too short and the take-up is too low to make much of a difference to female 
participation rates in practice. For example, Luxembourg has the most generous 
statutory leave entitlement for fathers (through individual paid parental leave rather 
than long paternity leave), but the female participation rate is below average in 
Luxembourg. Yet, Sweden and Iceland have some of the highest female participation 
rates and the most generous fathers’ entitlements to paid leave after Luxembourg. 
Unlike in Luxembourg, fathers’ leave in Sweden and Iceland largely consists of 
generous paternity leave. This suggests that paternity leave and fathers’ quotas play a 
more important role in influencing female participation rates than individual non-
transferable entitlements to parental leave, even if relatively well paid.  
 
Figure 3.18 Total paid leave available to couples and female participation rate  
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); EU-
SILC 2007, women aged 25-55. 
R=0.52 (p<0.05). 
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Figure 3.19 Total paid leave available to mothers and female participation 
rate  
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); EU-
SILC 2007 women aged 25-55. 
R=0.50 (p<0.05). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Total paid leave reserved for fathers and female participation rate  
   
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); EU-
SILC 2007 employees and self-employed individuals aged 25-55. 
R=0.1 
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Although female participation rates tend to be higher in countries with longer FTE 
paid parenthood leave, female part-time rates are lower. The correlation between 
total paid parenthood leave available to couples and female part-time rate (R=-0.48) 
and between total paid leave reserved for mothers and female part-time rate (R=-0.50) 
is moderately negative. At the same time, the linear association between total paid 
leave reserved for fathers and female part-time rate is virtually nil (R=0.05).  
 
While countries with more generous paid parenthood leave available to couples tend 
to have higher female participation rates, they also have higher levels of occupational 
segregation27. Figure 3.21 shows a significant positive relationship between the z-
score for the index occupational segregation and the z-score for total paid leave 
(R=0.54, p<0.01), while Figure 3.22, similarly, reports a significant positive 
association between occupational segregation and paid leave available to mothers 
(R=0.57, p<0.01). At the same time, the association between segregation and paid 
leave reserved for fathers is insignificant and negative (R=-0.20). These results 
suggest that although paid leave may make it easier for mothers to remain attached to 
the labour market, it does not guarantee a similar distribution of men and women 
across the occupational structure. Indeed, a positive association between female 
participation rates and levels of occupational segregation in Europe is documented in 
the literature (e.g. Bettio, 2002) and is also observed in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
27
 Duncan’s (1955) index of occupational segregation is calculated using 27 occupational categories 
from the EU-SILC 2007, including both full-time and part-time employees, but excluding armed 
forces. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of cross-country variation in occupational gender 
segregation.   
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Figure 3.21 Total paid leave available to couples and occupational segregation  
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); EU-
SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55. 
R=0.54 (p<0.01). 
 
Figure 3.22 Total paid leave available to mothers and occupational 
segregation 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); EU-
SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55. 
R=0.57 (p<0.01). 
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Figure 3.23 Occupational segregation and female labour force participation 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007, individuals aged 25-55. 
R=0.47 (p<0.05). 
 
Similarly, gender wage gaps tend to be larger in the countries with more generous 
parenthood leave entitlements for mothers.  There is a significant positive association 
between the duration of FTE paid leave available to couples and the average wage 
gap28 among full-time employees (R=0.61, p<0.01, Figure 3.24) and between the 
duration of FTE leave available to mothers and the average full-time wage gap 
(R=0.59, p<0.01, Figure 3.25). If Estonia is excluded, the correlation becomes 
somewhat lower (R=0.52 and R=0.40, respectively), but it is still significant at 
p<0.10. These findings are not surprising given that gender earnings gaps tend to be 
larger in countries with higher female participation rates because women with lower 
earnings potential are present in the labour market (Olivetti & Petrongolo, 2008). A 
significant positive relationship between female participation rates and average 
gender wage gaps amongst all employees (R=0.54, p<0.01) and full-time employees 
only (R=0.61, p<0.01) is also observed here using data from the EU-SILC 2007. 
 
                                               
28
 The correlation between total paid leave available to couples and median wage gap among full-time 
employees is of a similar order (R=0.59), while the correlation between FTE leave and average and 
median wage gaps amongst all employees are somewhat lower at R=0.48. 
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Figure 3.24 Total paid leave available to couples and average wage gap 
amongst full-time employees 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); EU-
SILC 2007, employees aged 35-55. 
R=0.61 (p<0.01). 
 
Figure 3.25 Total leave available to mothers and average wage gap amongst 
full-time employees 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); EU-
SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55. 
R=0.59 (p<0.01). 
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Table 3.16 shows the z-scores for the proportions of pre-school children using formal 
and informal childcare services. The Netherlands, Iceland and Denmark have the 
highest proportion of children in formal childcare facilities, in excess of one standard 
deviation above the cross-country mean (Figure 3.26). In contrast, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Austria have the lowest usage rates, under 
one standard deviation below the mean.  
 
Table 3.16 Childcare arrangements for children aged 0-2 and 3-5, z-scores 
 
% of children 
aged 0-2 in 
formal care 
% of children 
between the 
age of 3 and 
mandatory 
school age in 
formal care 
% of children 
aged 0-2 in 
formal care of 
at least 30 
hours a week 
% of children 
between the 
age of 3 and 
mandatory 
school age in 
formal care of 
at least 30 
hours a week 
% of children 
aged 0-2 in 
informal 
childcare 
% children 
between the 
age of 3 and 
mandatory 
school age in 
informal care  
AT -1.09 -0.35 -1.06 -1.26 0.10 0.67 
BE 0.81 1.14 0.35 0.74 -0.19 0.39 
CZ -1.56 -0.70 -1.16 -0.45 0.57 0.44 
DE -0.39 0.58 -0.33 -0.72 -0.49 -0.44 
DK 2.22 1.04 2.94 1.39 -1.51 -1.60 
EE -0.75 0.32 -0.24 1.31 0.49 0.27 
ES 0.49 0.68 -0.08 -0.24 -0.04 -0.57 
FI -0.26 -0.23 0.15 0.12 -1.31 -1.23 
FR 0.64 0.92 0.45 -0.04 -0.32 -0.25 
GR -0.91 -0.74 -0.54 -0.78 1.32 0.43 
HU -1.20 0.12 -0.80 0.62 1.10 1.26 
IE -0.08 0.24 -0.15 -1.15 -0.45 -0.58 
IS 1.51 1.07 2.21 1.71 -1.30 -1.50 
IT -0.26 0.71 -0.21 0.94 0.57 0.88 
LT -0.20 -1.69 -1.19 -2.13 -0.77 -0.55 
LU 0.44 0.08 0.07 -0.99 0.48 0.76 
LV -0.83 -1.71 -0.20 0.01 -0.71 -0.85 
NL 1.37 0.87 -0.77 -1.36 2.09 1.58 
NO 0.58 0.08 0.77 0.56 -1.13 -1.37 
PL -1.20 -2.95 -0.72 -0.95 0.41 0.54 
PT 0.11 0.01 0.74 0.90 0.16 0.30 
SE 1.00 0.87 0.66 0.88 -1.51 -1.55 
SI 0.30 0.29 0.85 0.81 1.84 1.91 
SK -1.54 -0.91 -1.07 0.52 -0.35 0.11 
UK 0.80 0.25 -0.66 -0.45 0.96 0.94 
Source: SILC 2007 (individual weights used). 
Formal childcare: pre-school; compulsory school; centre-based child-care; day-care; child minder  
Informal childcare: grandparents; other household members (not parents) 
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Figure 3.26 % of children aged 0-2 in formal care (z-scores) 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
 
Higher enrolment rates of children aged 0-2 in formal care tend to be associated with 
higher female participation rates, although the correlation is not statistically 
significant (R=0.28). Although the proportion of children aged 0-2 using formal care 
for at least 30 hours a week could be expected to have a higher correlation with 
female participation rates, it too is fairly weak (R=0.29). Interestingly, Figure 3.27 
shows a significant negative association between female participation rates and the 
proportion of younger children in informal care (R=-0.45, p<0.05). There is also a 
negative association between female participation rates and the proportion of 
children between the age of three and mandatory school age in informal care (R=-
0.35, p<0.10). Figure 3.27 shows a clear clustering of Scandinavian countries in the 
top left hand corner, with the lowest informal care usage rates and the highest female 
participation rates, while Southern countries like Greece, Italy and Spain have some 
of the lowest participation rates and some of the highest informal care usage rates. 
This suggests that in countries with more accessible formal childcare facilities for 
very young children, mothers are less likely to require informal childcare 
arrangements and more likely to work. By contrast, in countries where formal 
childcare facilities are less accessible, mothers have to rely on informal help from 
family and friends, which may not be readily available to all mothers, thus resulting 
in lower observed female participation rates. 
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Figure 3.27 Proportion of children aged 0-2 in informal care 
   
Source: EU-SILC 2007, women aged 25-55 (participation rate) and children aged 0-2. 
R=-0.45 (p<0.05). 
 
There appears to be a moderate negative association between the level of 
occupational segregation and enrolment rates in non-parental childcare by pre-school 
children. In countries with higher proportions of pre-school children using any form 
of non-parental childcare, formal or informal, observed levels of occupational 
segregation tend to be lower. The strongest correlations are observed for the 
proportion of children aged 0-2 (R=-0.35, p<0.10) and those between the ages of 3 
and mandatory school age (R=-0.48, p<0.05) in formal care. The associations 
between occupational gender segregation and children’s usage of informal care are 
negative, but not statistically significant29.  
 
Although there appears to be no evident relationship between enrolment rates of pre-
school children in formal childcare facilities and gender wage gaps, there is a 
significant negative relationship between informal care usage rates of pre-school 
children (both under 3’s and those between the age of 3 and mandatory school age)  
and gender earnings gaps amongst full-time employees (R=-0.40, p<0.05). It appears 
                                               
29
 The correlations between the Index of Dissimilarity and the proportion of children aged 0-2 and 
those between the age of 3 and mandatory school age in informal care are -0.21 and -0.19, 
respectively (all in z-scores). 
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that, once again, the relationship between non-parental childcare usage and gender 
inequality in the labour market is mediated by the female participation rate. Figure 
3.28 shows that average gender earnings gaps amongst full-time employees are 
higher in the countries where fewer children aged 0-2 use informal childcare. Thus, it 
is again the Scandinavian countries with higher female participation rates, more 
accessible formal childcare facilities and lower rates of informal childcare usage, that 
have the highest gender wage gaps among full-time employees.  
 
Figure 3.28 Proportion of children age 0-2 using informal care and average 
gender hourly wage gap among full-time employees 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55 (wage gap) and children aged 0-2. 
R=-0.40 (p<0.05). 
 
Table 3.17 shows the indicators of tax/benefit systems’ neutrality towards second 
earners in couples. The z-score of the ratio of average tax transfers (net of benefits) 
for single breadwinner families to average tax transfers for otherwise similar dual 
breadwinner families is reported in column 1. The raw figures were reported in Table 
3.8 in Section 3.3. The higher the ratio and, therefore, the z-score, the more tax a 
single breadwinner household would pay relative to a dual earner household on the 
same total income30. By contrast, the indicators are lowest in the tax/benefit systems 
biased in favour of single breadwinner families. Columns 2 and 3 show the z-scores 
                                               
30
 Total income of 133% APW, two children aged 4 and 6.  
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of the ratio of average tax rate for a secondary earner (whose spouse earns average 
wage, without any dependent children) on 67% and 100% of APW, respectively, to 
average tax rate for a single individual on the same wages. The raw figures were 
reported in Table 3.9 in Section 3.3. The higher the ratio (and the z-score), the more 
the tax/benefit system is biased against second earners in couples and, therefore, 
against dual-earner families. The association between female participation rates, 
occupational segregation, and gender wage gaps with each of these three indicators is 
explored below. 
 
Table 3.17 Tax treatment of couples (z-scores) 
 
Average tax transfers net of 
benefits for ‘single breadwinner’ / 
‘dual earner’ (z-score) 
(1) 
Average tax rate for secondary 
earner at 67% APW (with 
husband at 100% APW) / 
average tax rate for single earner 
at 67% APW, no children (z-
score) 
(2) 
Average tax rate for secondary 
earner at 100% APW (with 
husband at 100% APW) / 
average tax rate for single earner 
at 100% APW, no children  (z-
score) 
(3) 
AT 0.20 -0.80 -0.79 
BE -0.43 0.54 0.49 
CZ -0.83 -0.57 -0.39 
DE -0.73 0.50 0.49 
DK -0.52 0.43 0.39 
EE -0.65 0.29 0.39 
ES -0.01 0.44 -0.01 
FI 0.59 -0.93 -0.99 
FR -0.67 -0.09 -0.01 
GR 0.69 -0.93 -0.99 
HU 1.27 -0.93 -0.99 
IE 4.09 0.90 1.91 
IS -0.70 3.35 2.87 
IT 0.14 0.18 0.24 
LT -0.23 -0.93 -0.99 
LU 0.27 0.72 0.49 
LV -0.57 -0.53 -0.51 
NL -0.15 -0.59 -0.61 
NO -0.09 -0.51 -0.53 
PL -0.57 -0.68 -0.53 
PT 0.03 1.13 0.89 
SE 0.30 -0.93 -0.99 
SI -0.58 -0.32 -0.36 
SK -0.66 1.19 1.52 
UK -0.19 -0.93 -0.99 
Source: OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010). 
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Figure 3.29 Ratio of average tax transfers net of benefits for ‘single 
breadwinner’ families to average tax transfers for ‘dual earner’ 
families 
 
Source: OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010). 
 
Out of three indicators reported in Table 3.17, only the ratio of the net tax transfers 
for single breadwinner families to net tax transfers for dual earner families (column 1) 
has any kind of linear association with the studied gender equality in the labour 
market outcomes. It has a modest negative association with the female participation 
rate (R=-0.34, p<0.10): in countries where single breadwinner families with children 
pay relatively higher taxes net of benefits than dual earner families with the same 
gross earnings, female participation rates tend to be lower. If the outlier (Ireland) 
were removed, the correlation would be even stronger (R=-0.42, p<0.05). The 
finding is perhaps counter-intuitive, given that women are more likely to be 
secondary earners in couples and, therefore, they could be expected to be more likely 
to work in the tax/benefit systems less biased in favour of single breadwinner 
households.  
 
However, considering the participation rate of the type of women who would be the 
most likely to be responsive to tax and benefit measures, i.e. married, lower educated 
and with younger children, a somewhat different picture emerges. There is still a 
negative (but insignificant) correlation between the ratio of the net tax transfers for 
single breadwinner families to net tax transfers for dual earner families and the 
participation rate of married women without university education, with the youngest 
child aged 0-4 (R=-0.25), but it appears to be influenced by a group of outliers with 
some of the lowest participation rates (see Figure 3.30). If Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Greece, and Ireland were removed, a positive (but insignificant) 
correlation of R=0.22 would be observed. The correlation amongst the five excluded 
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countries is R=0.58. Thus, there is some evidence of an expected relationship 
between the tax/benefit regime and the participation rate of women who, in theory, 
are the least attached to the labour market, but the strength of the correlation is too 
weak to be reliable.  
 
Figure 3.30    Ratio of average net tax transfers for single breadwinner families 
to that for dual earner families and female participation rate 
(married, no university degree, youngest child aged 0-4)    
 
Source: OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010); EU-SILC 2007, women aged 25-55. 
R=-0.25  
 
The tax/benefit neutrality indicator (i.e. the ratio of the net tax transfers for single 
breadwinner families to net tax transfers for dual earner families) has a modest 
negative association with the level of occupational segregation (R=-0.35, p<0.10). At 
the same time, the tax/benefit indicator has a modest negative correlation with the 
average (R=-0.31, p<0.15) and the median (R=-0.31) gender wage gap among full-
time employees. Thus, gender wage gaps for full-time employees tend to be 
somewhat higher in the countries where the tax/benefit systems are more biased in 
favour of single breadwinner families (with two children aged 4 and 6). However, 
these correlations are too weak for this conclusion to be reliable. Furthermore, given 
that the tax/benefit regime is not likely to affect the labour market behaviour of all 
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women, it is not expected that it would influence the gender wage gaps (or 
occupational segregation level) in any straightforward way.    
Finally, Table 3.18 reports the z-scores for each of the gender-role attitudes 
statements discussed in Section 3.4, while Figure 3.31 reports the average of these z-
scores for each country. The most egalitarian attitudes, on average, are observed in 
Denmark and Sweden, followed by Slovenia, Finland, Spain and Iceland. The most 
traditional attitudes are observed in Austria, Italy and Lithuania.  
 
Table 3.18 Average gender-role attitudes – z-scores (EVS 1999) 
 Disagree (%) Agree (%) 
Cou
ntry 
scarce 
jobs to 
men 
women 
need 
children 
to be 
fulfilled 
preschoo
l child 
suffers 
with 
working  
mother 
women 
really 
want 
home 
and 
children 
housewif
e as 
fulfilling 
as paid 
job 
working 
mothers 
warm 
with 
children 
very 
important 
to share 
chores 
job best 
way to 
independ
ence for 
women 
fathers 
as suited 
to look 
after 
children 
husband
+wife 
contribut
e to HH 
income 
AT -1.2 0.6 -1.6 -0.3 -0.3 -2.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.8 -0.6 
BE 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.1 -0.5 
CZ -0.3 0.2 0.6 -0.9 -1.5 0.6 -1.1 0.1 -1.1 1.1 
DE -1.0 -0.2 -0.5 0.9 1.6 -0.9 -1.4 0.7 -0.3 -0.3 
DK 1.6 -1.2 2.3 2.6 0.5 1.2 0.5 1.0 1.1 -0.7 
EE 0.5 -1.0 -0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 -1.7 0.4 -0.9 0.4 
ES -0.5 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.6 -0.2 0.4 
FI 1.1 1.5 1.0 0.5 -1.9 2.0 -0.7 -1.2 1.4 -0.5 
FR -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.3 
GR 0.3 -1.0 -1.2 -0.5 1.6 0.0 0.7 0.8 -1.5 0.7 
HU -0.2 -1.8 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.6 0.9 
IE 0.6 1.4 0.5 0.2 -1.2 -0.5 1.6 -2.0 -1.0 -1.1 
IS 2.0 0.6 1.4 -0.3 -0.4 1.1 0.8 -2.9 1.1 -1.0 
IT -1.0 -0.3 -1.4 -0.6 0.4 -1.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.9 0.2 
LT -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -2.3 -1.7 0.1 -0.9 0.2 0.9 0.9 
LU -0.4 0.5 -0.6 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.3 -1.7 
LV 0.0 -1.6 -1.0 -0.6 1.8 0.0 -0.9 1.0 -0.4 0.8 
NL 1.2 1.7 0.7 1.5 0.7 0.6 -0.3 -1.4 0.2 -2.9 
PL -1.7 -0.8 -1.1 -1.1 -0.1 -2.3 1.8 0.1 1.3 0.7 
PT -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 0.3 0.8 -0.9 -1.2 0.4 -0.9 0.8 
SE 1.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.5 0.9 2.1 0.9 
SI -0.1 0.5 0.6 -0.5 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.2 1.0 
SK -1.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 0.6 -0.5 0.0 -1.2 0.8 
GB -0.4 1.2 0.7 0.9 -0.1 -0.3 1.4 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 
Source: European Values Survey 1999 (individual weights used)  
Norway did not participate in the EVS 1999 
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Figure 3.31 Average of z-scores for 10 gender-role attitudes questions 
 
Source: European Values Survey 1999. 
 
Figure 3.32 shows a positive (but not statistically significant) relationship between 
the gender-role attitudes and female participation rate 31  (R=0.28). However, the 
analysis in Section 3.4 showed that the 10 studied attitude questions form two 
separate sub-dimensions: attitudes to gender equality in the home and in the 
economic sphere (see Table 3.14).  The z-score of female participation rate has a 
higher correlation with the factor scores on the attitudes to gender equality in the 
home dimension (R=0.36, p<0.10) than with the factor scores on the gender equality 
in the economic sphere dimension (R=0.12). Although the two sub-dimensions are 
positively related (see Figure 3.15), it appears that egalitarian attitudes towards the 
sharing of caring responsibilities and household chores (Figure 3.34) are related to 
higher female labour market participation to a greater extent than egalitarian attitudes 
to equality in the economic sphere (Figure 3.34). It is not clear, however, whether 
more egalitarian attitudes lead to higher female labour market participation or the 
other way around. There is no evident association between the gender-role attitudes 
and any of the other gender equality outcomes, although the correlation coefficients 
are of expected signs32. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31
 The correlation between average gender role attitudes and the participation rate of married women 
without a university degree, with the youngest child aged 0-4, is R=0.51, p<0.05).  
32
 R=-0.19 for gender-role attitudes and the index of segregation; R=-0.18 for the median gender wage 
gap amongst full-time employees (R=-0.25 for the median gender wage gap amongst all employees). 
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Figure 3.32 Average gender-role attitudes (z-score) and female participation 
rate 
 
Source: European Values Survey 1999; EU-SILC 2007, women aged 25-55. 
R=0.28 
 
Figure 3.33 Attitudes to gender equality in the home and female participation 
rate  
 
Source: European Values Survey 1999; EU-SILC 2007, women aged 25-55. 
R=0.36, p<0.10. 
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Figure 3.34 Attitudes to gender equality in the economic sphere and female 
participation rate 
 
Source: European Values Survey 1999; EU-SILC 2007, women aged 25-55. 
R=0.12 (R=0.29 if Greece is excluded). 
 
The work/family reconciliation index is constructed from the indicators that are 
found to be most relevant to gender equality in the labour market outcomes, such as 
female participation rate, occupational segregation and average gender wage gap for 
full-time employees. Table 3.19 (column 5) shows the average of the z-scores for six 
indicators: total paid leave reserved for fathers33; proportions of children aged 0-2 in 
formal childcare facilities; the ratio of average tax transfers net of benefits for single 
breadwinner families to that for dual earner families; and the average gender-role 
attitudes (mean of z-scores for each of 10 separate attitudes). The scale reliability of 
these four items is 0.51, which is not very high. The scale would have a higher 
reliability of 0.66 if the tax/benefit component were dropped34. This is consistent 
                                               
33
 Although total paid leave available to mothers has a higher degree of correlation with the female 
participation rate, the availability of statutory leave reserved for fathers may tell more about the 
country’s commitment to gender equality in the sharing of childcare responsibilities. Gornick and 
Meyers (2003) also used fathers’ leave in their “gender equality” index. However, if total paid leave 
available to couples were also included in the summary measure, the ranking of some of the lower 
ranking countries would be higher (e.g. Hungary). The work-family reconciliation policies index 
compiled by the OECD (2001) includes FTE maternity leave as well as total childcare leave, but it is 
more relevant to mothers’ ability to work rather than to gender equality in the labour market. 
34
 However, the correlation between the average of z-scores on all four indicators and the average of 
z-scores on just three indicators (excluding the tax/benefit component) is very high (R=0.88). The 
only outlier is Ireland which scores much higher if the tax/benefit component is included.  
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with the finding of relatively low correlation between the tax/benefit indicator and 
the measures of gender equality in the labour market. However, the indicator is 
retained here because the tax/benefit environment affecting secondary earners in 
couples is expected to affect the labour market behaviour of married women, 
especially those with lower earnings potential (Jaumotte, 2003).  
 
The composite index is modestly negatively correlated with the median hourly 
gender earnings gap amongst all employees (R=-0.28) and full-time employees only 
(R=-0.25). Figure 3.35 shows that it is also negatively correlated with the index of 
occupational segregation (R=-0.46, p<0.05). The correlation between the composite 
index and female participation rates is positive, as would be expected, but very low35 
(R=0.11). However, there is a stronger positive correlation between the composite 
index and the participation rate of married women without a university degree, with 
the youngest child aged 0-4 (R=0.48, p<0.05). 
 
Figure 3.35  Segregation index and ‘work/family reconciliation index’ 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); OECD 
Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010); EVS 1999.; EU-SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55. 
R=-0.46, p<0.05. 
 
                                               
35
 The alternative index that omits the tax/benefit indicator has a weaker correlation with the measures 
of gender wage gap and with the index of segregation (R=-0.32), but a higher correlation with the 
female participation rate (R=0.30). 
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Figure 3.36 ranks the studied countries by the value of the average z-score 
(‘work/family reconciliation index’). It appears that there are three clusters of 
countries based on the composite index. The first group comprises the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Austria, Germany, Estonia and Latvia with the lowest z-
scores (between -0.9 and -0.5). The second and largest group includes the countries 
with middling z-scores of between -0.5 and +0.3: Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, 
France, Portugal, UK, Slovenia, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The third 
and smallest group consists of countries with the highest z-scores of between +0.6 
and +1: Finland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden.  
 
The resulting ranking, however, offers a simplified picture of the cross-country 
variation in work-family reconciliation policies and gender role attitudes relevant to 
gender equality in the labour market. Hence, it needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Some of the countries ranking high on the summary index rank low on some of the 
constituent measures. For instance, Luxembourg has the second highest ranking 
overall, but it ranks below average on the egalitarian gender role attitudes component. 
Ireland is the third highest ranking country, but it ranks below average on three out 
of four indicators (while topping the ranking on the tax neutrality measure). If the 
tax/benefit indicator were excluded, Ireland would have a below average z-score. 
Only one country, Sweden, scores above average on all four indicators.   
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Table 3.19 Work/family reconciliation index 
 
FTE leave 
reserved for 
fathers              
(z-score) 
(1) 
% children aged 
0-2 in formal 
care ( z-score) 
(2) 
Average tax 
transfers net of 
benefits for 
‘single 
breadwinner’ / 
‘dual earner’    
(z-score) 
(3) 
Average gender-
role attitudes   
(z-score) 
(4) 
Average of the 
z-scores 
(5)  
AT -0.84 -1.09 0.20 -0.70 -0.61 
BE 0.18 0.81 -0.43 0.17 0.18 
CZ -0.84 -1.56 -0.83 -0.23 -0.87 
DE -0.84 -0.39 -0.73 -0.14 -0.53 
DK -0.30 2.22 -0.52 0.88 0.57 
EE -0.30 -0.75 -0.65 -0.38 -0.52 
ES -0.30 0.49 -0.01 0.25 0.11 
FI 0.70 -0.26 0.59 0.33 0.34 
FR -0.30 0.64 -0.67 0.09 -0.06 
GR -0.74 -0.91 0.69 0.00 -0.24 
HU -0.57 -1.20 1.27 -0.25 -0.19 
IE -0.84 -0.08 4.09 -0.13 0.76 
IS 1.97 1.51 -0.70 0.25 0.76 
IT 1.27 -0.26 0.14 -0.52 0.16 
LT 0.24 -0.20 -0.23 -0.49 -0.17 
LU 2.78 0.44 0.27 -0.12 0.84 
LV -0.41 -0.83 -0.57 -0.09 -0.48 
NL -0.74 1.37 -0.15 0.21 0.17 
NO 0.78 0.58 -0.09 N/A 0.42 
PL -0.84 -1.20 -0.57 -0.31 -0.73 
PT 0.00 0.11 0.03 -0.31 -0.04 
SE 1.67 1.00 0.30 1.23 1.05 
SI -0.09 0.30 -0.58 0.44 0.02 
SK -0.84 -1.54 -0.66 -0.28 -0.83 
UK -0.76 0.80 -0.19 0.11 -0.01 
Sources: Column 1 – OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus 
(2008). Column 2 – EU-SILC 2007. Column 3 - OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 
29/04/2010). Column 4 – EVS 1999. 
 
Figure 3.36 Average of z-scores – work/family reconciliation index 
 
Source: Table 3.19, colum 
 
 
 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter reviewed important work-family reconciliation policies and attitudes to 
gendered division of labour in 25 European countries. It analysed and compared 
parenthood leave policies, childcare availability and affordability, fiscal rules that 
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affect secondary earners in couples, and prevailing social norms and attitudes to 
gender equality in the home and in the economic sphere, using comparable macro 
data compiled by the OECD as well as micro data from international surveys. 
Bivariate relationships between the studied indicators and female participation rates, 
gender wage gaps and an index of occupational gender segregation were analysed. 
Finally, a summary measure of work-family reconciliation policies and gender role 
attitudes was produced in order to rank the studied countries and set the scene for 
multivariate analyses in the following chapters.  
 
Comparing parenthood leave policy designs proved to be a challenge, due to the 
complexity and multidimensionality of family leave provisions. The countries were 
ranked according to the combined measure of length and generosity (full-time 
equivalent) of the parenthood leave entitlements available to couples and mothers as 
well as reserved for fathers. Eastern European and Nordic countries tend to have the 
longest FTE paid leave available to couples and mothers. However, while Eastern 
European countries tend to provide longer paid maternity leave provisions, Nordic 
countries are more likely to have shorter maternity leave combined with longer and 
more generous parental leave. With the exception of longer paternity leave in Iceland 
and Sweden, paternity leave tends to be very short in duration, although fully paid in 
most cases. As of 2006/2007, six countries had no statutory paternity leave provision 
at all (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Slovakia).  
 
Overall, there is greater variation in the designs of parental leave than maternity or 
paternity leave. While some countries guarantee job-protected leave until the child is 
three years old at relatively low rates of benefit, others offer leave of shorter duration 
(one year or less) at higher rates of pay. However, longer and more generous parental 
leave designs do not assure a gender egalitarian distribution of entitlements between 
mothers and fathers. For example, Iceland offers the most gender egalitarian 
parenthood leave provisions, without ranking high on the generosity or length of 
leave, while Lithuania offers one of the longest and most generous entitlements to 
couples, with relatively little leave reserved for fathers.  
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Although childcare enrolment rates are not a perfect proxy for the availability of 
childcare services, evidence from the EU-SILC 2007 suggests that there is still 
considerable unmet demand for accessible non-parental childcare for pre-school 
children in Europe. Formal childcare services for children under the age of three 
appear to be particularly scarce. Only eight out of 25 countries studied in this chapter 
have at least 33% of 0-2-year-olds in formal childcare services, attaining the 
Barcelona target for this age group. However, in two of these countries (the UK and 
the Netherlands), average weekly hours in formal childcare do not reach 20 hours. 
Including registered childminders in the definition of formal childcare noticeably 
increases childcare enrolment rates, highlighting the importance of this type of non-
parental childcare for children under three (though not for those between the age of 
three and mandatory school age) in most countries. Enrolment rates for children 
between the age of three and compulsory school age are considerably higher than 
enrolment rates for 0-2-year-olds, but the Barcelona target of 90% for this age group 
is met in only nine countries.  
 
Unsurprisingly, more children under the age of three attend formal childcare in 
countries that spend a higher proportion of their GDP on childcare and early 
education, on average. Contrary to what might be expected, however, no association 
between childcare fees (or net costs to parents) and enrolment rates for 0-2-year-olds 
is found, indicating that availability and affordability of childcare do not necessarily 
go hand in hand. Given high rates of informal childcare usage in countries with lower 
formal childcare enrolment rates, availability of childcare services for very young 
children may be a more serious problem than affordability.  
 
 Tax and benefit rules affecting married couples, particularly those with dependent 
children, further complicate the analysis of work incentives for women. Countries 
with individual taxation systems appear to be more favourable to dual-earner 
households, on balance. However, in individual taxation countries with benefits 
dependent on joint household income, spouses with lower earnings potential still face 
high marginal tax rates when entering employment due to the withdrawal of benefit 
income. In the majority of the studied countries in families without children, 
secondary earners face somewhat higher tax rates (when entering work on two-thirds 
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of average wage or average wage) than single individuals or primary earners (with 
non-working spouses) on the same income. Only in Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Sweden and the UK is there no difference in tax rates for primary, 
secondary and single earners entering work on two-thirds of average wage or average 
wage. However, when dependent children are present, secondary earners face 
considerably higher tax rates than comparable primary earners or lone parents, due to 
family benefits (and other benefits) being assessed on total household income. 
Although it still pays for secondary earners with children to work when in-work costs 
are disregarded (e.g. childcare fees), the gains from employment would be lower if 
in-work costs were fully accounted for36.     
 
Gender-role attitudes vary considerably across the countries studied in this chapter. 
Women have more gender egalitarian attitudes than men, on average. As expected, 
traditional gender-role attitudes tend to be more prevalent in Catholic countries 
(including the new accession states) than in Protestant countries (Britain and 
Scandinavia). Although, overall, countries that have more egalitarian attitudes to 
gender equality in the home also have more egalitarian attitudes to gender equality in 
the economic sphere, there are five notable exceptions to this pattern. Iceland, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Britain all score higher on the equality in the 
home dimension than their low scores on the equality in the market dimension would 
predict.  
 
Finally, the studied institutional and cultural factors that were found to be most 
relevant to gender equality in the division of market and non-market work produced 
a summary measure of work-family reconciliation policies and gender role attitudes. 
Similarly to the findings in OECD (2001), Gornick and Meyers (2003) and Ray et al. 
(2010), Scandinavian countries top the ranking on this composite index. Benelux 
countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) also rank highly, followed by the 
UK, France and, finally, Germany. At the same time, the new accession states tend to 
rank very low on the studied measure. Slovenia is the only exception, with the 
highest ranking of all the new accession countries, due to its above average scores on 
the proportion of children aged 0-2 in formal childcare and on egalitarian gender-role 
                                               
36
 The OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator does not include childcare costs in its modelling. 
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attitudes. Mediterranean countries tend to rank higher than the new accession states, 
but they lag behind Scandinavian and Benelux countries. Austria and Germany rank 
particularly low (along with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland), due to their 
lack of statutory paternity leave, low availability of formal childcare for very young 
children, the tax regime favouring single earner families over dual earner families37 
and more traditional gender-role attitudes. 
 
As expected, the composite index is negatively associated with the measures of 
gender inequality in the labour market. A moderately negative correlation between 
the work/family reconciliation index and the measure of occupational gender 
segregation is observed. This suggests that men and women are more likely to work 
in different occupational categories in the countries with more traditional gender-role 
attitudes and less egalitarian work/family reconciliation policies. However, the 
negative correlation with the median gender wage gap (amongst full-time employees 
and amongst all employees) is somewhat weaker. This suggests that factors other 
than work/family reconciliation policies and gender-role attitude, such as labour 
market institutions, may influence gender wage gaps. Furthermore, work/family 
reconciliation policies tend to have wider goals than gender equality in the labour 
market, such as fertility and child well-being. Although the composite index is 
positively related to the female participation rate, the strength of the correlation is 
quite low. This is largely because the tax/benefit component of the index has a weak 
correlation with the average female participation rate. Moreover, it is not surprising 
to find a relatively weak correlation between the composite index and the overall 
female participation rate, given that work/family reconciliation policies do not 
influence all women equally.  
 
Although this chapter used a variety of comparable macro level indicators, the 
analysis highlighted the need for more types of harmonised data sources. There 
appears to be a notable lack of comparable data on take-up rates of paternity and 
parental leave by fathers in the EU38. This is partly due to difficulties in identifying 
                                               
37
 With regard to the studied scenario: household income of 133% APW, couple family, two children 
aged four and six (see Table 3.8). 
38
 The OECD Family Database reports information on paternity leave usage rates, rather than take-up, 
for fathers with children under the age of one based on the European Labour Force Survey. No 
distinction is made, however, between maternity, paternity or parental leave. 
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the eligible group. Furthermore, there is a lack of comprehensive statistics on 
childcare quality, although the OECD Family Database provides average child-to-
carer ratios in formal childcare facilities for 0-3-year-olds in selected countries 
(OECD, 2010). Finally, no comparable information on the availability and 
affordability of childcare places, for those who want them, appears to be publicly 
available. Although there are statistics on childcare enrolment rates for all children in 
a certain age group as well as on average childcare fees (or net costs to parents) for 
selected family scenarios, it is still difficult to infer precisely to what extent there is 
an unmet demand for formal childcare places. 
 
Another limitation of the analysis in this chapter is that it does not allow the 
identification of causal relationships between the studied macro-level factors. Thus, 
it cannot be ascertained whether and to what extent the studied work-family 
reconciliation policies affect the labour force participation of women, gender wage 
gaps and occupational gender segregation. Furthermore, not all possible policies that 
might reasonably affect gender equality outcomes in the workplace are included in 
this study. A more comprehensive analysis, which is beyond scope of the present 
study, might include data on labour market institutions, such as collective bargaining 
coverage, employment market regulation and product market regulation. 
Nevertheless, this chapter analysed harmonised data covering 25 European countries 
to study the variations in work/family reconciliation policies and gender-role 
attitudes relevant to the gender division of labour in the home and in the labour 
market, and to rank the countries on a summary measure. In doing so, the analysis 
made two contributions to the comparative literature on work-family reconciliation 
policies in Europe. Firstly, it included a wider range of indicators than previous 
studies that focused primarily on parenthood leave and childcare policies. Secondly, 
new accession states were included in the analysis.  
 
The next chapter uses comparable longitudinal data for the period 1994 to 2001 to 
examine the relationship between recent childbirth and the relative risks of switching 
to part-time, inactivity or unemployment for full-time women in 13 European 
countries. It also analyses the relationship between switching from full-time to part-
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time work and the risk of occupational downgrading for both male and female 
employees. 
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Chapter 4 Activity changes and occupational transitions  
Although female participation in the labour force in industrialised countries has 
increased considerably in recent decades, women’s position in the labour market 
remains worse than men’s (OECD, 2008, p.140). Some of this gender inequality can 
be explained by women’s greater role in caring for children (Brewer & Paull, 2006). 
New mothers often take time out of employment following childbirth, but the human 
capital theory predicts that spells out of the labour force have a negative effect on 
lifetime earnings (Mincer & S. Polachek, 1974). Although part-time employment can 
be a way to alleviate the work-family conflict, as an alternative to non-participation, 
it too may have negative consequences for women’s careers (Crompton & Lyonette, 
2008). This chapter examines the association between recent childbirth and the 
likelihood of switching to part-time employment, inactivity or unemployment for 
full-time working women. Then it explores the relationship between switching from 
full-time to part-time work and occupational downgrading, using comparable 
longitudinal data from 13 European countries for the period 1994-200139.  
 
Literature review 
Several studies investigate the timing of women’s return to work after childbirth in a 
comparative perspective. Gutiérrez-Domènech (2005a) examines transitions from 
employment to non-employment for mothers in Belgium, West Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Sweden, using retrospective data from the United Nations Family and 
Fertility Survey (1992-1993). The study finds the highest decline in female post-birth 
employment in Spain and West Germany. Women with the highest level of education 
are more likely to return to work sooner in all countries except Sweden, where no 
significant differences by education level are found. 
 
Similarly, Gustafsson et al. (1996) find that education is not an important predictor of 
when women will return to work after childbirth in Sweden, while in Germany and 
Britain mothers with more years of work experience tend to return to work quicker. 
Their study uses data from national panel surveys for the period from the early 1980s 
to the early 1990s.  A subsequent study of timing of return to work after first birth in 
                                               
39
 The research presented in this chapter was funded by the European Commission under the 6th 
Framework Programme’s Research Infrastructures Action (Trans-national Access Contract RITA 
026040) hosted by IRISS C/I at CEPS/INSTEAD, Differdange (Luxembourg).   
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Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden over two decades (1980s-1990s) also 
shows that more educated mothers leave full-time housewife status significantly 
quicker in all the studied countries except Sweden (Gustafsson et al., 2002).  
 
Dex et al. (1998)  study female employment transitions after childbirth in the UK, 
using the National Child Development Study (NCDS) for the cohort of women born 
in 1958. They find that highly educated women are the most likely to stay in 
continuous employment around childbirth, suggesting a growing polarization 
between outcomes for highly educated and high earning mothers and those with 
lower education and wages. At the same time, the age of the youngest child is still 
the most important predictor of labour force participation for women with pre-school 
children. In a later study, Dex et al. (2008) find that although most of the highly 
educated women from the NCDS cohort delayed childbirth until their thirties and 
returned to work within a year after giving birth, almost a quarter (24%) of them 
returned to an occupation with a lower status, mostly due to working part-time.  
 
At the same time, Saurel-Cubizolles et al. (1999) investigate the female rates of 
return to work in the first year after childbirth in France, Italy and Spain. They find 
that 80% of mothers in France, 78% in Italy and 53% in Spain return to work by the 
time of their child’s first birthday. However, the samples used are not nationally 
representative, as only selected maternity units in a number of regions were included 
in the surveys. Public sector workers are the most likely to return to work within a 
year after childbirth in all three countries. French and Spanish women are also more 
likely to return to work if they have a higher level, professional or intermediate 
occupation. Women who worked part-time before the birth are the least likely to 
return within a year in all three countries.    
 
However, in a comparative study of nine European countries, using the ECHP 1994-
2001, Pronzato (2009) finds that institutional characteristics play a bigger role than 
human capital characteristics in determining the timing of return to work after 
childbirth for women. In countries with longer periods of job protection women are 
more likely to start working again by the time the child is one year old, but they 
return to work at a slower rate if parental leave is paid. When the child is two, the 
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positive effect of job protected leave is largest for medium and highly educated 
women, but when the child is three, the effect is largest for lower educated women. 
However, these differences by education are found to be smaller in countries with 
more generous parental leave arrangements, such as Finland.  
 
Del Boca et al. (2008) find that social policies, such as the availability of part-time 
work and childcare facilities, parental leave and child allowances, can have 
significant impacts on women’s labour market participation, particularly that of less 
educated women. They analyse the joint decision to work and to have children by 
women aged 21-45 with partners in seven European countries using the sixth (1999) 
wave of the ECHP. The study shows that the availability of ‘good quality’ part-time 
work significantly increases the chances of participation; the proportion of children 
aged 0-2 using childcare facilities significantly increases the probability of working; 
the length of optional parental leave first positively affects labour market 
participation, but then starts to decline; while family allowances tend to reduce 
participation. Similarly, Uunk et al. (2005) find a less negative effect of childbirth on 
female labour supply both in countries with more generous public childcare 
provision and in less affluent countries, using panel data from the ECHP. 
 
Ondrich et al. (1996) study the effects of the changes in West German maternity 
leave and benefit policy using data for the period from 1984 to 1991. They find that 
since maternity leave and benefits provision have become more generous, German 
mothers with more years of labour market experience and years of full-time work 
before childbirth are more likely to return to work after using up their maternity 
leave than mothers with weaker attachment to the labour force. In addition, a 
subsequent study finds that first-time mothers are less likely to return to work than 
mothers with previous children, possibly because the latter already have experience 
of arranging out-of-home infant care (Ondrich et al., 2003).  
  
At the same time, discontinuous employment may have adverse consequences for 
mothers’ careers, such as lower lifetime earnings through the loss of human capital 
and direct earnings foregone while out of the labour force (Gustafsson, 2001, p.236). 
An analysis of 1998 West German data, for example, shows that career breaks take a 
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toll on women’s wages, particularly if the break occurs later in the career (Beblo & 
Wolf, 2000). Based on the US National Longitudinal Surveys of Labour Market 
Experience, Shapiro and Mott (1994) find that the earnings premium to uninterrupted 
work around the first birth for women in 1987 (14-19 years after their first birth) is 
around 19% for white women and 7% for black women.  
 
Part-time employment can be an alternative to economic inactivity or full-time work 
for women with children, accommodating both the desires to spend time with the 
family and to stay in the labour market. However, negative economic outcomes of 
part-time work are well documented in the literature. These may include wage 
penalties (Manning & Petrongolo, 2008; Bardasi & Janet Gornick, 2008), 
concentration in low pay and low status jobs (Connolly & Gregory, 2008),  reduced 
access to training and occupational benefits (OECD, 2002), as well as less job 
security and fewer career advancement opportunities (Rosenfeld & Birkelund, 1995). 
Although, on balance, part-time working women in Europe40 typically report higher 
levels of satisfaction with their working hours, part-time workers in low status 
occupations tend to report lower levels of subjective economic well-being, such as 
satisfaction with their financial situation, (Warren, 2008). As part-time workers are 
considerably more likely to be women than men (Buddelmeyer et al., 2005), it is 
women who disproportionately bear the short- and long-term-costs of part-time 
employment.  
 
The nature and levels of part-time work by women differ considerably across Europe. 
The Netherlands consistently led with the highest female part-time work rates (over 
65%), followed by the UK with over 40% of employed women aged 25-59 working 
part-time in 1994-2001, according to the official Eurostat statistics (Table A 4-1 in 
Annex 4). At the same time, fewer than 15% of women worked part-time in the 
Southern Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) and in Finland. 
However, in these countries the share of involuntary41 part-time employment among 
women working part-time was highest (over 20%), while women typically chose to 
                                               
40
 Based on data from the Seventh (2000) wave of the ECHP.  
41
 ‘Persons working on an involuntary part-time basis are those who declare that they work part-time 
because they are unable to find full-time work’ (Labour Force Survey metadata, Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN /lfsq_esms.htm). 
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work part-time in the Netherlands and in the UK (Table A 4-2). Remarkably, in 2001 
the share of involuntary female part-time employment was 51% in Greece and only 2% 
in the Netherlands. Countries with higher rates of female part-time employment tend 
to have lower shares of involuntary part-time employment: there was a high negative 
correlation (R=-0.81, p<0.001) between these rates for the EU-15 in 2001.  
 
Switching from full-time to part-time employment may also be associated with 
downward occupational mobility (that is, moving to an occupation with a lower 
status, educational requirements, responsibilities or payment than before). Connolly 
and Gregory (2008) order occupations by average skill requirements and investigate 
movements between the resulting 15 job categories amongst prime-age women, 
using data from the New Earnings Survey Panel and the BHPS 1991-200142. The 
results from both surveys suggest a high incidence of occupational downgrading 
amongst women who move from full-time to part-time work. Although the study is 
not limited to mothers, the risk of downgrading while switching from full-time to 
part-time hours of work increases modestly with the presence of pre-school children 
in the household43. However, the risk drops again when the youngest child starts 
school. In contrast, Gutiérrez-Domènech (2005b) orders occupations by average 
occupational wage into four categories 44  and finds no evidence of downward 
occupational mobility amongst Spanish women who move from full-time to part-
time work after their first birth, using retrospective data from the 1995 Spanish 
Family and Fertility Survey. The author suggests that the finding could be explained 
by the relative paucity of full-time to part-time transitions after motherhood in Spain, 
as opposed to transitions to non-employment.     
 
Although several papers analyse the timing of women’s return to work after child-
birth in a sample of European countries45, fewer studies investigate activity and 
                                               
42
 A 15-occupation ranking is based on the average level of qualification held by full-time adult men 
and women working in the occupation, using data from the 2000 Labour Force Survey. 
43
 Evaluated at the sample means (BHPS), the probability of downgrading when moving from full-
time to part-time work increases by 4ppt for women with pre-school children who stay with their 
current employer and by 6ppt for those who switch employers.   
44
 Coefficients on occupation dummies are estimated in a log-wage equation controlling for age and 
square age for women aged 16-49 in the 1994-95 wave of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) and divided into four categories (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005b, pp.126-127) .  
45For exampele, Pronzato (2009) for Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, Austria, UK and 
Finland ; Gutiérrez-Domènech (2005a) for Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden; 
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occupational transitions of employed women after childbirth in a cross-national 
perspective. No studies to date analyse occupational downgrading for men who 
switch from full-time to part-time work. This chapter uses data from a harmonized 
cross-national longitudinal survey to study the relationship between childbirth and 
women’s transitions from full-time employment to part-time employment, 
unemployment or inactivity in 13 European countries over the period 1994-2001. 
The relationship between activity transitions and occupational downgrading is 
explored for both men and women. It is then investigated further for women, 
particularly in countries where childbirth is found to be related to an increased 
probability of switching from full-time to part-time work. The study uses two 
different definitions of occupational downgrading: moving to an occupation that is 
below the previous one in terms of average qualification and moving to an 
occupation that ranks lower in terms of average hourly earnings.  
 
The next section describes the data and the econometric model for the analyses of: 1) 
recent childbirth and women’s labour market transitions and 2) the association 
between full-time to part-time transitions and occupational mobility. The rest of the 
chapter presents the summary statistics of labour market and occupational transitions 
for men and women in Europe and discusses the results from multivariate analyses 
for women only. The final section summarises the main findings and concludes the 
chapter.  
 
Data, sample and estimation technique 
The study uses data from the ECHP. This is a standardised cross-national household-
based annual longitudinal survey, designed and coordinated at the EU level. The 
panel ran between 1994 and 2001, producing eight waves of data on multiple topics, 
including demographics, labour market activity and income. The survey provides 
harmonised data on households and individuals from 15 pre-enlargement EU 
countries (EU-15). Austria joined the survey in the second wave in 1995, Finland in 
the third wave in 1996, and Sweden in the fourth wave in 1997. See Peracchi (2002) 
for a review of the ECHP structure and a discussion of methodological and statistical 
issues relevant to economic research.  
                                                                                                                                     
Gustafsson et al. (1996) for Sweden, Germany and Britain; Saurel-Cubizolles et al. (1999) for France, 
Italy and Spain. 
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The ECHP was replaced with the EU-SILC in 2004 under Regulation (EC) no. 
1177/2003 (European Union, 2003). Although the EU-SILC has become the main 
EU-wide instrument for collecting micro-level information on income and social 
exclusion, it provides a more limited set of variables than the ECHP and produces a 
shorter panel, using a four year rotational panel design for most countries46. Also, the 
EU-SILC does not use a standardised questionnaire for all participating states, so 
information on several important variables, such as years in paid work, is sometimes 
unavailable for several countries (see Chapter 5). This chapter, therefore, uses the 
ECHP because it provides labour market activity data on the same individuals for up 
to eight years, as well as detailed fertility data and information on important personal 
and workplace characteristics. The following 13 countries are included in the 
analysis: Germany (sample based on the German Socio-Economic Panel), Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom (sample based on the BHPS), 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland. Sweden is excluded 
because it provides cross-sectional data only (and has no information on gross 
earnings) and Luxembourg because of its relatively small sample size.   
 
The analysis is based on the sample of  individuals aged 25-55 in order to disregard 
the cross national age differences in the timing and pattern of entry into and exit from 
the labour force. Although this age restriction excludes women who had children 
before the age of 25 from the sample and, therefore, disregards the potential effects 
of childbirth on the labour market behaviour of younger women, it ensures that 
women who may still be in education or training are excluded and facilitates 
comparison with the results in Chapters 5 and 6. The tiny minority of respondents 
with missing main activity information were also excluded from the analysis. 
Employment is defined here as being in paid work for at least 15 hours a week, 
including both employees and the self-employed47 . The minority of respondents 
whose main activity is an apprenticeship or another type of paid training are also 
defined as employed. Unfortunately, those working or studying under 15 hours a 
week constitute a separate category in the ECHP ('work/study < 15 hours') and no 
information is given on the starting year of the current job. Therefore, they are 
                                               
46
 For a more detailed discussion of the differences between the ECHP and EU-SILC, see Whelan and 
Maitre (2007). 
47
 However, the self-employed have no information on gross earnings. 
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defined as being out of the labour force in this study. However, this is a temporary 
activity, since more than half of these individuals make a transition to another state in 
each wave. To sum up, individuals whose main activity is paid employment, self-
employment, or paid training of at least 15 hours a week are defined as being 
employed. The self-reported unemployed form a separate category, while the rest are 
defined as being inactive. Table A 4-3 reports frequencies of main activity for men 
and women in each country.   
 
The chapter uses a self-assessed measure of part-time status because the legal 
definitions of part-time work and the length of a typical working week may vary 
across the studied countries. For individuals for whom the self-defined information 
on part-time or full-time status is missing, data on weekly hours worked are used 
instead. Following the approach in Manning and Petrongolo (2008), in such cases 
part-time employees are defined as those working less than 30 hours a week (25 
hours for teaching professionals).  
 
Labour market activity transitions are studied at the annual level. Although monthly 
transitions would be more precise, a large proportion of respondents have missing 
information on the month of end of their previous job or the start of their current job, 
particularly in Germany. Yearly, rather than monthly, transitions are studied in 
Manning and Petrongolo (2008) and in Buddelmeyer et al. (2005), who also used the 
ECHP. Pronzato (2009) uses monthly employment and fertility information from the 
ECHP but excludes Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, which have entirely 
missing monthly data on employment or fertility, and imputes the month of start of 
work for 10% of the remaining cases.  
 
Gross hourly wages are constructed from gross monthly earnings and weekly 
working hours in the main job, including paid overtime. Derived hourly earnings are 
then deflated using the 2005 Consumer Price Index in order to study transitions 
between better or worse paid occupations in each country using real wages.  
 
Children are defined as individuals aged 16 or younger living in the household. A 
dummy for a new birth in wave t is constructed using information on child-parent 
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pairs from the ECHP 'relationship' file and the year of birth of the child. The month 
of birth was not used because this information was entirely missing for the German 
sample and because labour market activity transitions were studied at the annual 
level. Step, adopted and foster children are also defined as children as long as they 
are under 17 years old and live in the household. A new birth is observed in wave t if 
the year of birth of the youngest (or sole) child in the household is the same as the 
year of the parent's personal interview in wave t or if the year of birth of the child is 
one year before the parent's personal interview but was not reported at the previous 
year's interview (as the child was born between the two interviews). Thus, a birth that 
occurs in wave t after the parent's personal interview is recorded as a new birth in 
wave t+1.     
 
Table A 4-4 reports the means of the workplace characteristics of employed men and 
women across the eight waves of the ECHP48. In all of the studied countries, men are 
more likely to have supervisory duties than women, with the largest gender 
differences observed in Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK and the 
smallest differences in the Southern European countries. A similar pattern holds for 
the sub-sample of full-time workers, except that the gender gap in the proportion of 
those with supervisory duties falls noticeably in the UK (Table A 4-7). Women are 
also uniformly more likely than men to work in the public sector, particularly in the 
UK, Finland and Denmark, and to hold temporary contracts. The largest gender 
differences in the proportions of temporary workers are found in Ireland and the 
smallest gender differences are observed in Denmark. Men have higher log hourly 
earnings, on average, in all of the studied countries, with the largest gender gap 
observed in the UK and the smallest in Italy.  
 
Men are also uniformly more likely to work in managerial occupations (including 
legislators, senior officials, and managers) than women, particularly in the 
Netherlands and the UK (Table A 4-5). The smallest gender differences are found in 
the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and France). At the same time, 
women are over-represented in the clerical and sales/services occupations, while men 
are over-represented in crafts and related trades as well as in ‘plant and machine 
                                               
48
 Seven waves in Austria and six waves in Finland.  
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operators and assemblers’ occupations. A similar pattern is observed among both 
full-time (Table A 4-8) and part-time workers (Table A 4-11). Using the Labour 
Force Survey 2000, Bettio (2002) reports the highest levels of occupational 
segregation, measured using the Duncan and Duncan (1955) Index of Dissimilarity, 
in Denmark, Sweden and Finland and the lowest in Greece and Italy.  
Occupational moves upwards or downwards are defined using two different 
approaches. Following Connolly and Gregory (2008), the first method uses average 
qualification levels within each occupation to derive an occupational ranking 
separately for each country. Using one-way analysis of variance, average levels of 
education49 were compared across nine major International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO-88) categories for all employees (male and female workers 
combined) separately by country. The occupational categories with similar average 
qualification levels were merged to create a seven-category ranking.  The second 
approach uses average hourly wages (converted to 2005 price levels and transformed 
onto a logarithmic scale) to order occupations within each country. The resulting 
number of significantly different categories varies between countries, however (from 
the lowest of five to the highest of seven categories). Unlike Gutiérrez-Domènech 
(2005b) who uses women’s log-wages and controls for age and age squared to order 
occupations, this paper uses average wages for the combined sample of male and 
female employees without controlling for age in order to create a ranking that is 
more representative of the employed population in each country.  
 
The analysis is done in two steps for women in Europe. First, the effects of childbirth 
on the probability of moving from full-time work to three alternative labour market 
states (part-time work, unemployment or inactivity) are investigated, controlling for 
a number of important household and occupational characteristics. Second, the 
effects of switching between full-time and part-time states, as well as changing 
employers, on the transitions between higher or lower ranked occupations are studied 
for employed women, also controlling for other relevant characteristics. Since there 
are three mutually exclusive destinations from full-time work, a competing risks 
framework is used to study the hazards of moving into part-time work, 
                                               
49
 The three-category education variable (‘highest level of general or higher education completed’) 
was recoded so that the lowest level of education (ISCED 0-2) had the score of 1 and the highest 
(ISCED 5-7) had the score of 3. 
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unemployment or inactivity. Because the time intervals are discrete (years), a 
multinomial logit model of the log odds of event of type j in period t as opposed to 
no event in this period is estimated (Allison, 1984, pp.17-18):  
 
log(hti(j)/hti (0))=α(j) (t) + β(j)’Xti(j)     j=1, …, k, where                                                 (1)                              
 
hti(j) is the hazard of the event j occurring in period t, given that no event occurred 
prior to t and hti (0) is the base (censored) outcome of no event in period t; α(j)(t) is the 
vector of the parameters for the duration variables (which can be expressed as a 
function of duration or as a vector of dummy variables for time intervals);  β(j)  is the 
vector of parameters and Xti(j) is the vector of the covariates that can be time-varying. 
It is assumed that any unobserved individual-specific effects that affect different 
destination hazards are not correlated. In all estimations, standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering within individuals, since observations are independent across 
individuals, but not necessarily across time for each individual50 . The estimated 
coefficients β(j) are exponentiated to obtain the relative risk ratios of making a 
transition to state j versus not making a transition. A discrete time competing risks 
event history (multinomial logit) model is also used to estimate the relative risks of 
moving to a higher or lower ranked occupation versus staying in the same 
occupational category.  
 
All estimations are carried out separately by country and by gender. 
  
Equation (1) does not allow for possible sample selection into (full-time) 
employment by women. Therefore, the findings should not be generalised to the 
whole female population. This chapter focuses on the labour market transitions of 
employed women and the findings are relevant for that group.  
 
Labour market activity transitions: summary statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the year-on-year transitions between four labour market states, 
separately for men and women, for the sample of 13 European countries across eight 
waves of the ECHP. Finland and Austria are excluded from the pooled sample 
                                               
50
 Using the ‘cluster’ sub-option in STATA 10.  
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because they are not present in all eight waves. There are notable differences 
between the labour market transition patterns of men and women: 
1) Full-time female workers show more mobility than male workers: 89% of 
women remain full-time in the subsequent year, compared with 95% of men.  
2) Full-time women are the most likely to switch to part-time work (4%) or 
inactivity (4%) each year, while male workers are the most likely to switch to 
unemployment (2%).  
3) Although the transition to part-time work is relatively infrequent even for 
women, it is a very stable state for those who already work part-time: 65% of 
women remain part-time the following year.  
4) For men part-time work is the most unstable state, while unemployment is the 
most unstable state for women.  
These results are comparable to those in Buddelmeyer et al. (2005)  reporting 
two-year transition matrices for the first five waves of the ECHP for the same set of 
the ECHP countries.  
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Table 4.1 Labour market transition patterns in each wave: EU-15  
 Year t+1   
 Women  
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive Total % 
Full-time      
Row % 88.7 4.4 2.9 4.1 100.0 
Column % 86.6 17.8 16.8 4.8 43.8 
Part-time      
Row % 21.9 65.0 3.3 9.8 100.0 
Column % 5.2 63.3 4.8 2.8 10.6 
Unemployed      
Row % 17.9 6.0 49.6 26.6 100.0 
Column % 3.3 4.5 54.7 5.9 8.2 
Inactive      
Row % 6.0 4.2 4.7 85.2 100.0 
Column % 5.0 14.4 23.7 86.5 37.4 
Total % 44.9 10.9 7.4 36.9 100.0 
 Men  
Full-time      
Row % 95.4 0.9 2.3 1.4 100.0 
Column % 94.2 37.4 28.6 16.2 83.1 
Part-time      
Row % 49.2 38.7 6.2 5.8 100.0 
Column % 1.2 39.3 1.9 1.7 2.0 
Unemployed      
Row % 33.7 3.3 54.1 8.9 100.0 
Column % 3.0 12.8 60.7 9.6 7.6 
Inactive      
Row % 19.0 2.9 8.2 69.9 100.0 
Column % 1.7 10.6 8.9 72.5 7.3 
Total % 84.2 2.0 6.8 7.1 100.0 
Countries: Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, UK. 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
As expected, women in countries with generally higher rates of part-time work (the 
Netherlands, the UK, Ireland and Belgium) are the most likely to switch from full-
time to part-time employment each year (Figure 4.1). Women in the Mediterranean 
and Scandinavian countries, who tend to have lower rates of part-time work 
generally, are the least likely to switch from full-time to part-time employment. 
Women in France, Austria and Germany, however, have middling transition rates 
despite their generally high levels of female part-time work (see Table A 4-1). 
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Figure 4.1 % of women (25-55) switching from full-time to part-time each 
year 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the year-on-year transition probabilities separately for women who 
gave birth in year t and those who did not: 
1) Women who reported working full-time in year t and who gave birth that year 
are less likely to remain working full-time in the subsequent year (82%) 
compared to those who did not give birth that year (89%).  
2) Full-time women who gave birth are more likely to switch to part-time work 
(8%) and inactivity (7%) the following year than those who did not, only 4% 
of whom move to part-time work and 4% to inactivity each year.  
3) Part-time women who gave birth in one year are more likely to remain part-
time in the subsequent year (69%) than those who did not give birth that year 
(65%). 
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Table 4.2  Labour market transition patterns among women in each wave 
 Year t+1  Total % 
Those who gave birth in Year t 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive  
Full-time      
Row % 81.6 8.4 2.8 7.1 100.0 
Column % 84.1 24.2 14.7 6.4 38.0 
Part-time      
Row % 17.1 68.5 2.8 11.6 100.0 
Column % 5.0 55.7 4.1 2.9 10.8 
Unemployed      
Row % 16.7 6.9 45.0 31.4 100.0 
Column % 3.6 4.2 49.5 5.9 8.0 
Inactive      
Row % 6.3 4.9 5.3 83.5 100.0 
Column % 7.3 16.0 31.7 84.8 43.2 
Total % 36.9 13.2 7.3 42.6 100.0 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
Full-time      
Row % 89.1 4.2 2.9 3.9 100.0 
Column % 86.8 17.3 16.9 4.7 44.2 
Part-time      
Row % 22.2 64.8 3.4 9.6 100.0 
Column % 5.2 63.9 4.8 2.8 10.6 
Unemployed      
Row % 17.9 5.9 49.9 26.3 100.0 
Column % 3.2 4.5 55.1 5.9 8.2 
Inactive      
Row % 5.9 4.1 4.7 85.3 100.0 
Column % 4.8 14.3 23.2 86.6 37.0 
Total % 45.4 10.7 7.4 36.5 100.0 
Countries: Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, UK. 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table A 4-13 to Table A 4-25 in Annex 4 report the yearly transition matrices 
separately by country. Figure 4.2 shows that full-time female workers who gave birth 
in year t are the most likely to remain full-time the following year in Denmark and 
the Mediterranean countries (85%-90%) and the least likely to do so in the 
Netherlands, Austria and Germany (50%-60%). The finding of the highest rate for 
Denmark is not surprising, given its high female participation rates and the finding of 
a relatively high ranking on the work/family reconciliation policy index constructed 
in Chapter 3, particularly on its childcare component. It is more remarkable to find 
high rates of remaining in full-time work after childbirth for the Mediterranean 
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countries. However, Uunk et al. (2005) also observe comparatively small negative 
effects of childbirth on working hours for women in these countries, using the ECHP 
1994-1999. Controlling for public childcare provision and the level of each country’s 
affluence, they find a smaller reduction in post-birth working hours for women in 
less affluent countries, such as Portugal.  
Figure 4.2  % of women (25-55) remaining full-time in year t+1 after last 
birth in year t 
 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
However, the full-time rate in year t+1 for women who gave birth in year t is likely 
to be over-estimated because some of these women would be on maternity or 
parental leave. Unfortunately, the ECHP does not use maternity/parental leave as a 
separate labour market activity category, so women may choose between inactivity 
and work responses. The two-year transitions (t-2, t+2, last birth at t) may show a 
more realistic picture of women’s activity around childbirth. Figure 4.3 summarises 
the probabilities of remaining full-time two years after the last birth for women who 
had worked full-time two years before childbirth. The estimated probabilities are 
consistently lower than these in the year-on-year analysis in Figure 4.2 but the 
country variation pattern is similar. The Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries 
still have the highest rates of staying in full-time work, while the rates are still lowest 
in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. 
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Figure 4.3 % of women (25-55) who worked full-time in year t-2 working 
full-time in year t+2 after last birth in year t 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Occupational transitions: summary statistics 
Table 4.3 reports yearly occupational transitions upwards or downwards, by skill 
(panel 1) and by occupational wage (panel 2), separately for male and female 
workers. Overall, occupational upgrading and downgrading are infrequent events 
relative to staying in the occupational category of the same ranking. Changes in the 
occupational ranking are the most infrequent in France in terms of both skill and 
occupational wage for both men and women. Occupational transitions by skill are the 
most frequent in the UK for women and in Belgium for men, while occupational 
moves by wage are the most frequent in Belgium for both men and women. Overall, 
upward occupational moves are just as likely as downward moves, particularly for 
women. This suggests that women are not uniformly losing out on occupational 
status: while some move down, others move up. Men are also about as likely to 
upgrade as to downgrade both by skill and occupational wage. For all other countries, 
the absolute difference between downgrading and upgrading is within 0.5 percentage 
points for both women and men (with the exception of Finland for men).  
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Table 4.3  Occupational transitions by skill (row %) 
 By skill (1) By occupational wage (2) 
 Female workers 
 Same  Up  Down N Same  Up  Down N 
Denmark 92.0 4.0 4.1 7,425 88.6 5.6 5.8 5301 
Netherlands 80.8 9.6 9.7 12,130 76.2 12.1 11.7 8,372 
Belgium 82.4 8.7 8.9 6,094 74.6 12.5 12.9 4,246 
France 95.6 2.3 2.2 15,199 94.0 3.0 3.0 11,088 
Ireland 83.7 8.0 8.4 6,150 76.5 11.7 11.9 3,987 
Italy 86.1 7.0 6.9 14,926 87.0 6.6 6.5 10,701 
Greece 90.9 4.5 4.6 8,001 87.6 6.0 6.4 5,361 
Spain 83.9 8.1 8.0 11,134 76.1 12.0 11.9 7,194 
Portugal 84.4 7.7 7.9 12,312 84.8 7.6 7.5 8,887 
Austria 84.3 7.8 7.9 7,209 80.7 9.5 9.8 5,096 
Finland 90.0 4.9 5.2 8,929 86.7 6.4 6.9 6,190 
Germany 87.5 6.4 6.1 15,661 82.8 8.6 8.6 11,134 
UK 79.2 10.6 10.2 12,235 77.2 11.5 11.3 8,970 
 Male workers 
Denmark 89.1 5.5 5.4 8,064 84.9 7.5 7.6 6,124 
Netherlands 77.9 11.3 10.9 18,117 78.7 10.9 10.4 13,970 
Belgium 75.4 12.4 12.3 7,661 64.6 17.6 17.7 5,609 
France 93.9 3.0 3.1 18,117 92.2 3.9 3.8 13,839 
Ireland 85.1 7.6 7.3 10,614 78.13 11.15 10.72 7,706 
Italy 83.1 8.3 8.6 25,451 85.7 7.0 7.2 19,383 
Greece 88.9 5.5 5.7 16,582 89.3 5.2 5.5 12,644 
Spain 81.5 9.4 9.1 21,411 72.4 13.9 13.7 15,560 
Portugal 84.5 7.8 7.8 16,556 86.4 6.7 6.9 12,933 
Austria 81.4 9.5 9.1 9,985 76.7 11.7 11.6 7,588 
Finland 88.5 5.4 6.1 9,605 84.8 7.1 8.0 6,861 
Germany 85.2 7.4 7.5 21,070 81.7 9.1 9.2 16,152 
UK 77.6 11.3 11.1 13,456 76.9 11.6 11.5 10,572 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the transitions upwards or downwards for the workers who switch 
from full-time to part-time work at the same time. Occupational moves are more 
likely for those who switch from full-time to part-time work than for the working 
population overall. Female workers are the most likely to move downwards by skill 
in Finland (20%) and the least likely to do so in France (4%); by occupational wage, 
female workers are the most likely to move downwards in the UK (20%) and the 
least likely to do so in France (5%). Male workers who switch from full-time to part-
time work are the most likely to move downwards by skill in the Netherlands (23%) 
and by occupational wage in Germany (23%), while downward moves are the least 
frequent in France (6%) by skill and in Greece (5%) by occupational wage. Contrary 
to the results for the working population at large, downward moves are generally 
more likely than upward moves amongst those who switch from full-time to part-
time work, particularly for women in Finland. In the UK, women are marginally 
more likely to upgrade by skill51, while being substantially more likely to downgrade 
                                               
51
 Based on a 3-category occupational ranking 
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than to upgrade by occupational wage. Connolly and Gregory (2008) find that a 
quarter of women switching into part-time work downgrade by skill, while 17% 
upgrade, using data from the British Household Panel (1991-2001) and a 15-category 
occupational ranking.  
Table 4.4  Occupational transitions by skill – workers who switch from full-
time to part-time (row %) 
 By skill (1) By occupational wage (2) 
Female workers 
 Same  Up  Down N Same  Up  Down N 
Denmark 83.9 7.3 8.8 281 83.1 6.8 10.1 281 
Netherlands 68.1 14.2 17.6 756 72.9 10.8 16.3 756 
Belgium 74.2 13.5 12.4 265 73.1 13.5 13.4 265 
France 92.0 4.4 3.7 650 91.8 3.6 5.3 650 
Ireland 73.7 14.0 12.3 349 77.0 12.4 10.6 349 
Italy 77.0 8.8 14.2 639 82.1 6.8 11.1 639 
Greece 90.2 4.9 5.0 237 89.8 4.2 6.1 237 
Spain 75.3 9.3 15.4 348 80.9 8.6 10.5 348 
Portugal 74.9 12.6 12.6 280 89.8 4.2 6.0 280 
Austria 70.7 13.5 15.8 315 77.1 8.5 14.4 315 
Finland 75.1 5.3 19.6 216 78.5 3.2 18.3 216 
Germany 76.9 10.0 13.2 628 78.5 7.7 13.8 628 
UK 65.0 18.1 17.2 692 72.0 9.0 19.0 692 
Male workers 
Denmark 71.8 6.7 21.5 61 70.3 7.9 21.8 61 
Netherlands 53.8 23.2 22.9 235 69.2 13.2 17.7 235 
Belgium 71.9 16.2 11.9 60 64.8 23.3 11.1 60 
France 89.5 4.9 5.7 171 85.3 8.7 6.0 171 
Ireland 84.3 6.3 9.4 187 71.4 8.6 20.0 187 
Italy 82.0 7.5 10.5 285 87.0 5.3 7.7 285 
Greece 84.7 8.5 6.8 242 89.8 5.7 4.5 242 
Spain 76.0 9.4 14.6 160 68.4 10.5 21.1 160 
Portugal 79.4 7.0 13.6 92 83.0 7.0 10.0 92 
Austria 68.0 17.3 14.7 57 72.2 12.3 21.6 57 
Finland 73.6 10.5 15.9 78 78.3 12.1 9.5 78 
Germany 64.1 15.7 20.2 95 65.5 11.1 23.3 95 
UK 66.3 16.7 17.1 99 72.6 10.8 16.6 99 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Although men are generally less likely than women to switch from full-time to part-
time hours (Table 4.1), in about half of the studied countries, men who do so are 
more likely than women to downgrade occupationally. Thus, in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, France, Greece, Portugal and Germany men are more likely to 
downgrade by skill, with the largest gender difference in Denmark (13ppt). At the 
same time, in Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria and 
Germany, men are more likely than women to downgrade by occupational wage, 
with the largest percentage point difference in Denmark (12ppt) and Spain (11ppt). 
Amongst the countries where women are more likely to downgrade than men, the 
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largest gender differences are in Finland, 9ppt and 4ppt, and in Italy, 3ppt and 4ppt, 
by skill and occupational wage, respectively.  
Labour market activity transitions: estimation results for women 
Table A 4-26 to Table A 4-38 in Annex 4 report the estimated effects of childbirth on 
the relative hazard of switching from full-time employment to part-time work, 
unemployment or inactivity for adult women, controlling for human capital 
characteristics (number of years in the current job, age, highest level of education), 
household characteristics (giving birth in the past year, age of the youngest child, 
number of dependent children, marital status)52, workplace characteristics (sector of 
employment, occupation) and dummies for years in full-time work (Model 1). The 
second specification additionally controls for activity at the last wave (part-time or 
unemployed/inactive) to capture the effects of intermittent full-time employment 
(Model 2).  
 
Being married has significant positive associations with the hazard of moving into 
part-time work or inactivity for women in all the studied countries except Finland. In 
Denmark, married women are 52% more likely to switch from full-time to part-time 
work, everything else being equal. The effect becomes non-significant once activity 
at the last wave is controlled for, which suggests that married women in Denmark are 
more likely to experience intermittent employment. Married women in the 
Netherlands, Austria and Belgium are significantly more likely to move to part-time 
work or inactivity, although in Belgium the effect disappears when activity at the last 
wave is controlled for.  In France, Italy and Germany, married women are more 
likely to switch from full-time to part-time work, while in Ireland, Greece and Spain, 
married women are more likely to become inactive than non-married women, 
everything else being equal. In Portugal, married women are less likely to become 
unemployed, but more likely to become inactive, everything else being equal. This 
could be explained by the relative scarcity of part-time work in the Mediterranean 
countries (Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005b; Manning & Petrongolo, 2008). In the UK, 
married women who work full-time are more likely to move into part-time work and 
inactivity, but less likely to become unemployed. In Finland, married women are also 
                                               
52
 The means of the demographic and human capital variables are reported in Table A 4-6 for all 
employed men and women, Table A 4-9for full-time workers and Table A 4-12 for part-time workers. 
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less likely to move from full-time work to unemployment, with marital status having 
no significant effect on the hazards of moving into part-time work or inactivity.  
 
An interaction between having a newborn child and being married was tested (results 
not reported). In Finland, childbirth has a significant positive effect on moving into 
part-time work for married women only, while the positive effect of being married is 
only significant for women who gave birth within a year of the interview. In France, 
Greece and Portugal the interaction term is negative and significant, however. Only 
married women who did not have a recent childbirth are more likely to become 
inactive and only recent mothers who are unmarried are more likely to be inactive.   
 
Broad occupational category is also associated with the hazard of exiting full-time 
employment. Overall, women who work full-time in higher status occupations are 
less likely to switch to part-time work, unemployment or inactivity. Thus, in 
Denmark women working in professional or associate professional occupations are 
less likely to switch to part-time work, while those working in sales or services are 
more likely to do so. There are some exceptions to this pattern, however. In France, 
professional women are twice as likely to move into part-time work as those in 
operative or elementary occupations. This may be due to the higher prevalence of 
part-time work amongst professionals in France. In Italy, full-time women in any of 
the six occupational categories are significantly less likely to become unemployed 
than those in operative or elementary occupations.  
 
Full-time women who gave birth in year t are significantly more likely to switch to 
part-time work the following year in the Netherlands, Belgium (Model 1 only), Italy, 
Austria, and the UK (see Diagram 4.1 below). The relative hazard of switching to 
part-time work is around twice that for women who did not give birth in year t.  
Recent childbirth significantly increases the relative hazard of moving from full-time 
work to unemployment in Ireland, Italy, the UK (Model 1 only) and Finland.  The 
relative risk of switching to unemployment for women who gave birth in these 
countries is around three to six times higher than for women who did not give birth 
that year. In the majority of the studied countries, the Netherlands, France, Italy, 
Greece (Model 1 only), Germany, Austria, the UK and Finland, recent childbirth 
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increases the relative hazard of moving from full-time employment to inactivity by 
two to four times the hazard for women who did not give birth that year. Conversely, 
in Portugal women who gave birth in year t are significantly less likely to switch to 
inactivity the following year. Only in Denmark and Spain is it the case that recent 
childbirth is not significantly related to the hazard of exiting full-time employment, 
everything else being equal.  
 
Diagram 4.1 Effects of childbirth on the hazard of exiting full-time work for 
women  
 Part-time Unemployment Inactivity 
Denmark    
The Netherlands +  + 
Belgium + (Model 1 only)   
France   + 
Ireland  +  
Italy + + + 
Greece   + (Model 1 only) 
Spain    
Portugal   - 
Germany   + 
Austria +  + 
The UK + + (Model 1 only) + 
Finland  + + 
+ significant positive effect; - significant negative effect; p<0.10. 
 
A new birth in the household does not affect the hazard of exiting full-time 
employment for men (results not reported). There are some exceptions, however. In 
Belgium the effect of a recent birth on moving into inactivity is significantly negative 
for full-time working men. In Greece a new birth has a positive effect on moving into 
unemployment and in Spain it has a positive effect on switching to part-time work, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
Activity at the last wave (t-1) is another important predictor of the likelihood of 
exiting full-time employment for women. In Denmark, unemployment or inactivity 
in the previous wave significantly increases the hazard of moving to unemployment 
or inactivity the following year (t+1). In the Netherlands, part-time work in the 
previous year increases the hazard of switching to part-time work or inactivity the 
following year. So does unemployment or inactivity in the previous wave. In 
Belgium, part-time work, inactivity or unemployment in the previous wave increase 
the likelihood of moving to part-time work in the subsequent wave. In France, part-
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time work in the previous wave increases the hazard of moving from full-time to 
part-time work in the following wave. In Ireland, part-time work in the previous 
wave increases the hazard of moving to part-time work or unemployment, while 
unemployment or inactivity in the previous wave increases the likelihood of 
switching to inactivity. Overall, these results suggest that intermittent work history is 
associated with a lower probability of remaining in full-time work for women, which 
is not a surprising finding. 
 
Occupational transitions: estimation results for women 
Table A 4-39 to Table A 4-51 in Annex 4 report the multinomial logit estimates of 
the relative hazard of moving up or down the occupational hierarchy in terms of skill 
(specification one) or occupational wage (specification two) as opposed to staying in 
an occupation of the same ranking for employed women. Both specifications control 
for the number of years in the current job, changes in hours (staying part-time, 
moving from full to part-time work, moving from part to full-time work, as opposed 
to staying full-time), employer changes, working in the public sector, as well as 
various personal and household characteristics, such as age, education, marital status, 
number of dependent children, age of the youngest child and a recent childbirth.  
 
In all the countries where childbirth was found to be associated with an increased 
risk of moving from full-time to part-time work53 for women (except Belgium, where 
switching hours is found to have no significant relationship with the hazards of 
upgrading or downgrading), switching from full- to part-time hours increases the risk 
of occupational downgrading (see Diagram 2):  
1) The Netherlands - women who move from full-time to part-time work are 
more likely to downgrade by skill and by occupational wage than those who 
remain working full-time. In contrast, women who make the opposite move, 
from part-time to full-time work, are more likely to upgrade occupationally 
both by skill and wage.  
2) Italy - moves from full to part-time work are associated with an increased risk 
of downgrading both by skill and occupational wage, while the opposite 
moves are linked to a somewhat higher risk of upgrading than downgrading.  
                                               
53
 Netherlands, Belgium, Italy,  Austria, and the UK 
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3) Austria - switching to part-time hours is linked to a somewhat higher risk of 
downgrading than upgrading by skill and to a higher risk of downgrading by 
occupational wage.  
4) UK - switching to part-time hours increases the risk of downgrading both by 
skill54 and by occupational wage, while, at the same time, decreasing the risk 
of upgrading by wage. As expected, switching to full-time hours increases the 
risk of upgrading by occupational wage in the UK.  
5) The only other countries where switching from full to part-time work 
increases the risk of occupational downgrading, while the opposite move 
generally increases the risk of upgrading, are Germany, Finland and Spain 
(by skill only55).  
6) In the following countries, switching from full-time to part-time work does 
not significantly affect the probability of occupational downgrading or 
upgrading (by skill or by wage) at all: Denmark, Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Greece and Portugal.  
7) In all of the studied countries, except Belgium and Germany, those who 
remain in part-time work are less likely to either upgrade or downgrade than 
to remain in an occupational category of the same ranking. 
 
Diagram 4.2 Effects of switching from full-time to part-time work on the 
hazard of exiting current occupational ranking for women  
 By skill By occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Denmark     
Netherlands  +   +  
Belgium     
France     
Ireland     
Italy  +   + 
Greece     
Spain  +    
Portugal     
Germany  +   + 
Austria +   +    +  
UK  +  -   +   
Finland  +   +   
+ significant positive effect; - significant negative effect; p<0.10 
                                               
54
 Connolly and Gregory (2008) also found substantial evidence of occupational downgrading by skill 
associated with moves to part-time work in Britain.   
55
 Gutiérrez-Domènech (2005b) also finds no evidence of occupational downgrading by occupational 
hourly wage on switching from full-time to part-time work for women in Spain, but does not study 
occupational transitions by skill. 
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It is changing employer that is the most important predictor of moving into an 
occupation of a different ranking. The odds of occupational downgrading or 
upgrading are large and significant in all of the studied countries in both 
specifications. In the following countries changing employer is associated with a 
somewhat higher likelihood of downgrading than upgrading: Denmark, the 
Netherlands, France, Ireland, Italy, Austria (by skill only) and Finland (by wage 
only). In the UK, on the other hand, changing employer significantly increases both 
the probability of upgrading and downgrading (by skill and by wage), but the odds of 
upgrading are somewhat higher than the odds of downgrading, all else being equal. 
This suggests that, on balance, changing employer is more likely to lead to a career 
progression.    
 
Tenure in the current job is another important predictor of occupational change in all 
countries except Finland and Austria, although no clear cross-national pattern 
emerges. In Denmark, women who spent less than nine years with the same 
employer are more likely to downgrade occupationally both by skill and wage. In the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Greece and Germany, however, women who spent 
less than four years in their current job as opposed to nine or more years (the omitted 
category) are less likely to change their occupational ranking at all. In France, on the 
other hand, women with less than four years of tenure are more likely to upgrade 
occupationally both by skill and wage.  In Italy, women with four to eight years of 
tenure are more likely to upgrade by skill, but also just as likely to upgrade as to 
downgrade by occupational wage. In Spain, women with less than four years of 
tenure are less likely to upgrade or to downgrade, but those with four to eight years 
in their current job are more likely to upgrade by skill. In Portugal, those with less 
than four years of tenure are less likely to upgrade by skill or wage. In the UK, those 
with four to eight years of tenure are more likely to upgrade by wage, everything else 
being equal.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
Childbirth is found to be related to the patterns of female labour market activity in 
the industrialised countries examined here. This chapter uses comparable 
longitudinal data from the ECHP for the period 1994 to 2001 to explore the 
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relationship between recent childbirth and the relative risks of switching to part-time 
work, inactivity or unemployment for full-time women, as well as the link between 
switching from full-time to part-time work and the risk of occupational downgrading, 
across 13 European countries.  
 
In all of the studied countries, women are more likely than men to switch from full-
time to part-time work or inactivity, on average. Recent childbirth is associated with 
an increased probability of leaving full-time work. Thus, full-time working women 
who gave birth within a year of the interview are more likely to switch to part-time 
work or inactivity the following year. In contrast, part-time working women who 
gave birth during one year are more likely to remain in their part-time status the 
following year. Once important human capital and workplace characteristics are 
controlled for, full-time female workers who gave birth in year t are significantly 
more likely to leave full-time employment in all studied countries except Denmark 
and Spain. Full-time working women are more likely to switch to part-time work 
than to remain working full-time in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and the UK, 
where female part-time rates are relatively high, but also in Italy, where part-time 
rates are generally low. At the same time, in Ireland, Italy, the UK and Finland, 
recent childbirth increases the probability of moving from full-time work to 
unemployment, while in the Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece, Germany, Austria, 
the UK and Finland, recent childbirth increases the risk of switching to inactivity.   
 
Substantial evidence of occupational downgrading by skill and occupational hourly 
wage on switching from full-time to part-time work is found in the majority of the 
studied countries. Overall, downward occupational moves are substantially more 
likely for workers who switch from full-time to part-time work than in the working 
population at large, both for men and women. The opposite move, from part-time to 
full-time work, is usually associated with a higher risk of occupational upgrading. 
Although men are generally less likely than women to switch from full-time to part-
time hours, in about half of the studied countries, men who do so are more likely 
than women to downgrade occupationally, on average. Thus, in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, France, Greece, Portugal and Germany, men are more likely than 
women to downgrade by skill when moving from full-time to part-time work. At the 
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same time, in Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria and 
Germany, men are more likely than women to downgrade by occupational wage. 
 
In four out of five countries where childbirth is found to be associated with an 
increased risk of moving from full-time to part-time work for women (the 
Netherlands, Italy, Austria, and the UK), switching from full-time to part-time hours 
significantly increases the risk of occupational downgrading even after important 
personal and workplace characteristics are controlled for. This suggests that recent 
mothers in these countries are not only more likely to move from full-time to part-
time work when returning to employment after childbirth, but they are also more 
likely to switch to an occupation of a lower ranking than before. However, as 
switching from full-time to part-time work is also found to be associated with 
occupational downgrading for men (either by skill or occupational wage or both) in 
most of the studied countries, childbirth appears to be important for women only as a 
potential trigger for the switch from full-time to part-time work, rather than for 
occupational downgrading as such. This suggests that if the quality of part-time jobs 
in the economy improves, there may be less occupational downgrading associated 
with moves from full-time to part-time employment for both men and women.  
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Chapter 5 Gender wage gaps across the distribution  
 
The previous chapter examined the relationship between recent childbirth and the 
probability of switching from full-time to part-time work, inactivity or 
unemployment for mothers in 13 EU countries. In Britain the likelihood of switching 
from full-time work one year after childbirth into any of the three ‘competing states’ 
was found to be particularly high. This suggests that full-time working women with 
young children could be a non-representative sub-group of all women. If their 
characteristics are associated with greater earnings potential, it can be said that 
women are positively selected into full-time work. This chapter considers the 
possibility of sample selection for women working full-time, while focusing on their 
in-work situation relative to men.  
 
This chapter also analyses data for five other countries with different family and 
employment policies and different levels and shapes of gender earnings gap 
distributions: Italy, France, Spain, Poland and the Czech Republic. As the analysis in 
Chapter 3 demonstrated, the countries studied in this chapter have distinct family and 
employment policies that may have an impact on gender equality in the labour 
market, although, as member states of the EU, they are all subject to a common equal 
pay and equal opportunities framework. This chapter documents the observed gender 
wage gaps across the distribution; examines the determinants of women’s 
participation in full-time work; discusses the differences in earnings potential 
between full-time working women and all women; and analyses the gender 
differences in the distribution of personal characteristics and the returns to these 
characteristics among full-time workers in the studied countries.  
 
Introduction and literature review 
Although the EU is committed to gender equality in the labour market, women are 
still paid lower hourly wages than men, on average (European Commission, 2009). 
Reducing the gender wage gap has been part of the European Employment Strategy 
since 1999 (Plantenga & Remery, 2006). The Council of the European Union 
(Council Decision of 22 July 2003) adopted employment guidelines calling on the 
member states to achieve a substantial reduction in the gender pay gap by 2010. 
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According to the Structure of Earnings Survey 2007, the mean gender gap in gross 
hourly earnings ranges from 4% in Italy to 30% in Estonia, averaging 17% across the 
EU (European Commission, 2009).   
 
In Britain, equal pay legislation has been in force since the mid-1970s56 , but a 
substantial gender earnings gap still exists (Anderson et al., 2001; Mumford & P. N. 
Smith, 2009). Joshi et al. (1998) provide a historical perspective on the development 
of the gender wage gap in Britain. Based on the New Earnings Survey, the median 
hourly earnings gap among full-time workers was 58% before the Equal Pay Act was 
enacted in the mid-1970s, 40% in 1980 and 25% in 1992. With regard to the 
differences between the earnings distributions, the gender wage gap was higher 
among lower earners than higher earners before the Equal Pay Act, but this pattern 
has been reversed after 1978. By the early 1990s, the gap narrowed considerably 
among the lowest earners but widened among top earners.  
 
The raw gender gaps may hide important differences in individual characteristics, 
such as human capital endowments, and in returns to these characteristics.  The value 
of decomposing the gender wage gap into the part related to differences in 
characteristics (the “explained part”) and the part related to differences in returns (the 
“unexplained part”) is well documented in the labour economics literature57. A meta-
analysis of the international gender wage gap by Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebmer 
(2005) covering the time period 1960s-1990s reveals that most of the decrease in 
unadjusted gender earnings differentials since the 1970s is due to more productive 
characteristics for female workers. See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a 
comprehensive survey of trends in average gender wage gaps in the US. In a recent 
study of earnings determinants in Britain using a matched employee-workplace 
dataset58, Mumford and Smith (2009) find that only 17% of the gender earnings gap 
                                               
56
 See Dickens (2007) for an analysis of the development of British employment equality law. 
57Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) pioneered the decomposition of the gender earnings gap at the 
conditional mean. Juhn et al. (1993) and DiNardo et al. (1996) extended the Oaxaca-Blinder approach 
to the full conditional distribution. Donald et al. (2000) developed a flexible hazard-function based 
estimation approach in the presence of covariates; Machado & Mata (2005) proposed a 
counterfactuals-based technique to decompose the wage gap across the distribution using the quantile 
regression framework. 
58
 The British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004. 
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is due to differences in characteristics, while the rest is due to differences in returns 
to these characteristics.  
 
Moreover, gender wage differentials may be affected by the unequal labour supply of 
men and women. It is important to allow for differences in labour force attachment 
and the likelihood of participating in the labour market (or working full-time) among 
women (“non-random selection into employment”) because those who do work may 
be a non-representative sub-sample of all women, which could result in the under- or 
over-estimation of the observed gender wage gap (Heckman, 1979; Buchinsky, 1998; 
Melly, 2006; Picchio & Mussida, 2010). It is particularly important to account for 
possible non-random selection of women into employment when comparing gender 
wage gaps in several countries because female employment rates vary substantially 
across the EU member states (Beblo et al., 2003; Olivetti & Petrongolo, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, gender wage gaps evaluated at the mean often mask substantial 
variation in the gender differential across the earnings distribution. In recent years 
there has been an increased emphasis on studying gender wage gaps at different 
centiles, using quantile regression methods (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Albrecht et al., 
2003; Albrecht et al., 2009; De la Rica et al., 2008; Nicodemo, 2009a). These studies 
find that the gender wage gap tends to vary across the distribution: it may be 
relatively larger among lower earners (the “sticky floors” effect) or among higher 
earners (the “glass ceiling” effect) or both (the “U-shaped” gap).  
 
A number of recent studies use the quantile regression decomposition framework 
developed by Machado and Mata (2005) to decompose the gender wage gap across 
the distribution into the portion due to differences in the distribution of observed 
characteristics and the portion due to differences in the distribution of returns to these 
characteristics. Albrecht et al. (2009) further developed the Machado-Mata 
decomposition technique to account for sample selection of women into employment. 
In their study of gender wage gaps among full-time workers in the Netherlands, they 
report evidence of a glass ceiling effect and find that most of the gender wage gap is 
due to differences in the distribution of returns to labour market characteristics. They 
also find evidence of positive selection of women into full-time employment, most of 
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which is due to full-time working women having better rewarded characteristics than 
all women. They demonstrate that if all women worked full-time, the average log 
wage gap between male and female workers would have been even higher.   
 
In an earlier study, Albrecht et al. (2003) document a glass ceiling effect for Sweden 
using 1998 data, which persists even after controlling for important human capital 
and workplace characteristics. They find that around half of the gender earnings gap 
among the better paid is due to gender differences in returns to labour market 
characteristics and around half to gender differences in the distribution of these 
characteristics. The authors did not account for women’s selection into employment 
in this analysis. 
 
Gender wage gaps tend to be lower in Southern Europe, even after adjusting for 
wage inequality in each country (Olivetti & Petrongolo, 2008). Since female 
employment rates are also lower in Southern European countries and women with 
more productive characteristics are more likely to work, Olivetti and Petrongolo 
argue that lower gender wage gaps in these countries are due to low-wage women 
being absent from the observed wage distribution.  Having imputed the wages for 
non-employed women, they show that the resulting median gender wage gaps are 
higher than the observed median gaps, which suggests that women are more likely to 
be positively selected into employment than men. They find the largest discrepancy 
between the selection-corrected and observed gender wage gaps in Southern Europe 
and France. However, this study uses data from the ECHP 1994-2001 and leaves out 
the new accession states.   
 
Similarly, Arulampalam et al. (2007) study gender gaps across the earnings 
distribution in eleven pre-enlargement EU countries, using harmonised data from the 
ECHP for 1995-2001. Without accounting for sample selection, they find that 
women are paid less than men along the distribution in all of the studied countries 
even if women had the same distribution of relevant observed characteristics as men. 
The study finds glass ceilings in 10 out of 11 countries, Spain being the only 
exception.  Evidence of sticky floors is only found in Italy and Spain. The authors 
suggest that the observed cross-country differences in the size and shape of the 
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gender wage gaps can be due to differences in institutional settings, such as family 
policies and wage setting institutions.  
 
De la Rica et al. (2008) examine gender wage gaps in Spain across the earnings 
distribution of full-time workers, using data for 1999. They also analyse the ECHP 
and use the Machado-Mata quantile regression decomposition framework. In contrast 
to the overall higher and increasing gender wage gaps across the distribution in most 
other European countries, the earnings gap in Spain is lower and flatter. Although 
they do not correct for selection, having sub-divided their sample of workers by 
education, they find evidence of a glass-ceiling effect for the highly educated 
workers and a sticky floor effect for the less educated workers. Del Rio et al. (2006) 
obtained similar results using Spanish data for 1995. Using data for Spain from the 
Wage Structure Survey 2002, covering workplaces with 10 or more employees, 
Felgueroso et al. (2008) demonstrate that the gender wage gap across the distribution 
differs by the collective bargaining level, even after the differences in observed 
characteristics are accounted for. Among workers covered by national and regional 
agreements, the gender wage gap increases steadily along the distribution, while for 
those under firm level agreements (who tend to work in larger workplaces), the 
gender wage gap, in contrast, decreases along the distribution.  The study did not, 
however, account for sample selection into employment for women. 
 
Picchio and Mussida (2010) investigate the wage gap across the distribution in Italy, 
using a hazard function based approach by Donald et al. (2000) combined with their 
own semi-parametric method to correct for possible non-random selection into the 
workforce. They use pooled data from the EU-SILC for the period 2004-2006. The 
study finds that Italian women are positively selected into employment to a much 
greater extent than men, with women who stay out of work being more likely to 
receive lower returns to their characteristics than comparable men. After adjusting 
for sample selection, the gender wage gap widens considerably both at the bottom of 
the distribution (from 17.9% to 25.6%) and at the top (from 17.3% to 24.5%), even if 
the distribution of characteristics is the same for men and women. The authors 
suggest that the somewhat greater effect of sample selection of women into work 
among lower earners may be due to Italy’s relatively ungenerous work-family 
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reconciliation policies, described in Del Boca (2002), that make it difficult for lower 
skilled women with family commitments to participate in the labour market. 
 
Nicodemo (2009a) investigates the gender gap across the earnings distribution 
among married individuals in five Mediterranean countries (Spain, France, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal), using data from the ECHP 2001 and the EU Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2006. Substantial gender wage gaps are observed 
in each of the studied countries, with sticky floors being more prevalent than glass 
ceilings. After correcting for sample selection by married women into employment, 
the study finds that most of the gender wage gap is due to differences in rewards 
rather than in characteristics.   
 
Grajek (2003) examines the gender wage gap in Poland during the transition period 
1987-1996, using net monthly earnings data from the Polish Household Budget 
Survey. The mean gender wage gap has decreased by 10.2 log points over this period, 
suggesting that the transition to market economy favoured female workers, who were 
better educated, on average. In a comparative study of ten Eastern European 
countries, including Russia and Ukraine, Brainerd (2000) also finds that female 
relative wages increased most dramatically in Poland during the peirod 1986-1992. 
Most of this decrease in the wage gap, however, happened in 1989, a year before the 
market reforms, with the gap stabilising in the 1990s (Grajek, 2003). Using data for 
1990, 1996 and 2001, Pollert (2005) finds that although the average gender wage 
gaps narrowed in the early transition years in most of the Central and Eastern 
European countries, they later widened in the 1990s in some countries (the Czech 
and Slovak Republics). Poland currently reports one of the lowest average hourly 
gender wage gaps in the EU, in contrast to the Czech Republic with one of the 
highest (European Commission, 2009).  
 
This chapter investigates gender differences between the log hourly wage 
distributions of full-time employees in a sample of EU countries using the quantile 
regression decomposition framework (Machado & Mata, 2005), including allowance 
for possible non-random selection of women into full-time employment (Albrecht et 
al., 2009). The study uses comparable cross-sectional data for Italy, France, Spain, 
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Poland and the Czech Republic from the EU-SILC and data for Britain from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Both datasets include information on 
earnings as well as individual and household characteristics. The chapter makes 
several original contributions to the existing research on gender wage gaps in the EU: 
• It is the first study to cover both old and new accession countries, unlike 
Arulampalam et al. (2007); Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) or Gannon et al. 
(2007). The chapter analyses the determinants of female full-time 
employment in selected countries (Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Poland and 
the Czech Republic), making allowance for sample selection of women into 
full-time work in the estimation of earnings functions and simulating the 
gender wage gaps that would be observed if all women worked full-time. It is 
the first such analysis to date for Britain, France, Spain, Poland and the Czech 
Republic59.  
• By focusing on six large European countries with different shapes and levels 
of unadjusted gender wage gap distributions among full-time employees, this 
chapter explores different drivers of gender earnings gaps. 
• Finally, the study discusses the empirical results in the context of institutional 
differences in work/family reconciliation policies across the selected 
countries, making an original contribution to the comparative literature on 
women-friendly welfare state.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes data and 
variables, justifies country and sample selection, presents descriptive wage statistics 
and discusses the control variables included in the analysis. First it compares the 
distribution of gender earnings gaps among full-time employees across the studied 
countries; then it presents the theoretical model of earnings and discusses the 
personal and labour market characteristics of full-time employees in five countries.  
                                               
59
 Albrecht et al. (2009) use a similar decomposition methodology to analyse data for the Netherlands.  
De la Rica et al. (2008) use data for Spain and Arulampalam et al. (2007) include Spain and France in 
their study, but they do not allow for women’s sample selection in their decomposition of gender 
wage gaps across the distribution. Picchio and Mussida (2010) study the gender wage gaps across the 
distribution in Italy for all employees, rather than for full-time employees only. They use a different 
sample selection adjustment technique. There are no studies to date that investigate gender wage gaps 
across the distribution with sample selection adjustment in Poland or the Czech Republic. See Chzhen 
and Mumford (2009) for an earlier version of the analysis for Britain. 
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The ensuing section discusses women’s selection into full-time employment. The 
determinants of women’s participation in full-time work are compared across the 
studied countries. The results from the simulation of women’s wages that would be 
observed if all women worked full-time are then presented and discussed.  
 
The penultimate section analyses the results from the earnings functions estimations 
and from the decompositions of the gender wage gaps. Firstly, the returns to personal 
characteristics at three different points in the earnings distribution (low earners, 
middle earners and high earners) are presented for male and female full-time 
employees in the studied countries in order to test the hypothesis that men tend to 
receive higher returns to their characteristics, even after controlling for women’s 
differential propensity to work full-time.  Secondly, the results from the simulation 
of gender wage gaps that would be observed if all women worked full-time are 
discussed. Finally, the results from the decomposition of gender earnings gaps 
among full-time employees are presented, in order to test the hypothesis that gender 
wage gaps in all of the studied countries are largely due to women receiving lower 
returns to their labour market characteristics than men, across the entire distribution.  
 
The final section summarises the main findings and concludes the chapter. 
 
Wage data and the earnings function 
This chapter uses data from two datasets: the BHPS 2005 for Britain60 and the EU-
SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic.  The EU-SILC 
is the main EU-wide instrument for collecting comparable micro-level information 
on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions annually. It was launched 
under EC Regulation no. 1177/2003 with 18 countries in 2004, with the rest of the 
EU-25 countries joining in 2005 and Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Switzerland 
joining in 2006. Unfortunately, the EU-SILC sample for Britain does not have valid 
information on the ‘years in paid work’ variable61. Since potential lifetime work 
                                               
60
 Due to differences in sampling in the BHPS, individuals from Northern Ireland are not included in 
the analysis. 
61
 Although the EU-SILC has information on the ‘year when highest level of education was attained’ 
which can be used to construct a proxy measure of work experience, it tends to over-estimate years in 
paid work, especially for women. For example, in Spain, the proxy measure exceeds the actual 
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experience (age minus years in education, minus age at the start of compulsory 
schooling) is considered to be an inferior measure of lifetime work experience in the 
literature (S. Polachek, 2006; Regan & Oaxaca, 2009), this chapter uses data from 
the BHPS for Britain, which contains information on years in paid work. Therefore, 
the results for Britain and the other five countries are not directly comparable, 
although similar variables are used in the analyses wherever possible. 
 
The BHPS is a nationally representative, annual sample of private British households. 
It was launched in 1991. Each year, individual adult members of households are 
interviewed over a broad range of socioeconomic topics resulting in a rich and 
relevant data set. In 1992 and 1993 respondents were asked for information on their 
lifetime employment status and job histories which is used here to derive the work 
experience variable. This chapter uses the 2005/06 wave of data (Wave 15) because 
attitudinal questions were introduced in that wave (and not repeated since) that are 
important in the estimation of women’s full-time work participation equation 
(Albrecht et al., 2009). There are no attitudinal questions in the EU-SILC, however.  
 
The studied sample of EU countries covers different welfare regime and family 
policy clusters. Thus, Italy and Spain belong to the ‘Latin Rim’ welfare regime 
(Ferrera, 1996), while France is a conservative-corporatist welfare state and Britain is 
classed as a liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Poland and the Czech 
Republic are commonly classified as ‘post-communist’ welfare states (Fenger, 2007) 
with common pre-socialist Bismarckian (conservative-corporatist) roots (Aspalter et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, the countries studied here differ in terms of their family 
policies and the level of support for working mothers. In the literature France stands 
out as having the most advanced work-family reconciliation policies, compared with 
Britain, Italy and Spain (Lewis, 1992; Gauthier, 1996; J. Gornick & Meyers, 2003). 
However, the analysis in Chapter 3, using more recent data, shows that France ranks 
somewhat lower than the UK, Spain and Italy on a composite indicator of work-
family reconciliation policies and gender-role attitudes62. Although Poland and the 
                                                                                                                                     
measure by almost two years, on average, for full-time working men; three years for full-time working 
women; five years for part-time working women; and almost 15 years for non-working women. 
62
 The composite indicator is the average of z-scores on FTE job-protected leave reserved for fathers; 
proportion of children aged 0-2 in formal childcare; the ratio of average tax transfers net of benefits 
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Czech Republic share a common socialist legacy of high levels of female labour 
force participation and state support for working mothers, they have been following a 
re-familialisation policy, moving towards the male-breadwinner model with 
gendered division of paid and unpaid labour since their transition to a market 
economy (Saxonberg & Sirovátka, 2006). Poland and the Czech Republic rank 
lowest on the composite index of work/family reconciliation policies in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, it is expected to find the largest negative effects of having young children 
on the propensity of mothers’ working full-time in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
 
None of the Nordic countries could be included in the analysis because their samples 
lack information on some of the key variables, such as years in paid work and 
workplace characteristics. This is unfortunate because the Nordic countries tend to 
have the highest level of state support for working mothers in Europe. At the same 
time, Germany could not be included because its EU-SILC sample does not have any 
regional information that would allow controlling for living in East or West Germany 
in the analysis63.  
 
The five selected EU-SILC countries as well as Britain have large enough sample 
sizes of full-time employees and provide valid (non-missing) information on such 
key variables as years in paid work, managerial duties and size of the workplace. 
Furthermore, these countries have markedly different shapes and levels of unadjusted 
gender wage gap distributions among full-time employees, allowing the investigation 
of different patterns of gender wage inequality.  
 
This chapter focuses on full-time employees because the composition of the female 
labour force and the full-time share of female employees vary considerably across 
the EU. Across the six selected countries, female prime-age employment rates range 
from 60% in Italy to almost 76% in France, UK and the Czech Republic, while part-
time shares of female employment range from around 10% in the Czech Republic 
                                                                                                                                     
for single breadwinner households to that for dual earner households (couple family, 133% APW, two 
children aged 4 and 6); and egalitarian gender-role attitudes. See Table 3.19 in Chapter 3.  
63
 Beblo et al. (2003)  include a dummy variable for East Germany in the analysis of mean gender 
wage gaps in 1998. Because of the differences in the wage trends between East and West Germany, 
Antonczyk et al. (2010) limit their analysis of gender wage gaps across the distribution to West 
Germany only.   
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and Poland to 42% in the UK, according to the Labour Force Survey 2007 (Eurostat, 
2010). After allowing for women’s selection into full-time employment, the results 
are expected to be more comparable across the studied countries.  Male part-time 
rates are uniformly low across the EU: only in the Netherlands does it exceed 10% 
(Eurostat, 2010).   
 
The estimation samples are restricted to respondents aged 25 to 55 who are currently 
employed or, for women only, are out of the labour market. The age restriction is 
imposed in order to disregard the cross national age differences in the timing and 
pattern of entry into and exit from the labour force and it facilitates comparable 
research (Beblo et al., 2003; Albrecht et al., 2009; Picchio & Mussida, 2010).  
 
 It is important to note that unlike in the BHPS, where full-time employment is 
defined as work of 30 or more hours a week, full-time status is self-defined in the 
EU-SILC. Therefore, the definitions of full-time and part-time work may vary across 
the studied countries. However, part-time work in the EU-SILC does not usually 
exceed 35 hours a week and full-time work starts from around 30 hours a week64. 
Since the length of a usual working week varies across the studied EU-SILC 
countries65, using self-defined measures of full-time work is appropriate in this study. 
 
In both the BHPS and EU-SILC, non-working and part-time employed men66 are 
excluded from the analysis as are the self-employed; the minority of workers with no 
expected weekly working hours; those reporting working more than 75 hours per 
week; and those with missing data on any of the important labour market or personal 
characteristics. Individuals with derived hourly earnings of less than £1 an hour or 
more than £100 an hour were also excluded from the BHPS sample; those with 
                                               
64
 See notes about variable PL030 “self-defined current economic status” in the EU-SILC UDB 
Variables Description version 2007-2 from 01-08-09. 
65
 Usual average weekly hours in main job range from 38.9 in France to 42.3 in the Czech Republic 
among full-time employees (male and female combined) and from 22.6 in Spain to 21.2 in Italy 
among part-time female employees. 
66
 There were only 46 men employed part-time in the 25 to 55 age bracket in the BHPS data, most of 
whom have missing data on at least one of the important labour market or personal characteristics 
used in the analysis. The share of male employees aged 25-55 working part-time (in the EU-SILC 
sample) is 1% in the Czech Republic, 3% in Poland, Spain and France, and 4% in Italy. 
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derived hourly earnings in excess of 150 Euros or below the national minimum 
wage67 were excluded from the EU-SILC sample. 
 
Variable definitions and summary statistics for the sub-samples of full-time male and 
female workers, female part-time workers and non-working women are presented in 
Table 5.1 for Britain; Table 5.2 for Italy, Spain and Poland, and Table 5.3 for France 
and the Czech Republic. Summary statistics for selected deciles are provided in 
Annex 5 (Table A 5-2 to Table A 5-7). 
 
The distribution of wages in the BHPS and the EU-SILC 
The wage measure used in the analysis is the natural logarithm of gross hourly 
earnings. For Britain it is derived from gross monthly pay at last payment and total 
weekly hours (including paid overtime). Men’s average hourly wages are 
substantially higher than women’s in Britain (see Table 5.1a): the mean gender 
earnings gap among full-time workers is 16 log wage points.  
 
At the same time, the wage measure in the EU-SILC is derived from current gross 
monthly earnings for the countries that have valid cases on this measure (Italy, Spain, 
Poland) and from gross annual cash or near cash income in the reference period for 
the countries that lack valid information on the monthly variable (France and the 
Czech Republic)68. Both measures include paid overtime. Total weekly hours in the 
main job, however, as used to derive gross hourly earnings, include both paid and 
unpaid regular overtime. Since men are more likely than women to provide unpaid 
overtime (see Engellandt & Riphahn, 2005 for Switzerland; Giannelli & Braschi, 
2002 for Italy), thus reducing their derived hourly wages, the resulting gender wage 
gaps may be somewhat under-estimated.  
 
Men’s average hourly earnings are substantially higher than women’s in all 26 
countries in the EU-SILC 2007 (see Table A 5-1 Annex 5): the mean gender earnings 
                                               
67
 For countries without a statutory minimum wage (e.g. Italy), those with hourly wages below 1 Euro 
were excluded from the sample. 
68
 In both France and the Czech Republic, the income reference period is 12 months previous to 
fieldwork. Thus, the earnings information for these two countries refers to 2006 rather than 2007. It is 
not possible to link the cross-sectional and longitudinal files (or two cross-sectional files) in the EU-
SILC to obtain current information on the same individuals. 
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gap amongst all full-time employees ranges from 3 log wage points (lwp) in Greece, 
Poland and Portugal to 34 lwp in Estonia. Across the five studied countries, the mean 
gender wage gap for full-time employees is lowest in Poland (3 lwp), Italy (4 lwp), 
middling in France (7 lwp) and Spain (8 lwp) and highest in the Czech Republic (23 
lwp). In this context, the mean wage gap in Britain (16 lwp) is relatively high.  
 
These mean log wage gaps may, however, disguise important differences across the 
wage distribution, such as those between low earners and high earners. Figure 5.1 
plots the estimated kernel densities of full-time men and women’s hourly earnings in 
the six studied countries. The distributions of male wages are consistently more 
symmetric than those of women, whose wages tend to be skewed to the left. The 
gender differences are the most noticeable in the Czech Republic, which is consistent 
with the finding of the largest mean gender earnings gap. 
 
Figure 5.2 plots the raw (unadjusted) gap in log hourly earnings between male and 
female full-time employees at each centile of the distribution69. Figure 2A in the 
Annex shows the unadjusted gender log wage gaps across the distribution for all 26 
EU-SILC countries. The wage gap in Britain, based on data from the BHPS 2005/06, 
shows some notable declines between the 50th and 70th centiles and subsequent 
increases across the highest three deciles suggesting the presence of a glass ceiling70. 
There does not, however, appear to be a sticky floor effect in the raw data71. The 
observed earnings gap for the UK based on data from the EU-SILC 2007 (Figure 2A) 
shows a similar pattern, with a pronounced glass ceiling effect.  Focussing the 
analysis on a single point in the wage distribution (such as the mean or median) 
would mask these changes in the gender wage gap that occur across the earnings 
distribution.  
 
The wage gap in Italy is positive and significant in the lower half of the distribution, 
but not significantly different from zero beyond the 70th centile. There is some 
evidence of a sticky floor, as the gap is highest at the bottom of the distribution and 
                                               
69
 The 95% confidence interval is estimated via bootstrapping with 100 repetitions (see Melly, 2006).  
70
 The gap is 17 log wage points at the 75th centile; 18 log wage points at the 90th centile; and 20 log 
wage points at the 95th centile. 
71
 The gap at the 1st, 5th and 10th centiles is 15 log wage points, whilst the gap at the 25th centile is 16 
log wage points. 
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tends to decrease overall. A similar shaped gender wage gap was found for all 
employees in Italy in Picchio and Mussida (2010), who also used the EU-SILC.  
 
In Spain and in Poland, the gender wage gaps are also generally low (never 
exceeding 15 lwp) and they decrease along the distribution. The wage gap in Spain 
crosses the zero line at around the 7th decile and reverts back to significantly positive 
only at the very top of the distribution, suggesting some evidence of a glass ceiling 
for the highest earning full-time women72. In Poland, the gap reaches zero at the 6th 
decile, dropping below zero (to -10 lwp) between the 80th and the 95th centiles, and 
rises again at the very top. The negative gap between the 80th and the 95th centiles 
may be due to women’s substantially higher levels of education among full-time 
employees in the top quintiles of their respective distributions (see Table A 5-5). 
 
The unadjusted earnings gaps in France and in the Czech Republic increase along the 
distribution, with a particularly strong glass ceiling effect in the Czech Republic. The 
wage gap in France increases in an almost linear fashion along the distribution from 
zero to around 15 lwp at the 95th centile with an insignificantly small decrease 
afterwards. The earnings gap in the Czech Republic also increases along the 
distribution, but in a much less linear way. It rises steeply from 10 lwp to 25 lwp in 
the bottom quintile of the distribution, slowly drops to 20 lwp at the 6th decile, goes 
back to 30 lwp at the 9th decile and then accelerates rapidly to almost 45 lwp at the 
top of the distribution. These results confirm the pattern of variation in the mean 
gender wage gaps for full-time employees: the gap across the distribution is lowest 
overall in Poland and highest in the Czech Republic.   
 
However, the unadjusted gender wage gaps among full-time employees are not 
strictly comparable across the countries studied here because of different female 
participation rates and the shares of women working full-time. For example, although 
the wage gap is much lower in Italy than in the Czech Republic, the female 
participation rate is lower; thus, women who work full-time in Italy are likely to have 
                                               
72
 Arulampalam et al. (2007) find a decreasing earnings gap across the distribution in Spain for the 
period 1995-2001 in the combined sample of part-time and full-time workers, while de la Rica et al. 
(2008) document a sticky floors effect for lower educated workers and a glass ceiling effect for the 
higher educated using Spanish data for 1999.  
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human capital characteristics associated with higher earnings than full-time working 
women in the Czech Republic, resulting in the lower observed gender wage gap in 
Italy. 
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Figure 5.1  Kernel density earnings estimates for full-time employees 
 
Italy (EU-SILC) 
 
 
Spain (EU-SILC) 
 
Poland (EU-SILC) 
 
France (EU-SILC) 
 
Czech Republic (EU-SILC) 
 
Britain (BHPS) 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic; BHPS 2005 for 
Britain. 
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Figure 5.2 Unadjusted gender log wage gap  among full-time employees 
 
Italy (EU-SILC) 
 
 
Spain (EU-SILC) 
 
Poland (EU-SILC) 
 
France (EU-SILC) 
 
Czech Republic (EU-SILC) Britain (BHPS) 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic; BHPS 2005 for 
Britain. 
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theoretical basis for the earnings function, since Mincer’s (1958) seminal paper. By 
treating education and experience as investments (human capital), Mincer was able 
to model individuals’ earnings as a function of their investment choices. Assuming 
that individuals invest in human capital until the costs of investment equal the 
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specification in which the natural logarithm of earnings is a linear function of years 
of schooling (S. Polachek, 2007).  
 
The same approach is used here. At the individual employee level, it is assumed that 
wages increase in line with measures of accumulated skills such as education and 
years of work experience. Education is measured by the highest qualification level 
achieved. Work experience in the BHPS is the accumulated years of actual labour 
market work experience using the individual’s employment history since first leaving 
full-time education73  (Halpin, 2000). In the EU-SILC actual work experience is 
measured as the “number of years spent in paid work” since starting the first regular 
job either as an employee or self-employed74.   
 
The earnings function is augmented by the inclusion of further explanatory variables: 
marital status; occupation; having managerial or supervisory duties; firm size; and 
region. For Britain, private sector employment is also included. This variable is not 
available in the EU-SILC. The variables included in the EU-SILC but not in the 
BHPS earnings regressions are migrant status (“born outside the EU-25”) and type of 
contract. (Variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 5.1 for 
Britain; Table 5.2 for Italy, Spain and Poland; and Table 5.3 for France and the 
Czech Republic. Similar information for the allocation of characteristics across the 
earnings distribution for men and women are presented in Annex 5).  
 
In all six countries studied here, men tend to have more years of work experience 
than women, although the mean gender difference is not statistically significant for 
full-time employees in Poland (Table 5.2). However, men working full-time are less 
likely to have a university degree than women, on average, in Italy, Spain, Poland 
and France. Men are as likely to have a university degree as women, on average, in 
the Czech Republic and in Britain. Women working part-time are substantially less 
likely to have a university degree, on average, than either full-time men or women in 
                                               
73
 Work experience includes both full-time and part-time experience. A more detailed analysis of 
work-history in the BHPS by Olsen et al. (2010) finds a positive net effect of full-time work 
experience on wages and no net effect of part-time work experience on wages. 
74
 Any time spent temporarily out of work while having a job (such as on maternity leave) is taken 
into account; it is up to the respondent whether or not to count part-time work experience (EU-SILC 
UDB Variables Description version 2007-2 from 01-08-09 (variable PL200)).  
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all of the studied countries except France, where part-time women (35%) are more 
likely to have a university degree than full-time men (32%).  
 
In spite of full-time working women’s higher educational qualifications, they are less 
likely to have managerial or supervisory duties or to work in senior managerial 
occupations than men in all of the studied countries. Men outstrip women by around 
10 percentage points in having managerial or supervisory duties in all countries 
except Poland (where men lead by 4 ppt) and Britain (where men lead by 2 ppt), 
among full-time employees. Men are increasingly more likely to carry out 
managerial duties at the higher end of the earnings distribution (see Table A 5-2 to 
Table A 5-7 in the Annex). Having managerial duties is typically more prevalent 
than working in a managerial occupation and the correlation between the two is 
modest75. Part-time women are the least likely of all to have managerial duties or to 
work as managers.  
 
In all of the studied countries women disproportionately outnumber men in clerical 
occupations and in service/sales occupations, while men are more likely to be 
concentrated in trades and operative occupations at the lower end of the occupational 
distribution and in managerial occupations at the top end of the occupational 
structure. Full-time women are about as likely as men to work in professional 
occupations and more likely than men to work as technicians and associate 
professionals. However, among full-time employees in Spain and Poland, women are 
substantially more likely to work in professional occupations than men, on average.  
Part-time female employees tend to be concentrated in lower status clerical, 
sales/service and elementary occupations in all of the studied countries, although 
some also work in higher skilled white-collar jobs. Occupation has been shown to be 
an important determinant of wages for full-time women relative to part-time women 
in Britain (Connolly & Gregory, 2008; Manning & Petrongolo, 2008) and for the pay 
of full-time men relative to part-time women (Mumford & P. N. Smith, 2009). 
According to the most recent data from the BHPS, occupational sex segregation 
                                               
75
 In the British (BHPS) sample, the correlation coefficient between being a manager (ISCO 1) and 
having managerial duties is 0.47 in the combined sample of full-time employees (0.50 among men and 
0.42 among women). The corresponding correlations are 0.14 in the Italian sample; 0.21 in the 
Spanish sample; 0.40 in the Polish sample; 0.23 in the French sample; and 0.38 in the Czech sample. 
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accounted for 17% of the average gender wage gap in the UK in 2007 (Olsen et al., 
2010).  
 
Men typically outnumber women in positions of responsibility in the EU. Women 
comprise only 30% of managers (directors, chief executives and managers of smaller 
enterprises) and 3% of directors of top quoted company boards across the EU 
(European Commission, 2009). According to the UK Equal Opportunity Commission 
(2005), women in Britain make up just 8% of the senior judiciary, 8% of senior 
police officers, 10% of top business leaders and 9% of national newspaper editors. 
Similar results are found for lawyers in the U.S. with only some 6% of law firms 
having managing partners who are female (National Association of Women Lawyers, 
2008, pp.2-7). 
 
The summary statistics tables also include information on the number of children in 
the household and the age of the youngest child. These variables are used in the 
estimation of women’s probability of working full-time in order to correct for 
possible non-random selection into full-time work, but not included in the earnings 
functions themselves. Full-time working women are disproportionately less likely to 
have children under 16 in the household than are full-time men, part-time women or 
non-working women in all of the studied countries. Full-time female employees also 
tend to be the least likely to have children aged four or younger in the household. In 
France, however, full-time working women are more likely to have a pre-school age 
single child (9%) than full-time working men (8%) or part-time women (4%), 
although they are less likely to have two or more children with the youngest being 
under five years old. In all of the studied countries, full-time men and non-working 
women are the most likely to have pre-school children in the household, while part-
time women are the most likely to have children aged five years or older. This 
pattern suggests that women with very young children may be relatively constrained 
in their ability to work, especially full-time.   
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Table 5.1    Britain - variable definitions and means (BHPS 2005) 
 
Definitions 
 
      (1) 
Full-time men 
(2) 
Full-time 
women 
(3) 
Part-time 
women 
(4) 
Non 
working 
women 
(5) 
Gross hourly wage 13.50 11.48 8.88 - 
Log of gross hourly wage 2.47 2.31 2.04 - 
Accumulated years of work experience 13.05 11.61 10.60 3.86 
Non-labour income (1000s) 16.69 23.08 31.47 29.47 
Age (years) 39.97 39.94 40.83 40.48 
Highest level of education     
     Degree  0.23 0.29 0.16 0.15 
     Other higher 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.23 
     A-levels 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 
     O-levels 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.21 
     Other secondary 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.11 
     No formal secondary or higher qualification 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.18 
Married (or living in a de facto relationship) 0.63 0.52 0.76 0.62 
Disagree that family suffers if mother works full-
time 0.40 0.54 0.33 0.30 
Age of youngest child in household     
    No children under 16  0.55 0.67 0.30 0.37 
    5 years or younger 0.23 0.10 0.32 0.37 
    6-11 years 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.19 
    12-15 years 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.08 
Managerial duties 0.47 0.45 0.16 - 
Size of firm     
   Less than 25 0.27 0.29 0.42 - 
    25-199 0.38 0.41 0.33 - 
    200 or over 0.36 0.30 0.25 - 
Private sector 0.78 0.51 0.53 - 
Occupational category      
     Managers 0.21 0.15 0.05 - 
     Professionals 0.14 0.18 0.09 - 
     Assoc Professionals 0.16 0.19 0.10 - 
     Admin/Secretarial 0.05 0.23 0.23 - 
     Skilled Trades 0.18 0.02 0.02 - 
     Personal Services 0.01 0.10 0.18 - 
     Sales and Customer  
     Services 0.02 0.06 0.19 - 
     Operatives 0.14 0.03 0.01 - 
     Elementary 0.09 0.04 0.14 - 
Region     
    South of England 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.30 
    London 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09 
    East Midlands 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.24 
    North of England 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 
    Wales 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
    Scotland 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.08 
     
Number of observations 1747 1283 665 528 
     
Source: British Household Panel Survey, Wave 15. Cross-sectional weights used.  
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Table 5.2     Variable definitions and means (EU-SILC 2007) 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. Cross-sectional weights used.  
*Occupational category of the last job for non-working women. 
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Hourly wage (euro) 11.10 10.76 9.33 - 10.56 9.75 8.10 - 3.34 3.27 2.82 - 
Log wage 2.33 2.29 2.15 - 2.25 2.17 1.99 - 1.08 1.05 0.90 - 
Work experience 
(years) 17.27 15.09 14.21 6.02 18.21 15.06 14.32 8.26 16.90 16.42 13.25 11.36 
Age 40.52 40.04 39.54 40.45 38.92 38.48 38.96 40.64 38.67 39.60 37.93 40.74 
Log non-labour income 9.42 9.97 10.17 10.20 9.24 9.82 9.86 9.96 8.52 8.86 9.01 8.92 
Highest level of 
education             
Lower secondary or 
below 0.44 0.27 0.39 0.58 0.39 0.24 0.42 0.56 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.17 
 Secondary/further 0.41 0.48 0.49 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.73 0.57 0.67 0.74 
 University 0.15 0.25 0.12 0.08 0.36 0.51 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.39 0.27 0.10 
Born outside EU-25 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Married 0.65 0.60 0.71 0.75 0.64 0.60 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 
Age of youngest child 
in household             
 No children under 16 0.56 0.64 0.41 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.44 0.53 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.47 
One child aged 0-4 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.09 
One child aged 5-10  0.07 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 
 One child aged 11-15  0.10 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 
 2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.14 
 2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-10 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 
 2 or more children, 
youngest aged 11-15 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Managerial duties 0.29 0.19 0.11 - 0.32 0.23 0.09 - 0.24 0.20 0.09 - 
Size of firm             
10 or fewer 0.28 0.29 0.47 - 0.28 0.32 0.55 - 0.35 0.36 0.51 - 
11-149 0.35 0.35 0.30 - 0.33 0.31 0.26 - 0.24 0.26 0.32 - 
 50 or over 0.38 0.36 0.23 - 0.38 0.37 0.19 - 0.41 0.38 0.17 - 
On permanent contract 0.89 0.86 0.75 - 0.79 0.78 0.60 - 0.78 0.82 0.49 - 
Occupational category*              
 Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 
Professionals 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.31 0.20 0.06 
Technicians and 
associate professionals 0.19 0.33 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.10 
Clerks 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.11 
Service workers and 
shop    and market 
sales workers 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.27 
Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers / Craft 
and related trades 0.24 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.26 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.23 
Plant and machine 
operatives and 
assemblers 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.05 
Elementary 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.31 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.16 
             
Unweighted No. 
observations 6093 4012 1287 4597 3867 2719 695 3030 3995 3424 308 3105 
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Table 5.3     Variable definitions and means (EU-SILC 2007) 
 France Czech Republic 
 
Definitions 
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Hourly wage (euro) 14.54 13.39 14.22 - 4.23 3.28 2.84 - 
Log wage 2.61 2.54 2.56 - 1.34 1.11 0.95 - 
Work experience (years) 18.48 17.31 17.25 8.09 18.08 18.93 16.89 11.22 
Age 39.89 40.01 41.43 39.53 39.03 41.11 40.50 37.03 
Log non-labour income 9.21 9.45 10.00 10.18 8.67 9.03 9.21 9.19 
Highest level of education         
Lower secondary or below 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.39 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.17 
 Secondary/further 0.49 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.73 
 University 0.32 0.44 0.35 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.10 
Born outside EU-25 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Married 0.53 0.47 0.67 0.59 0.65 0.68 0.84 0.67 
Age of youngest child in 
household         
 No children under 16 0.52 0.61 0.38 0.43 0.59 0.68 0.48 0.33 
One child aged 0-4 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.19 
One child aged 5-10  0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.07 
 One child aged 11-15  0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.06 
 2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.23 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.23 
 2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-10 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 
 2 or more children, 
youngest aged 11-15 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 
Managerial duties 0.37 0.30 0.21 - 0.25 0.15 0.07 - 
Size of firm         
10 or fewer 0.15 0.19 0.28 - 0.15 0.21 0.41 - 
11-149 0.27 0.27 0.25 - 0.39 0.38 0.38 - 
 50 or over 0.58 0.54 0.47 - 0.46 0.41 0.21 - 
On permanent contract 0.94 0.93 0.86 - 0.92 0.92 0.71 - 
Occupational category*          
 Legislators, senior officials 
and managers 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Professionals 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.06 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.12 0.20 0.32 0.22 0.22 
Clerks 0.07 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.08 0.10 
Service workers and shop    
and market sales workers 0.06 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.07 0.15 0.25 0.26 
Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers / Craft and 
related trades 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.32 0.09 0.03 0.14 
Plant and machine 
operatives and assemblers 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.07 
Elementary 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.16 
         
Unweighted No. 
observations 2773 1880 808 1295 3130 2666 118 1286 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. Cross-sectional weights used.  
*Occupational category of the last job for non-working women. 
 
Allowance is made for possible non-random selection of women into full-time 
employment in the estimation of the earnings functions below. To identify the 
selection effect, additional information on the age of children present in the 
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household, non-labour income 76  and the worker’s response to the attitudinal 
statement “the family suffers if the mother works full-time” are included in the 
analysis for Britain. Fortin (2005) and Albrecht et al., (2009) both stress the 
importance of including attitudinal (or belief) measures in the analysis of women’s 
employment decisions. This may be particular important for beliefs that vary 
between individuals and cultural groups (such as the relationship between working 
hours and the perceived ability to be a successful mother). Full-time working women 
in Britain are less likely to have young children in the household and they are more 
likely to have positive attitudes77 to the acceptability of mothers working full-time.  
 
There is no information on attitudes in the EU-SILC, but the number and ages of 
dependent children as well as women’s non-labour income should be sufficient as 
exclusion restrictions (i.e. they are present in the selection regression, but not in the 
earnings regression). Thus, it is assumed that these variables are associated with the 
decision to participate in the labour market full-time but not with earnings78.  
 
Estimation 
The quantile regression model of Koenker and Bassett (1978) is employed to 
estimate earnings functions for males (m) and females (f):  
 
wim = xim΄βθm + uθim   with  Quantθ(wim |xim)   = xim΄βθm                  i=(1,…, n)        
  
wif = xif΄βθf + uθif   with  Quantθ(wif |xif)   = xif΄βθf                           i=(1,…, n)              
 
                                               
76
 In the BHPS, non-labour income is derived as total annual household income in the reference period 
(12 months before the interview) minus the individual’s income from labour in the same period. 
Similarly, in the EU-SILC, non-labour income is annual gross household income (HY010) minus the 
individual’s own gross earnings (PY010G), over the reference period (12 months before the interview 
or fieldwork). 
77
 Although it could be argued that the attitude variable should be lagged, questions about gender-role 
attitudes were only asked in the 15th wave of the BHPS (2005/2006). 
78
 In the British sample of full-time female employees, neither the age of children, nor non-labour 
income, nor attitude to working full-time is significantly correlated with average hourly earnings, 
having controlled for education, experience, marital status, age and region. Similarly, in the EU-SILC 
samples, non-labour income and the number/age of children are not correlated with average hourly 
earnings, everything else held equal. The only exception is the Czech Republic, where annual non-
labour income (log) has a significant positive effect on hourly earnings for full-time working women.  
However, participation and full-time rates are also very high in the Czech sample, so the potential for 
sample selection is lower. 
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where wi is the natural log of the average hourly earnings of individual i;  xi is a Kx1 
vector of regressors measuring a range of individual characteristics; and uθi is a 
residual term. The distribution of the residual term uθi is unspecified, but the θth 
quantile of the error term uθi is assumed to be zero (Hao & Naiman, 2007). It can be 
shown that the estimates     , the quantile regression coefficients, are consistent 
estimates of the rates of return to observed characteristics at different quantiles in the 
conditional wage distribution (see, for example, Machado & Mata, 2005, p.447). 
 
The need to allow for sample selection when estimating an earnings function, such as 
the non-random probability of women being employed full-time, is well documented 
by Heckman (1979). Buchinsky (1998) proposes a semi-parametric estimator for 
selection correction in the quantile regression model and provides examples. 
Albrecht et al., (2009) employ the Buchinsky method and extend the Machado-Mata 
(2005) decomposition method to account for selection in the quantile regression 
framework, when estimating β(θ) for women working full-time (ff): 
 
wiff = xiff  βθff + hθ(ziff γ) + uθiff   with  Quantθ(wiff|ziff= xiff ) =  xiff  βθf + hθ(ziff γ)          (3) 
 
where zff  is the set of variables that influence the probability that a woman works 
full-time (including a selection of xf) for individual i; and the term hθ(ziffγ) is 
analogous to the  Mill’s ratio in the Heckman procedure with parameters γ. (For 
identification, zff also includes  at least one continuous variable not included in xf.)  
 
Albrecht et al. (2009) show the steps to simulate the selection-corrected distribution 
(the distribution of wages for all women, if all women worked full-time) via the 
adapted M-M algorithm79:  
1. Estimate γ using a single-index method. 
2. Sample θ from a uniform (0,1) distribution. 
3. Estimate β
 
(θ) and h(.) using the Buchinsky approach. 
                                               
79
 The comparable steps in the Machado-Mata procedure are: 1. Sample θ from a uniform (0,1) 
distribution; 2. compute ˆ ( )Bβ θ ; 3. Sample xA from the empirical distribution ˆ AXG ; 4. Compute 
ˆ
ˆ ( )BAB Aw x β θ= ; and  5.  Repeat steps 1 to 4 M times 
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4. Sample xA from the empirical distribution of women’s characteristics ˆ AXG
 
. 
5. Compute ˆˆ ( )A Aw x β θ=  
6.  Repeat steps 2 to 5 M times. 
 
The difference between the selection-corrected distribution (simulated following the 
above steps) and the actual distribution of full-time women’s wages shows the effect 
of selection. Following Albrecht et al. (2009) this selection effect can be decomposed 
into a part due to observables and a part due to unobservables by modifying step 4 in 
the above algorithm and sampling from the empirical distribution of full-time women 
only, rather than all women. This produces a distribution of wages that would be 
observed if women who do not work full-time had the same distribution of observed 
characteristics as those who actually work full-time.  The difference between this 
distribution and the distribution obtained in step 4 by sampling from data on all 
women gives the part of the selection effect due to observables. The portion due to 
unobservables is the difference between the distribution of wages obtained by 
sampling from data on full-time women and the actual distribution of full-time 
women’s wages.  
 
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 provide results from standard probit and single index80 
(Ichimura, 1993) estimation of the determinants of participating in full-time work by 
women in Britain and in the five EU-SILC countries, respectively. Unsurprisingly, in 
all six countries women are found to be significantly more likely to be working full-
time (rather than working part-time or not working) if they have more years of work 
experience and higher education qualifications. In Britain, women are also 
significantly more likely to work full-time if they disagree with the attitudinal 
statement “the family suffers if the mother works full-time”.   
 
In contrast, the presence of dependent children, particularly very young children, is 
typically strongly negatively associated with the probability of women working full-
time. France is the only country where the negative effect of having one child aged 
                                               
80
 The constant and the coefficient on the first continuous variable (years of work experience) are not 
identified in the single index model, they are normalised here by setting them equal to the 
corresponding values in the probit model, thereby making the results of the two models comparable.  
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four or younger on the propensity to work full-time is not statistically significant. 
This is possibly due to shorter paid parental leave for families with only one child in 
France and the accessibility of day care and early education facilities for young 
children, particularly those aged 3-5 years old (Fagnani & Boyer, 2008; Fagnani & 
Math, 2009; OECD, 2010). However, having two or more children, with the 
youngest being four or younger, has a significantly negative effect on the chances of 
working full-time even in France. Across the five EU-SILC countries, the negative 
effect of having one or more pre-school children in the household is strongest in 
Poland and the Czech Republic. This is not surprising, since these two countries 
scored very low on the composite index of work/family reconciliation policies in 
Chapter 3. In Britain, there is a significant positive interaction between having 
children aged five or younger and the attitude variable: the negative effect of having 
one or more young children in the household is smaller for those with a positive 
attitude to mothers working full-time. 
 
Furthermore, higher non-labour income is typically negatively associated with the 
probability of women participating in full-time employment. In Britain, the negative 
effect of non-labour income is only significant for married women (Table 5.4). In all 
five EU-SILC countries, however, the negative effect of non-labour income is 
significant for women who are not married, with an additional negative effect for 
married women (in at least one of the two models) in all countries except Spain. 
Moreover, older women are less likely to work full-time in all of the studied 
countries. This appears to be a cohort effect. In Britain, women aged 45-55 are the 
least likely to work full-time rather than part-time or not at all. 
 
 Women born outside the EU-25 are significantly less likely to work full-time in 
Spain, Poland and in France in both models and in Italy in the single-index 
estimation only. Immigrant women in the Czech Republic appear to be more likely to 
work full-time (in the single-index estimation). However, the numbers of immigrants 
are very low in Poland and in the Czech Republic (under 1% amongst all women in 
the sample).  
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Table 5.4  Estimates of the incidence of full-time work among women (Britain) 
 Probit (1) Single Index (2) 
 B SE B SE 
Constant -1.51*** 0.15 -1.51 - 
Work experience (years) 0.18*** 0.01 0.18 - 
Work experience squared  (x 100) -0.005*** 0.001 -0.11*** 0.0001 
Age group (ref: 45-55)     
      25-34 0.70*** 0.09 0.48*** 0.04 
      35-44 0.25** 0.08 -0.15*** 0.03 
Non-labour income (1000’s) 0.001 0.003 0.0005 0.001 
Married 0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.04 
Positive working mother attitude 0.31*** 0.07 0.08** 0.03 
Youngest child aged 0-5  -1.44*** 0.11 -1.57*** 0.06 
Youngest child aged 6-11 -0.88*** 0.11 -0.31*** 0.05 
Positive working mother attitude x 
Youngest child age 0-5  0.37* 0.15 0.16* 0.06 
Positive working mother attitude x 
Youngest child age 6-11 0.23 0.16 0.01 0.08 
Married x non-labour income  -0.01** 0.004 -0.003* 0.001 
Highest level of education (ref: minimal)     
     Degree 1.06*** 0.12 0.45*** 0.06 
     Other higher 0.63*** 0.12 0.16*** 0.05 
     A-levels 0.54*** 0.13 0.14* 0.06 
     O-levels 0.42** 0.12 -0.60*** 0.04 
     Other 0.22 0.15 0.05 0.06 
Inverse Mill’s ratio 0.01 0.04 - - 
     
Number of observations 2476 2476 
     
Source: BHPS 2005-06, Wave 15. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
Note: The constant and work experience coefficients in the single index model are normalised.  
Controls are included for region.  
Variables included in the earnings equation in the Heckman two-step procedure: actual work 
experience (quadratic), education, marital status, and regional controls. 
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Table 5.5    Estimates of the incidence of full-time work among women  
                    (EU-SILC) 
 Probit (1)  
 Italy Spain Poland France 
Czech 
Republic 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 2.40*** 0.22 1.95*** 0.26 3.39*** 0.37 3.29*** 0.26 4.68*** 0.44 
Actual work experience 0.17*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.01 
Actual work experience 
squared (x100) -0.25*** 0.0002 -0.22*** 0.0002 -0.26*** 0.0002 -0.10** 0.0002 -0.22*** 0.0003 
Age -0.05*** 0.003 -0.05*** 0.003 -0.12*** 0.004 -0.06*** 0.004 -0.12*** 0.01 
Log non-labour income -0.12*** 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.10* 0.04 -0.15*** 0.02 -0.10* 0.04 
Highest level of education (ref: university) 
    Lower secondary or    
below -1.16*** 0.05 -0.98*** 0.04 
1.06*** 0.05 
-0.76*** 0.07 -1.59*** 0.12 
    Secondary or further -0.55*** 0.04 -0.58*** 0.05 -0.46*** 0.05 -0.88*** 0.08 
Married 0.28 0.32 -0.50 0.36 0.53 0.42 1.12* 0.52 1.31* 0.62 
Born outside EU-25 -0.12 0.06 -0.16* 0.07 -1.31* 0.51 -0.32** 0.09 -0.08 0.26 
Number and age of children (ref: no children under 16) 
    1 child, aged 0-4 -0.32*** 0.06 -0.61*** 0.07 -0.55*** 0.07 -0.08 0.10 -2.02*** 0.10 
    1 child, aged 5-10 -0.41*** 0.061 -0.35*** 0.07 -0.18** 0.07 -0.22* 0.10 -0.24* 0.10 
    1 child, aged 11-15 -0.17** 0.05 -0.20** 0.06 0.07 0.06 -0.24** 0.08 0.33** 0.10 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 -0.61*** 0.06 -0.76*** 0.07 -0.82*** 0.07 -1.02*** 0.08 -2.02*** 0.11 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-15 -0.43*** 0.05 -0.40*** 0.06 -0.19** 0.06 -0.61*** 0.07 -0.05 0.09 
Log non-labour income 
* Married -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 -0.12† 0.07 
Inverse Mill’s ratio 0.31*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.04 0.002 0.0232 0.14*** 0.02 0.05* 0.02 
Number of observations 9896 6444 6837 3983 4070 
           
 Single index (2) 
 Italy Spain Poland France 
Czech 
Republic 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 2.40 - 1.95 - 3.39 - 3.29 - 4.68 - 
Actual work experience 0.17 - 0.14 - 0.21 - 0.10 - 0.21 - 
Actual work experience 
squared (x100) -0.25*** 0.0001 -0.20*** 0.0001 -0.26*** 0.0001 -0.09*** 0.0001 -0.23*** 0.0001 
Age -0.04*** 0.002 -0.05*** 0.002 -0.12*** 0.003 -0.06*** 0.003 -0.11*** 0.003 
Log non-labour income -0.14*** 0.01 -0.03** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.01 -0.09*** 0.02 
Highest level of education (ref: university) 
    Lower secondary or     
below -1.23*** 0.04 -0.92*** 0.04 
0.87*** 0.04 
-0.52*** 0.04 -1.35*** 0.06 
    Secondary or further -0.57*** 0.03 -0.39*** 0.03 -0.35*** 0.03 -0.67*** 0.04 
Married 0.22** 0.07 -0.35 0.23 0.65* 0.25 0.57*** 0.12 0.87* 0.35 
Born outside EU-25 -0.20*** 0.04 -0.19*** 0.04 -0.62** 0.24 -0.24*** 0.05 0.20* 0.10 
Number and age of children (ref: no children under 16) 
    1 child, aged 0-4 -0.29*** 0.04 -0.54*** 0.05 -0.40*** 0.044 -0.02 0.05 -1.58*** 0.06 
    1 child, aged 5-10 -0.44*** 0.04 -0.40*** 0.05 -0.21*** 0.04 -0.11* 0.05 0.03 0.05 
    1 child, aged 11-15 -0.27*** 0.03 -0.19*** 0.05 0.09* 0.04 -0.16*** 0.04 0.31*** 0.05 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 -0.53*** 0.04 -0.69*** 0.05 -0.68*** 0.04 -0.62*** 0.04 -1.97*** 0.06 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-15 -0.42*** 0.04 -0.49*** 0.04 -0.16*** 0.04 -0.38*** 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Log non-labour income 
* Married -0.03*** 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.06* 0.03 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.07† 0.04 
Number of observations 9896 6444 6837 3983 4070 
 
          
Source: EU-SILC 2007.   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10. 
Note: The constant and work experience coefficients in the single index model are normalised.  
Controls are included for region.  
Variables included in the earnings equation in the Heckman two-step procedure: actual work 
experience (quadratic), education, marital status, immigrant status, and regional controls. 
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Figure 5.3 plots the selection effect or, in other words, the difference between the 
(simulated)81 selection-corrected distribution and the actual distribution of full-time 
women’s wages in six countries. This selection effect is then decomposed into the 
portion related to observable characteristics and the portion related to unobservable 
characteristics. By modifying the algorithm and sampling from the empirical 
distribution of full-time women only (Albrecht et al., 2009), a distribution of wages 
that would be observed if women who do not work full-time had the same 
distribution of observed characteristics as those who actually do work full-time is 
simulated. The difference between this distribution and the distribution obtained by 
sampling from data on all women gives the portion of the selection effect due to 
observables (Figure 5.4). The portion due to unobservables (Figure 5.5) is the 
difference between the distribution of wages obtained by sampling from data on full-
time women and the actual distribution of full-time women’s wages.  
 
In Britain, the selection effect can be seen to be positive throughout, generally sitting 
between 10 and 20 log wage points; with some evidence of both a sticky floor and a 
glass ceiling. Figure 5.3 reveals that the women observed to be working full-time in 
Britain have higher earnings potential in this work than do British women in general; 
this is especially true for women in the lowest and the highest deciles of the 
distribution. The selection effect is due to differences in the observed characteristics 
(Figure 5.4) and differences in the unobserved characteristics (Figure 5.5), but the 
former dominate. 
 
In Italy, the overall selection effect is large and positive throughout, but highest at 
the bottom of the distribution (50 lwp). This suggests that Italian women working-
full-time have the characteristics associated with the highest earnings potential, 
particularly among lower earners 82 . The portion of the selection effect due to 
differences in observed characteristics (Figure 5.4), such as education, work 
experience, migrant status, as well as the relevant household characteristics, is also 
highest at the bottom of the distribution (30 lwp), indicating that women who work 
                                               
81
 The term hθ(ziffγ) (equation 3) is a power series expansion of the single index selection probability 
estimated with a semi-parametric least squares procedure (Ichimura, 1993) . 
82
 This finding is in line with that in Picchio and Mussida (2010), who use a different selection 
correction method to adjust for selection into employment, rather than full-time work. 
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full-time have higher levels of human capital and fewer family-related constraints on 
their employment. At the same time, Figure 5.5 shows significant unobserved 
differences between full-time women and all women, also highest at the bottom of 
the distribution (20 lwp). Thus, it is the highest earning women in Italy who are the 
most likely to be self-selected into full-time work, both in terms of their observed 
and unobserved characteristics. The absence of statutory minimum wage in Italy may 
be one of the reasons why lower skilled women are more likely to stay out of full-
time employment. 
 
The selection effect is positive and significant throughout in Spain, gradually falling 
from around 30 lwp to 10 lwp (Figure 5.3). This suggests that the highest earners are 
the least likely to be self-selected into full-time employment. Figure 5.4 shows that 
the portion of the selection effect due to differences in observable characteristics is 
positive and significant at around 25 lwp throughout the distribution, with a steep 
decrease beyond the 8th decile. It can be seen from Figure 5.5 that the portion of the 
selection effect due to unobservables is less substantial, at around 5 lwp throughout, 
but largely near zero beyond the 6th decile. This suggests that full-time working 
women are more likely to have the observed characteristics associated with higher 
earnings potential, rather than unobserved characteristics (not controlled for in the 
model; Table 5.5). 
 
It is notable that the size of the selection effect in the lower half of the distribution is 
considerably larger in Italy than in Spain, although it is similar in the second half of 
the earnings distribution. A possible explanation could be related to differences in 
tax/benefit regimes with respect to secondary earners in couples in these countries, 
discussed in Chapter 3. Secondary earners (on 67% of the Average Production Wage) 
in couples with children tend to lose a higher proportion of their earnings to taxes 
and benefit withdrawals in Italy than in Spain, especially in comparison with primary 
earners and lone parents on the same earnings (see Figure 3.14 in Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, there is no statutory minimum wage in Italy. Thus, women with lower 
earnings potential in Italy may find it less worthwhile to enter employment. 
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The selection effect is positive but modest in Poland. It steadily increases along the 
distribution from 5 lwp to around 15 lwp at the 9th decile and beyond. The selection 
effect is largely due to significant differences in observable characteristics between 
full-time female employees and all women, while the portion due to unobservables is 
not statistically significant, except for a small negative effect in the middle and at the 
end of the distribution (Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5). Thus, the individual 
characteristics controlled for in the participation equation, such as education, years of 
work experience, migrant status, marital status, non-labour income and the number 
and age of children, largely explain the differences in the likelihood of working full-
time (as opposed to working part-time or not working at all) for women. This 
suggests that lower levels of education and experience as well as family 
commitments make it difficult for women to participate in the labour market and to 
work longer hours in particular.  
 
It is a curious finding that the selection effect is greater in Poland than in the Czech 
Republic, although employment and full-time work rates are comparable in these 
countries 83 . Furthermore, both countries rank very low on the work/family 
reconciliation index in Chapter 3. Both lack statutory paternity leave provisions and 
non-transferable parental leave entitlements for fathers, while allowing mothers to 
stay at home on job-protected parental leave until the child is three years old. The 
only difference is that the parental leave is more generously paid in the Czech 
Republic (50 FTE weeks) than in Poland (16 FTE weeks). Both countries have low 
formal childcare enrolment rates for pre-school children, similar tax/benefit regimes 
for secondary earners in couples and relatively traditional gender-role attitudes. 
However, there is a difference in the conditions attached to paid parental leave: in 
Poland the parental allowance is means tested and is not paid if the parent is working 
or if the child attends a kindergarten; in the Czech Republic, the parental benefit is 
flat rate (with three options differing by duration and payment) and parents are 
allowed to work full- or part-time (Moss & Korintus, 2008). Hence, Polish mothers 
with greater earnings potential may find it more worthwhile to forgo the parental 
leave and return to work (although they may still be constrained by the availability of 
                                               
83
 Employment rates are 65% and 57% in the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively, in the 
effective sample used in the analysis. Full-time shares of female employment are 96% and 92%, 
respectively. 
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childcare places). Indeed, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 (summary statistics) show that the 
differences in educational qualifications across the three activity groups of women 
(full-time, part-time and non-working) are greater in Poland; these differences are 
even more pronounced for mothers of very young children84.  
 
In France the selection effect is positive and modest: it remains at around 10 lwp 
across the entire distribution, plunging beyond the 9th decile. It can be seen from 
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 that the overall selection effect is entirely due to 
differences in observed characteristics between women who work full-time and all 
French women, since the differences due to unobserved characteristics are not 
significantly different from zero. These findings suggest that women who work full-
time in France are more likely to have the observed characteristics associated with 
higher earnings, but this selection effect is modest by international standards 
(compared with findings for Spain and Italy, for example). This is not a surprising 
finding given that family and employment policies in France aim to make it easier 
for French women to combine work and family if they wish to work (Fagnani & 
Math, 2009).  
 
The selection effect is even smaller in the Czech Republic (Figure 5.3) and also 
largely due to differences in observed characteristics (Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5) The 
overall selection effect does not exceed 5-7 lwp at any point in the distribution and it 
is not significantly different from zero beyond the 6th decile.  Women in the Czech 
Republic have some of the lowest non-participation and part-time rates in the EU 
(Eurostat, 2010), so it is not surprising that little evidence of selection into full-time 
work is found. 
 
To sum up, the overall selection effect is positive and large in Italy and in Spain, 
small by comparison in Britain, France and Poland, and negligible in the Czech 
Republic. The positive selection effect in Italy and in Spain is due to differences in 
                                               
84
 For women with children aged 0-4, there is a significant association between activity status and 
having a university degree (p<0.0001) in Poland, with full-time working women being much more 
likely to be university educated (51%) than part-time working women (45%) or non-working women 
(19%). In the Czech Republic, the association is not significant at 1% (p=0.04); part-time women 
(39%) are more likely to be university educated than full-time women (25%) or non-working women 
(17%). 
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both observable and unobservable characteristics, but the part related to observables 
dominates. In contrast, the positive selection effect in Britain, France, Spain, Poland 
and the Czech Republic is almost entirely due to differences in observable 
characteristics. Allowance for selection is made accordingly in the estimation of the 
earnings functions for full-time working women below.   
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Figure 5.3 Log wage gap between actual full-time women and the wages that 
would be observed if all women worked full-time 
 
Italy
 
 
Spain  
 
Poland 
 
France  
 
Czech Republic 
 
Britain 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic; BHPS 2005 for 
Britain. 
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Figure 5.4 The portion of the selection effect due to differences in observed 
characteristics between full-time female employees and all women 
 
Italy
 
 
Spain 
 
Poland  
 
France 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Britain 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic; BHPS 2005 for 
Britain. 
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Figure 5.5  The portion of the selection effect due to differences in 
unobserved characteristics between full-time female employees 
and all women 
Italy
 
Spain 
 
Poland  
 
France 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Britain 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic; BHPS 2005 for 
Britain. 
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Earnings function results 
Selected results (at the 20th quantile, the median and the 80th quantile) from the 
quantile regressions for log hourly earnings for men (equation 1) and women with 
Buchinsky selection correction (equation 3)85  working full-time are presented in 
Table 5.6  for Britain and Tables 5.7 through 5.11 for the other five countries. 
 
There are substantial gains associated with higher education qualifications and work 
experience for men and women. Contrary to what might be expected, however, 
women have higher returns to having a university degree than men in all five EU-
SILC countries, but particularly so in Spain and Poland. Thus, it appears that it is not 
simply differences in returns to academic qualifications that drive the raw gender 
wage gaps in earnings in these countries. The only exception is Britain, where the 
returns to educational qualifications (A-Level and above) are higher for men than for 
women at each of the selected quantiles. 
 
Workplace characteristics tend to be crucial predictors of earnings. There are positive 
returns to having managerial duties, working in a larger workplace, having a 
permanent contract (EU-SILC only), and having a white-collar high-skilled 
occupation throughout the distribution for full-time men and women in all of the 
studied countries. The returns associated with carrying managerial duties are 
typically higher for men than for women, especially at the top end of the earnings 
distribution. Notably, the returns tend to rise across the distribution for men, but not 
for women. Working in a larger workplace also tends to carry higher returns for men 
than for women. These results suggest that differential returns associated with these 
workplace characteristics play a role in driving the observed gender wage gaps in the 
studied countries. 
 
 The returns to working in the ISCO-1 ‘managerial’ occupation (legislators, senior 
officials and managers) tend to increase across the distribution for men and women 
in all six countries. The returns are higher for men than for women in Britain (at the 
2nd decile only), Spain (at the 2nd decile and the median), in Poland (at the 2nd decile 
                                               
85
 The function hθ(zff γ) is a power series approximation (using the inverse Mill’s ratio from the 
Heckman’s two-step procedure) of the filtered single index selection probability (see Table 5.4 for 
Britain and Table 5.5 for the EU-SILC countries). See Albrecht et al. (2009, p.385). 
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only), and in the Czech Republic (at the 8th decile only). On the contrary, the returns 
are higher for women than for men in Italy and in France (at the 8th decile). Women 
tend to have higher returns to working in professional (ISCO-2) and associate 
professional occupations (ISCO-3), with the returns typically increasing across the 
distribution, in each of the studied countries. In contrast, men tend to have 
substantially higher returns to working in skilled trades and craft occupations than 
women. These tend to be the occupations heavily dominated by men (see summary 
statistics tables above).  
 
Being married is positively associated with wages for men in all of the studied 
countries, but carries no wage premium (or penalty) for women. Married men tend to 
earn around 10% more at each selected point in the distribution in all six countries. 
Having been born outside the EU-25 carries a significant penalty for both men and 
women in Italy and Spain, as well as in the Czech Republic (at the median and for 
men only). However, immigrant workers in Spain are not a homogenous group, with 
immigrants from non-Spanish speaking countries facing the largest wage gap relative 
to native Spanish workers (Nicodemo, 2009b). Interestingly, there is a significant 
immigrant penalty at the median and a premium at the 2nd decile for women in 
Poland, with no significant effects for men, although immigrants make up less than 1% 
of female and male full-time employees in the sample. 
 
To sum up, men tend to have higher returns across the distribution from workplace 
characteristics, such as having managerial duties and working in a larger workplace, 
than women. The returns associated with being married are ubiquitously high for 
men, but virtually nil for women. However, the returns associated with having a 
university degree are higher for women in all of the studied countries except Britain. 
As regards occupational characteristics, women tend to have higher returns 
associated with working in professional and associate professional occupations, but 
the premiums to working in skilled trades and craft occupations are higher for men.  
Men tend to have higher returns to working in managerial occupations than women 
at the bottom of the distribution in Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland and at the top of 
the distribution in the Czech Republic. However, women tend to have higher returns 
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to working in managerial occupations at the top of the distribution in Britain and in 
France. 
 
Table 5.6     Regression results for full-time men and women (Britain) 
 
Men Women (with selection correction) 
quantile 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th 
Work experience (years) 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03*** 
Work exp squared (x 100) -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.07* -0.02 -0.05** 
Highest level of education 
(ref: minimal)       
     Degree 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.26** 0.29*** 0.29** 
     Other higher 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.15* 0.13 0.13* 0.16* 
     A-levels 0.19** 0.22*** 0.17* 0.08 0.12* 0.08 
     O-levels 0.11 0.12** 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.01 
     Other secondary 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09 
Married 0.08** 0.09*** 0.09** -0.01 0.02 -0.05 
 Managerial duties  0.10*** 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 
Size of firm (ref: 200 or 
over)       
     Under 25 -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.09* -0.12*** -0.13*** 
     25-199 -0.07** -0.08*** -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
Private sector -0.00 0.02 0.06* -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 
Occupational category (ref: 
elementary)       
     Managers 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.29*** 0.48*** 0.69*** 
     Professionals 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.62*** 0.75*** 0.71*** 
     Assoc Professionals 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
     Admin/Secretarial 0.15* 0.16*** 0.22** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.28** 
     Skilled Trades 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.19*** -0.03 0.05 0.06 
     Personal Services 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.13* 0.15 
     Sales and customer 
serv. 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.17 
     Operatives 0.12*** 0.10* 0.13** 0.14 0.12 0.15 
Region (ref: South)       
      Scotland -0.08 -0.12*** -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 
      Wales -0.13** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 
      London 0.18** 0.12* 0.18* 0.18** 0.13* 0.13* 
      East and Midlands -0.07 -0.12*** -0.14** -0.06 -0.09* -0.08 
      North, Yorkshire and  
Humber -0.05 -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.03 -0.06* -0.09 
Lambda - - - -1.06** -0.78* -0.15 
Lambda^2 - - - 1.82* 1.25 0.35 
Lambda^3 - - - -1.14* -0.77 -0.23 
Lambda^4 - - - 0.23 0.15 0.05 
Constant 1.46*** 1.69*** 1.89*** 1.64*** 1.75*** 1.82*** 
Pseudo R-Square 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.35 0.35 
Number of observations 1747 1283 
Source: BHPS 2005/06.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications. 
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Table 5.7     Regression results for full-time men and women (Italy) 
 Men Women (with selection correction) 
quantile 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th 
Actual work experience 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
Actual work experience 
squared (x1000) -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.38*** -0.45*** -0.54*** 
Highest level of education 
(ref: secondary)       
     Lower secondary or below -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.23*** 
     University 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.30*** 
Born outside EU-25 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07** -0.08* -0.09** -0.05 
Married 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.10*** -0.01 0.02 0.004 
Managerial duties 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.03* 0.03* 0.03 
Size of firm (ref: 50 or over)       
   10 or fewer -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.09*** 
    11-49 -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03** -0.03 
On permanent contract 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.04 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.005 
Occupational category (ref: 
elementary)        
   Legislators, senior officials 
and managers 0.13* 0.27*** 0.54*** 0.26*** 0.42*** 0.56*** 
    Professionals 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.55*** 
    Technicians and associate 
     professionals 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 
     Clerks 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.07** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
     Service workers and shop    
and market sales workers 0.07** 0.05* 0.09* 0.11** 0.05* 0.03 
     Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers / Craft and 
related trades 0.05* 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05* -0.04 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and assemblers 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.08* 0.04 0.01 
Region (ref: North)       
    Central -0.03** -0.03** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03 
    South -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.17*** -0.09*** -0.05 
    Islands -0.07** -0.05** -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
Lambda - - - 0.14 -0.07 -0.02 
Lambda^2 - - - 0.13 0.31* 0.33 
Lambda^3 - - - -0.07 -0.10* -0.11 
Constant 1.68*** 1.91*** 2.19*** 1.44*** 1.70*** 1.85*** 
Pseudo R Square 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.30 
Unweighted No. observations 6093 4012 
Source: EU-SILC 2007.   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications. 
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Table 5.8     Regression results for full-time men and women (Spain) 
 Men Women (with selection correction) 
quantile 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th 
Actual work experience 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
Actual work experience 
squared (x1000) -0.23** -0.32*** -0.34*** 0.34** -0.40*** -0.35** 
Highest level of education 
(ref: secondary)       
     Lower secondary or below -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 
     University 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
Born outside EU-25 -0.10** -0.07* -0.09** -0.10** -0.10** -0.17*** 
Married 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.03 0.001 0.04 
Managerial duties 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.06** 0.09*** 0.11** 
Size of firm (ref: 50 or over)       
   10 or fewer -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.15** -0.13*** 
    11-49 -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.06** -0.06** 
On permanent contract 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.06* 
Occupational category (ref: 
elementary)        
   Legislators, senior officials 
and managers 0.50*** 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.40 0.41*** 0.61*** 
    Professionals 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.60 0.64*** 0.61*** 
    Technicians and associate 
     professionals 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24 0.28*** 0.28*** 
     Clerks 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.20 0.21*** 0.19*** 
     Service workers and shop    
and market sales workers 0.11** 0.06* 0.13*** 0.09 0.07** 0.07* 
     Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers / Craft and 
related trades 0.12*** 0.07** 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and assemblers 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12 0.17 0.22** 
Region (ref: North)       
   Central -0.04* -0.06*** -0.05 -0.01 -0.06** -0.09** 
   South -0.07** -0.08*** -0.06* -0.03 -0.06** -0.09*** 
   East 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.05* 
Lambda - - - 0.86** 0.64* 0.07 
Lambda^2 - - - -1.39** -0.70 0.25 
Lambda^3 - - - 0.87** 0.39 -0.21 
Lambda^4 - - - -0.17** -0.07 0.05 
Constant 1.62*** 1.83*** 2.05*** 1.19*** 1.34*** 1.76*** 
Pseudo R Square 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.35 0.39 
Unweighted No. observations 3867 2719 
Source: EU-SILC 2007.   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications. 
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Table 5.9     Regression results for full-time men and women (Poland) 
 Men Women (with selection correction) 
quantile 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th 
Actual work experience 0.01* 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Actual work experience 
squared (x1000) -0.07 -0.18* -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.36** -0.44*** 
Highest level of education 
(ref: secondary)       
     Lower secondary or below -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
     University 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 
Born outside EU-25 -0.13 -0.35 -0.05 0.15* -0.19* -0.29 
Married 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.04** 0.03 -0.00 
Managerial duties 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.07** 0.05* 0.07* 
Size of firm (ref: 50 or over)       
   10 or fewer -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.04* -0.04** -0.04* 
    11-49 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
On permanent contract 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
Occupational category (ref: 
elementary)        
   Legislators, senior officials 
and managers 0.47*** 0.50*** 0.71*** 0.39*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 
    Professionals 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.40*** 0.54*** 0.66*** 
    Technicians and associate 
     professionals 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.51*** 
     Clerks 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 
     Service workers and shop    
and market sales workers 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.07*** 0.09** 
     Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers / Craft and 
related trades 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.01 0.07* 0.09* 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and assemblers 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 
Region (ref: North)       
    Central 0.04* 0.07*** 0.08* 0.05* 0.07*** 0.08** 
    South 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08** 0.01 0.02 0.03 
    East 0.03 -0.004 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Lambda - - - 0.01 -0.07 -0.13 
Lambda^2 - - - 0.04 0.08 0.11 
Lambda^3 - - - -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Constant 0.29*** 0.43*** 0.65*** 0.07 0.21*** 0.46*** 
Pseudo R Square 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.35 
Unweighted No. observations 3995 3424 
Source: EU-SILC 2007.   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications 
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Table 5.10     Regression results for full-time men and women (France) 
 Men Women (with selection correction) 
quantile 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th 
Actual work experience 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
Actual work experience 
squared (x1000) -0.13* -0.24*** -0.18* -0.12 -0.08 -0.10 
Highest level of education 
(ref: secondary)       
     Lower secondary or below -0.02 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.04* -0.06** -0.05 
     University 0.05** 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 
Born outside EU-25 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 
Married 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
Managerial duties 0.03 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.02 0.03 0.05* 
Size of firm (ref: 50 or over)       
   10 or fewer -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.08** 
    11-49 -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06** 
On permanent contract 0.06 0.08*** 0.10** 0.05* 0.07* 0.08** 
Occupational category (ref: 
elementary)        
   Legislators, senior officials 
and managers 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.60*** 
    Professionals 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 
    Technicians and associate 
     professionals 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 
     Clerks 0.08** 0.07* 0.06 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
     Service workers and shop    
and market sales workers 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 
     Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers / Craft and 
related trades 0.07** 0.07** 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and assemblers 0.05* 0.06* 0.07 0.05 -0.00 0.05 
Region (ref: West)       
   North -0.01 -0.01 -0.07* 0.003 -0.01 -0.01 
   South 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 
   East 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.004 0.01 -0.02 
Lambda - - - -0.10 0.10 0.01 
Lambda^2 - - - 0.11 -0.04 0.05 
Lambda^3 - - - -0.02 0.02 -0.0002 
Constant 2.08*** 2.15*** 2.34*** 1.97*** 2.01*** 2.13*** 
Pseudo R Square 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.28 0.32 
Unweighted No. observations 2773 1880 
Source: EU-SILC 2007.   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications 
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Table 5.11     Regression results for full-time men and women (Czech Republic) 
 Men Women (with selection correction) 
quantile 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th 
Actual work experience 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01* 
Actual work experience 
squared (x1000) 
-0.44 *** -0.32*** -0.31* -0.24** -0.34*** -0.21* 
Highest level of education 
(ref: secondary) 
      
     Lower secondary or below -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07** -0.07** -0.07 
     University 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 
Born outside EU-25 -0.14 -0.16* -0.24 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Married 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.11*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Managerial duties 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
Size of firm (ref: 50 or over)       
   10 or fewer -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.10*** 
    11-49 -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.09*** 
On permanent contract 0.12*** 0.08* 0.04 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.09* 
Occupational category (ref: 
elementary)  
      
   Legislators, senior officials 
and managers 
0.30*** 0.45*** 0.63*** 0.43*** 0.46*** 0.57*** 
    Professionals 0.32*** 0.42*** 0.58*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 
    Technicians and associate 
     professionals 
0.29*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 
     Clerks 0.15* 0.17** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 
     Service workers and shop    
and market sales workers 
0.15** 0.22*** 0.31*** 0.05* 0.04 0.05 
     Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers / Craft and 
related trades 
0.15*** 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.05 0.09*** 0.12** 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and assemblers 
0.11** 0.15** 0.22*** 0.12** 0.14*** 0.15** 
Region (ref: East)       
    Central 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.12** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 
    Moravia 0.03 0.004 0.02 -0.01 -0.001 -0.02 
    North -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
Lambda - - - 0.30* 0.17 0.22 
Lambda^2 - - - -0.34 -0.21 -0.28 
Lambda^3 - - - 0.10 0.08 0.10 
Constant 0.57*** 0.88*** 1.09*** 0.41*** 0.57*** 0.78*** 
Pseudo R Square 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.26 
Unweighted No. observations 3130 2666 
Source: EU-SILC 2007.   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications 
 
 
Figure 5.6 compares the (simulated) selection-adjusted gender earnings gap with the 
raw gender earnings gap in Figure 5.2 by overlaying the two plots for each country. 
The selection-adjusted gender wage gap shows the difference between the 
distribution of men’s full-time wages and the distribution of wages that women 
would earn if all women worked full-time. The extent to which the two plots are 
distinct (their confidence intervals not overlapping) indicates the degree to which 
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women’s selection into full-time employment makes a difference to gender earnings 
gaps among full-time employees. 
Consistent with the finding of a large positive selection effect in Italy, the selection-
adjusted earnings gap is substantially larger than the observed raw gap at all points in 
the distribution, particularly at the bottom. There is a strong evidence of a sticky 
floors effect: if all women worked full-time, the gender wage gap would be largest 
for the lowest earners (60 lwp), dropping to 30 lwp at the top of the distribution. The 
findings are quite similar for Spain, although the gap is lower: the selection-adjusted 
gap is larger than the observed gap, especially at the bottom of the distribution. It is 
relatively stable at 40 lwp in the bottom half of the distribution, decreasing to 10 lwp 
at the very top.  
 
In line with the finding of moderately positive selection effects in Britain, Poland and 
in France, the selection adjusted earnings gap in these countries is not substantially 
larger than the observed gap in absolute terms. However, it is large in relative terms: 
if all women worked full-time, the gender earnings gaps would be almost twice as 
high as currently observed in these countries. Furthermore, there is some evidence of 
a glass ceiling effect in France and in Britain. The two plotted gaps in Britain have 
very similar shapes and they overlap beyond the 8th decile, suggesting that the gender 
gap for the highest earners would not change significantly if all women worked full-
time. 
 
The selection-adjusted earnings gap in the Czech Republic closely matches the raw 
gap, with the confidence intervals intersecting at all points in the distribution except 
the section between the 2nd and 4th deciles, where the selection adjusted gap is 
somewhat larger. This is consistent with the finding of a small positive selection 
effect for women in that part of the distribution.  Thus, if all women worked full-time, 
the gender wage gap across the distribution would not be significantly different from 
the gap currently observed. This is related to women working full-time having a 
largely similar distribution of characteristics to that of all women. This is not 
surprising given that the vast majority of prime-age women already work, and most 
of them work full-time.  
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To sum up, if all women worked full-time in each of the studied countries, the gender 
wage gap would be noticeably higher in the Southern-European countries (Italy and 
Spain) and somewhat higher in Britain, Poland and France, while it would hardly 
change from the current levels in the Czech Republic. It is important to note that this 
analysis is limited in a sense that it does not take into account any macro-level 
changes that would occur if all women worked full-time in the studied countries or 
whether they would all be able to find work. The purpose of the analysis is to 
illustrate the differences in the sizes of the selection effect in these countries. 
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Figure 5.6     Gender log wage gap between full-time men’s wages and the 
wages that would be observed if all women worked full-time 
 
Italy 
 
 
Spain 
 
Poland 
 
France 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Britain 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic; BHPS 2005 for 
Britain. 
 
Finally, Figure 5.7 provides the counterfactual distribution of the gender earnings 
gap for full-time employees that would be observed if women retained their own 
distribution of characteristics but were rewarded for them in the same way as men. 
The characteristics included in the simulation are the same as those in the earnings 
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function above. The simulated gap is substantially lower than the observed (raw) gap 
between full-time men and women’s earnings across the distribution in each of the 
studied countries, which suggests that a substantial part of the raw gender wage gap 
is related to women earning lower returns to their labour market characteristics than 
men. 
 
In Britain, Spain and France, the counterfactual gender wage gap would be negligible, 
suggesting that the earnings gaps currently observed are largely due to differences in 
the returns to characteristics. In Italy the simulated wage gap would be negative in 
the middle part of the distribution (around -5 lwp) and not significantly different 
from zero otherwise. This suggests that not only do men receive higher returns to 
their characteristics, but also that among middle-earners, women have a distribution 
of characteristics associated with somewhat greater earnings potential than men. It 
appears that full-time women’s higher levels of education across the distribution (see 
Table A 5-5) are associated with this difference. 
 
Similarly, the wage gap would be reversed in Poland, reaching -15 lwp at the top of 
the distribution. This indicates that women in Poland have a distribution of observed 
characteristics associated with higher earnings potential than men. If they received 
the same returns to these characteristics as men, female employees would be better 
paid than male full-time employees. Full-time female employees in Poland are more 
likely to have a university degree (39%) than male employees (21%), on average. In 
fact, more women have degrees than men within each quintile of the respective 
earnings distributions (for example, 81% of women in the top quintile of their 
earnings distribution have a university degree, compared with 50% of men; Table A 
5-5). Women are also more likely than men to have a permanent contract within each 
quintile of the distribution and to work in a professional (ISCO-2) occupation. 
Although men have slightly more years of work experience across the distribution 
than women and are somewhat more likely to have managerial duties, these 
differences are negligible.   
 
Finally, if full-time women were paid like men, the wage gap would disappear in the 
bottom half of the distribution in the Czech Republic, but remain positive in the top 
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half, with a glass ceiling effect indicated. It would still be substantially lower than 
currently observed (below 20 lwp). These results indicate that at least a small part of 
the large unadjusted gender wage gap in the Czech Republic (Figure 2) is due to 
gender differences in the distribution of characteristics. While male and female full-
time employees tend to have quite similar levels of education and work experience, 
men are more likely to have managerial duties, to work in managerial occupations, 
and to work in larger workplaces than women across the distribution (Table A 5-7).  
 
To sum up, substantial unexplained gender differences in returns to observable 
characteristics for full-time employees are found in each of the studied countries. If 
full-time female employees were paid like men, the observed gender wage gaps 
across the distribution would disappear or even reverse (in Poland and, to a smaller 
extent, in Italy). Only in the Czech Republic is some evidence of gender differences 
in the distribution of characteristics found, and only among top earners: if Czech 
women were paid like men, a moderate positive wage gap in the top quintile of the 
distribution would remain. This gap would still be much lower than currently 
observed. 
 
Even so, given the evidence of positive selection into full-time work for women in 
five out of six countries studied here, if all women worked full-time (including those 
with lower earnings potential), the gender wage gaps due to differences in the 
distribution of observed characteristics would likely persist in these countries even if 
women had male returns to these characteristics.  
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Figure 5.7    Log wage between full-time men and women paid like men 
 
Italy 
 
 
Spain 
 
Poland 
 
France 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Britain 
 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 for Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the Czech Republic; BHPS 2005 for 
Britain. 
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Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the gender earnings gap across the distribution, using 
the quantile regression decomposition method (Machado & Mata, 2005) with sample 
selection adjustment to account for possible non-random presentation of women into 
full-time work (Albrecht et al., 2009), in six large European countries. 
 
The mean gender wage gap among prime-age full-time employees is lowest in 
Poland (3 lwp) and highest in the Czech Republic (24 lwp). However, the mean 
gender wage gaps hide substantial variation in the earnings gap across the 
distribution. In Italy, Spain and in Poland, the relatively small earnings gap decreases 
across the distribution, while in France and in Britain the earnings gap increases 
steadily, indicating a glass ceiling effect. The highest overall earnings gap is 
observed in the Czech Republic: it has an S-shape with steep increases both in the 
bottom and top deciles of the distribution.  
 
Non-random selection of women into full-time employment plays an important role 
in Italy and Spain and, to a smaller extent, in Britain, France and Poland. Thus, 
women who work full-time tend to have the characteristics associated with a higher 
earning potential. For the Czech Republic alone, little evidence of a selection effect 
is found. Among the determinants of women’s full-time employment (as opposed to 
part-time work or non-participation), the number and age of dependent children are 
found to play an important role. In Poland and the Czech Republic, the presence of 
pre-school children has the strongest negative effect on the propensity to work full-
time. This is consistent with those countries’ low ranking on the work/family 
reconciliation index in Chapter 3.  
 
If all women worked full-time in each of the studied countries, the gender earnings 
gap would be lowest in Poland and in France, largest in Italy and Spain and middling 
in the Czech Republic and Britain. However, in Italy and Spain it would be 
substantially greater than currently observed, as women with lower earnings potential 
(re-)entered the labour market on a full-time basis, while in the Czech Republic the 
selection-adjusted gender earnings gap would largely remain at the current high level. 
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This is consistent with the finding of a very low selection effect in the Czech 
Republic.  
 
Substantial unexplained gender differences in returns to observable characteristics 
for full-time workers are found in all of the studied countries: if full-time female 
employees were paid like men, the observed gender wage gaps across the distribution 
would largely disappear or even reverse. In Italy, Spain, Britain and France, the 
gender wage gap for full-time employees would become insignificant. In Poland it 
would actually reverse, with increasingly larger gender wage gaps in favour of 
women towards the top of the earnings distribution.  
 
Only in the Czech Republic would a small gender wage gap in favour of men remain 
at the top of the distribution, largely due to women having a distribution of 
workplace characteristics associated with a lower earnings potential than men. 
However, if all women in the studied countries worked full-time, including those 
with lower rewarded productive characteristics, a gender wage gap would be likely to 
persist even if women were paid like men. 
 
In each of the countries studied here, there is a scarcity of women in higher status 
positions in the workplace. Full-time women are substantially less likely to work in 
managerial occupations and to hold supervisory duties than men both on average and 
within each quintile of the earnings distribution. They are also typically less likely to 
work in larger organisations and to have permanent contracts. To address the issue of 
gender differences in workplace characteristics in more depth, the next chapter 
focuses on occupational gender segregation in 26 European countries.  
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Chapter 6 Cross-national variation in occupational gender 
segregation  
 
This thesis focuses on two forms of gender inequality in the labour market: pay gaps 
and occupational segregation. The previous chapter analysed the gender gap across 
the earnings distribution of full-time employees in five countries with different 
work/family reconciliation policies and different levels of earnings inequality. In 
each of these countries, women tend to receive lower returns to their labour market 
characteristics than men, including workplace characteristics such as the major 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) group of the occupation 
they work in. Female full-time employees are substantially less likely to work in 
managerial occupations and to hold supervisory duties in the workplace. 
 
Both men and women working full-time are at risk of occupational downgrading by 
skill or occupational hourly wage when they switch to part-time work, according to 
the findings in Chapter 4 for 13 of the old-EU member states. However, women are 
more likely to switch to part-time work than men, on average, especially after having 
a child.  Recent childbirth is found to be associated with a higher probability of 
moving from full-time to part-time work for women in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Austria, the UK and Italy. In all of these countries except Belgium, switching to part-
time work substantially increases the likelihood of moving into an occupation with 
lower educational requirements or average hourly wages than before. This chapter 
analyses implications of this potential occupational gender segregation 86  in the 
enlarged EU in more depth.  
 
Women in the EU are concentrated in a narrow range of occupations, in spite of 
dramatic increases in labour force participation in recent decades (European 
Commission, 2009). Gender-based occupational segregation is one of the most 
durable aspects of labour markets around the world. As such, it increasingly attracts 
the attention of policy-makers and researchers. With nearly half the labour force 
effectively excluded from many occupations, human capital is wasted and the labour 
markets stay fairly rigid and inefficient (Anker, 2001). Moreover, occupational 
                                               
86
 Occupational gender segregation and occupational segregation by sex are used interchangeably here. 
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gender segregation adversely affects women’s status, income, and expected returns 
on human capital investment, perpetuating gender inequality into future generations.  
 
To address the fourth research question of the thesis (“how does occupational gender 
segregation vary across the EU?”), this chapter focuses on gender differences in 
occupational distributions in 25 European countries and explores cross-national 
variation in occupational gender segregation levels using summary measures and 
log-linear methods. It seeks to shed light on the macro-level factors associated with 
cross-national differences in segregation levels. The following section reviews recent 
research on occupational gender segregation, relevant economic and sociological 
theories of segregation and measurement issues in segregation studies. The rest of the 
chapter describes the data, variables and methods used in the analysis and presents 
the empirical results. 
 
Literature review 
This section introduces the subject of occupational segregation by sex and gives an 
overview of recent literature on theories of segregation, research findings and issues 
in measurement.  
 
Occupational gender segregation refers to “inequality in the distribution of male and 
female workers across occupational groups” (Chakravarty & Silber, 2007, p.185). 
Thus, it is a different concept from “concentration”, which denotes the over-
representation of men or women in a particular occupation, while segregation refers 
to the entire occupational structure. The two concepts are closely related, as 
“segregation measures the combined effect of concentration in all the occupations 
involved” (Blackburn & Jarman, 2006, p.290). Furthermore, the horizontal and 
vertical dimensions of occupational segregation are often distinguished in the 
literature. Vertical segregation refers to occupational hierarchy, either in the same 
field (e.g. surgeons versus general practitioners) or across the entire occupational 
structure (e.g. manual versus professional occupations), whereas horizontal 
segregation denotes unequal distribution of men and women across occupations with 
somewhat similar requirements, but in entirely different areas of work (e.g. female 
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carers versus male refuse collectors), according to Fortin and Huberman87 (2002). 
Horizontal segregation can also be defined as the gender divide across lower status 
manual and non-manual occupations (i.e. women being concentrated in non-manual 
semi-professional, clerical, sales and service occupations and under-represented in 
manual occupations such as trades and crafts) (Charles, 2003). Blackburn and Jarman 
(2006) argue that it is vertical segregation that is central to the study of inequality. 
However, horizontal segregation is no less important if female-dominated 
occupations are undervalued (see Grimshaw & Rubery, 2007) and women have no 
access to better rewarded male-dominated occupations with broadly similar 
educational and/or skill requirements.  
 
The main strands of gender occupational segregation research include inter-temporal 
patterns in segregation over the 20th century (Gross, 1968 for the US; Hakim, 1979 
for Great Britain; Jacobs, 1989a for 56 countries; Rubery & Fagan, 1993 for the EU; 
Fortin & Huberman, 2002 for Canada; P. England, 2006 for the US), patterns of 
cross-national variation in occupational segregation (Charles, 1992; Anker, 1998; J. 
Dolado et al., 2003), segregation in specific professions (e.g. Truss, 1993 for 
secretarial occupations), occupational segregation as a predictor of gender wage gaps 
(e.g. F. D. Blau & Kahn, 2003), and the relationship between occupational 
segregation and female employment (Bettio, 2002) as well as other macro-level 
factors (Charles, 1992; Nermo, 2000). The literature on occupational segregation in 
European countries is relatively scarce and somewhat outdated.  More recent studies 
include Dex et al. (2008) for England and Wales and Dolado et al. (2003) for the EU 
compared with the US.  
 
Using data for Britain from the 1980 General Household Survey, Miller (1987) found 
that occupational segregation, based on six broad occupational categories, made a 
relatively small contribution to the overall gender wage gap amongst married adults. 
Thus, even if male and female employees had similar occupational distributions, the 
gender wage gap would only be 5 percentage points lower than the observed 60% 
gap. Most of the wage differences were found within broad occupational groups.  
                                               
87
 The example of horizontal segregation in Fortin and Huberman (2002) is female nurses versus male 
truck drivers, but it can be plausibly argued that these occupations require different skills and 
qualifications. 
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Blau and Kahn (2003) also find a positive but small and insignificant effect of 
occupational segregation (based on 75 occupational categories), after controlling for 
collective bargaining coverage, parental leave, unemployment insurance and job 
protection policies, in their international study of gender wage gaps in 22 
industrialised countries over the 1985-1994 period.  
 
Dex et al. (2008) examine the changes in male and female occupational distributions 
between 1981 and 2001, using Census data for England and Wales. The proportion 
of women in managerial occupations rose from 5% to 11% by 2001, but remained 
below that of men (19%). At the same time, the proportion of women in professional 
and associate professional groups rose from 17% to 24%, almost catching up with 
the percentage of men in such occupations (26%).  At the same time, the proportion 
of women in administrative and secretarial occupations and in personal service 
occupations fell from 30% to 23% and from 21% to 13%, respectively. However, the 
movement of women out of typically female occupations was not matched by the 
movement of men into them, as the proportions of men in these occupations 
remained very low over the studied period. 
 
Dolado et al. (2002; 2003) find higher levels of occupational gender segregation in 
the EU than in the US in 1999, using the index of dissimilarity 88  with 108 
occupations. They use data from the 1999 European Labour Force Survey for 13 EU 
countries and the 1999 Current Population Survey for the US.  Southern European 
countries are found to have more similar (low) levels of segregation to the US, with 
the largest differences found for Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany and the 
UK. The study confirms earlier results for Europe by Rubery and Fagan (1993) and 
Anker (1998), covering the 1980s. Differences in segregation levels between the EU 
and the US are found to be particularly high for the group of highly educated women 
aged 35-44. Dolado et al. (2003) find that the sex composition effect89 dominates in 
explaining the reduction of occupational segregation across age cohorts, rather than 
                                               
88
 The “Index of Dissimilarity” was developed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) to study residential 
racial segregation and has been widely used in studies of occupational gender segregation since the 
study by Gross (1968). 
89
 The effect of the sex composition of occupations, holding the size of occupations constant. 
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the occupational mix effect90. For example, the sex composition effect explains 85% 
and 91% of the decrease in occupational segregation for highly educated women 
aged 25-34 relative to the 35-44 group in the US and in the EU, respectively. The 
study finds a positive correlation between the level of occupational segregation and 
the share of part-time jobs in the economy, but no significant correlation between 
occupational segregation and the ‘unexplained’ component of the gender wage gap.  
 
Theoretical explanations of occupational segregation 
Neo-classical economic theories have been very influential in explaining 
occupational gender segregation. For instance, Polachek (1981) showed that 
women’s intermittent labour force participation was associated with a substantial 
proportion of the difference in the male and female occupational distributions, using 
data from the US National Longitudinal Survey. If women had zero ‘home time’, the 
number of women in professional and managerial occupations would increase by 35% 
and 133%, respectively, while the presence of women in menial occupations would 
decrease by more than one-quarter (S.W. Polachek, 1981, p.68). This suggested 
women’s expected life cycle labour force participation patterns were related to their 
occupational ‘choices’: women would prefer occupations with lower rates of human 
capital depreciation during their time out of the labour force. Furthermore, a 
complementary human capital approach suggested that women would opt for 
occupations with higher starting wages and lower returns to experience in the 
knowledge that their labour force participation would be interrupted (Zellner, 1975). 
Similarly, Becker (1993, p.56) argued that the household responsibilities of married 
women limited their time and energy for market activities and investment in market-
specific human capital, which could explain much of the gender difference in 
earnings and occupational attainment. Anticipating lower returns in the labour 
market, women would further reduce their investment in market capital. Thus, the 
human capital model is sometimes used to describe the persistent occupational 
segregation by sex in terms of women’s lower productivity in the labour market (due 
to their lower endowments, higher family constraints, and preferences for jobs more 
compatible with their household activities).  
                                               
90
 The effect of the occupational mix of the economy, holding the sex composition of occupations 
constant. 
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However, the main assumptions of the human capital theories of occupational gender 
segregation have been criticized. These theories emphasize the life cycle utility 
maximising labour supply behaviour of women, largely ignoring that occupational 
choices are often made in a short-term perspective in response to social and 
economic constraints and opportunities (Jacobs, 1989b). Furthermore, according to 
Anker (2001), the human capital theory does not fully explain the persistence of 
occupational segregation by sex in developed countries in light of women’s 
increasing education and labour market experience, falling intensity of household 
chores due to the use of modern household appliances91 , and the prevalence of 
female-headed households. Although occupational gender segregation has decreased 
in many countries over the past several decades, Anker (2001, p.132) argues that it 
remains very high. 
 
Furthermore, female dominated occupations do not necessarily have lower human 
capital depreciation rates or higher starting wages. For instance, England (1984) 
found no significant interaction between the length of time out of labour force and 
the female share in the occupation, controlling for education and experience, using 
1974 data for women from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Thus, wage 
depreciation during ‘home time’ did not vary between typically male and female 
occupations. Furthermore, the study found higher wage returns for women working 
in male-dominated occupations, both at the start of the career and later on, contesting 
Zellner’s (1975) hypothesis that typically female occupations had higher starting 
wages and lower returns to experience.  
 
In spite of the criticisms of the human capital model in relation to occupational 
segregation, other neo-classical theories are often used to explain gender differences 
in occupational attainment. For instance, the theory of statistical discrimination (see 
Arrow, 1998) posits that given the differences in average productivity between two 
groups in the presence of high information costs associated with evaluating the 
productivity of each (prospective) worker, it may be rational for employers to 
                                               
91
 However, there are still considerable gender differences in the division of child-care labour in two-
parent families, with  mothers performing more of the time-consuming care labour (e.g. physical care 
and travel) than fathers even if both participate in the labour market, as indicated by time-use surveys 
in developed countries (Finch, 2006; Craig, 2006). 
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discriminate against individuals from the on average less productive group based on 
their readily observable characteristics (e.g. sex, race). Although this theory is 
relevant to recruitment, it is less useful for understanding gender discrimination in 
promotion, since information costs are much lower (Anker, 2001). Moreover, 
statistical discrimination arguably offers a more viable explanation of occupational 
segregation in segmented, rather than competitive, labour markets (Jacobs, 1989b).  
 
The compensating differentials model, another neo-classical theory, is also 
sometimes used to explain women’s preference for some occupations and lower pay 
in female-dominated occupations. It states that women seek occupations with good 
working conditions and fringe benefits. Since these occupations are partly rewarded 
in non-monetary terms, their actual pay is lower. However, there is little empirical 
support for this model with respect to occupational segregation, since many of the 
low-paid female-dominated occupations do not have ‘pleasant working conditions’ 
(Anker, 2001, p.135) and jobs with onerous physical environments do not always 
carry a significant wage premium for either men or women (Kilbourne et al., 1994)92. 
However, due to gendered division of domestic labour, women may opt for female-
dominated and lower paid occupations with flexible working conditions out of 
necessity, without preferring flexible working conditions to a greater extent than men 
(Bettio & Verashchagina, 2009b, p.41). 
 
Similar to the economic theories that emphasise personal preferences, Hakim (1991; 
1995) argues that women in industrialised countries fall into at least two 
‘qualitatively different’ groups in terms of their commitment to market employment: 
those who prioritise long term career plans and full-time work, with their orientation 
to work similar to that of men; and those who prefer the domestic sphere, make little 
investment in market skills and seek flexible jobs most compatible with family life. 
The latter group of women would thus be more likely to choose lower status, routine 
work occupations (often working part-time), while the former group of women tend 
to work in higher paid and higher status occupations (Hakim, 1995). Thus, 
occupational segregation reflects the outcomes of the personal preferences of 
different types of women. This argument has been widely criticised in sociological 
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 Based on data from the US National Longitudinal Study, 1968-1981 waves. 
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literature on the grounds that many women aspire to both career and family 
fulfilment (Ginn et al., 1996; Crompton & Harris, 1998) and that there is no 
empirical evidence to support Hakim’s claim that women have unconstrained life 
choices or that women with different work histories have entirely opposing attitudes 
to employment (McRae, 2003). In her later work, Hakim (2000) elaborated the 
preference theory, arguing that both the career-centred and home-centred women 
were the minority, with the majority93 of women aiming to combine careers with 
motherhood. In spite of the earlier critique of Hakim’s argument, the idea that careers 
are central for only a minority of women found empirical support (McRae, 2003). 
Furthermore, based on the preference theory, Esping-Andersen (2002) argues that the 
‘women-friendly’ policies are only relevant to the (majority) group of women who 
favour the dual roles of mothers and workers and, being unwilling to forgo 
motherhood for the sake of a career, tend to work in flexible, female-dominated 
occupations.   
 
In contrast to theories of occupational segregation that emphasise individual choice, 
non-economic (e.g. feminist) theories maintain that occupational segregation can be 
shaped by societal context, which includes major institutions (such as education 
systems, welfare regimes) and the ideas of masculinity and femininity prevailing in 
the society (Crompton & Harris, 1998). Such theories highlight the role of gender 
stereotypes held by employers and societies at large in affecting differential 
occupational attainment of men and women. As the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 
showed, even welfare state institutions in industrialised countries, such as the tax and 
benefit rules and parenthood leave provisions, are founded on the assumption of 
gendered division of labour, with women being responsible for unpaid care work and 
men for paid market work (see Orloff, 2009).  
 
Since household chores and childcare are still widely seen as women’s responsibility, 
employers may be biased against female workers, thus perpetuating the stereotypes. 
This, in turn, helps explain why women make fewer investments in labour market 
skills and why they are more likely to choose the fields of study less rewarded in the 
labour market.  Moreover, typically female activities have been and still are 
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 “Potentially encompassing 80% of all adult females” (Hakim, 2000, p.165). 
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culturally devalued, as demonstrated by the pay penalty associated with working in a 
female-dominated occupation and the generally low esteem attached to unpaid caring 
work, according to England (2006). Feminist theories also predict that women are 
over-represented in occupations that are most consistent with their ‘female’ 
characteristics and most similar to the tasks they do at home, such as looking after 
children. Anker found support for this theory in his study of occupational segregation 
in 41 countries: he concluded that female-dominated occupations closely reflected 
typical gender stereotypes about women (1998, p.276).   
 
The influence of labour market discrimination on observed occupational gender 
segregation in industrialised countries has also been suggested in both sociological 
and economic research.  However, no conclusive evidence of a causal link exists so 
far. The ways in which women gravitate towards lower-paying occupations because 
of “gender biases in hiring and promotion” are very hard to document and measure 
(de Ruijter & Huffman, 2003). Deeply rooted gender role attitudes that make it 
difficult for women to enter male-dominated occupations have been commonly cited 
as the source of horizontal occupational sex segregation (e.g. Fortin & Huberman, 
2002). Likewise, “social attitudes and cultural biases” discriminate against women 
and keep them from reaching high-level occupations typically occupied by men, 
resulting in vertical segregation (OECD, 2002, p.95). Furthermore, women who 
succeed in entering typically male occupations may face severe obstacles to career 
advancement (Bergmann, 2005). It has been argued that both employees’ preferences 
and labour market discrimination may determine gender differences in occupational 
distributions, but it is difficult to distinguish between the two empirically (F. D. Blau 
& Kahn, 2000, p.89). 
 
One of the ways to glean an insight into the forces behind occupational segregation 
by sex is to study international variation in the extent to which employed men and 
women are found in different types of jobs. Although causal inferences are hard to 
make, comparative studies help explore the ways in which differences in institutions 
are associated with differences in segregation levels. The next sub-section reviews 
comparative scholarship on occupational gender segregation. 
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Cross-national studies of occupational gender segregation 
Although historical analysis of occupational gender segregation in individual 
countries tend to dominate the research field, cross-national studies have recently 
become more common. Such studies find remarkably different levels of occupational 
segregation across countries, although differences across Western European 
countries tend to be smaller (Jacobs & Lim, 1992; Rubery & Fagan, 1993; Charles, 
1992; Anker, 1998; Nermo, 2000; J. Dolado et al., 2003). Not only concerned with 
comparing the levels of segregation, some of these studies explicitly address the 
question of what macro-economic factors influence cross-national variation in 
segregation, mostly using log-linear modelling methods (e.g. Charles, 1992; Charles 
& Grusky, 1995; Nermo, 2000). Log-linear modelling has long been used in social 
mobility sociological research (see Erikson & Goldthorpe, 2002) and became popular 
in cross-country sex segregation research in the 1990’s. 
 
Charles (1992) analysed cross-national variation in occupational sex segregation in 
25 industrialised countries, using occupational macro-level International Labour 
Organisation statistics for 1985. The aim of the study was to explain the international 
variation in sex segregation levels with relevant economic, social and cultural macro-
level characteristics. The analysis involved log-linear modelling of observed 
frequencies in a 300-cell matrix (6 occupations; 2 sexes; 25 countries). The study 
found overall positive effects of the size of the employee class, the size of the service 
sector, and corporatism on segregation, as well as negative (i.e. more ‘integrative’) 
effect of fertility rates, gender egalitarianism94 and labour force growth. None of the 
new accession EU member states were included in the study, however. 
 
Nermo (2000) examines sex segregation in the labour market in seven countries 
(Sweden, Norway, Finland, UK, US, Austria and Spain), net of employment sector 
and work time effects, also using log-linear modelling. The study uses cross-
nationally comparable micro-data from the Luxembourg Employment Study95. A 
stronger association between sex and occupation is found for Finland, Norway and 
                                               
94
 Gender egalitarianism index was based on principal component analysis of three dummy variables: 
legal availability of abortion on request; marital rape defined as a crime; and at least 12 weeks of 
statutory paid maternity leave. 
95
 1989 data for the UK, 1990 for Finland, Norway, Sweden and the US, 1991 for Austria, and 1993 
for Spain (Nermo, 2000, p.304). 
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the UK than for Sweden, Austria, Spain or the US, although overall the levels of sex 
segregation are broadly similar across the seven countries96. Cross-national variation 
in the distribution of employment sector (services versus manufacturing) across sex 
and occupation is found to have an effect on the relative strength of association 
between occupation and sex across countries. Evidence of higher segregation in the 
service sector than in the industrial sector is found for the US, Sweden, Finland and 
Austria, while the reverse is found for Spain. Part-time work, however, is not found 
to have an influence on the cross-national pattern of sex segregation.  
 
Charles (2003) studies vertical and horizontal dimensions of occupational gender 
segregation in a cross-national perspective in 10 industrialised countries97, using data 
from the 1990 ILO labour force statistics. None of the new accession states is 
included. Vertical segregation is defined on the aggregated level of major ISCO 
groups by an internationally comparable measure of occupational status98. Horizontal 
segregation is defined in terms of non-manual (managerial; professional; associate 
professional; clerical; service/sales) and manual (agriculture; craft; operative and 
labourer) occupational groups. A model that allows for both horizontal and vertical 
segregation shows that: 1) women tend to be under-represented in the manual sector 
and 2) women’s occupations have lower average socio-economic scores in both 
manual and non-manual sectors.  
 
Controlling for vertical segregation, the highest levels of horizontal segregation are 
found in France and Sweden and the lowest levels are found in Portugal and Italy 
(Charles, 2003). The strongest vertical segregation is observed in France and the UK, 
while Portugal and Italy show the lowest levels of segregation. The finding of weak 
segregation on both dimensions in Italy and Portugal suggests that women tend to be 
positively selected into higher status white-collar work and negatively selected into 
lower status blue-collar work due to the low availability of low status non-manual 
occupations (e.g. service/sales) that are female-dominated in most other countries 
                                               
96
 A log linear model of constant segregation across the studied countries mis-classified only 7% of 
the cells in the 1120-cell contingency table with categories of occupation, sex, country, work-time and 
sector of employment (Nermo, 2000, p.314). 
97
 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, and Japan. 
98
 The socio-economic index by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).  The ranking of the socio-economic 
index (SEI) of occupations matches the ranking of the ISCO major groups with the exception of 
managerial occupations that are ranked second on the SEI measure and first on the ISCO measure. 
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(2003, p.275). Cross-national variation in the dimensions of occupational segregation 
is found to be related to macro-level cultural and structural variables. Gender 
egalitarianism99 is found to be related to lower levels of vertical segregation in the 
white collar sector, while post-industrialism100 is found to be positively associated 
with horizontal segregation and vertical segregation in the blue-collar sector. 
Similarly, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) find that developed welfare states with 
large public service sectors are characterised by higher levels of female labour force 
participation and, at the same time, over-representation in female-typed (non-manual) 
occupations and under-representation in managerial occupations.  
 
The measurement of occupational segregation 
This section overviews the benefits and the limitations of the most common 
approaches to measuring occupational gender segregation. The prevailing method 
relies on constructing scalar segregation indices which denote the extent of deviation 
from a counterfactual integrated structure of employment.  
 
The Index of Dissimilarity (ID) was proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) for the 
study of residential racial segregation in the US and was later adopted for the study 
of occupational gender segregation (Gross, 1968). The ID has been by far the most 
popular summary index of occupational gender segregation, particularly in single-
country studies without time trends. It is straightforward in both its computation and 
interpretation. 
 
 The ID is defined as follows:  
 
  1 2 ∑ 

 

	 , where 
 
fj and mj denote the number of women and men in the jth occupation, while F and M 
are the total numbers of women and men in the labour force, respectively. The ID 
can be interpreted as the proportion of either men or women who would have to 
leave the occupations previously dominated by their group, without replacement, in 
                                               
99
 Defined as the proportion of national respondents in the 1990 World Values Survey disagreeing 
with the statement that ‘men have greater rights to jobs during periods of high unemployment’ . 
100
 Measured as the mean of standardised scores on service-sector size and size of the employee sector. 
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order to achieve a gender-integrated occupational distribution (Watts, 1995, p.3). The 
value of the index ranges between 0 (full integration) and 1 (complete segregation, 
i.e. men and women work in entirely different occupations). By definition, the ID 
assumes that a fully integrated occupational structure would be achieved if in each 
occupational category the share of female and male employees were the same as the 
share of female and male workers in the total labour force, respectively. Thus, an 
integrated occupational structure can exist even if men substantially outnumber 
women in the labour force (and in each occupation). The ID satisfies four important 
properties of a gross index of segregation (Watts, 1998): organizational 
equivalence101, size invariance102, gender symmetry103, and the principle of transfers 
in its weak form104. 
 
However, the ID has several well documented conceptual and methodological 
limitations. On a conceptual level, it is criticised for obscuring the sources of 
segregation by summarising all the deviations from an integrated occupational 
distribution in a single measure (Charles, 1992). Furthermore, in a cross-country 
comparative perspective, the same value of the segregation index may denote 
different types of occupational inequality and have different implications in terms of 
status, pay and career opportunities (Rubery & Fagan, 1995). At the same time, the 
main methodological limitation of the index is its sensitivity to the size of 
occupations (i.e. the ID fails to exhibit occupations invariance). This makes the ID 
less useful for the analyses of variation of segregation over time or across countries 
because the size of occupations can vary across countries or across time. To address 
this issue, a size-standardised version of the index that controls for the size of 
occupations was proposed by Gibbs (1965). It was used for comparative and 
historical studies of segregation (Gross, 1968; Das Gupta, 1987; Jacobs, 1989a). 
Although it controls for differences in occupational sizes, the size-standardised index 
                                               
101
 Organizational equivalence refers to the invariance of the index to either a combination of two 
occupations with similar gender distributions or a division of an occupational category into two 
groups with identical segregation patterns.  
102
 Size invariance denotes the invariance of the index to proportional changes of the populations of 
men and women. 
103
 Gender-symmetry refers to the index being unaffected if data on females is replaced by the 
corresponding data on males.  
104
 The principle of transfers in its weak form stipulates that if a female worker moves from a female-
dominated occupation to a male-dominated occupation and her former place is taken by a male 
employee from a male-dominated occupation, the magnitude of the index falls. 
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is criticised for its sensitivity to differences in the participation rate of the minority 
group, i.e. it is not composition invariant (Semyonov et al., 2000). This can be a 
serious concern if the size-standardised ID is used to compare occupational gender 
segregation across countries with different female participation rates. The original ID 
does not have this limitation, as it is invariant to the sex composition of the labour 
force. However, Jacobs (1993) argues that the limitations of the index of 
dissimilarity are not significant enough to merit its replacement. This may explain 
why the index of dissimilarity has remained widely used, although often in 
conjunction with other indices.  
 
Furthermore, the value of ID may vary with the level of aggregation of occupational 
categories. The more narrowly defined the occupational categories are, the higher the 
measured level of segregation tends to be. This suggests that occupational 
segregation is likely to be more pronounced across narrowly defined job categories 
than across broad occupational groups, which often mask the level of segregation 
within them. However, using highly disaggregated occupational categories becomes 
problematic if there are very few cases in some of them, since such small 
occupations will disproportionately affect the overall value of ID (Jacobs, 1993). 
Most cross-national studies of occupational sex segregation use highly aggregated 
occupational categories (e.g. one-digit ISCO) instead of more narrowly defined ones, 
because they are more comparable across countries (Watts, 1998). A common 
approach in cross-country studies using a segregation index is to check that the cross-
national pattern of segregation based on  highly aggregated occupations is the same 
as that obtained from more disaggregated ones (Nermo, 2000). 
 
Alternative indices of segregation were proposed in sociological research to counter 
the failure of the index of dissimilarity to exhibit occupational invariance (e.g. 
Karmel & Maclachlan, 1988; Charles & Grusky, 1995), but they tend to have 
limitations of their own. The Karmel-MacLachlan (1988) index is neither occupation 
nor composition invariant, so it is not useful for cross-national studies, while the 
logarithmic index 105  proposed by Charles and Grusky (1995) does not exhibit 
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 	  , where fj and mj are the numbers of women and men, 
respectively, in occupation j. 
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organizational equivalence and is sensitive to the extent of occupational 
disaggregation (Watts, 1998). However, the logarithmic index derived from log-
linear models of gender, occupations and national factors, can be used for cross-
national studies of occupational segregation because it is both occupation and 
composition invariant (Charles, 1992). As a margin-free measure of occupational 
segregation, it is a suitable approach for the analysis of cross-national variation in the 
association between occupations and gender rather than for the study of absolute 
levels of segregation, which are influenced by the occupational structure and the 
gender composition of the labour force (Nermo, 2000). 
 
At the same time, a different strand of segregation research adapted the methodology 
of income inequality analysis. Hutchens (2004) proposed an index measure (“square 
root index”), showed that it satisfied seven properties of a good index of segregation 
and illustrated how it could be applied to occupational segregation by sex. The 
square root index S is defined as follows: 

  ∑  

  
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· 

  	  , where  
fj and mj denote the number of women and men in the jth occupation. One of its 
useful properties is that the total index is ‘additively decomposable’ by subgroups of 
occupations, so the total index can be decomposed into segregation ‘within’ the sub-
groups and ‘between’ the subgroups. By comparison, the ID lacks this property, 
while the Charles (1992) and Charles and Grusky (1995) structural approach allows 
modelling ‘within’ and ‘between’ sub-group effects in a log-linear framework. 
However, unlike the logarithmic index derived from log-linear modelling by Charles 
(1992), the square root index exhibits organisational equivalence (property P4 
‘insensitivity to proportional divisions’ in Hutchens (2004)). 
 
Similarly to the ID, the square root index ranges from 0 (full integration) and 1 (total 
segregation), although it lacks the simple interpretation of the ID. The square root 
index S can be interpreted as the sum across all occupational categories of each 
occupation’s deviations from “distributional evenness”, while for each occupation 
this deviation is the difference between the geometric mean of the shares of different 
sexes in the absence of segregation (i.e. the counterfactual) and the geometric mean 
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of the observed shares (Jenkins et al., 2008, p.24). In the absence of segregation, the 
proportion of women working in the jth occupation out of all female workers would 
be equal to the proportion of men in the jth occupation out of all male workers 
(fj/F=mj/M).  The square root index is invariant to both occupational structure (i.e. 
number and size of occupations) and composition of the labour force (Mora & Ruiz-
Castillo, 2008).  
 
Thus, the square root index is the suitable measure of occupational gender 
segregation across countries. This index has been notably underused in cross-national 
studies of occupational segregation, although it has been employed in cross-national 
research on social segregation in secondary schools (Jenkins et al., 2008). This 
chapter makes an original contribution to the cross-country comparative literature on 
occupational gender segregation by using both the ID and the square root index to 
compare the levels of occupational segregation in the enlarged EU.  
 
Data and methods 
This chapter uses two summary indices to compare the levels of segregation across 
25 European countries: the Duncan and Duncan (1955) index of dissimilarity (ID) 
and the square root index S (Hutchens, 2004). The ID is chosen for its parsimony and 
because it is widely used in sex segregation literature in spite of being sensitive to 
differences in occupational structure. The square root index is used because it is 
proven to be a good index of segregation (2004); it can be decomposed into the 
within and between components; and is relatively under-used in sex segregation 
literature, while it has become popular in the studies of educational segregation (e.g. 
Jenkins et al., 2008). To the extent that the two indices result in different cross-
country patterns of segregation, the difference could be attributed to the ID being 
sensitive to occupational structure differences, which can be further investigated. 
 
Data from the EU-SILC 2007 is used for the analysis in this chapter. See Chapter 5 
for the description of the dataset. Measures of segregation are based on the eight 
major (one-digit) and 26 minor (two-digit) ISCO-88 groups106 available in the EU-
SILC 2007. The armed forces category is excluded because it is almost entirely 
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 EU-SILC variable PL050. See Annex 4 of the EU-SILC UDB Variables Description version 2007-
08-09 for a full list of two-digit occupational groups. 
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composed of men. The EU-SILC does not offer a finer degree of disaggregation than 
the two-digit groups. The aggregated one-digit groups are:  
• Legislators, senior officials and managers; 
• Professionals; 
• Technicians and associate professionals; 
• Clerks; 
• Service workers and shop and market sales workers; 
• Skilled agricultural and fishery workers combined with craft and 
related trades workers; 
• Plant and machine operators and assemblers; 
• Elementary occupations. 
Both full-time and part-time employees are used in the analysis, although the self-
employed are excluded to facilitate comparison with the results presented in Chapters 
4 and 5. Similarly to the analysis in the two previous chapters, the working sample is 
limited to adults in the 25-55 age bracket.  
 
In order to test whether there is a significant variation in the levels of segregation 
across the 25 studied countries, log-linear modelling with iterative proportional 
fitting (see Deming & Stephan, 1940; Agresti, 2007) is used to model observed 
frequencies (cell counts) in contingency tables with four or five categorical variables. 
Importantly, all of these variables are treated as ‘responses’, rather than one 
dependent and a number of independent variables, as it would be the case with 
logistic regression.  This is because the relationships amongst all of these variables 
are the object of interest.  
 
To illustrate, for a four-way contingency table (with categorical variables W, X, Y, 
and Z), the most complex saturated model with all main effects and interaction terms 
is: 
 
log 
    
    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where, 
 is the cell count in each cell; i, j, k, and l are the dimensions107 of the 
contingency table; and  are effect parameter estimates. This model would fit the 
data perfectly, but it is not parsimonious.  
 
 
In contrast, a complete independence model would not have any interaction terms: 
 
log 
    
       
 
Between the most complex saturated model and the simplest complete independence 
model, a range of models that exclude the four-way interaction term 
 , but 
include any two-way or three-way interaction terms can be fitted.  
 
The goodness of fit of a restricted model is assessed using the likelihood ratio 
statistic. Its p-value tests the null hypothesis that the fitted model is the same as the 
saturated model. Therefore, a non-significant p-value indicates that the restricted 
model is not significantly different from the saturated model, explaining all of the 
variation in the data. On the other hand, the finding of statistical significance 
suggests that the restricted model does not explain all of the variation in the data. It is 
also possible to compare the fits of two nested models by taking the ratio of their 
likelihood ratio statistics.   
 
Results 
Table 6.1 shows the values of ID (column 1) and the square root index S (column 2), 
including its ‘within’ (column 3) and ‘between’ (column 4) components. Since the 
two indices use different scales, their standardised values (z-scores) are reported in 
Figure 6.1. On both indices, Italy ranks lowest, while Estonia scores highest. The 
pattern of variation is similar using the two measures, as the relatively high level of 
correlation (R=0.78) indicates (Figure 6.2). However, there are some notable 
exceptions. Greece and Luxembourg score considerably lower on the ID than on the 
square root index S, while Austria and France score higher on the ID than on S.   
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 In a simple two-way table, i and j would be the rows and columns. 
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Since ID is not occupation invariant, in contrast to the square root index, the 
occupational structure in the outlier countries merits further investigation. In 
Luxembourg, the relatively gender-integrated associate professionals group (24.5% 
of all employees are in this category) is the fourth largest such group, while 
service/sales occupations (10%) is the second smallest category, across the studied 
countries. Male-dominated operative and craft occupations are also some of the 
smallest groups (Table A 6-4 in Annex 6). Because heavily gender segregated 
occupations, such as sales/services, crafts and operatives are relatively small in 
Luxembourg, compared with other countries, the standardized value of the ID is 
much lower than the value of S (Figure 6.2). Greece also has a higher value of S than 
the ID, although the difference is not large. Greece has the smallest managerial 
category (1.5% of all employees are managers) of all the studied countries, but it’s 
heavily dominated by men (79% of all managers are men). On the other hand, the 
clerical occupations (17.2%) and sales/services (17.9%) are the third largest groups. 
However, in Greece these occupations are not as heavily dominated by women as in 
other countries: 38% of clerical employees and 52% of sales/services employees are 
men, see Table A 6-3). This may explain why the relative ranking of the ID for 
Greece is not as large as the ranking of the square root index. 
 
In contrast, Austria and France rank higher on the ID than on S. Austria has the 
smallest professionals category (8.3% of all employees), but it is not dominated by 
either men or women (56% of professionals are women, Figure A3 in the Annex). 
Because this category is relatively small compared to other countries, the fact that it 
is gender-integrated is not captured sufficiently by the relative value of the ID, but it 
still counts for the square root index ranking. Similarly, France has a relatively small 
professional category (12.5% of all employees), but its composition is gender 
balanced (47% of women).   
 
There is no clear pattern of variation in the ID and S scores by welfare regime. 
However, the new accession states tend to be more segregated (particularly the three 
Baltic countries), Hungary being the exception; the Southern-European countries 
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tend to have lower levels of segregation by sex, while the liberal countries (UK108 
and Ireland) and conservative-corporatist Continental countries have middling scores. 
Social-democratic Nordic countries also have middling segregation levels: Iceland, 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark all have below average scores on both indices. 
Finland is the exception, as it has the second highest score on the ID and an above 
average value of S. According to Bettio and Veraschagina (2009b), who find a 
similar pattern of occupational gender segregation109 across the enlarged EU in 2007, 
with the Baltic countries exhibiting the highest segregation levels, using three-digit 
occupations data from the EU Labour Force Surveys 1992-2007, there has been 
notable convergence in segregation over the past decade. Thus, segregation 
decreased in most of the Nordic countries and increased in many of the 
Mediterranean and Eastern-European countries (2009b, p.32). Although it is not clear 
why the Baltic countries are so highly segregated, national experts suggest that 
women have historically had access to higher education and professions, with limited 
representation in the top positions, however (2009b, pp.99-100). 
 
In an earlier study of occupational segregation in 15 old-EU countries using data 
from the 2000 Labour Force Survey, Bettio (2002) also observes the highest value of 
the ID in Finland and the lowest value in Italy and Greece. However, Sweden and 
Denmark rank higher than Luxembourg, Germany and Austria. This is not surprising, 
given the finding in Bettio and Veraschagina (2009b) of converging segregation 
levels in the EU. Overall, the levels of the ID in Bettio (2002) are considerably larger 
than in the present study, but the level of disaggregation of occupational groups110 is 
considerably higher too. Using finer occupational categories tends to result in higher 
values of the ID, everything else being equal. Moreover, as the ID is not occupation 
invariant and the occupational structures in the studied countries are likely to have 
changed since 2000, the values of ID in this chapter are not strictly comparable with 
those in the earlier study.  
 
                                               
108
 Unfortunately, it is not possible to do the analysis separately for Britain and Northern Ireland 
because there is no regional information for Britain in the EU-SILC 2007. 
109
 Using the ID and Karmel and MacLachlan (1988) indices.  
110
 110 occupations, 3-digit ISCO 88 groups.  
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The square root index is decomposed into the portion due to differences across the 
two-digit ISCO groups within the one-digit groups and the portion due to differences 
between the major (one-digit) groups. Since the one-digit groups are ordered 
hierarchically according the level of skill 111  (i.e. from manual low skilled 
‘elementary’ occupations to high-skilled white-collar managerial occupations), the 
‘between’ differences can be roughly interpreted as vertical segregation, while the 
‘within’ differences can be considered horizontal segregation 112 . Using this 
framework, Scandinavian countries (except Iceland) and Liberal countries have 
higher levels of vertical than horizontal segregation. A closer look at female shares 
within one-digit occupational groups in these countries (see Table A 6-3) reveals that 
women are disproportionately over-represented in clerical and sales/service 
occupations and under-represented in crafts/related trades in operative occupations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
111
 “ISCO 88 groups jobs together in occupations and more aggregate groups mainly on the basis of 
the similarity of skills required to fulfil the tasks and duties of the jobs” (ILO) 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/index.htm 
112
 For example, within Elementary occupations, there are female-dominated ‘Domestic and related 
helpers, cleaners and launderers’ and male-dominated ‘garbage collectors and related labourers’ as 
well as ‘manufacturing labourers’ and other labourers. 
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Table 6.1 Levels of segregation in 25 countries  
 
ID  
(1) 
S-overall 
(2) 
S within 1-digit 
groups (3) 
S between1-digit 
groups (4) 
AT 0.482 0.166 0.061 0.105 
BE 0.434 0.148 0.067 0.081 
CZ 0.502 0.202 0.117 0.086 
DE 0.471 0.176 0.056 0.120 
DK 0.460 0.181 0.073 0.109 
EE 0.560 0.250 0.125 0.125 
ES 0.459 0.179 0.076 0.103 
FI 0.541 0.208 0.084 0.124 
FR 0.498 0.179 0.064 0.114 
GR 0.446 0.210 0.090 0.120 
HU 0.427 0.175 0.093 0.082 
IE 0.434 0.164 0.061 0.103 
IS 0.442 0.185 0.096 0.089 
IT 0.390 0.133 0.074 0.059 
LT 0.530 0.254 0.147 0.107 
LU 0.472 0.247 0.134 0.113 
LV 0.536 0.236 0.114 0.122 
NL 0.468 0.186 0.078 0.109 
NO 0.459 0.167 0.060 0.107 
PL 0.487 0.215 0.106 0.109 
PT 0.483 0.223 0.140 0.082 
SE 0.455 0.174 0.068 0.106 
SI 0.456 0.176 0.100 0.076 
SK 0.522 0.222 0.127 0.095 
UK 0.455 0.170 0.064 0.106 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time) 
The ID is based on 26 (2-digit) ISCO occupational groups; S is based on 2-digit and 1-digit ISCO 
groups.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Standardised scores of ID and S-overall 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
Scores ordered by the value of ID. 
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Figure 6.2 Standardised S-overall by standardised ID across 25 countries 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
R=0.78 (p<0.001). 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the square root index is negatively correlated with the work/family 
reconciliation index constructed in Chapter 3 (Figure 6.1). However, the strength of 
the correlation is rather weak (R=-0.29). The work/family reconciliation index was 
found to be associated with the ID to a greater extent (R=-0.46, p<0.05) in the 
analysis in Chapter 3. The strength of the correlation between S and the policy index 
would be higher if the outlier Luxembourg were excluded (R=-0.45, p<0.05). 
Analysing the ‘within’ and ‘between’ components of S separately shows that the 
former (R=-0.30) is more strongly correlated with the policy index than the latter 
(R=-0.05). This suggests that the policy environment is more important for gender 
differences in occupational attainment across the groups with comparable 
requirements but in different fields of work (e.g. computing professionals vs. health 
professionals) than across hierarchical groups (e.g. managers vs. clerical workers).  
Overall, these results indicate that the extent of occupational gender segregation 
amongst employees, particularly horizontal segregation, tends to be lower in 
countries with more gender-egalitarian work/family reconciliation policies and 
prevailing gender-role attitudes.  
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Figure 6.3 Work/family reconciliation index by the square root index S 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008); OECD 
Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010); EVS 1999.; EU-SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55. 
R=-0.29 (R=-0.45, p<0.05 if Luxembourg is excluded). 
 
Although the summary indices show that levels of segregation vary across the EU, 
they give no indication of whether this variation is statistically significant. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether these differences are driven by variation in the 
levels of part-time employment, education or other characteristics of the labour force, 
although both indices implicitly control for the differences in the gender composition 
of the labour force and the square root index, but not the ID, is invariant to 
differences in occupational structures. Table 6.2 displays the proportions of full-time 
employees with a university education, while Table 6.3 shows the proportions of 
male and female employees working part-time in each country. Both tables indicate 
substantial variation in part-time rates and higher education rates, controlling for 
gender, across the studied countries. Therefore, it could be that differences in the 
composition of the labour force by part-time/full-time status as well as by the highest 
level of education could explain most of the observed cross-country variation in the 
levels of segregation. 
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Table 6.2  Proportion of employees with a university education 
Country Female Male 
AT 0.20 0.21 
BE 0.53 0.42 
CZ 0.15 0.18 
DE 0.24 0.31 
DK 0.37 0.27 
EE 0.43 0.25 
ES 0.45 0.35 
FI 0.50 0.38 
FR 0.37 0.30 
GR 0.40 0.26 
HU 0.27 0.17 
IE 0.44 0.40 
IS 0.42 0.29 
IT 0.22 0.15 
LT 0.44 0.27 
LU 0.31 0.27 
LV 0.31 0.17 
NL 0.37 0.36 
NO 0.43 0.32 
PL 0.35 0.20 
PT 0.24 0.12 
SE 0.43 0.31 
SI 0.30 0.19 
SK 0.23 0.21 
UK 0.32 0.32 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
 
Figure 6.4 Proportion of employees with a university education 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
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Table 6.3  Proportion of employees working part-time 
Country Female Male Total 
AT 0.43 0.05 0.22 
BE 0.45 0.07 0.25 
CZ 0.05 0.01 0.03 
DE 0.53 0.05 0.27 
DK 0.22 0.04 0.13 
EE 0.06 0.02 0.04 
ES 0.19 0.03 0.10 
FI 0.13 0.04 0.08 
FR 0.31 0.04 0.18 
GR 0.14 0.04 0.08 
HU 0.06 0.03 0.04 
IE 0.39 0.06 0.23 
IS 0.22 0.02 0.12 
IT 0.23 0.04 0.13 
LT 0.03 0.02 0.02 
LU 0.40 0.02 0.18 
LV 0.05 0.01 0.03 
NL 0.72 0.11 0.40 
NO 0.21 0.02 0.11 
PL 0.09 0.03 0.06 
PT 0.07 0.01 0.04 
SE 0.32 0.06 0.19 
SI 0.05 0.02 0.03 
SK 0.04 0.01 0.03 
UK 0.34 0.04 0.20 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
 
Figure 6.5 Proportion of employees working part-time 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees aged 25-55. 
 
To test the hypothesis that the variation in part-time work rates explains some of the 
cross-country variation in the relationship between sex and occupation (i.e. 
occupational segregation), three nested models with country, occupation, sex and 
part-time work status are fitted and compared (Table 6.4). The data (observed 
frequencies) are arranged on the country level in a four-dimensional 800-cell 
contingency table: 25 countries x 2 sexes x 8 occupational groups x 2 work time 
groups. Iterative proportional fitting is used to predict the counts in each cell. The fit 
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of each model is evaluated using the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic L2. Model 1 
in Table 6.4 is a complete independence model (C + O + S + PT) that assumes that 
the effects of the four variables are independent of each other. In other words, the 
main effects of each variable are modelled (as they would be in a cross-tab with a 
Pearson chi-square test), but the association between any two or three of these 
variables is not allowed to vary across the categories of another variable. For 
instance, the association between occupation and sex (occupational segregation) 
cannot vary by country or part-time work status. As expected, such a model offers a 
very bad fit, as indicated by the statistical significance of the likelihood ratio statistic 
at p<0.001. If the model offered a good fit, the likelihood ratio statistic would not be 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, there are likely to be interaction 
effects amongst the four dimensions that the tested model cannot account for. 
 
 A more realistic model needs to allow the association between occupation and sex to 
differ across the studied countries. Figure 6.1 above shows that both the ID and S 
indices range between -2 and +2 standard deviations across 25 countries. Also, the 
level of S is found to be negatively correlated with the work/family reconciliation 
index (Figure 6.3), which indicates that segregation levels may be different in 
countries with diverse policy environments and prevailing social norms. 
 
Moreover, the model needs to account for the potential associations between working 
time status, occupation and sex. Both neo-classical and feminist theories discussed in 
section 6.1 suggest that women may opt for occupations more compatible with their 
family and caring responsibilities. Since part-time work is one of the ways to 
reconcile the demands of job and family, and occupations tend to differ in their 
prevalence of part-time hours113, the level of segregation could be different amongst 
full-time and part-time employees. At the same time, women are predominantly more 
likely to work part-time than men, but male and female part-time rates tend to co-
vary114 (Table 6.3). Thus, it could be expected that in countries where part-time work 
is more common for men and women, segregation levels amongst part-time 
                                               
113
 For instance, part-time rates tend to be lowest amongst workers in managerial and operative 
occupations and highest amongst workers in clerical, service/sales and elementary occupations.  
114
 There is a high positive correlation (R=0.84) between male and female part-time work rates (Table 
6.3).  
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employees would be lower because women and men would work in more similar 
occupations.  Segregation levels would also be lower amongst full-time employees, 
since women who opt for occupations more compatible with their family 
responsibilities and less career-oriented women would be more likely to work part-
time instead. Thus, observed segregation levels would be lower overall. Indeed, 
Figure 6.6 shows that the index of segregation S amongst part-time employees tends 
to be lower in countries with higher part-time work rates (R=-0.61). The negative 
correlation is somewhat stronger between the level of S amongst full-time employees 
and the total part-time rate (R=-0.64), but weaker between the overall level of 
segregation and part-time rate (R=-0.50). However, it appears that part-time work 
rate is primarily related to the ‘within’ component of occupational segregation (see 
Figure 6.7) (R=-0.65) than to the ‘between’ component (R=0.14). This suggests that 
in countries with higher part-time work rates, men and women tend to work in more 
similar occupations within larger hierarchical one-digit groups (e.g. services/sales), 
rather than across these groups.  
 
Thus, Model 2 allows for three-way interactions between country, occupation and 
part-time work (C*O*PT); country, sex and part-time work (C*S*PT); and 
occupation, sex and part-time work (O*S*PT). A three-way interaction allows the 
association between each pair of the three variables to vary across the levels of the 
third variable, within each level of the fourth variable that is not included in the 
interaction term. For instance, the term C*S*PT allows the association between sex 
and part-time work to vary across countries, within each fixed level of occupation. 
Notably, Model 2 does not include the three-way interaction term between country, 
occupation and sex, which would denote the cross-country variation in the 
relationship between occupation and sex net of part-time work. Therefore, the levels 
of segregation are assumed to be the same in all countries (constant segregation 
model), controlling for part-time work.  
 
 Compared with the baseline mutual independence model, Model 2 improves the fit 
significantly. The L2 /Lb2 contrast in Table 7.2 shows the improvement of fit. Thus, 
Model 2 accounts for almost 97% of variation115 under Model 1.  However, the 
                                               
115
 1± L2 /Lb2 = 1±3.2 = 97(%). 
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likelihood ratio statistic in Model 2 is still statistically significant, suggesting that the 
model of constant segregation does not offer a perfect fit. This is not surprising, since 
a constant segregation model does not seem to be realistic. 
 
Finally, Model 3 is identical to Model 2 except for the inclusion of another three-way 
interaction term (O*S*C), which allows for the cross-national variation in 
occupational segregation by sex. The inclusion of this term offers a further 
substantial improvement of fit, but the model still does not fit perfectly (L2 is still 
statistically significantly different from zero at p<0.001). Thus, although the 
variation in part-time work rates explains some of the variation in occupational 
segregation, a model with only four factors and all of the interaction effects short of a 
saturated model (which would include all possible interactions, including a four-way 
interaction term) does not predict the observed cell counts perfectly. This suggests 
more variables may need to be added to the model to try to account for the observed 
variation116. 
 
Table 6.4 Models with country, occupation, sex and part-time work 
Model (Model 1 as baseline) L2 df L2 /Lb2 
Model 1: (C + O + S + PT)   81,000*** 766 100 
Model 2: (C*O*PT+ C*S*PT + O*S*PT) 2,600*** 336 3.2 
Model 3: (C*O*PT+ C*S*PT+ O*S*PT+O*S*C) 308*** 168 0.38 
L2 Likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic 
C – country; O – occupational group; S – sex; PT – part time rate. 
Number of individuals: 145,144; number of cells: 800.  
***p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
116
 A four-way model similar to Model 3 with education level instead of part-time work does not fit 
the data perfectly either (L2 =815, df=336, p<0.001;1200 cells). 
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Figure 6.6 Square root index by part-time rate 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees aged 25-55. 
R=-0.61 (p<0.01). 
 
Figure 6.7 ‘Within’ component of the square root index and part-time rate 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees aged 25-55. 
R=-0.65 (p<0.001). 
 
Given that the composition of the labour force in the countries studied here varies by 
the level of education (see Figure 6.4), the next model adds an education variable to 
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test the hypothesis that, along with part-time work rates, the variation in education 
levels explains most of the variation in segregation levels by sex. In line with the 
neo-classical theories discussed in section 6.1, it could be argued that women who 
invest in education and market skills would be less likely to gravitate towards 
female-dominated occupations. Thus, it would be expected to find the lowest levels 
of segregation amongst higher educated employees.    
 
Table 6.5 shows three nested models with five terms: country, occupation, sex, part-
time work and education 117 . The data are arranged in a 2,400-cell matrix: 25 
countries x 2 sexes x 8 occupational groups x 2 working time groups x 3 education 
groups. In contrast to the previous models, the variation in degree levels is now 
allowed for, including all the interaction effects with each of the four other factors. 
Five different four-way interaction terms can now be included. The mutual 
independence Model 1, as before, fits badly. Model 2, which includes all of the four-
way interaction terms except the one between country, sex, occupation and education 
(C*O*S*E), offers a substantial improvement118 in fit compared with the base model. 
Crucially, it includes a four-way interaction term between country, sex, occupation 
and part-time work (C*O*S*PT), which allows for the cross-country variation in the 
levels of occupational gender segregation (C*S*O) to vary by part-time status. Yet 
Model 2 still does not fit perfectly, as indicated by the significance of its likelihood 
ratio statistic (p<0.001). If this model offered a perfect fit, it would indicate that there 
is no cross-national variation in sex segregation levels by the level of education, 
given cross-national differences in the occupational distribution and in the 
composition of the labour force by sex, education and part-time status.  
 
However, when the fourth interaction term (C*S*O*E) is added to Model 2, which 
allows for occupational segregation (S*O) to vary across countries and the three 
levels of education, the model has a much smaller likelihood-ratio statistic. It is no 
longer significant at 5%, with p=0.812. This is a perfect fit, especially considering 
the large sample size (145,144 employees across 25 countries). Compared with 
Model 2, Model 3 improves fit by 31% (313/1,000) with a loss of 336 degrees of 
                                               
117
 Three groups by the highest education qualification: lower secondary or below; upper secondary or 
further; university degree (see Chapter 5).  
118
 Model 2 explains more than 99% of variation under Model 1 (1±0.006). 
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freedom119.  In other words, Model 3 accounts for about 69% of the variation under 
Model 2 (1±0.31=69%). This suggests that cross-national variation in the level of 
occupational segregation differs across the levels of education, holding part-time 
status constant (C*O*S*E). At the same time, the cross-national variation in 
segregation also varies across the levels of part-time status, within each level of 
education (C*O*S*PT). Thus, the variation in both education and part-time work 
levels appears to be important. This is not surprising in light of the finding in Chapter 
4 that switching from full-time to part-time work tends to be related to occupational 
downgrading by skill, for both men and women. Furthermore, education is typically 
found to be associated with individual occupational attainment in the sociological 
literature (Sewell et al., 1969; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). 
 
Table 6.5 Models with country, occupation, sex, part-time work             
status,       and   education  
Model (Model 1 as baseline) L2 df L2 /Lb2 
Model 1: (C + O + S + PT + E)   180,000*** 2364 100 
Model 2: (C*O*S*PT +C*S*PT*E+O*S*PT*E +C*O*PT*E) 1,000*** 672 0.006 
Model 3: (Model 2 + C*O*S*E) 
312.9  
(p= 0.812) 
336 0.002 
L2 Likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic. 
C – country; O – occupational group; S – sex; PT – part time rate; E – highest level of education. 
Number of individuals: 145,144; number of cells: 2400. 
***p<0.001. 
 
To investigate in which countries the level of segregation differs noticeably by the 
highest educational qualification, Table 6.6 shows the square root index S (based on 
26 occupational groups) separately for employees with lower secondary education or 
below (column 1), upper secondary education (column 2) and higher education 
(column 3). Figure 6.8 orders the indices sorted by the overall level of S. As 
expected, in each of the studied countries segregation is lowest amongst university 
educated employees. This finding is, by and large, in line with the neo-classical 
theories as well as with Hakim’s (1995) preference theory: women who invested in 
their education and market skills are more likely to work in more gender-integrated 
occupations. However, there is some cross-country variation in the extent to which 
the level of segregation differs amongst lower-educated employees.  
                                               
119Df in model 2 (672) – Df in model 3 (336). Degrees of freedom = number of cells – (number of 
parameters – number of constraints). 
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In 14 out of 25 countries studied here, the level of segregation is inversely related to 
education: the largest values of S are observed for employees without upper 
secondary education, while the lowest levels of segregation are found for those with 
university education. Thus, it is among the lowest educated employees that men and 
women are the most likely to work in entirely different occupations. This lends 
support to the hypothesis that women with lower human capital endowments are 
more likely to self-select into typically female occupations (e.g. personal services as 
opposed to craft and related trades), either because they choose to specialise in tasks 
more compatible with their homemaking responsibilities, because they are less 
career-oriented, or because they expect employers to see them as such. Most of the 
countries in this group are Southern-European (Spain, Italy and Greece), Continental 
(Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and Baltic (Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania). The largest differences by the level of education are observed in 
Luxembourg and Lithuania120.  
 
Countries with larger differences in the level of segregation between the lowest and 
highest educated employees also tend to have larger gender wage gaps at the bottom 
of the earnings distribution for full-time employees (see Figure A 5-1 inAnnex 5). 
This suggests that, among those without upper secondary education, women tend to 
be concentrated in lower paid occupations than men. Overall, there appears to be a 
weak positive association between the level of horizontal segregation (as measured 
by the relative contribution of the ‘within’ component of the square root index, see 
Table 6.1) and the total level of segregation amongst employees with the lowest level 
of education (R=0.18)121. Thus, men and women without upper secondary education 
tend to be employed in entirely different fields of work (e.g. women are most likely 
to work in sales and personal services, while men are more likely to work in crafts 
and related trades, as well as in operative occupations; see Table A 6-6).  
 
The other 11 countries have the highest levels of segregation amongst employees 
with upper secondary/further education, followed by those with lower education. All 
                                               
120
 There is no apparent association between the prevalence of employees with lower education and 
the value of S amongst lower educated employees (R=-0.01). For instance, 31% and 5% of employees 
have lower secondary education or below in Luxembourg and Lithuania, respectively. 
121
 There is no apparent association between the overall level of horizontal segregation and the value 
of S amongst employees with upper secondary education (R=-0.02) or university education (R=0.08). 
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of the Nordic countries fall into this group, along with Austria, Czech Republic, 
France, Hungary, Portugal, and Slovenia. Nordic countries tend to have below 
average levels of segregation amongst employees with the lowest level of education 
(see Figure A 6-1 in Annex 6) and middling segregation levels amongst those with 
upper secondary education (Figure A 6-2). This could be related to more egalitarian 
gender-role attitudes as well as to the more ‘women-friendly’ policy environment 
(see Chapter 3). However, as regards the segregation levels among university 
educated employees, Nordic countries drift apart in the rankings. While Norway, 
Sweden and Iceland have below average levels of segregation, Denmark and Finland 
score higher than average, with Finland producing the highest index of S of all the 
countries studied here (Figure A 6-3). This could be related to particularly high 
female shares in clerical occupations, 81% and 76%, and in sales/services 
occupations, 78% and 77%, in Finland and in Denmark, respectively (Table A 6-3). 
Even amongst those with a university education, the female shares in clerical 
occupations are 94% and 75% in Finland and Denmark, respectively. 
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Table 6.6 Gender segregation within categories of education      
 
S – lower secondary or below 
(1) 
S – upper secondary/further 
(2) 
S – university/higher 
(3) 
AT 0.159 0.192 0.155 
BE 0.238 0.226 0.091 
CZ 0.221 0.234 0.125 
DE 0.308 0.210 0.107 
DK 0.182 0.228 0.138 
EE 0.336 0.302 0.164 
ES 0.252 0.190 0.117 
FI 0.222 0.264 0.164 
FR 0.195 0.235 0.124 
GR 0.355 0.262 0.084 
HU 0.192 0.205 0.114 
IE 0.249 0.218 0.144 
IS 0.247 0.272 0.118 
IT 0.140 0.135 0.099 
LT 0.403 0.313 0.143 
LU 0.446 0.254 0.091 
LV 0.367 0.259 0.148 
NL 0.306 0.240 0.096 
NO 0.220 0.231 0.102 
PL 0.300 0.251 0.107 
PT 0.294 0.120 0.150 
SE 0.220 0.220 0.108 
SI 0.161 0.214 0.101 
SK 0.268 0.265 0.137 
UK 0.284 0.219 0.105 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
 
Figure 6.8 Gender segregation within categories of education 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
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Figure 6.9 S within the lowest education category by the ‘% within’ overall S 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Base: employees (both full-time and part-time), aged 25-55. 
R=0.18 (R=0.24 if Germany is excluded). 
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the differences in occupational distributions of male and 
female employees in 25 European countries and studied the cross-national variation 
in occupational gender segregation levels. It started by reviewing recent research on 
occupational gender segregation, relevant economic and sociological theories of 
segregation by sex, and measurement issues in segregation studies. This chapter 
makes an original contribution to the cross-country comparative literature on 
occupational gender segregation by employing both the widely used Duncan and 
Duncan (1955) Index of Dissimilarity and the square root index S (Hutchens, 2004) 
to compare the levels of occupational segregation in the enlarged EU. The square 
root index is increasingly being used in education segregation comparative research, 
but not in gender segregation studies. Previous comparative studies on occupational 
gender segregation in the EU do not include any of the new accession states (Charles, 
1992; Charles, 2003; Nermo, 2000; Bettio, 2002; J. Dolado et al., 2003).  
 
Based on the index measures of segregation, substantial levels of occupational 
segregation by sex are found in 25 European countries. Italy ranks lowest, while 
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Estonia scores highest on both indices. The pattern of variation is very similar using 
the two measures. The only exceptions are Greece and Luxembourg, which rank 
considerably lower on the ID than on the square root index S, while Austria and 
France rank higher on the ID than on S.  These differences in rankings are largely 
due to the ID being sensitive to differences in the occupational structure across the 
studied countries, which are further explored in the Results section.  The 25 countries 
are almost equally split according to whether the vertical component or the 
horizontal component of segregation dominates. In three Scandinavian countries, the 
UK and Ireland, the vertical dimension prevails. 
 
Although there is no clear pattern of variation in ID and S scores by welfare regime, 
the new accession states tend to be more segregated, while the Southern-European 
countries tend to have lower levels of gender segregation. Nordic countries are found 
to have middling segregation levels, with the exception of Finland that scores high 
on both indices. However, there is some evidence of segregation levels being 
associated with the work/family reconciliation policy environment. The level of 
occupational segregation by sex, especially horizontal segregation within aggregated 
hierarchical groups, tends to be lower in countries with more gender egalitarian 
work/family reconciliation policies and prevailing gender-role attitudes.   
 
Moreover, the cross-national variation in the association between occupation and sex 
is found to be significant and to a large extent due to differences in part-time work 
rates and the education levels of the labour force. Thus, the observed counts in a five-
way contingency table with country, occupation, sex, part-time work and education 
level can be perfectly fitted with a model that allows for all possible four-way 
interaction effects among these variables. Accounting for the education composition 
of the labour force is found to be particularly important, since a four-way model with 
country, occupation, sex and part-time work, including all possible three-way 
interactions, does not offer a perfect fit. Moreover, even when education is included, 
the model does not fit well until the four-way interaction term between country, 
occupation, sex and education is included. It allows the cross-national variation in 
sex segregation to vary across different categories of education, for each fixed 
category of work-time status. The finding of the importance of education 
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composition of the labour force is not surprising, since education is likely to be 
associated with individual occupational attainment.  
 
In each of the studied countries segregation is lowest amongst university educated 
employees. This finding is largely consistent with the neo-classical theories that 
emphasise personal preferences: women who invested in their education and market 
skills are less likely to work in female-dominated occupations. Moreover, in the 
majority of the countries studied here, the level of segregation is highest amongst the 
employees with the lowest level of education (lower secondary or below). This 
suggests that men and women with lower human capital endowments tend to self-
select into occupations compatible with more traditional gender-role stereotypes, 
such as the female-dominated personal services occupations and male-dominated 
manual lower skilled operative occupations. The largest differences in the value of 
the segregation index by the level of education are observed in Luxembourg and 
Lithuania.  
 
Nordic countries tend to have lower levels of segregation amongst employees 
without upper secondary education, compared with other countries, and middling 
segregation levels amongst those with upper secondary or further education. This 
could be related to more egalitarian gender-role attitudes as well as to the more 
‘women-friendly’ policy environment, which protect lower educated women from 
concentrating in typically female occupations. There is no Nordic clustering in 
segregation levels amongst university educated employees, however. While Norway, 
Sweden and Iceland have lower to middling levels of segregation, Denmark and 
Finland score higher than average, with Finland topping the rankings. This could be 
due to university educated women being disproportionately over-represented in 
clerical occupations in these countries.   
 
Finally, the next chapter draws together the results of the empirical studies in this 
thesis. It reiterates the research questions raised in the introduction, discusses the 
findings, limitations and avenues for further research, and concludes.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
In spite of significant increases in female labour market participation and educational 
achievement in the EU in recent decades, women still lag behind men in terms of 
employment rates, earnings and occupational attainment. The overarching aim of this 
thesis was to shed light on the interplay between the characteristics of individuals 
associated with productivity, labour market returns to these characteristics, and 
country-level work-family reconciliation policies in influencing female employment 
and gender inequalities in terms of earnings and occupational attainment. The 
analysis focused on prime-age employees in 25 European countries, including new 
EU member states. This concluding chapter briefly reviews the main findings of the 
thesis, bringing together the different elements of the study; discusses its theoretical 
and empirical contributions to existing research, as well as the limitations of the 
study; reflects on the policy implications of the findings; and suggests directions for 
future research. 
 
Review of the study 
The literature review discussed comparative scholarship on the welfare state and 
work-family reconciliation policies in Europe, placing this thesis in a theoretical 
context, identifying research gaps in the literature and demonstrating the contribution 
of this work. It concluded that although the existing welfare state and family policy 
typologies are useful for the study of female employment, particularly amongst 
women with children, they are not perfectly suited to comparative studies of wage 
gaps and occupational segregation.  
 
Chapter 3 then set the policy context for the thesis. It investigated the variation in 
duration, generosity and gender neutrality of parenthood leave schemes; availability 
of childcare for pre-school children; gender biases in tax/benefit systems; and 
prevailing gender-role attitudes in 25 European countries, using comparable macro 
data compiled by the OECD as well as micro data from international surveys. It 
summarised the most relevant policy and social norms features in a composite 
indicator and explored its relationship with female employment rates, average gender 
wage gaps and occupational gender segregation.  
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Given this work/family reconciliation policy context, Chapter 4 focused on the 
relationship between recent motherhood and adverse labour market outcomes for 
women. It examined the association between recent childbirth and the relative risks 
of switching to part-time, inactivity or unemployment for full-time working women 
in 13 pre-enlargement EU countries122. It used micro-level longitudinal data from the 
European Community Household Panel for the period 1994 to 2001. Once important 
human capital and workplace characteristics are controlled for, full-time working 
women who gave birth within a year of the interview are found to be likely to remain 
full-time the following year only in Denmark and Spain. Full-time female workers 
are more likely to switch to part-time employment than to remain working full-time 
in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and the UK, where female part-time 
participation rates are relatively high, but also in Italy, where part-time participation 
rates are generally low. Furthermore, substantial evidence of occupational 
downgrading by skill or occupational hourly wage on switching from full-time to 
part-time work is found for both men and women in the majority of the studied 
countries. However, since transitions from full-time to part-time work are observed 
for women more often than for men, and part-time work is found to be a more stable 
state for women, occupational downgrading appears to be a more serious issue for 
female workers. Moreover, in four out of five countries where recent childbirth is 
found to be associated with an increased risk of moving from full-time to part-time 
work, full-time to part-time transitions are linked to a higher risk of occupational 
downgrading, even after relevant personal and workplace characteristics have been 
controlled for.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 focused on two measures of gender inequality in the labour market 
in the enlarged EU, gender wage gaps and occupational segregation, using recent 
micro-data from the EU-SILC. Chapter 5 examined the differences in the log hourly 
wage distributions of men and women working full-time using quantile regression 
methods, focusing on Britain, Italy, Spain, Poland and the Czech Republic. Given the 
finding of recent childbirth being associated with leaving full-time work in Chapter 4 
for women, potential self-selection of full-time female employees was considered. 
Finally, Chapter 6 analysed the differences in occupational distributions of male and 
                                               
122
 Excluding Sweden and Luxembourg. 
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female employees in 25 European countries and studied the cross-national variation 
in occupational gender segregation levels. 
 
To condense the findings across all the chapters of this thesis that covered the 
enlarged EU, Table 7.1 summarises the main indicators of interest: the work/family 
reconciliation index (column 1); female participation rate (column 2); participation 
rate of married women without a university education, with the youngest child aged 
0-4 (column 3); median log hourly gender wag gap amongst employees (column 4); 
and the square root index of occupational gender segregation (column 5). No distinct 
group of countries scores highly on all the indicators, but some regional clusters 
emerge.  
 
Table 7.1 Summary of work/family reconciliation and gender equality in 
the labour market indicators  
 
Work/family 
reconciliation 
index 
(1) 
Total female 
participation 
rate 
(2) 
Female 
participation rate 
(married, no 
university 
education, 
youngest child 
aged 0-4) 
(3) 
Median gender 
wage gap (all 
employees) 
(4) 
Occupational 
segregation 
Index S 
(5) 
CZ -0.87 0.70 0.20 0.22 0.202 
SK -0.83 0.81 0.58 0.23 0.222 
PL -0.73 0.67 0.48 0.05 0.215 
AT -0.61 0.69 0.30 0.23 0.166 
DE -0.53 0.71 0.45 0.19 0.176 
EE -0.52 0.80 0.45 0.4 0.25 
LV -0.48 0.77 0.52 0.25 0.236 
GR -0.24 0.42 0.32 0.08 0.210 
HU -0.19 0.69 0.27 0.07 0.175 
LT -0.17 0.81 0.55 0.25 0.254 
FR -0.06 0.76 0.54 0.08 0.179 
PT -0.04 0.74 0.78 0.08 0.223 
UK -0.01 0.72 0.49 0.22 0.170 
SI 0.02 0.77 0.81 0.04 0.176 
ES 0.11 0.60 0.40 0.11 0.179 
IT 0.16 0.57 0.45 0.06 0.133 
NL 0.17 0.75 0.64 0.14 0.186 
BE 0.18 0.71 0.57 0.07 0.148 
FI 0.34 0.76 0.40 0.15 0.208 
NO 0.42 0.80 0.70 0.18 0.167 
DK 0.57 0.78 0.74 0.12 0.181 
IE 0.76 0.66 0.43 0.14 0.164 
IS 0.76 0.80 0.62 0.17 0.185 
LU 0.84 0.67 0.58 0.15 0.247 
SE 1.05 0.83 0.72 0.16 0.174 
Source: EU-SILC 2007; OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and 
Korintus (2008); OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010); EVS 1999. 
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All the Nordic countries (classified as social-democratic welfare states by Esping-
Andersen (1990) and ‘dual-breadwinner’ states by Lewis (1992)) score in the top ten 
on the policy index and average female participation rates. With the exception of 
Finland, they also have above average rates of participation of married women 
without a university education with their youngest child under five. Finland’s outlier 
status may be due to its long and relatively generous parental leave, which is unusual 
for Nordic countries, enabling women in Finland to look after their children at home 
until the youngest child is three years old (see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3). At the same 
time, all the Nordic countries have middling levels of occupational segregation and 
gender wage gaps.  
 
The two liberal welfare regime countries, the UK and Ireland, are not as similar. The 
UK sits in the middle of the policy index ranking, with exactly 12 countries above 
and below. Accordingly, it has middling female participation rates on both measures 
(for all women and for married women with lower education and younger children). 
Although the median gender wage gap is relatively high in the UK, occupational 
segregation here is one of the lowest. Indicating that although men and women tend 
to work in quite similar broad occupational categories (particularly in white-collar 
occupations), men are still better paid, on average. Ireland, however, ranks in the top 
four on the policy index due to its above average performance on the tax/benefit 
neutrality component (see Table 3.19 in Chapter 3), although it ranks below average 
on the gender-neutrality of parenthood leave, childcare and gender-role attitude 
components of the index.  While female participation rates in Ireland are among the 
lowest, the median gender wage gap is middling and occupational segregation is 
relatively low. This suggests positive selection by women into employment; those 
who actually work are more likely to have higher earnings potential and to work in 
less segregated occupations.  
 
The corporatist-conservative welfare states do not appear to form a consistent cluster 
either. The three Benelux countries score highly on the policy index (in the top ten), 
although they rank differently on various components of the index. Luxembourg tops 
the scale on the measure of gender-neutrality of parenthood leave, due to its paternity 
leave provisions and generous parental leave reserved for fathers (although, in 
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practice, the take-up rate is not high). It also scores above average on the tax/benefit 
gender-neutrality measure and the proportion of children aged 0-2 in formal 
childcare. However, Luxembourg has a below average score on the measure of 
gender-role attitudes. In contrast, Belgium has above average scores on the 
parenthood leave, childcare and attitude components of the index, but its tax/benefit 
system appears to be somewhat biased towards single-earner families. The 
Netherlands has relatively high enrolment rates of children under three in formal 
childcare and more egalitarian gender-role attitudes, but it has below average scores 
on the parenthood leave and tax/benefit components. However, participation rates of 
lower educated married women with younger children are relatively high in all three 
countries, while the median wage gaps are middling (although lower in Belgium). 
Yet, these countries are wide apart on the index of occupational segregation: 
Belgium is the second least segregated country of all, Luxembourg is the third most 
segregated country, and the Netherlands has middling segregation levels.     
 
Austria and Germany sit in the bottom fifth of the policy index ranking, with 
consistently below average scores on each of the components of the index discussed 
in Chapter 3. It is not surprising, then, to find lower female participation rates in 
these countries, especially amongst lower educated prime-age married women with 
younger children (30% in Austria and 45% in Germany). This suggests that women 
with lower earnings potential may find it more difficult to reconcile their work and 
family lives. This lends some support to Gauthier’s (1996) family policy typology 
which classifies Germany as a ‘pro-traditional’ country, whose family policy is 
characterised by longer family leave and low provision of formal childcare.  
Although Austria and Germany have some of the largest gender wage gaps, they 
have below average segregation levels. This implies that although men and women 
may work in broadly similar occupations, men are better paid, on average. Lower 
female participation levels also suggest positive selection into full-time work.  
 
France does not fit neatly into any cluster. In some ways it is similar to the Benelux 
countries, but in others it is closer to Germany and Austria. In Gauthier’s (1996) 
family policy typology, France is described as a ‘pro-family/pro-natalist’ country 
with a policy emphasis on helping mothers combine childbearing with employment.  
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Its ranking on the work/family reconciliation policy index is somewhat below 
average, although France scores highly on the childcare and attitudes components of 
the index. The multivariate analysis in Chapter 5 shows no significant relationship in 
France between having one child aged four or younger and women’s propensity to 
work full-time (as opposed to working part-time or not participating). France has 
higher female participation rates than the Benelux countries, Germany or Austria, 
although lower than that in Nordic countries. However, France slides downwards in 
the rankings when the participation rate of married lower-educated women with 
younger children is considered. It scores higher than Austria and Germany, but lower 
than the Benelux or Nordic countries (with the exception of Finland). The finding of 
a lower participation rate for women with lower earnings potential and more family 
constraints on their employment is consistent with a moderate (positive) selection 
effect found for women in France in Chapter 5.  
 
Southern-European (‘Latin Rim’) countries have middling scores on the policy index 
(lowest in Greece and highest in Italy and Spain), but they rank differently on the 
various components of the index discussed in Chapter 3. Italy does better than 
average on the parenthood leave component, while Spain and Portugal have above 
average scores on the childcare component. Greece and Italy have above average 
ranks on the tax/benefit component, while Spain and Italy have above average scores 
on the attitude index. Nevertheless, these countries as a group have some of the 
lowest female participation rates. Greece, Italy and Spain, in fact, have the lowest 
total female participation rates of prime-age women in all of the studied countries. 
Portugal is an outlier, with a participation rate closer to that of the UK. The 
Southern-European countries drift further apart when the participation rates of lower 
educated married women with younger children are considered. Greece, Spain and 
Italy are still in the bottom half of the rankings, but they have higher participation 
rates than the Czech Republic, Hungary or Austria. Remarkably, Portugal has the 
second highest participation rate amongst this group of women, behind Slovenia. 
This pattern suggests that although the Southern-European countries may not have 
the most ‘women-friendly’ or gender-neutral family and employment policies, other 
macro-level factors, not directly considered in this thesis, must play a role in 
influencing female participation rates.  
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The Southern-European countries also have similar gender wage gaps, all relatively 
low (below the cross-country average). The gender gaps across the earnings 
distribution in Italy and Spain were investigated in more detail in Chapter 5. There is 
evidence of sticky floors (the wage gap is larger amongst lower earners and 
decreases along the distribution) and relatively large selection effects (women with 
higher earnings potential tend to select into full-time work) for these two countries.  
However, there is no obvious Southern-European cluster with respect to occupational 
segregation: Italy has the lowest level of segregation, Spain falls in the middle of the 
cross-country distribution, while Greece and Portugal have above average 
segregation levels. In Spain, Italy and Greece, the level of segregation is found to be 
inversely related to the level of education (see Figure 6.8 in Chapter 6): segregation 
levels are largest amongst employees without upper-secondary education and lowest 
amongst the university educated. In Portugal, the level of segregation is 
disproportionately larger among the lowest educated employees, but similar among 
those with upper-secondary or further education and those with higher education.  
 
Finally, the new EU member states all rank in the bottom half of the policy index, 
except Slovenia which sits next to the UK in the middle of the ranking. The Czech 
and Slovak Republics, as well as Poland, have the lowest values of the policy index; 
they consistently score below average on all four components of the index discussed 
in Chapter 3.  As expected, all the new member states rank in the bottom half of the 
female participation distribution, with the lowest participation rates found in Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, they all have below average 
participation rates for married women with lower education and younger children, 
except middle-ranking Slovenia. The clustering falls apart, however, with respect to 
gender inequality outcomes. While Slovenia, Poland and Hungary have some of the 
lowest median gender wage gaps of all, the Czech and Slovak Republics, as well as 
the Baltic trio, have the largest wage gaps across the studied countries (along with 
the UK and Austria). The wage gaps across the distribution in Poland and the Czech 
Republic were examined in greater depth in Chapter 5. A moderate selection effect is 
found for women in Poland and virtually no selection for those in the Czech 
Republic. This may explain why wage gaps are lower on average in Poland and 
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higher in the Czech Republic: women with lower earnings potential are less likely to 
work at all in Poland, while there are fewer differences in the characteristics of 
women who work and those who do not in the Czech Republic. As regards 
occupational segregation, all the new member states except Hungary and Slovenia 
rank in the top of the cross-country distribution, with the highest segregation levels 
observed in the Baltic countries.  
 
The Baltic countries appear to stand out from the rest of the new accession states. 
They have some of the highest gender earnings gaps and segregation levels. Their 
work/family reconciliation policies are characterised by longer and more generous 
parenthood leave available to couples (including provisions reserved to fathers), but 
some of the lowest formal childcare enrolment rates for children aged 0-2. Lithuania 
and Estonia have more traditional gender-role attitudes than any other new accession 
country, but Latvia scores higher on the combined indicator of attitudes than the rest 
of the new member states. 
 
Overall, this thesis finds mixed evidence that the countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, including the Baltic countries, form a separate type with respect to their 
work/family reconciliation policies relevant to gender equality in the labour market. 
Firstly, these countries are rather heterogeneous, with the three Baltic countries 
perhaps forming their own cluster. Secondly, on some indicators the new member 
states are more similar to Southern-European and to more traditional continental 
European countries such as Austria and Germany. This supports the finding of the 
ideal-type analysis in Aspalter et al. (2009) that the Czech and Slovak republics, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have been returning to their pre-socialist Bismarckian 
roots, thus being more similar to Austria and Germany.  There is also some support 
to the claim in Saxonberg and Sirovatka (2006) that the Czech and Slovak republics, 
Hungary and Poland have been following a re-familialisation policy since their 
transition to a market economy.  
 
However, it has to be reiterated that the composite index of work/family 
reconciliation policies is not very highly correlated with any of the gender equality 
indicators in Table 7.1 (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion).  Table 7.2 
presents a correlation matrix of the studied indicators from the previous table. There 
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is a positive and significant correlation between the composite index and the 
participation rate of married women without university education, with the youngest 
child aged 0-4 (R=0.48), but the correlation with the total female participation rate is 
much weaker and not significant (R=0.11). As discussed in Chapter 3, this is not 
surprising because family policies are more likely to affect women who are the least 
attached to the labour market. The correlations between the composite index and the 
median gender wage gap for all employees as well as the segregation index S are 
negative but not statistically significant. Although the direction of the associations is 
as expected, they are understandably weak because work/family reconciliation 
policies have wider goals than gender equality in the labour market (e.g. female 
labour supply, child well-being, fertility), while wage gaps and occupational 
segregation may be influenced by various other labour market factors. A significant 
positive linear association (R=0.43) is found between the total female participation 
rate and the median gender wage gap, but no significant correlation between the 
participation rate of lower educated women with family constraints is observed. 
Finally, the correlation between the median gender wage gap and the index of 
occupational gender segregation (R=0.48) is positive and significant, which suggests 
that male-dominated occupations tend to be better paid. 
 
Table 7.2 Correlation matrix of gender equality in the labour market 
indicators and the work/family policies reconciliation index  
 
Work/family 
reconciliation 
index 
Total female 
participation rate 
Female 
participation rate 
(married, no 
university 
education, 
youngest child 
aged 0-4) 
Median gender 
wage gap (all 
employees) 
Total female participation 
rate 
0.11    
Female participation rate 
(married, no university 
education, youngest child 
aged 0-4) 
0.48* 0.54*   
Median gender wage gap 
(all employees) 
-0.28 0.43* -0.18  
Occupational segregation 
Index S 
-0.29 0.20 0.02 0.48* 
Source: EU-SILC 2007; OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and 
Korintus (2008); OECD Tax/Benefit Calculator (accessed on 29/04/2010); EVS 1999. 
* p<0.05 
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To sum up, this thesis concludes that the existing work-family reconciliation policies 
in the EU have not caught up sufficiently with the dramatic advances in women’s 
labour market position. To various extents, they retain elements of the traditional 
male breadwinner model. Even in the Nordic countries, which rank highest on most 
measures of gender equity in work/family reconciliation policies analysed in Chapter 
3, women tend to earn less than men, on average, and to work in a narrower range of 
occupations than their male counterparts. At the other extreme, Eastern-European 
and Southern-European countries tend to have more traditional gender-role attitudes 
and a policy environment less compatible with the dual-earner/dual-carer model of 
the family, but women who do work, particularly those who work full-time, tend to 
enjoy more equality with men in terms of their wages and occupational attainment 
(although there are some exceptions to this pattern). This is consistent with positive 
selection into full-time work, whereby women with the highest earnings potential 
and fewer family constraints on their employment are more like to participate in the 
labour market and to work longer hours.   
 
Strengths and weaknesses of the thesis 
The thesis has made several original contributions to the comparative welfare state 
research area by examining the variation between countries in work/family 
reconciliation policy and gender-role attitudes relevant to gender equality in the 
labour market, and by analysing individual level determinants of gender inequalities 
in the enlarged EU. In doing so, this thesis used a multi-disciplinary approach, 
drawing on the literature and methods from the fields of labour economics and 
comparative social policy. It employed a variety of modern and advanced 
quantitative techniques in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, complementing them with a less 
statistically complex policy analysis in Chapter 3.  
 
A general contribution of this thesis is its coverage of the EU-25, including both old 
and new EU member states, as opposed to earlier studies that focus on the EU-15. 
 
Amongst its more specific contributions, the thesis explores a gender-sensitive 
analysis of work/family reconciliation policies using a wider range of indicators than 
most of the previous studies that focused primarily
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childcare policies (J. Gornick & Meyers, 2003; De Henau et al., 2006; De Henau et 
al., 2007; Ray et al., 2010). Furthermore, the study explicitly includes information on 
gender-role attitudes, instead of treating cultural differences between countries 
implicitly as country fixed effects (e.g. Jaumotte, 2003). 
 
The thesis also makes an original contribution to the existing research on gender 
wage gaps in the EU. The study in Chapter 5 is the first analysis to date for Britain, 
France, Spain, Poland and the Czech Republic that makes allowance for sample 
selection of women into full-time work in the estimation of earnings functions, while 
simulating the gender wage gaps that would be observed if all women worked full-
time, as well as decomposing the gender wage gap across the entire distribution (as 
opposed to the mean or the median) into the part due to differences in individual 
characteristics and the part due to differences in the returns to these characteristics.  
 
Finally, the analysis in Chapter 6 makes an original contribution to the cross-country 
comparative literature on occupational gender segregation by using the square root 
index (Hutchens, 2004) to compare the levels of occupational segregation in the 
enlarged EU. Although this segregation measure is increasingly popular in education 
studies, it has not been used in cross-country comparative gender segregation 
research to date. The study compared the findings based on the square root index and 
the widely-used Index of Dissimilarity, investigating the differences in the results.  
 
This thesis also has several limitations. Some of these limitations have to do with the 
quality and availability of data. For instance, it was not possible to carry out the 
analysis of gender segregation at the level of industry or sector (i.e. public/private) 
because the EU-SILC does not provide information on sector of work and several 
countries lack information on industry (i.e. Nordic countries and the Netherlands). 
Meanwhile, the analysis in Chapter 5 used a different data source for Britain than for 
the other four countries because the British sample in the EU-SILC lacks data on 
years in paid work. At the same time, data on gender-role attitudes used in Chapter 3 
is somewhat out of date (1999/2000). Thus, the results from the analysis of gender-
role attitudes need to be interpreted with some caution. Although more recent (2008) 
data from the European Values Study are now available, the last round of the survey 
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excludes several of the studied countries123. Also, these data were not published until 
late July 2010, shortly before this thesis was finalised. Finally, the analysis of labour 
market activity and occupational transitions in Chapter 4 covers the period 1994-
2001, using data from the ECHP, while the data on wages and occupational 
segregation in Chapters 5 and 6 are from the EU-SILC 2007. Similarly, Chapter 3 
analyses policy indicators as of 2006/2007. Although the ECHP is a more suitable 
dataset for the longitudinal analysis in Chapter 4, the age of the data source makes 
comparison of findings with the rest of the thesis more difficult.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 3 is mostly bivariate and does not allow the 
identification of causal relationships between the studied macro-level factors. Thus, 
it cannot be ascertained whether or to what extent the studied work-family 
reconciliation policies affect the labour force participation of women, gender wage 
gaps and occupational gender segregation. Meanwhile, the analysis does not include 
a wider range of macro-level indicators that are likely to be connected with wages 
and occupational segregation, such as the measures of labour market regulation, 
collective bargaining and wage determination practices. However, as this thesis 
focuses on work/family reconciliation policies and gender-role attitudes, labour 
market institutions are somewhat outside its scope.  
 
Policy implications 
The findings of this thesis suggest that higher levels of female employment do not 
necessarily ensure gender parity in pay and occupational attainment. Thus, although 
Nordic countries tend to have higher female participation rates, even among women 
with lower earnings potential and more family constraints on employment, they have 
middling gender wage gaps and occupational gender segregation. Rather than 
promoting work-family reconciliation policies in order to increase female labour 
supply for its own sake, greater attention needs to be paid to the quality of female 
employment and gender equality in terms of pay and occupational attainment. 
Moreover, family and employment policies geared towards the facilitation of work 
and family lives do not influence all women equally. It is those with lower levels of 
education and younger children whose participation rates are found to be more 
                                               
123
 Britain, Iceland, Italy, Sweden, and Norway. 
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strongly related to the work/family reconciliation policy environment in the studied 
countries.  
Although work/family reconciliation policies are not found to be a panacea for 
promoting gender equality in the labour market, there is some evidence that more 
gender-egalitarian policies with respect to parenthood leave, childcare facilities for 
very young children and fiscal rules affecting secondary earners in couples are 
related to smaller gender wage gaps and lower levels of occupational segregation, 
particularly its horizontal dimension. Although the strength of these relationships is 
only moderate, there appears to be some scope for promoting gender equality in the 
labour market by making it easier for women to work without compromising either 
their careers or fertility. Thus employment and family policies may need to explicitly 
promote a gender-neutral dual-earner/dual-carer model of the family in which both 
men and women do unpaid caring and paid labour market work. Otherwise, women 
have to face a trade-off between having children and pursuing a career, which results 
either in the situation of low employment and low fertility or in the scenario of 
relatively high employment and fertility combined with high levels of occupational 
segregation and gender wage gaps.  
 
Although some of the countries studied here appear to be relative laggards with 
respect to their work/family reconciliation policies, there may be substantial policy 
opportunities. Thus, parenthood leave designs have been evolving in recent decades, 
as the EU introduced minimum statutory guarantees for maternity leave and parental 
leave. For instance, the parenthood leave system in Germany has gradually moved 
away from a more traditional male-breadwinner model characterised by a long period 
of leave available to mothers at low rates of pay to a more gender-egalitarian system 
that encourages fathers to share parental leave124 (Erler, 2009). Although Germany 
and several other EU countries do not guarantee legal entitlements to paternity leave, 
it is not inconceivable that such provisions will be instituted in the near future. The 
EU, perhaps, has a role to play in this area. Similarly, the availability and 
affordability of childcare facilities for pre-school children may improve faster in the 
countries with the least developed provision. For instance, relatively low availability 
                                               
124
 If fathers take at least two months of parental leave, the length of parental leave benefit extends 
from 12 months to 14 months. See notes to Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. See Erler (2009) for a discussion 
of the evolution of parenthood leave in Germany since 1878.  
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of formal childcare facilities in Central and Eastern European countries may offer a 
policy opportunity to develop a coherent and integrated childcare and early education 
system, similarly to the experience of Nordic countries that were latecomers in pre-
school programmes provision (Morgan, 2008). 
 
Directions for future research  
Although this thesis examines the cross-country variation in work/family 
reconciliation policies, it does not establish the extent in practice to which the dual-
earner/dual-carer model of the family is prevalent in the EU. For instance, 
harmonised time-use data would allow the degree to which men and women share 
domestic and caring tasks to be measured. A potential source of such data is the 
European Social Survey 2004. The analysis of the gender division of domestic labour 
in couple households would thus complement the study of gender inequality in the 
labour market. 
 
Also, the analysis of individual labour market transitions in Chapter 4 based on the 
ECHP data for 1994-2001 could be replicated using the longitudinal component of 
the EU-SILC 2007. Although it is only a four-year rotation panel, there are four 
years of data on the same individuals for the period 2004-2007, which can make it 
possible to explore the effect of childbirth on their labour market transitions. 
However, sample size is likely to be a problem for smaller countries, since only one 
of the four sub-samples in each country will have data spanning four years125. Also, 
the EU-SILC database provides a less comprehensive list of relevant variables than 
the ECHP. It lacks information on the sector of work, and some information is 
missing on years in paid work, size of workplace and type of contract for several 
countries.  
 
Finally, an extension of the analysis in this thesis might look into fertility and child 
poverty patterns in the enlarged EU. Given the career-fertility trade-offs that higher 
educated women tend to face in countries with less effective work/family 
reconciliation policies (Esping-Andersen, 2009), it may be worthwhile to explore 
how far the policy index constructed in Chapter 3 is associated with fertility 
                                               
125
 See “EU-SILC User Database Description Version 2007-2 from 01-08-09” pp. 37-39. 
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measures. Furthermore, since a lack of sufficient job-protected family leave or 
accessible and affordable childcare services for younger children may prevent 
mothers from entering employment, particularly if they have lower human capital 
endowments, their children may be vulnerable to poverty. Thus, the relationship 
between the policy index and child poverty indicators could also be fruitfully 
investigated in future work. 
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Annex 3 Annex for Chapter 3 
 
Figure A 3-1 % respondents disagreeing that “When jobs are scarce, men have 
more right to a job than women” 
 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
   
Figure A 3-2 % respondents disagreeing that “A woman has to have children 
in order to be fulfilled” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
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Figure A 3-3 % respondents disagreeing that “A pre-school child is likely to 
suffer if his or her mother works” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
 
Figure A 3-4 % respondents disagreeing that “A job is alright but what most 
women really want is a home and children” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
 
Figure A 3-5 % respondents disagreeing that “Being a housewife is just as 
fulfilling as working for pay” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
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Figure A 3-6 % respondents agreeing that “A working mother can establish 
just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a 
mother who does not work” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
 
Figure A 3-7 % respondents agreeing that “Sharing household chores is 
important for a successful marriage” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
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Figure A 3-8 % respondents agreeing that “Having a job is the best way for a 
women to be an independent person” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
   
Figure A 3-9 % respondents agreeing that “In general, fathers are as suited to 
look after their children as mothers” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
 
Figure A 3-10  % respondents agreeing that “Both the husband and wife should 
contribute to household income” 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
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Figure A 3-11 Average scale on ‘attitudes to equality in the home’ and factor 
scores 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
R=0.92 
 
Figure A 3-12 Average scale on ‘attitudes to equality in the economic sphere’ 
and factor scores 
 
Source: European values study 1999 (cross-sectional weights used). 
R=0.64  
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Table A 3-1 Summary of maternity leave legislation (as of 2006/2007) 
 Payment Eligibility  Flexibility in use Financing 
AT 
100% of average income for the last three 
months of employment before taking leave 
for employees; there is no ceiling on 
payment (16 weeks) 
No qualifying conditions  
 None 
State/SI  
 
BE 
Employees in the private sector: first month 
at 82 per cent of earnings plus 75 per cent 
for the remaining weeks with a ceiling of 
€86.34 per day. Public sector: statutory civil 
servants receive full salary; contractual civil 
servants, as for private sector. 15 weeks (11 
weeks FTE) 
All insured women 
(employees) 
 
The start of maternity leave 
can be delayed until one 
week before birth. SI 
CZ 
Sixty-nine per cent of gross daily wage up to 
a ceiling of CZK479 (approximately €20) for 
a calendar day. 28 weeks (14 weeks FTE) 
All women residents. An 
employee must have 
contributed to sickness 
insurance for at least 270 
days during the last two 
years  
None except for when leave 
can be started before birth. 
Health 
insurance  
 
DE 
100%  of earnings, with no ceiling on 
payments. 14 weeks (14 FTE) All insured women None 
SI + 
employer  
DK 
100 % up to (DKR 3515 p/w) 18 weeks (18 
FTE) 
 
6 weeks of residence 
(OECD). 
A period of work of at least 
120 hours in 13 weeks 
preceding the paid leave 
(Moss and Korintus, 
2008). None Employer 
EE 
100% of average earnings (calculated on 
employment in the previous calendar year). 
There is no ceiling on the benefit. 28 
weeks (28 FTE) 
All insured mothers  
 
None except for when leave 
can be started before birth; 
taking 
leave is obligatory SI 
ES 
One hundred per cent of earnings up to a 
ceiling of €3,074 a month. A flat-rate benefit 
(€527 per month or €17 per day) is paid for 
42 days to all employed women who do not 
meet eligibility requirements. 16 weeks (16 
FTE) 
180 days insurance 
contributions paid in last 5 
years (OECD). At least 
180 days insurance 
contributions in the 
previous seven years, or 
360 days during working 
life (Moss and Korintus, 
2008) 
Mothers may take leave part 
time except for the six weeks 
following birth State 
FI 
During the first 56 days of leave, the 
payment is equal to 90 per cent of annual 
earnings up to a ceiling of €46,207, with a 
lower percentage for higher earnings; after 
this initial period of leave, benefit is paid at 
70 per cent of earnings up to €30,033, again 
with a lower percentage for higher earnings. 
Half of all mothers with an employment 
contract receive full pay during the first 
three months of the maternity leave. During 
this period the daily benefit is paid to the 
employer. Mothers not employed and those 
whose annual earnings are less than €6,513 
before the birth get a minimum flat-rate 
allowance of €15.20 a working day 
(€380/month). 17.5 weeks (16.9 weeks 
FTE) 
All parents are eligible  
 None SI 
FR 
One hundred per cent of earnings, up to a 
ceiling of €2,773 a 
Month. 16 weeks (16 FTE) 
All employees and self-
employed workers (Moss 
and Korintus, 2008). 
10 months insurance 
contributions  (OECD) 
Two weeks can be taken 
before or after birth. SI 
GR 
100% of earnings, with no ceiling in 
payment. 17 weeks (17 FTE) 
200 days work in last 2 
years  (OECD) None 
SI/employe
r  
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HU 
70% of average daily earnings, with no 
ceiling on payments. 24 weeks (16.8 
FTE). 
All insured women 
(OECD). 
Women employees and 
self–employed women 
with at least 180 days of 
previous employment are 
entitled to benefit payment 
for the period of maternity 
leave (Moss and Korintus, 
2008) 
The start date can be 
between four weeks before 
birth and the birth 
its SI 
IE 
70% of earnings, subject to a minimum of 
€151.60 per week and up to a ceiling of 
€232.40 a week for 26 weeks; the remaining 
16 weeks are unpaid. 42 weeks (18.2 FTE) 
39 ins. contributions paid 
in the 12 months pre- 
leave  
 
None except for when leave 
can be started before birth State 
IS 
80% of earnings up to a ceiling of €6,000 
per 
month. 13 weeks (10.4 FTE). 
 
for those who have been 
in the workforce during the 
preceding 24 months 
(Moss and Korintus, 
2008).  
> 6 months in workforce 
(OECD) 
 
Two weeks just after  the 
birth, but can take leave on a 
part-time basis and work part 
time after that. Can take it  
as several blocks of time. IS 
IT 
80% of earnings with no ceiling for 
salaried workers. 20 weeks (16 FTE). 
All women residents 
(OECD). 
All women employees and 
self-employed women with 
social security 
membership (Moss and 
Korintus, 2008). 
 
After the 20-week period: 4 
weeks before the birth and 
16 weeks after; or 8 
weeks before the birth and 
12 after SI 
LT 100%. 21 weeks (FTE) 
Insured women with 3 
months of insurance 
during the last 12 months 
or at least 6 months during 
the last 24 months 
(OECD) 
  SI 
LU 
100 % (with minimum and maximum 
payments) 16 weeks (FTE. All insured women   SI 
LV 
100% of the average gross wages upon 
which contributions have been paid during 6 
months. 19 weeks (FTE). 
All insured women  
  SI 
NL 
One hundred per cent of earnings up to a 
ceiling equivalent to the 
maximum daily payment for sickness benefit 
(€177). 16 weeks (FTE) 
All women employees (all 
insured women) 
Pregnant workers are not 
allowed to 
work from four weeks before 
the expected delivery date SI 
NO 
Either 100% or 80%, up to a ceiling of  
€50,140.  The lower rate of benefit gives a 
longer leave period. No statutory maternity 
leave, but 9 weeks reserved for mother 
(Moss and Korintus, 2008). Varies if period 
of parental leave is 48 weeks: pay is 100% 
of earnings; for a year pay is 80% of 
earnings up to maximum EUR 50,140 
(OECD). 9 weeks (FTE) assuming shorter 
parental leave overall. 
6 out of preceding 10 
months in work (either 
parent)  and have earned 
at least half the basic 
national insurance benefit 
payment over the previous 
year None State 
PL 
100% of average earnings for 12 months 
before 
birth, with no ceiling on payments. 18 
FTE. 
No qualifying conditions  
(OECD). 
Insured employees (Moss 
and Korintus, 2008). 
None except for when leave 
can be started before birth 
SI / 
employer  
 
PT 
100% of earnings, with no ceiling on 
payments. 17 FTE 
6 months insurance 
contributions  
 
Women can choose when to 
take 30 of the 90 days. 
Women (or men) can take 
120 calendar days at 100 % 
of earnings or 150 calendar 
days at 80%. The mother State 
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Source: OECD Family Database (version June 2009) Table PF7.1; Moss and Korintus (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
must take at least six 
weeks leave after which 
the remaining entitlement 
can be transferred to the 
father 
SE 
No statutory maternity leave, but pregnant 
women are eligible for 50 days of leave paid 
at 80% of income if they work in jobs 
considered injurious or involving risk to the 
foetus. Other pregnant women may use 
paid Parental leave or sick leave up to 60 
days before the baby is due. 80% up to a 
ceiling of EUR 43,070 (and min. EUR 19 per 
day) (OECD). 12 weeks (9.6 FTE)  
 
All parents are eligible  
 
Paid leave can be taken at 
any time until a child’s eighth 
birthday. Parents can take 
paid leave full-time, half-
time, quarter-time or one-
eighth time, with the length 
of leave extended 
accordingly. Parents can 
take leave in one continuous 
period or as several blocks 
of time. State 
SI 
100% of average earnings of the entitled 
person 
during the 12 months prior to the leave. 
Minimum payment at 55% of the minimum 
wage. Women not insured at the time of 
leave but who have been insured for at least 
12 months in the last 3 years before leave 
receive 55 to 105% of the minimum wage. 
15 weeks FTE.  
All insured women + 
women who have been 
insured for at least 12 
months in the last three 
years preceding the leave  
 None SI 
SK 
55% net wage up to a low maximum (350 
SKK / day – 7500 SKK /month). 28 weeks 
(15.4 FTE) 
All women residents  
  SI 
UK 
90% of woman’s average earnings for six 
weeks with no ceiling plus a flat-rate 
payment of £117.18 (approximately 18.5% 
of AW) for 33 weeks. Plus 13 weeks unpaid. 
52 weeks (11.5 FTE) 
Continuous employment 
for 26 weeks, into the 15th 
week before the baby is 
due 
 
None except for when leave 
can be started before birth. 
Employer 
(refunded 
for at least 
92%).  
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Table A 3-2 Summary of paternity leave legislation (as of 2006/2007) 
 Payment Eligibility  Flexibility in use 
AT 
No statutory paternity arrangements (but collective 
agreements generally providing for one or two days)    
BE 
3 days: 100% (employer); Next: 82 % up to max. 
(health insurance) . 2 weeks (1 week FTE) All male employees 
Must be taken during the first month of 
the child’s life, but can be 
distributed throughout this month 
except for the first three days, 
which must be taken immediately after 
childbirth 
CZ No statutory entitlement    
DE No statutory entitlement   
DK 
2 weeks, to be taken during the first 14 weeks after 
birth. 100 % up to (DKR 3515 p/w) 
Anyone in a 
recognised 
partnership, including 
same sex 
partnerships  
EE 
100% of average earnings (calculated on earnings 
from six previous calendar months) up to a ceiling of 
three times average monthly earnings. 2 weeks (FTE) 
All public servants and 
other employed 
fathers with 
permanent 
employment contracts 
Must be taken during the mother’s 
maternity leave or two months 
after the birth of a child 
ES 
100% of earnings, paid by the Social Security Fund, 
with a ceiling of up to  €3,074 a month, except for the 
first two days which remain paid by employers. 2 
weeks (FTE) 
 
All employees fulfilling 
contributory 
requirements (i.e. at 
least 180 
days in the previous 
seven years, or 360 
days during working 
life) 
The first two days have to be used at 
the time of birth. The 13 days of 
paternity leave can be used 
during or immediately after the end of 
maternity leave. 10 weeks maternity 
leave may be transferred to the 
father if both parents fulfil 
conditions. 
FI 
Earnings-related benefit, with payment equal to 70% of 
annual earnings up to €30,034, with a lower 
percentage for higher earnings. 8 weeks incl. father’s 
month (5.7 weeks FTE) 
12 ‘bonus’ days are 
only for fathers who 
take the last two 
weeks of parental 
leave  
The one to 18 days can be taken in four 
segments, the 12 bonus days in one 
segment 
FR 
100% of earnings, up to a ceiling of €2,773 a 
Month. 2 weeks (FTE) As maternity leave 
Must be taken within the four months 
following the birth. 
GR 100%. 0.4 weeks FTE (2 days) Male employees 
Must be taken at the time of the child’s 
birth. 
HU 
One hundred per cent of father’s average daily wage. 1 
week (FTE) All employed fathers 
to be taken during the first two months 
of the child’s life 
IE 
No general statutory entitlement, but 14 weeks of 
unpaid parental leave (individual entitlement).  
3 paid days leave are used to be granted by employers 
at birth (OECD)  
All employees who 
have completed one 
year’s continuous 
employment with their 
present employer 
Transfer of Parental leave entitlements 
from one parent to another if both 
parents are employed by the same 
employer, subject to the employer’s 
agreement 
IS 
80% of earnings up to a ceiling of €6,000 per 
month. 13 weeks (10.4 FTE) 
All men who have 
been economically 
active prior to 
childbirth are 
eligible for leave 
The father can take leave on a part-time 
(50 per cent) basis and work part time. 
It is also possible to take leave in one 
continuous period or as several blocks 
of time 
IT There is no general statutory entitlement   
LT 100%. 4 weeks. 
Insured employed 
fathers with 7 months 
of insurance during 
the last 24 month  
  
LU 100%. 0.4 weeks (2 days) 
Has to be 
working/employed to 
be eligible  
LV 
80% of the average gross wages upon which 
contributions have been paid during 6 months . 2 
weeks (1.6 FTE) 
Insured employed 
fathers  
  
NL 
100% of earnings, with no upper ceiling, paid by the 
employer. 0.4 weeks (2 working days). FTE 
has to be 
working/employed to 
Leave can be taken within four weeks 
after the birth of the child 
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be eligible 
NO 
2 weeks „daddy days‟ are unpaid.  Remaining 6 
weeks  
of statutory father quota of parental leave  paid at 
100% if the total of leave of the father does not exceed 
35 weeks; otherwise paid at 80%.  
 All employed fathers 
have the right to 
leave, but payment is 
negotiated and paid 
by the employer none 
PL 
No general statutory entitlement, but part of maternity 
leave over 14 weeks may be used by father in limited 
cases. 4 weeks (FTE) for 1st child   
PT 
One hundred per cent of earnings, with no ceiling on 
payments. Obligatory. 1 week. 
6 months insurance 
contributions  
 
The five days may be taken during the 
first month after birth 
SE 
Ten days (+ 60 days = fathers’ quota, see ‘Parental 
leave’). Eighty per cent of earnings up to a ceiling of 
SEK403,000 per year 
(2007) (€43,070). 11.7 weeks (9.3 FTE) 
To get the maximum 
amount of 
compensation, a 
father needs to be 
employed for at least 
240 days before the 
date of birth. 
Can be used at any time during the first 
60 days after childbirth. 
SI 
During the first 15 days of the paternity leave, 100% of 
average earnings up to a ceiling of 2.5 times the 
average wage, with a minimum payment of 55 per cent 
of the minimum wage. 
For the remaining 75 days the father is paid social 
security contributions based on the minimum wage 
(approximately 
€80 per month). 13 weeks (2.8 FTE) 
Seventy-five calendar 
days may be taken as 
full-time leave up to 
the child’s third 
birthday. If they are 
taken as individual 
days, the length of the 
leave is equal to 70 
per cent of the eligible 
calendar days. 
Fathers are obliged to 
take at least 15 days of full-time leave 
during the child’s first six 
months 
SK No general statutory entitlement   
UK 
Flat-rate payment of £117.18 (approximately €150) a 
week for 2 weeks. FTE 0.3 weeks. 
Those who have 
worked continuously 
for their employer for 
26 weeks ending with 
the 15th week before 
the baby is due. 
to be taken during the first eight weeks 
of the child’s life 
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Table A 3-3 Summary of parental leave legislation (as of 2006/2007) 
 Payment Eligibility  Flexibility in use 
Entitle-
ment 
AT 
Parental leave is unpaid, but a childcare benefit 
is available to all families who meet the eligibility 
conditions, whether or not parents take parental 
leave.  
3 options:  
1) a long period: €436 a month for 30 months of 
for 36 months if both parents apply  
2) mid-range option: €626 a month for 20 
months (or 24 months for 2 parents)  
3) a short option: (€800 for 15 months or 18 
months for both parents.  104 weeks (17 FTE) 
All employees are 
entitled to take 
parental leave 
Leave may be taken by one 
parent only (mother or father) or 
by both parents on an alternating 
basis (the whole period can be 
divided into a maximum of three 
parts alternating between 
parents, with each part at least 
three months). Both parents 
cannot take leave at the same 
time except for one month the 
first time they alternate leave. Family 
BE 
€698.65 per month if leave taken full time. 
26 weeks per couple (5.6 FTE) 
12 weeks per parent (2.6 FTE) 
All employees who 
have completed one 
year’s employment 
with 
their present 
employer (during 
the last 15 months) 
and who have, 
or expect to have, 
parental 
responsibility for a 
child 
FT leave may be taken full-time, 
or half time over 6 months or for 
one day a week over 15 months. 
For half-time leaven the total 
duration of 6 months can be split 
into blocks, minimum 2 months. 
80% part time work may be split 
in blocks of at least 3 months. 
The following rule also available: 
one month at full-time + 2 
months at half time + 5 months at 
one-fifth.  Ind. 
CZ 
3 options of parental benefit:  
1) long option: basic rate of €305 per months 
until age of 21 months + reduced rate (€150) 
until age 48 months  
2) mid-range option: €305 until child reaches 36 
months  
3) short option: €455 until age of 24 months, 
only for women entitled to maternity benefit 10% 
of APW (or EUR 121 pm)  
156 weeks (50.3 FTE) 
There are no 
special 
requirements; 
however, each 
parent has to ask 
for formal approval 
of the employer. 
Parents can work, full time or 
part time, while receiving 
parental benefit. Both parents 
can take parental leave at the 
same time, but only one of them 
is entitled to parental benefit. 
They can alternate in receiving 
benefit as often they want. 
Parents can place a child under 
three years in a childcare facility 
for up to five days a month 
without losing parental benefit; 
they can also have a three-year-
old in kindergarten for up to four 
hours each day 
without losing benefit. 
Leave is 
an 
individual 
entitlement 
(but only 
one parent 
is entitled 
to the 
benefit 
DE 
Replacement rate of 67% of a parents’ average 
earnings during the 12 months preceding 
childbirth, up to a ceiling of EUR 1800 per 
months; minimum payment is EUR 300 even for 
parents without prior income.  Low income 
supplement: for every EUR 2 of monthly 
earnings below EUR 1000, their childrearing 
benefit increases by 0.1 per cent. Speed 
premium bonus: if another child is born within 
the 24 months the childrearing benefit is 
increased by 10%. Both parents are equally 
entitled to the childrearing benefit but if the 
father takes at least 2 months of leave the 
overall length of benefit payment is extended 
to 14 months. 156 weeks (34.8 FTE) 
• Parental leave: all 
parents gainfully 
employed at date of 
birth. 
• Childrearing 
benefit: all parents, 
if not employed for 
more than 30 
hours a week 
Instead of 12(+2) months the 
childrearing benefit may be 
spread over 24(+4) months, but 
the monthly benefit level is 
reduced so that the overall 
payment remains the same. 
Parents receiving a childrearing 
benefit may work up to 30 hours 
a week. The final year of 
Parental leave may be taken up 
to a child’s eighth birthday with 
the employer’s agreement. Both 
parents are entitled to take leave 
at the same time and both can 
take-up to two leave intervals Family 
DK 
One hundred per cent of earnings up to a ceiling 
of DKK703 (€100) 
per working day before taxes for full-time 
employees, or DKK3,515 (€470) weekly. 32 
weeks (FTE) 
Eligibility for an 
employee is based 
on a period of work 
of at least 120 hours 
in 13 weeks 
preceding the paid 
leave. 
Possibility to work part time with 
reduced payment accordingly. 
Between 8 and 13 weeks can be 
taken later; any further period 
must 
be agreed with the employer. 
This entitlement is per family. 
Parents can prolong the 32 
weeks leave to 40 weeks (for all) 
Ind.,  but 
the total 
leave 
period 
cannot 
exceed 
more than 
32 
weeks per 
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or 46 weeks (only employees). 
The benefit level is reduced over 
the extended leave period, so 
that the total benefit paid equals 
32 weeks 
at the full rate of benefit.  
 
family. 
EE 
2 types of payment, neither of which is 
specifically linked to parental leave:  
1) Parental benefit: 100% of average earnings in 
the previous calendar year for 435 days (62 
weeks) with a ceiling at 3 times of the average 
wage (€1620 per months in 2008)  
2) Childcare benefit: flat-rate payment (EUR 
38.5 per month), paid from the end of parental 
leave benefit until the child reaches age 3, for 
both working and non-working parents.  156 
weeks (62 weeks FTE) 
Fathers are eligible 
for parental benefit 
when their child has 
reached 
70 days of age 
Parental leave may be used in 
one part or in several parts at 
any time until a child is three 
years of age. 
When a parent takes up 
employment after the birth of a 
child, the parental benefit is 
reduced 
Family 
 
ES None. 156 weeks (0 FTE) 
All employees, 
though employees 
on temporary 
contracts can only 
claim leave that is 
shorter than their 
contract period 
Each parent is entitled to take 
leave until three years after 
childbirth. 
Leave is an individual right. 
There are no limits to the number 
of periods of leave that can be 
taken until the child is three 
years, with no minimum period 
Ind, but 
156 per 
family 
FI 
Parental leave. During the first 30 days of 
leave, the 
payment is equal to 75% of annual earnings up 
to €46,207, with a lower percentage for higher 
earnings. After this initial period of leave, the 
payment is 70% of earnings up to €30,033, with 
a lower percentage for higher earnings. The 
minimum flat-rate allowance is €15.20 a working 
day (€380/month). Moss and Kortintus, 2008. 
26 weeks (158 working days). 
Homecare leave (child not in municipal 
childcare) .  
up to 3rd birthday of younger child  taken after 
paid parental leave.  basic allowance : €294 p/m 
for first child + subsequent € 94,09 p/m (if under 
3 years) or € 60,46 p/m (if over 3 years), 
possible supplements.  
Overall: 156 weeks (appx. 35.8 FTE). 
Entitlements based 
on residence in 
Finland 
Each parent can take leave in 
two parts, of at least 12 days 
duration. Leave can be taken 
part time, at 40–60 per cent of 
full-time hours, but only if both 
parents take part-time leave and 
only with the employer’s 
agreement. Benefit payments are 
reduced accordingly. The 
‘father's month’ can be taken 
within six months from the end of 
the Parental leave period 
provided that the child has been 
taken care of at home by the 
mother or the father until the start 
of the ‘father's 
month’ 
Family 
 
FR 
Complément de libre choix d’activité (CLCA) – is 
available 
to all families who meet the eligibility condition 
whether or not they are on parental leave. It is a 
flat-rate payment (€536 per month, appx20% 
AW in 2007), paid to families whose income is 
below a certain level (in practice, about 90 per 
cent of families are eligible). However, to 
parents with only one child it is only paid until 
six months after the end of the Maternity leave; 
in other families it is paid until the child reaches 
three years of age. 
Complément optionnel de libre choix d’activité 
(COLCA) – is available to large families (with at 
least three children, the youngest born since 
July 2006): an allowance of €766 per month is 
paid on condition that one parent stops working 
completely. However, the duration is only for 
one year. Large 
families can choose between COLCA and 
CLCA. 
156 weeks (31.1 FTE 2+ children, 6.3FTE if 1 
All employees are 
eligible for Parental 
leave if they have 
worked at least one 
year for their 
employer before the 
birth of a child. 
Eligibility for CLCA 
becomes more 
restrictive the fewer 
children a parent 
has: for example 
with three children 
the eligibility 
condition is 
to have worked for 
two out of the five 
years preceding 
birth (two out 
of the four years for 
parents with two 
children), but with 
Parents taking leave may work 
between 16 and 32 hours per 
week. 
• If parents work part time, the 
CLCA payment is reduced. If 
both 
parents work part time, they can 
each receive CLCA but the total 
cannot exceed one full CLCA 
payment. For the higher 
allowance paid 
for large families (COLCA), one 
parent must stop work 
completely. 
Ind. , but 
payment 
per family 
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child).  only one 
child it is necessary 
to have worked 
without a break for 
two years 
preceding birth. 
GR 
Unpaid.  
14 weeks (3.5 months per parent). 0 FTE 
30 weeks per family. 0FTE 
Leave is an 
individual 
entitlement. All 
employees who 
have completed one 
year’s continuous 
employment with 
their present 
employer are 
eligible. 
For an employee to 
be entitled, his/her 
spouse must work 
outside 
the home. 
Leave may be taken up to the 
time the child turns three and a 
half 
years.  Leave may be taken in 
several blocks of time subject to 
agreement 
with the employer Ind. 
HU 
• GYES (for non-insured parents): Flat-rate 
benefit equal to the amount of the minimum old-
age pension approximately €105pm) in 2007. 
156 weeks (23 weeks FTE) for uninsured 
parents, or from the end of GYED until the 3rd 
birthday for insured parents. 
• GYED (for insured parents): Benefit of 70 per 
cent of earnings, up to a ceiling of (€355 per 
month) in 2007. from the end of the Maternity 
leave period until the child’s 
second birthday. 80 weeks (56 weeks FTE)  
GYES: all parents. 
GYED: either of the 
parents living with 
the child is eligible 
as long as she/he 
has been employed 
for at least 180 days 
within the two years 
before the birth of 
the child; however, 
only one parent can 
actually take GYED. 
Both are family entitlements 
except for GYED up to the 
child’s first birthday, which is 
an entitlement only for 
mothers. A parent taking GYES 
cannot work until the child’s first 
birthday, but can then work 
unlimited hours while still 
receiving the full benefit until the 
child’s third birthday. Family 
IE 
14 weeks (0 FTE) per parent per child. 
28 weeks (0FTE) per family. 
All employees who 
have completed one 
year’s continuous 
employment with 
their present 
employer 
Leave may be taken up to the 
child’s eighth birthday. 
 Leave may be taken in separate 
blocks of a minimum of six 
continuous weeks or more 
favourable terms subject to 
employer’s agreement. 
• Transfer of Parental leave 
entitlements from one parent to 
another if both parents are 
employed by the same employer, 
subject to the employer’s 
agreement. Ind. 
IS 
Parental leave: 80% of earnings up to a ceiling 
(approximately €6,000 per month), for those who 
have been in the workforce during the preceding 
24 months. 
Childcare leave: Each parent may take 13 
weeks unpaid leave until the child is eight years 
old. 
Total: 39 weeks per couple (0 FTE) according 
to Moss and Korintus (2008) 
All parents who 
have been 
economically active 
prior to childbirth 
are 
eligible for parental  
leave 
Leave can be taken in one 
continuous period or as several 
blocks of time. 
Joint 13 
weeks of 
paid leave 
PLUS 13 
weeks 
each 
IT 
Thirty per cent of earnings when leave is taken 
for a child under three years; unpaid if taken 
when a child is three to eight years, 
unless annual earnings are under approximately 
2.5 times the 
amount of minimum earnings (for 2004, 
€13,396).  
43 weeks (10 months) per couple (13 weeks 
FTE). 
26 weeks (6 months) per parent (7.8 weeks 
FTE). 
All employed 
parents, except 
domestic workers 
and home helps. 
Self-employed 
workers are 
generally entitled to 
three months, which 
can be taken only 
during the first year 
after the child’s birth 
Fathers taking 3 months 
Paternity leave are entitled to 
one month of additional Parental 
leave. Leave can be taken at any 
time until a child is eight years 
old. There are two options for 
taking this leave: a single leave 
period up to a maximum of six 
months; or shorter leave periods 
amounting to a 
maximum of six months. It is 
Ind., but 
the total 
amount of 
leave taken 
by two 
parents 
cannot 
exceed 10 
months 
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possible for each parent to take 
leave at the same time 
LT 
100% after the expiry of the maternity leave until 
child is 1 year and 85% for the remaining period.  
104 weeks (88.3 FTE) according to the OECD  
Parental benefit is paid to 
persons who are on child care 
leave or continued to work during 
the child care period.  
 Family? 
LU 
6 months per parent per child (12 months if work 
under 50 % full time), to be taken after maternity 
leave, and before the child’s birthday for the 
other parent . €1840 per month during 6 months 
if full time; €920 per month during 12 months if 
part time. 
52 weeks (12 months) per couple (26 weeks 
FTE) 
26 weeks (6 months) per parent (13 weeks 
FTE)    Ind. 
LV 
70% of the average gross wage upon which 
contributions have been paid during 12 months . 
52 weeks (36.4 FTE) according to the OECD   Family? 
NL 
1) 3 months per parent per child  
(6 months if half part time work)  
One parent at a time (mother has priority)  
2) Right to change working time  
Unpaid, except civil servant (75%) or favourable 
collective agreements  For participants in the life 
course saving scheme, tax reduction of half the 
statutory minimum wage (50% of €1,335 a 
month) . 
26 weeks per couple (0 FTE) 
13 weeks per parent (0FTE) 
All employees who 
have completed one 
year’s continuous 
employment with 
their present 
employer 
Flexibility: leave to be taken in 
blocks of at least one month. 
Also 4 months adoption unpaid 
leave (for child up to 12)  
 Ind. 
NO 
Maximum length is 54 weeks with 100% paid 
leave. Of these, 9 weeks are for the mothers 
(included under maternity leave) and 6 weeks 
are for the fathers. The remaining 39 weeks are 
a family entitlement and may be taken by either 
mother or father.  
100% if one parent take up to 29 weeks of the 
family entitlement (up to maximum 400,872 
NOK) a year  
- 80 % if parent take more than 29 weeks of the 
family entitlement (up to 39 weeks)  
29  weeks (29 weeks FTE) 
The eligibility rules 
are the same for 
fathers and 
mothers. They must 
be employed for 6 
of the last 10 
months prior to birth 
and have 
earned at least half 
the basic national 
insurance benefit 
payment 
over the previous 
year 
Family entitlement: it is possible 
to choose a longer period of 
leave 
(39 weeks) paid at 80 per cent of 
earnings, or a shorter (29 weeks) 
paid at 100 per cent. 
Family, but 
some 
quotas for 
mothers 
and fathers 
PL 
€115 per month for 24 months; Means-tested 
benefit at household level for 3 years at 
maximum if monthly household income is less 
than €145.  
156 weeks (16.1 FTE) 
Employees with a 
work record of at 
least six months 
Leave can be taken until a child’s 
fourth birthday. Family 
PT 
3 months per parent per child (non-transferable).  
Unpaid, except for 15 (calendar) „daddy days‟, 
paid at 100%  
26 weeks per couple (0 FTE) 
 
All employees with 
a record of six 
months (continuous 
or 
intermittent) of 
insurance 
contributions. 
The three months leave may be 
taken up to the child’s sixth 
birthday and can be taken: a) on 
a full-time basis for three months; 
b) on a half-time basis for a 
period of 12 months per parent; 
or c) on an 
alternating basis, i.e. working half 
time and full time up to a 
maximum of three months full 
time per parent Ind. 
SE 
(480 days to be shared between the parents, 60 
days reserved each parent)  
360 days at 80 per cent of earnings 
up to a ceiling of SEK403,000 per year (2007) 
(€43,070); the 
All parents are 
entitled to paid 
parental leave, but 
paid leave at 80% of 
earnings requires 
The length of leave is counted in 
days  to enhance flexibility of 
use. Paid and unpaid leave can 
be combined to enable parents to 
stay at 
Family, but 
some 
weeks 
reserved 
for each 
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remaining 90 days at a flat-rate payment of 
SEK180 a day (€20). 
Total: appx. 72 weeks (FTE 52.8) 
parents to have had 
an income of over 
SEK180 a day for 
240 days before the 
expected date of 
delivery or adoption. 
home longer. Paid leave can be 
taken at any time until a child’s 
eighth birthday. Parents can take 
paid leave full-time, half-time, 
quarter-time or one-eighth time, 
with the length of leave extended 
accordingly (e.g. 
one day of full-time leave 
becomes two days of half-time 
leave and 
four days of quarter-time leave). 
Parents can take leave in one 
continuous period or as several 
blocks 
of time. An employee taking 
Parental leave has the right to 
stay away from work for a 
maximum of three periods each 
year. 
parent 
SI 
100% of average earnings up to a ceiling. 
37 weeks FTE 
Insured: covered by 
parental leave 
insurance that forms 
part of the social 
security insurance 
Each parent is entitled to half of 
the total, but this individual right 
may be transferred between 
parents.  
Parental leave may be taken as 
520 days of a half-time leave 
combined with part-time work 
(half of the normal working hours 
per day). If Parental leave is 
taken half time, the benefit paid 
is 
reduced accordingly. Up to 75 
days may be taken at any time 
up to the child’s eighth birthday, 
as full-time or part-time leave or 
by individual days. In 
this last case, the length of the 
leave is equal to 70 per cent of 
the eligible calendar days. 
Family, 
Each 
parent is 
entitled to 
half the 
total, but 
this 
individual 
right may 
be 
transferred 
between 
parents 
SK 
Up to child’s 3rd birthday; Individual right to be 
taken after maternity leave  SKK 3790 pm; (SKK 
1200 if the parent is working or on sick-pay)  
156 weeks (30.7 FTE)   
Ind., but 
payment 
per family 
UK 
Thirteen weeks per parent per child (i.e. an 
individual right), with a maximum of four weeks 
leave to be taken in any one calendar year 
26 weeks per couple (0FTE) 
13 weeks per parent (0FTE) 
All employees who 
have completed one 
year’s continuous 
employment with 
their present 
employer and who 
have, or expect to 
have, parental 
responsibility for a 
child. 
• Leave may be taken in blocks 
or in multiples of one week, up to 
four 
weeks per year. 
• Leave may be taken up to the 
child’s fifth birthday. Ind. 
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Annex 4 Annex for Chapter 4 
Table A 4-1 Part-time share of total female employment (age 25-59) (%) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Greece 6.7 7.2 7.4 7.0 9.0 9.2 7.1 6.3 
Finland N/A 12.1 11.6 11.7 13.0 12.6 12.2 12.1 
Portugal 10.7 10.3 11.1 12.9 14.3  13.2 13.0 12.7 
Spain 14.4 15.6 16.2 16.6 16.1 16.8 16.0 16.6 
Italy 12.6 13.1 13.0 13.8 14.4 15.8 17.3 18.0 
Denmark 30.3 30.7 30.4 29.6 30.5 28.7 30.0 27.0 
Luxembourg 21.4 21.9 19.6 21.4 24.2 25.4 26.9 27.3 
Sweden N/A 40.4 38.7 38.4 38.3 37.5 33.3 28.4 
France 27.0 28.0 28.5 29.9 30.6 30.9 30.5 30.0 
Ireland 23.0 24.3 23.4 23.8 30.7 30.8 30.6 31.6 
Austria N/A 29.4 31.1 31.3 32.7 35.1 35.7 35.9 
Belgium 29.3 30.8 31.2 31.9 33.6 40.4  40.6  37.8 
Germany 36.7 36.9 36.1 37.6 38.7 39.3 40.2 41.5 
UK 45.3 44.7 44.9 44.2 43.9 43.4 43.3 42.9 
Netherlands 68.5 68.8 69.5 68.4 67.9 68.8 70.7 71.2 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; data sorted on 2001 values. 
 
Table A 4-2 Involuntary part-time share of total female part-time employment 
(age 25-59) (%) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Netherlands 3.4 4.7 3.8 3.6 3.7 2.9 3.1 1.8 
UK 10.5 10.4 9.4 9.2 8.4 7.3 6.8 6.5 
Luxembourg 8.8 7.1 N/A 7.4 7.1 8.8 6.2 7.3 
Austria N/A 5.5 8.8 8.0 12.5 8.5 8.0 9.0 
Ireland 20.1 19.3 18.6 16.1 19.6 14.1 12.0 10.5 
Germany 9.0 9.2 11.5 13.1 13.3 12.6 11.6 11.5 
Belgium 25.3 24.9 23.2 21.7 22.4 15.4 18.7 15.6 
Denmark 19.9 19.7 17.5 15.7 16.6 18.7 16.3 16.5 
France 34.5 33.6 34.2 37.1 23.7 22.5 21.7 21.1 
Spain 18.1 20.6 23.1 25.2 25.6 24.4 22.7 21.6 
Sweden N/A 27.8 30.3 31.0 30.1 29.4 24.6 26.5 
Portugal 24.3 29.9 29.9 29.3 31.2 33.6 35.2 27.1 
Italy 30.9 30.2 30.9 31.6 31.7 31.7 30.8 31.3 
Finland N/A 53.8 52.3 51.7 42.5 51.0 47.0 44.3 
Greece 35.7 33.6 35.2 39.4 45.1 44.4 45.1 50.8 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; data sorted on 2001 values. 
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Table A 4-3 Summary statistics – labour market activity by country (%) 
 Employed Full-time  Unemployed Inactive  
Women     N (ALL) 
Denmark 76.9 85.0 9.0 14.1 9,567 
Netherlands 53.8 56.7 14.2 32.0 22,129 
Belgium 56.3 76.2 12.1 31.6 10,199 
France 64.5 83.5 8.8 26.7 23,802 
Ireland 45.4 71.8 2.8 51.8 13,302 
Italy 47.6 87.5 7.2 45.2 32,950 
Greece 41.1 92.3 7.6 51.2 20,542 
Spain 40.2 86.2 11.0 48.8 27,467 
Portugal 65.9 93.1 6.3 27.7 20,232 
Austria 66.5 76.6 3.6 29.9 11,525 
Finland 74.4 93.4 10.5 15.1 11,428 
Germany  60.5 77.0 7.6 31.9 25,229 
UK  64.9 69.0 2.3 32.8 18,679 
Men     N (ALL) 
Denmark 87.5 98.1 5.6 6.9 9,139 
Netherlands 89.0 96.3 4.7 6.2 19,821 
Belgium 86.4 98.2 7.4 6.2 8,744 
France 87.0 97.6 6.9 6.1 20,676 
Ireland 79.9 94.2 14.0 6.1 12,646 
Italy 81.7 97.9 8.6 9.7 31,481 
Greece 86.8 97.5 5.9 7.3 19,193 
Spain 79.4 97.8 11.8 8.8 26,556 
Portugal 88.1 98.8 4.5 7.4 18,861 
Austria 91.1 98.5 3.8 5.0 11,028 
Finland 82.7 97.3 9.7 7.6 11,100 
Germany  84.1 98.3 7.6 8.3 24,372 
UK  86.1 97.9 4.4 9.5 15,543 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-4 Summary statistics – workplace characteristics by country (%) 
 Supervisor 
Intermediate 
supervisor 
Not a 
supervisor 
Public  
sector 
Temporary 
contract Log wage  
Women       N (ALL) 
Denmark 8.8 15.5 75.7 55.7 9.8 4.56 7,425 
Netherlands 6.0 12.6 81.4 33.6 12.4 3.07 12,130 
Belgium 6.4 14.8 78.8 36.5 14.1 5.88 6,094 
France 7.7 18.5 73.8 40.1 8.4 3.91 15,199 
Ireland 9.6 17.5 73.0 33.5 17.8 1.64 6,150 
Italy 4.3 14.2 81.5 35.6 10.9 2.47 14,926 
Greece 3.9 5.9 90.2 28.2 19.3 7.00 8,001 
Spain 4.7 15.3 80.0 26.6 33.8 6.64 11,134 
Portugal 3.0 7.2 89.8 22.4 16.8 6.18 12,312 
Austria 6.2 18.5 75.3 27.7 9.6 4.62 7,209 
Finland 8.2 17.5 74.3 48.2 15.3 3.95 8,929 
Germany  0.0 - - 35.0 9.9 2.84 15,661 
UK  19.1 16.9 64.1 35.8 5.3 1.70 12,235 
Men        
Denmark 21.1 14.3 64.6 25.0 9.4 4.68 8,064 
Netherlands 17.1 19.2 63.7 21.2 7.7 3.24 18,117 
Belgium 16.0 24.0 60.0 25.8 8.4 5.98 7,661 
France 18.4 23.9 57.6 25.8 6.7 4.05 18,117 
Ireland 18.3 17.2 64.5 25.8 8.3 1.85 10,614 
Italy 11.5 19.0 69.5 22.9 9.3 2.53 25,451 
Greece 8.7 9.4 81.9 23.1 18.2 7.11 16,582 
Spain 10.9 20.8 68.2 16.0 29.7 6.75 21,411 
Portugal 7.6 7.9 84.4 13.8 14.4 6.31 16,556 
Austria 14.0 30.4 55.6 22.1 8.1 4.85 9,985 
Finland 20.6 16.6 62.8 23.7 11.0 4.12 9,605 
Germany  0.0 - - 20.0 7.1 3.06 21,070 
UK  30.1 16.4 53.5 17.1 3.5 1.98 13,456 
Individual base weights used. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-5 Summary statistics – occupational categories by country (%) 
 ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9 N 
(EMPL) Women          
Denmark 3.6 15.6 27.8 20.7 19.8 1.0 1.3 3.8 6.2 7,425 
Netherlands 7.6 19.3 26.9 21.9 15.1 0.8 1.4 2.1 4.9 12,130 
Belgium 2.9 26.5 14.1 28.4 14.1 0.4 2.5 1.7 9.5 6,094 
France 3.6 8.9 23.4 28.2 18.2 1.1 1.9 5.1 9.5 15,199 
Ireland 5.6 19.8 11.1 23.3 20.9 1.1 2.1 7.7 8.3 6,150 
Italy 1.6 15.7 13.3 29.6 14.8 1.6 9.6 3.1 10.7 14,926 
Greece 9.3 20.9 9.9 21.2 13.8 5.5 7.7 2.4 9.2 8,001 
Spain 6.8 20.9 12.4 15.1 18.6 3.5 4.3 2.4 15.9 11,134 
Portugal 5.7 10.5 9.7 13.6 17.6 8.4 12.4 5.3 16.8 12,312 
Austria 3.9 5.8 16.6 25.0 23.7 6.6 4.0 1.9 12.3 7,209 
Finland 6.0 23.4 20.3 16.2 19.3 3.2 3.3 1.7 6.6 8,929 
Germany  3.4 13.1 33.3 19.1 16.0 1.0 5.0 3.4 5.7 15,661 
UK  13.1 14.4 15.6 25.4 20.3 0.2 1.6 3.6 5.8 12,235 
Men           
Denmark 10.2 19.3 17.0 5.9 5.5 2.5 18.9 12.7 7.9 8,064 
Netherlands 17.0 19.9 19.4 7.9 5.6 1.3 15.2 9.1 4.7 18,117 
Belgium 9.7 17.2 13.7 15.4 6.4 1.7 15.1 11.0 9.8 7,661 
France 7.6 11.4 19.5 7.8 5.8 3.1 22.6 16.8 5.6 18,117 
Ireland 13.8 12.5 9.9 7.0 6.9 9.9 16.6 13.1 10.3 10,614 
Italy 4.7 7.1 12.0 16.0 11.0 3.5 26.1 10.0 9.7 25,451 
Greece 13.1 14.1 5.6 9.1 8.2 10.6 23.0 12.0 4.3 16,582 
Spain 9.7 10.5 10.9 6.6 9.0 5.7 25.0 12.4 10.3 21,411 
Portugal 10.3 7.9 7.5 6.5 9.3 5.4 31.7 13.3 8.2 16,556 
Austria 10.3 4.8 16.1 8.7 9.9 6.9 26.0 10.9 6.4 9,985 
Finland 12.8 16.5 14.5 4.8 4.5 5.8 22.1 13.8 5.1 9,605 
Germany  7.5 16.0 16.8 6.4 5.5 1.5 29.0 11.3 6.0 21,070 
UK  22.0 14.8 10.9 7.9 5.8 1.6 19.7 12.2 5.1 13,456 
Individual base weights used.  
ISCO 1: legislators, senior officials and managers; ISCO 2 professionals; ISCO 3 technicians and 
associate professionals; ISCO 4 clerks; ISCO 5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers; 
ISCO 6 skilled agricultural and fishery workers; ISCO 7 craft and related trades workers; ISCO 8 
plant and machine operators and assemblers; ISCO 9 elementary occupations.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-6 Summary statistics – demographic characteristics by country (%) 
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Denmark 39.61 35.3 45.2 19.4 47.9 23.9 21.0 7.2 6.52 8.2 66.8 7,425 
Netherlands 39.22 11.8 30.7 57.5 52.6 16.5 22.4 8.5 7.53 4.7 69.1 12,130 
Belgium 39.62 35.5 33.3 31.2 47.7 22.1 21.2 9.0 7.15 5.7 72.1 6,094 
France 39.83 26.8 29.5 43.7 46.1 24.1 21.9 8.0 7.03 7.4 68.4 15,199 
Ireland 39.01 14.8 40.4 44.8 37.3 21.3 22.0 19.4 7.20 7.8 70.2 6,150 
Italy 39.25 9.3 40.4 50.3 52.5 25.3 17.3 5.0 7.70 5.1 74.4 14,926 
Greece 39.65 21.8 31.6 46.6 50.8 21.1 23.7 4.4 8.50 3.9 79.6 8,001 
Spain 38.87 23.7 17.4 58.9 49.1 23.9 21.6 5.5 7.79 5.3 71.4 11,134 
Portugal 39.24 11.3 12.6 76.1 45.5 28.1 20.3 6.1 8.05 4.8 75.1 12,312 
Austria 39.06 8.7 64.4 27.0 50.5 22.9 20.5 6.1 7.71 4.9 68.8 7,209 
Finland 40.66 40.6 38.9 20.4 50.2 20.6 19.9 9.3 7.18 6.6 62.2 8,929 
Germany  39.75 18.2 62.7 19.0 52.9 24.5 17.0 5.6 8.21 3.2 68.7 15,661 
UK  40.37 38.6 13.1 48.3 48.6 20.3 21.5 9.6 7.32 6.0 67.3 12,235 
Men             
Denmark 39.70 32.7 49.0 18.3 53.6 21.0 18.7 6.7 6.25 8.1 59.6 8,064 
Netherlands 39.11 13.9 31.3 54.8 57.7 13.9 20.6 7.8 7.13 4.8 63.6 18,117 
Belgium 39.29 37.0 35.3 27.7 53.5 19.8 19.1 7.6 6.63 6.2 66.6 7,661 
France 39.71 24.9 34.6 40.5 51.3 21.3 20.0 7.4 6.76 7.4 63.1 18,117 
Ireland 39.19 18.4 35.2 46.4 45.7 16.1 20.4 17.8 6.79 7.9 66.7 10,614 
Italy 39.20 10.6 39.5 49.9 56.2 22.6 16.2 4.9 7.41 5.1 66.7 25,451 
Greece 39.78 24.5 34.4 41.2 50.8 20.2 24.6 4.4 8.02 4.9 71.9 16,582 
Spain 38.71 24.7 19.2 56.1 53.6 20.7 20.7 5.1 7.51 5.0 65.4 21,411 
Portugal 38.97 9.5 12.4 78.2 49.2 26.0 19.3 5.5 7.70 5.2 72.6 16,556 
Austria 38.95 8.5 78.1 13.4 56.7 18.4 18.9 6.0 7.27 5.2 62.6 9,985 
Finland 40.62 29.2 46.6 24.2 55.4 17.9 17.8 8.9 6.95 6.5 57.3 9,605 
Germany  39.65 26.6 60.5 12.9 59.9 19.3 15.9 4.9 8.01 3.0 60.7 21,070 
UK  40.51 49.0 13.1 37.8 54.5 16.4 20.2 8.9 6.86 6.4 67.5 13,456 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-7 Full-time workers only – summary statistics (%) 
 Supervisor 
Intermediate 
supervisor Not a supervisor Log wage  
Women     N (ALL) 
Denmark 9.9 15.6 74.5 4.56 6,322 
Netherlands 9.0 15.8 75.2 3.10 6,548 
Belgium 7.9 16.7 75.4 5.88 4,606 
France 8.9 19.9 71.2 3.92 12,635 
Ireland 11.8 19.8 68.4 1.70 4,361 
Italy 4.7 15.0 80.2 2.45 13,025 
Greece 4.1 6.1 89.7 6.99 7,375 
Spain 5.4 16.8 77.7 6.67 9,635 
Portugal 3.1 7.5 89.4 6.18 11,298 
Austria 7.8 21.7 70.5 4.63 5,449 
Finland 8.6 17.7 73.7 3.95 8,315 
Germany  0.0 0.0 0.0 2.85 12,358 
UK  25.0 18.9 56.1 1.79 8,401 
Men      
Denmark 21.4 14.5 64.1 4.68 7,909 
Netherlands 17.6 19.3 63.1 3.24 17,457 
Belgium 16.2 24.1 59.8 5.97 7,523 
France 18.8 24.1 57.1 4.05 17,653 
Ireland 18.8 17.5 63.7 1.86 10,057 
Italy 11.6 19.1 69.2 2.53 24,889 
Greece 8.9 9.4 81.6 7.11 16,143 
Spain 11.1 21.1 67.8 6.75 21,018 
Portugal 7.7 8.0 84.3 6.31 16,365 
Austria 14.0 30.6 55.5 4.85 9,843 
Finland 21.0 16.8 62.2 4.13 9,384 
Germany  0.0 0.0 0.0 3.07 20,829 
UK  30.4 16.6 53.0 1.99 13,200 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-8 Full-time workers only – summary statistics (%) 
 ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9 N 
(EMPL) Women          
Denmark 4.1 17.2 28.4 20.2 18.4 0.8 1.4 4.3 5.3 6,322 
Netherlands 10.4 22.4 27.3 20.5 10.7 0.6 1.6 2.5 3.9 6,548 
Belgium 3.7 26.3 14.6 30.3 12.3 0.5 2.8 2.0 7.6 4,606 
France 4.1 8.6 24.7 28.6 17.8 1.2 2.0 5.7 7.3 12,635 
Ireland 7.2 21.7 12.4 23.7 16.8 1.3 2.2 8.8 5.9 4,361 
Italy 1.7 14.9 13.5 30.1 15.1 1.5 10.1 3.2 9.8 13,025 
Greece 9.9 19.1 10.2 22.1 14.3 5.2 7.9 2.6 8.7 7,375 
Spain 7.5 21.9 13.0 15.9 18.3 3.7 4.4 2.5 12.8 9,635 
Portugal 5.8 10.2 9.9 14.5 17.6 7.9 12.8 5.7 15.5 11,298 
Austria 4.8 6.3 18.1 24.8 22.1 8.2 4.1 2.1 9.4 5,449 
Finland 6.3 23.7 20.3 16.2 19.0 3.2 3.5 1.7 6.1 8,315 
Germany  4.2 13.6 33.3 18.7 14.5 1.2 5.9 3.9 4.6 12,358 
UK  17.1 16.8 16.9 24.3 15.0 0.2 1.9 4.1 3.7 8,401 
Men           
Denmark 10.4 19.3 17.0 5.8 5.4 2.5 19.1 12.9 7.6 7,909 
Netherlands 17.3 19.7 19.5 7.8 5.4 1.2 15.5 9.1 4.5 17,457 
Belgium 9.8 17.0 13.6 15.3 6.4 1.7 15.2 11.0 9.8 7,523 
France 7.7 11.0 19.5 7.8 5.8 3.0 22.8 17.0 5.4 17,653 
Ireland 14.5 12.7 10.2 7.2 7.0 9.8 16.8 13.5 8.3 10,057 
Italy 4.7 6.7 12.0 16.1 11.0 3.5 26.3 10.1 9.5 24,889 
Greece 13.4 13.4 5.6 9.2 8.3 10.4 23.2 12.2 4.3 16,143 
Spain 9.8 10.3 10.9 6.4 8.9 5.6 25.3 12.5 10.2 21,018 
Portugal 10.3 7.6 7.5 6.5 9.4 5.3 31.8 13.4 8.1 16,365 
Austria 10.3 4.6 16.1 8.6 9.8 7.0 26.1 11.0 6.5 9,843 
Finland 13.1 16.5 14.1 4.6 4.2 5.9 22.4 14.1 4.9 9,384 
Germany  7.6 15.6 16.8 6.4 5.3 1.5 29.4 11.3 6.0 20,829 
UK  22.2 14.7 10.8 7.7 5.6 1.6 20.0 12.4 5.0 13,200 
Individual base weights used.  
ISCO 1: legislators, senior officials and managers; ISCO 2 professionals; ISCO 3 technicians and 
associate professionals; ISCO 4 clerks; ISCO 5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers; 
ISCO 6 skilled agricultural and fishery workers; ISCO 7 craft and related trades workers; ISCO 8 
plant and machine operators and assemblers; ISCO 9 elementary occupations.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-9 Full-time workers only – summary statistics (%) 
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Denmark 39.50 40.8 45.7 13.5 45.7 25.7 22.0 6.7 6.73 7.4 68.3 6,322 
Netherlands 36.17 18.2 26.9 54.8 81.3 9.3 7.4 2.0 8.56 2.3 43.7 6,548 
Belgium 37.29 54.0 30.7 15.3 51.0 22.7 20.5 5.9 6.81 6.3 63.0 4,606 
France 39.42 33.9 32.0 34.1 48.8 27.3 20.0 3.9 7.47 6.0 62.8 12,635 
Ireland 36.00 29.4 48.5 22.2 58.1 18.7 15.5 7.7 6.73 7.0 52.7 4,361 
Italy 38.43 14.1 51.2 34.7 56.0 25.9 15.0 3.1 7.78 4.8 67.8 13,025 
Greece 38.08 36.4 34.6 29.1 52.6 21.7 22.4 3.3 8.60 3.7 69.1 7,375 
Spain 37.55 41.4 21.1 37.5 57.2 21.4 17.5 3.9 7.98 4.0 59.0 9,635 
Portugal 37.86 15.6 14.8 69.6 43.5 30.1 21.4 5.0 7.96 5.0 73.0 11,298 
Austria 38.18 11.2 66.9 21.9 61.3 21.0 14.0 3.6 8.08 5.5 57.5 5,449 
Finland 41.29 45.4 36.3 18.2 51.0 21.1 19.6 8.3 7.81 4.5 63.5 8,315 
Germany  38.65 23.7 62.0 14.3 66.4 21.8 9.7 2.0 8.91 3.5 55.4 12,358 
UK  39.88 48.7 13.4 38.0 65.0 18.1 13.3 3.6 8.69 3.3 60.4 8,401 
Men             
Denmark 40.05 34.4 49.1 16.5 51.0 21.8 20.1 7.0 6.34 8.1 63.6 7,909 
Netherlands 38.97 14.6 31.6 53.8 55.5 14.4 21.7 8.4 7.04 5.2 66.4 17,457 
Belgium 38.96 39.4 36.0 24.6 51.2 21.2 20.0 7.6 6.60 6.5 69.1 7,523 
France 39.82 25.3 36.0 38.6 48.0 22.8 21.7 7.6 6.77 7.8 67.0 17,653 
Ireland 39.12 22.5 40.3 37.2 42.9 17.1 22.2 17.8 6.73 8.6 71.1 10,057 
Italy 39.69 11.0 40.0 48.9 50.8 25.5 18.3 5.5 7.33 5.8 72.9 24,889 
Greece 40.19 25.3 34.3 40.4 46.7 21.5 27.0 4.8 7.93 5.4 76.4 16,143 
Spain 39.16 26.4 19.2 54.4 48.9 22.6 23.2 5.3 7.48 5.6 71.4 21,018 
Portugal 38.98 10.1 12.2 77.7 45.3 27.9 21.1 5.7 7.68 5.5 76.5 16,365 
Austria 38.93 8.7 78.8 12.5 54.6 19.0 20.1 6.3 7.29 5.4 64.6 9,843 
Finland 40.61 32.1 46.9 21.0 50.7 19.4 19.9 10.0 6.98 7.0 62.7 9,384 
Germany  39.77 28.9 60.2 10.8 56.4 21.2 17.4 5.0 8.04 3.3 64.8 20,829 
UK  40.28 51.0 13.3 35.6 53.4 17.0 21.2 8.4 6.87 6.4 69.3 13,200 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-10 Part-time workers only – summary statistics (%) 
 Supervisor 
Intermediate 
supervisor Not a supervisor Log wage  
Women     N (ALL) 
Denmark 2.6 14.8 82.6 4.54 1,103 
Netherlands 2.2 8.4 89.4 3.05 5,582 
Belgium 1.9 8.9 89.2 5.87 1,488 
France 1.8 11.4 86.8 3.89 2,564 
Ireland 3.3 11.1 85.6 1.49 1,789 
Italy 1.6 8.5 89.9 2.57 1,901 
Greece 0.9 3.2 95.9 7.08 626 
Spain 0.5 6.1 93.4 6.50 1,499 
Portugal 0.4 2.9 96.7 6.14 1,014 
Austria 1.6 9.1 89.3 4.58 1,760 
Finland 2.3 14.4 83.3 3.90 614 
Germany  0.0 0.0 0.0 2.84 3,303 
UK  6.0 12.3 81.7 1.52 3,834 
Men      
Denmark 1.9 7.7 90.4 4.48 155 
Netherlands 4.8 14.3 80.9 3.23 660 
Belgium 7.1 19.7 73.2 6.11 138 
France 4.2 15.6 80.1 4.22 464 
Ireland 2.5 6.1 91.5 1.61 557 
Italy 4.9 11.9 83.3 2.71 562 
Greece 2.3 6.5 91.2 7.24 439 
Spain 3.8 9.0 87.1 6.79 393 
Portugal 0.5 3.4 96.0 6.54 191 
Austria 16.6 20.8 62.6 4.96 142 
Finland 6.2 7.1 86.5 3.83 221 
Germany  0.0 0.0 0.0 2.94 241 
UK  9.0 3.2 87.8 1.71 256 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-11 Part-time workers only – summary statistics (%) 
 ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9 N 
(EMPL) Women          
Denmark 1.2 6.9 24.6 23.5 28.0 2.2 1.0 1.2 11.5 1,103 
Netherlands 4.0 15.2 26.3 23.7 20.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 6.1 5,582 
Belgium 0.4 27.1 12.7 22.3 19.7 0.0 1.4 0.9 15.5 1,488 
France 1.0 10.5 16.9 26.2 20.5 1.0 1.3 1.9 20.7 2,564 
Ireland 1.5 15.0 7.6 22.5 31.5 0.8 1.8 4.8 14.5 1,789 
Italy 0.4 21.6 12.1 26.0 12.8 2.2 5.8 2.4 16.8 1,901 
Greece 2.1 43.3 6.0 11.0 7.8 8.5 5.2 0.5 15.6 626 
Spain 2.6 14.6 8.9 10.0 20.3 2.1 3.7 2.2 35.5 1,499 
Portugal 4.3 14.5 6.7 1.6 17.6 14.4 6.7 0.1 34.0 1,014 
Austria 1.0 4.2 11.7 25.8 28.8 1.6 3.7 1.3 21.8 1,760 
Finland 0.9 19.2 20.7 15.6 23.6 3.4 0.9 1.2 14.6 614 
Germany  0.8 11.3 33.3 20.5 20.9 0.5 1.9 1.5 9.4 3,303 
UK  4.2 8.9 12.6 27.9 32.1 0.1 1.0 2.6 10.5 3,834 
Men           
Denmark 2.0 21.1 18.0 7.8 10.9 4.9 8.6 4.8 21.9 155 
Netherlands 8.5 26.1 18.2 8.1 10.2 1.9 7.8 8.6 10.9 660 
Belgium 0.8 29.3 16.6 18.3 7.4 0.6 11.8 7.3 7.8 138 
France 1.7 29.8 17.0 5.9 5.6 7.7 11.8 8.5 12.0 464 
Ireland 2.3 9.9 5.1 4.8 4.9 11.7 12.5 6.6 42.2 557 
Italy 0.9 25.6 10.9 10.6 10.7 3.4 16.1 3.9 18.0 562 
Greece 2.8 41.9 5.8 3.6 4.0 16.3 17.8 2.6 5.3 439 
Spain 4.9 17.8 9.9 18.5 10.8 8.4 11.3 5.3 13.1 393 
Portugal 7.2 27.5 5.7 0.6 2.0 13.3 25.1 2.5 16.1 191 
Austria 10.5 16.8 18.6 15.4 16.1 0.5 15.6 4.0 2.5 142 
Finland 2.6 15.8 26.7 13.7 12.2 2.8 10.8 3.8 11.4 221 
Germany  4.1 33.9 18.5 6.7 18.0 2.2 4.7 7.0 4.9 241 
UK  13.4 18.1 13.7 15.9 12.0 1.9 7.6 5.3 12.2 256 
Individual base weights used.  
ISCO 1: legislators, senior officials and managers; ISCO 2 professionals; ISCO 3 technicians and 
associate professionals; ISCO 4 clerks; ISCO 5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers; 
ISCO 6 skilled agricultural and fishery workers; ISCO 7 craft and related trades workers; ISCO 8 
plant and machine operators and assemblers; ISCO 9 elementary occupations.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-12 Part-time workers only – summary statistics (%) 
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Denmark 42.39 32.9 46.5 20.6 48.4 20.2 21.1 10.2 7.44 4.2 82.7 1,103 
Netherlands 39.56 13.8 28.7 57.5 39.9 21.9 29.8 8.3 7.27 6.9 76.6 5,582 
Belgium 38.56 41.2 33.9 24.9 31.9 26.0 29.6 12.5 6.94 8.1 81.0 1,488 
France 40.10 26.5 28.5 45.0 41.7 23.2 27.6 7.6 7.15 7.0 74.8 2,564 
Ireland 39.56 14.5 45.5 40.0 25.2 26.1 29.0 19.7 7.26 8.4 77.0 1,789 
Italy 38.64 17.6 46.9 35.4 41.6 34.2 19.7 4.4 7.57 5.5 77.6 1,901 
Greece 38.45 49.5 22.1 28.3 44.9 26.0 26.1 2.9 7.45 5.6 73.9 626 
Spain 36.78 29.9 18.1 52.0 48.8 25.5 20.7 4.9 7.80 5.1 64.0 1,499 
Portugal 41.34 16.7 7.0 76.3 48.6 27.3 18.6 5.5 8.35 4.6 78.6 1,014 
Austria 38.62 9.0 64.0 27.0 30.7 31.7 31.7 6.0 7.97 4.7 79.7 1,760 
Finland 39.92 36.6 44.6 18.8 47.5 17.5 21.6 13.4 7.35 5.0 70.4 614 
Germany  41.45 19.6 66.1 14.4 38.0 34.3 22.0 5.7 9.22 0.8 85.5 3,303 
UK  41.42 35.0 13.1 51.9 35.0 23.5 31.8 9.8 7.56 5.6 81.2 3,834 
Men             
Denmark 36.93 41.0 46.3 12.7 64.0 13.3 15.0 7.8 5.75 10.1 40.2 155 
Netherlands 40.46 14.2 26.5 59.3 57.7 15.4 21.3 5.6 8.36 3.8 54.7 660 
Belgium 39.73 49.5 33.3 17.2 62.1 11.5 19.9 6.6 6.17 4.7 48.0 138 
France 40.48 36.2 26.8 37.0 56.7 16.8 17.0 9.6 6.60 7.2 51.7 464 
Ireland 40.74 13.1 26.5 60.4 52.6 14.6 17.9 14.9 6.68 5.0 58.0 557 
Italy 39.32 26.5 33.1 40.5 55.8 21.8 18.0 4.5 7.48 6.2 63.9 562 
Greece 40.21 44.2 14.5 41.3 55.0 17.7 24.3 3.1 8.51 3.5 67.2 439 
Spain 36.22 39.5 20.6 39.9 65.7 15.0 14.6 4.7 6.32 5.3 48.2 393 
Portugal 40.58 22.4 15.7 61.9 56.6 18.9 15.6 8.9 7.05 7.2 58.4 191 
Austria 37.28 22.8 74.1 3.1 63.7 15.5 12.2 8.6 6.36 5.5 46.2 142 
Finland 39.41 27.8 45.6 26.6 70.6 9.6 16.7 3.0 6.28 4.8 41.9 221 
Germany  38.10 34.0 49.7 16.4 80.6 5.8 7.6 6.0 6.62 1.8 35.2 241 
UK  40.53 56.1 10.3 33.6 67.2 14.0 11.7 7.2 6.33 9.6 48.5 256 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-13 Labour market transition patterns among women in Denmark 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 91.3 3.6 2.8 2.3 100.0 
Column % 82.3 19.1 18.0 9.4 58.9 
Part-time 
     
Row % 14.4 77.6 0.0 8.0 100.0 
Column % 1.4 45.2 0.0 3.6 6.5 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 38.3 13.5 32.1 16.2 100.0 
Column % 8.8 18.1 52.1 16.8 14.9 
Inactive      
Row % 24.8 9.9 13.9 51.3 100.0 
Column % 7.5 17.6 29.9 70.3 19.7 
Total % 65.3 11.1 9.2 14.4 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 90.7 3.6 3.3 2.4 100.0 
Column % 89.3 20.2 28.2 11.8 66.0 
Part-time      
Row % 20.5 68.1 6.2 5.2 100.0 
Column % 3.7 68.4 9.6 4.7 12.0 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 27.8 8.7 41.2 22.3 100.0 
Column % 3.7 6.4 47.3 14.6 8.8 
Inactive 
     
Row % 17.0 4.5 8.6 69.9 100.0 
Column % 3.4 5.0 14.9 69.0 13.3 
Total % 67.0 11.9 7.7 13.5 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table A 4-14  Labour market transition patterns among women in the 
Netherlands 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 49.6 35.5 3.8 11.2 100.0 
Column % 74.7 14.0 3.7 4.6 15.0 
Part-time 
     
Row % 5.6 85.1 2.1 7.2 100.0 
Column % 19.0 75.7 4.6 6.7 33.9 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 1.4 9.1 46.7 42.8 100.0 
Column % 1.9 3.1 39.6 15.4 13.1 
Inactive 
     
Row % 1.1 7.2 21.3 70.4 100.0 
Column % 4.4 7.2 52.2 73.3 37.9 
Total % 10.0 38.1 15.5 36.5 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 85.3 9.9 2.0 2.8 100.0 
Column % 84.3 12.4 4.7 2.8 31.0 
Part-time 
     
Row % 12.9 77.9 2.8 6.4 100.0 
Column % 9.4 72.0 4.8 4.8 22.8 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 6.0 9.4 49.7 34.9 100.0 
Column % 2.8 5.6 55.4 16.8 14.8 
Inactive 
     
Row % 3.5 7.9 14.8 73.9 100.0 
Column % 3.5 10.0 35.1 75.6 31.4 
Total % 31.4 24.7 13.2 30.7 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-15 Labour market transition patterns among women in Belgium 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 85.7 11.2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Column % 88.2 25.0 5.6 4.0 48.1 
Part-time 
     
Row % 19.1 71.1 2.7 7.1 100.0 
Column % 7.6 61.2 3.8 7.2 18.6 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 4.4 8.8 66.3 20.5 100.0 
Column % 1.4 6.1 76.5 16.8 15.1 
Inactive      
Row % 7.0 9.3 10.2 73.5 100.0 
Column % 2.7 7.8 14.1 72.0 18.1 
Total % 46.8 21.6 13.1 18.5 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 90.0 5.7 2.1 2.2 100.0 
Column % 89.6 17.8 7.7 2.9 42.3 
Part-time      
Row % 16.3 74.2 4.8 4.6 100.0 
Column % 5.0 70.6 5.4 1.8 12.9 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 9.0 5.9 70.8 14.4 100.0 
Column % 2.6 5.3 75.7 5.5 12.3 
Inactive 
     
Row % 3.8 2.7 4.0 89.6 100.0 
Column % 2.9 6.3 11.2 89.8 32.5 
Total % 42.5 13.6 11.5 32.4 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table A 4-16 Labour market transition patterns among women in France 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 80.8 7.0 2.0 10.3 100.0 
Column % 84.1 28.3 11.9 11.2 43.6 
Part-time 
     
Row % 21.9 62.6 1.1 14.4 100.0 
Column % 5.2 57.6 1.5 3.6 9.9 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 15.9 4.6 53.4 26.1 100.0 
Column % 3.9 4.4 74.4 6.7 10.2 
Inactive 
     
Row % 7.9 2.9 2.5 86.7 100.0 
Column % 6.9 9.8 12.2 78.6 36.3 
Total % 41.9 10.7 7.4 40.1 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 90.7 4.1 2.4 2.8 100.0 
Column % 89.4 21.5 16.4 6.1 55.3 
Part-time      
Row % 26.6 61.2 5.9 6.2 100.0 
Column % 5.2 63.7 7.9 2.7 10.9 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 16.1 7.3 63.8 12.8 100.0 
Column % 2.5 6.0 66.6 4.3 8.5 
Inactive 
     
Row % 6.6 3.6 3.0 86.8 100.0 
Column % 3.0 8.8 9.2 86.9 25.3 
Total % 56.1 10.4 8.2 25.3 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-17 Labour market transition patterns among women in Ireland 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 77.1 14.0 2.6 6.3 100.0 
Column % 85.6 23.6 36.1 3.4 29.1 
Part-time 
     
Row % 8.1 69.7 6.0 16.2 100.0 
Column % 4.3 56.6 40.4 4.2 14.0 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 0.0 13.9 19.8 66.4 100.0 
Column % 0.0 1.5 18.0 2.3 1.9 
Inactive      
Row % 4.8 5.7 0.2 89.3 100.0 
Column % 10.0 18.3 5.6 90.1 55.0 
Total % 26.2 17.2 2.1 54.5 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 86.3 6.8 1.9 4.9 100.0 
Column % 83.5 15.5 25.2 3.1 32.0 
Part-time      
Row % 21.5 62.4 2.1 14.0 100.0 
Column % 8.4 57.4 11.3 3.6 13.0 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 23.6 11.2 40.0 25.2 100.0 
Column % 1.9 2.1 43.0 1.3 2.6 
Inactive 
     
Row % 3.9 6.7 1.0 88.4 100.0 
Column % 6.2 25.0 20.5 92.0 52.4 
Total % 33.1 14.1 2.4 50.4 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table A 4-18 Labour market transition patterns among women in Italy 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 85.8 7.8 2.3 4.1 100.0 
Column % 83.2 39.7 16.7 3.3 38.3 
Part-time 
     
Row % 37.5 51.3 0.3 10.8 100.0 
Column % 6.1 43.8 0.4 1.5 6.4 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 18.4 3.1 39.4 39.1 100.0 
Column % 2.5 2.1 40.1 4.3 5.3 
Inactive 
     
Row % 6.5 2.2 4.4 86.9 100.0 
Column % 8.2 14.4 42.8 91.0 50.0 
Total % 39.5 7.5 5.2 47.8 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 90.4 3.8 1.8 4.1 100.0 
Column % 86.2 29.7 11.0 3.8 41.6 
Part-time      
Row % 40.9 48.2 2.4 8.4 100.0 
Column % 5.7 54.2 2.2 1.2 6.0 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 15.7 3.3 52.7 28.2 100.0 
Column % 2.7 4.7 59.9 4.8 7.6 
Inactive 
     
Row % 5.2 1.4 4.0 89.4 100.0 
Column % 5.4 11.5 27.0 90.3 44.8 
Total % 43.6 5.4 6.7 44.4 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-19 Labour market transition patterns among women in Greece 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 88.0 3.2 2.1 6.7 100.0 
Column % 81.8 28.3 14.7 4.5 35.3 
Part-time 
     
Row % 55.8 37.7 0.0 6.6 100.0 
Column % 7.0 45.3 0.0 0.6 4.8 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 19.3 7.0 40.4 33.3 100.0 
Column % 3.2 11.1 50.0 3.9 6.3 
Inactive      
Row % 5.7 1.1 3.4 89.9 100.0 
Column % 8.0 15.4 35.4 91.0 53.6 
Total % 38.0 4.0 5.1 53.0 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 88.53 2.62 3.29 5.56 100 
Column % 84.88 35.94 18.13 4.03 37.37 
Part-time      
Row % 48.48 34.04 3.61 13.87 100 
Column % 3.93 39.47 1.68 0.85 3.16 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 19.82 2.18 45.92 32.07 100 
Column % 4.03 6.36 53.68 4.94 7.93 
Inactive 
     
Row % 5.41 0.96 3.49 90.14 100 
Column % 7.16 18.23 26.5 90.18 51.54 
Total % 38.98 2.72 6.78 51.52 100 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table A 4-20 Labour market transition patterns among women in Spain 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 86.3 6.3 5.1 2.4 100.0 
Column % 73.7 27.6 10.4 1.1 24.2 
Part-time 
     
Row % 27.1 53.2 5.7 14.0 100.0 
Column % 4.9 49.2 2.4 1.3 5.1 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 21.6 0.6 42.8 35.0 100.0 
Column % 9.4 1.3 44.8 8.0 12.4 
Inactive 
     
Row % 5.8 2.1 8.6 83.6 100.0 
Column % 11.9 21.9 42.4 89.7 58.3 
Total % 28.3 5.5 11.8 54.4 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 86.3 3.2 5.0 5.5 100.0 
Column % 81.8 19.4 16.6 3.9 34.3 
Part-time      
Row % 28.5 47.8 8.5 15.2 100.0 
Column % 4.3 46.0 4.6 1.7 5.5 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 18.7 4.7 45.0 31.6 100.0 
Column % 5.8 9.2 49.3 7.4 11.2 
Inactive 
     
Row % 6.0 3.0 6.2 84.9 100.0 
Column % 8.1 25.4 29.6 86.9 49.0 
Total % 36.2 5.7 10.2 47.9 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-21 Labour market transition patterns among women in Portugal 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time      
Row % 91.0 2.6 5.0 1.3 100.0 
Column % 91.7 27.3 35.2 3.9 63.9 
Part-time 
     
Row % 16.3 60.0 16.1 7.6 100.0 
Column % 1.0 39.3 7.1 1.5 4.0 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 18.9 12.0 50.0 19.1 100.0 
Column % 2.4 15.7 44.2 7.3 8.1 
Inactive      
Row % 12.7 4.6 5.1 77.6 100.0 
Column % 4.8 17.8 13.5 87.4 24.0 
Total % 63.4 6.2 9.1 21.3 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 91.2 1.7 3.4 3.7 100.0 
Column % 89.5 23.9 35.7 8.3 61.2 
Part-time      
Row % 32.2 52.1 2.4 13.3 100.0 
Column % 2.4 53.5 1.9 2.2 4.6 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 35.0 1.8 43.9 19.4 100.0 
Column % 3.6 2.6 48.3 4.5 6.3 
Inactive 
     
Row % 10.1 3.2 2.9 83.8 100.0 
Column % 4.5 20.1 14.1 85.1 27.9 
Total % 62.3 4.5 5.7 27.5 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table A 4-22 Labour market transition patterns among women in Germany 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 60.0 13.0 0.8 26.3 100.0 
Column % 90.6 61.2 15.1 25.0 50.7 
Part-time 
     
Row % 29.4 70.0 0.0 0.6 100.0 
Column % 3.2 24.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 1.4 11.9 49.1 37.6 100.0 
Column % 0.1 1.5 26.2 1.0 1.3 
Inactive 
     
Row % 4.7 3.2 3.3 88.8 100.0 
Column % 6.1 13.3 58.8 74.0 44.3 
Total % 33.6 10.7 2.5 53.2 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 88.3 4.1 4.0 3.7 100.0 
Column % 85.8 12.9 26.0 5.7 46.7 
Part-time      
Row % 19.0 68.5 2.5 10.0 100.0 
Column % 5.8 67.3 5.1 4.9 14.6 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 24.6 6.6 47.8 20.9 100.0 
Column % 4.0 3.5 52.1 5.5 7.8 
Inactive 
     
Row % 6.8 8.0 4.0 81.3 100.0 
Column % 4.4 16.4 16.9 83.9 30.8 
Total % 48.1 14.9 7.2 29.8 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
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Table A 4-23  Labour market transition patterns among women in the UK 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 70.8 15.6 2.1 11.5 100.0 
Column % 79.0 16.1 42.0 5.3 24.6 
Part-time 
     
Row % 14.3 65.9 1.6 18.2 100.0 
Column % 11.9 50.8 24.1 6.3 18.4 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 5.5 12.6 5.3 76.6 100.0 
Column % 0.5 1.0 8.2 2.8 1.9 
Inactive      
Row % 3.5 13.9 0.6 82.1 100.0 
Column % 8.6 32.1 25.8 85.6 55.1 
Total % 22.1 23.8 1.2 52.9 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 88.2 6.2 1.2 4.4 100.0 
Column % 88.2 14.0 25.7 6.6 46.4 
Part-time      
Row % 16.0 70.2 1.2 12.7 100.0 
Column % 7.0 69.1 11.5 8.3 20.2 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 19.6 14.8 23.3 42.3 100.0 
Column % 1.0 1.7 25.1 3.2 2.3 
Inactive 
     
Row % 5.9 10.1 2.6 81.5 100.0 
Column % 3.9 15.2 37.7 81.9 31.1 
Total % 46.5 20.5 2.1 30.9 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1994-2001. 
 
Table A 4-24  Labour market transition patterns among women in Austria 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 61.5 13.0 3.7 21.8 100.0 
Column % 85.8 43.2 57.6 35.1 58.7 
Part-time 
     
Row % 14.2 57.3 1.8 26.7 100.0 
Column % 5.1 48.6 7.2 11.0 15.1 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 13.5 0.0 86.5 0.0 100.0 
Column % 0.1 0.0 7.3 0.0 0.3 
Inactive 
     
Row % 14.7 5.6 4.0 75.6 100.0 
Column % 9.0 8.2 27.9 53.8 25.9 
Total % 42.1 17.7 3.8 36.4 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 90.8 3.9 2.7 2.5 100.0 
Column % 89.1 12.2 39.1 4.4 50.6 
Part-time 
     
Row % 17.7 75.7 1.7 4.9 100.0 
Column % 5.5 73.9 7.7 2.7 15.9 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 23.5 11.5 39.2 25.8 100.0 
Column % 1.6 2.6 39.9 3.3 3.6 
Inactive 
     
Row % 6.6 6.2 1.6 85.6 100.0 
Column % 3.9 11.4 13.3 89.6 30.0 
Total % 51.6 16.3 3.5 28.6 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1995-2001. 
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Table A 4-25 Labour market transition patterns among women in Finland 
 Year t+1 
 Total % 
 Those who gave birth in Year t 
 
Year t Full-time Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 78.7 3.9 3.8 13.7 100.0 
Column % 74.4 38.4 37.7 17.2 48.7 
Part-time 
     
Row % 58.1 29.9 0.0 12.1 100.0 
Column % 4.3 23.3 0.0 1.2 3.8 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 47.8 2.2 8.2 41.9 100.0 
Column % 3.8 1.8 6.7 4.4 4.0 
Inactive      
Row % 20.8 4.1 6.3 68.9 100.0 
Column % 17.5 36.5 55.6 77.3 43.5 
Total % 51.5 4.9 4.9 38.7 100.0 
 
Those who did not give birth in Year t 
 
Full-time 
     
Row % 91.2 2.6 3.6 2.6 100.0 
Column % 89.1 35.0 26.4 15.7 71.3 
Part-time      
Row % 44.9 39.7 7.4 8.0 100.0 
Column % 3.2 38.9 4.0 3.5 5.2 
Unemployed 
     
Row % 29.9 6.9 50.8 12.4 100.0 
Column % 4.5 14.3 57.6 11.4 11.0 
Inactive 
     
Row % 18.5 5.0 9.4 67.1 100.0 
Column % 3.2 11.7 12.0 69.5 12.4 
Total % 72.9 5.3 9.7 12.0 100.0 
Individual base weights used.  
Source: ECHP 1996-2001. 
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Table A 4-26 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (DK) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.82*** 4.04*** 1.76** 1.55* 3.08*** 0.88 
 (0.38) (0.93) (0.49) (0.39) (0.93) (0.28) 
4-8 1.54* 1.92** 1.51 1.03 2.39*** 1.19 
 (0.38) (0.55) (0.50) (0.35) (0.78) (0.43) 
New birth 1.29 1.27 0.97 1.57 1.62 0.64 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.40) (0.64) (0.76) (0.33) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.52 0.84 1.17 1.36 0.72 1.66 
 (0.57) (0.33) (0.54) (0.62) (0.36) (0.79) 
5-10 1.27 0.90 1.53 1.13 0.85 1.55 
 (0.42) (0.30) (0.64) (0.45) (0.33) (0.68) 
Age 1.44*** 1.02 0.74** 1.33** 1.07 0.89 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.09) (0.18) (0.14) (0.12) 
Age squared 1.00*** 1.00 1.00** 1.00* 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.52** 0.96 0.85 1.19 0.88 0.77 
 (0.31) (0.19) (0.20) (0.28) (0.20) (0.18) 
Public sector 0.84 0.74 1.53 0.74 0.63* 0.94 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.45) (0.17) (0.16) (0.25) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.75* 0.36*** 0.63 1.54 0.53* 0.56 
 (0.57) (0.11) (0.20) (0.59) (0.19) (0.21) 
ISCED 3 1.24 0.47*** 0.74 1.12 0.58* 0.60* 
 (0.35) (0.12) (0.20) (0.36) (0.17) (0.18) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 0.60 1.02 1.01 0.60 1.16 1.02 
 (0.19) (0.28) (0.37) (0.23) (0.38) (0.41) 
Two 0.70 0.76 0.69 0.78 0.79 0.71 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.34) 
Three or more 0.86 0.41* 0.26* 0.87 0.53 0.26* 
 (0.36) (0.21) (0.20) (0.41) (0.29) (0.20) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.37 0.61 1.48 0.48 0.16** 2.42 
 (0.25) (0.35) (0.83) (0.42) (0.14) (1.44) 
Professionals 0.44** 0.62 0.63 0.81 0.56 1.07 
 (0.17) (0.28) (0.30) (0.40) (0.28) (0.54) 
Assc. professionals 0.53* 0.49** 0.61 0.82 0.48* 0.70 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.22) (0.40) (0.19) (0.29) 
Clerks 0.73 1.04 0.60 0.98 0.89 0.90 
 (0.25) (0.33) (0.25) (0.45) (0.34) (0.42) 
Service/sales 1.88* 1.13 1.54 2.97** 1.18 1.98* 
 (0.63) (0.34) (0.53) (1.29) (0.41) (0.76) 
Skilled agr./craft 1.99 0.65 2.83 2.05 0.95 1.33 
 (0.99) (0.42) (2.02) (1.29) (0.64) (1.08) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    2.26 2.10 2.46 
    (2.45) (1.48) (1.40) 
Unemployed/inactive    0.71 3.90** 6.69*** 
    (0.77) (2.59) (3.84) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7748 0.7937 
Log pseudolikelihood -1957.8283   -1448.9336   
N 6,271 5,067 
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Table A 4-27 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (NL) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 0.95 3.87*** 1.45 0.66** 3.77*** 1.45 
 (0.14) (1.35) (0.38) (0.12) (1.55) (0.46) 
4-8 1.09 1.59 0.76 1.04 1.36 0.79 
 (0.15) (0.53) (0.20) (0.15) (0.56) (0.24) 
New birth 2.63*** 1.49 2.40* 4.16*** 1.14 3.05* 
 (0.74) (0.94) (1.23) (1.42) (0.91) (1.78) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 2.36*** 3.43** 4.16** 1.63 3.68* 3.41* 
 (0.73) (1.99) (2.31) (0.56) (2.54) (2.27) 
5-10 1.61* 1.92 3.36** 1.25 1.98 2.64 
 (0.44) (0.95) (1.78) (0.39) (1.08) (1.68) 
Age 1.16** 1.39* 0.81* 0.96 1.25 0.81 
 (0.08) (0.24) (0.10) (0.09) (0.25) (0.13) 
Age squared 1.00** 1.00* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 2.73*** 1.53 3.41*** 2.50*** 1.29 2.86*** 
 (0.34) (0.45) (0.82) (0.34) (0.47) (0.80) 
Public sector 1.30** 0.78 0.44*** 1.40** 1.04 0.49** 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.12) (0.18) (0.34) (0.15) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.48** 1.20 1.39 1.92*** 1.16 1.55 
 (0.23) (0.54) (0.46) (0.36) (0.67) (0.59) 
ISCED 3 1.43*** 2.10*** 1.63* 2.10*** 2.03** 1.54 
 (0.19) (0.54) (0.42) (0.33) (0.67) (0.47) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 1.14 0.99 0.75 1.05 1.21 0.97 
 (0.27) (0.45) (0.31) (0.29) (0.58) (0.45) 
Two 0.73 0.43* 0.80 0.64 0.40* 0.80 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.46) (0.19) (0.22) (0.54) 
Three or more 0.84 0.62 0.85 0.97 0.89 1.00 
 (0.32) (0.46) (0.57) (0.44) (0.68) (0.77) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.50** 0.29** 0.73 0.51** 0.24** 1.13 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.33) (0.15) (0.16) (0.63) 
Professionals 0.76 0.39* 0.59 0.61* 0.31* 0.75 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.26) (0.17) (0.21) (0.42) 
Assc. professionals 1.13 0.43* 0.46* 1.05 0.36* 0.89 
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) (0.45) 
Clerks 0.66* 0.66 0.59 0.65 0.61 1.06 
 (0.16) (0.31) (0.24) (0.17) (0.34) (0.55) 
Service/sales 1.04 0.74 1.24 1.03 0.78 2.06 
 (0.26) (0.37) (0.50) (0.27) (0.44) (1.08) 
Skilled agr./craft 1.33 2.32 2.85** 1.21 2.42 4.77*** 
 (0.54) (1.35) (1.45) (0.58) (1.59) (2.79) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    20.57*** 0.82 17.81*** 
    (10.37) (0.83) (11.47) 
Unemployed/inactive    12.56*** 0.96 29.26*** 
    (7.04) (0.95) (21.55) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7126 0.7335 
Log pseudolikelihood -2537.909 -1847.5255 
N 6,369 5,001 
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Table A 4-28 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (BE) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.38 4.05*** 2.44*** 0.85 5.08*** 2.20** 
 (0.36) (1.21) (0.71) (0.25) (1.98) (0.76) 
4-8 1.43 2.74*** 0.92 1.27 2.56** 1.05 
 (0.35) (0.81) (0.35) (0.33) (0.98) (0.45) 
New birth 1.92** 1.12 1.90 1.60 1.18 1.14 
 (0.60) (0.70) (1.15) (0.64) (1.11) (0.99) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.14 1.51 0.99 1.17 1.79 0.96 
 (0.36) (0.80) (0.66) (0.43) (1.23) (0.77) 
5-10 1.15 2.15 1.53 1.34 2.52* 1.78 
 (0.31) (1.00) (0.85) (0.39) (1.38) (1.09) 
Age 1.03 1.01 0.98 0.87 1.07 0.81 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.24) (0.16) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.43* 0.93 1.81* 1.19 0.67 1.48 
 (0.29) (0.22) (0.58) (0.25) (0.19) (0.51) 
Public sector 0.97 0.85 0.49** 0.93 0.73 0.46** 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.14) (0.18) (0.27) (0.15) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 0.87 0.57 0.58 0.79 0.45 0.50 
 (0.32) (0.23) (0.27) (0.32) (0.22) (0.26) 
ISCED 3 1.07 1.03 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.81 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.38) (0.33) (0.35) (0.30) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 1.07 0.92 0.42* 1.10 0.64 0.43* 
 (0.31) (0.42) (0.19) (0.35) (0.35) (0.22) 
Two 1.55 1.18 0.69 1.32 0.63 0.66 
 (0.50) (0.62) (0.41) (0.47) (0.39) (0.42) 
Three or more 1.83 0.85 0.74 1.47 0.71 0.70 
 (0.73) (0.53) (0.56) (0.65) (0.53) (0.58) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.24 0.33* 0.89 0.40 0.66 0.85 
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.56) (0.46) (0.55) (0.64) 
Professionals 1.92 0.13*** 0.73 1.82 0.14** 0.68 
 (0.79) (0.08) (0.39) (0.81) (0.14) (0.41) 
Assc. professionals 1.22 0.45* 0.22*** 1.16 0.75 0.21** 
 (0.49) (0.20) (0.13) (0.51) (0.42) (0.13) 
Clerks 0.92 0.25*** 0.38** 0.98 0.46 0.30** 
 (0.34) (0.10) (0.17) (0.38) (0.22) (0.15) 
Service/sales 1.78 0.43** 0.84 1.39 0.78 0.70 
 (0.63) (0.15) (0.35) (0.57) (0.35) (0.31) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.81 0.88 1.38 0.95 1.53 1.28 
 (0.46) (0.44) (0.75) (0.57) (0.89) (0.69) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    6.57*** 3.12 3.21 
    (2.27) (2.32) (2.67) 
Unemployed/inactive    2.43* 0.87 1.55 
    (1.19) (0.70) (1.27) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7481 0.7613 
Log pseudolikelihood -1543.2128 -1145.147 
N 4,420 3,460 
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Table A 4-29 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (FR) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) 
Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.36* 6.19*** 2.19*** 1.01 3.51*** 1.45* 
 (0.22) (1.06) (0.35) (0.19) (0.70) (0.30) 
4-8 1.47*** 1.83*** 1.28 1.43** 1.66** 1.34* 
 (0.22) (0.38) (0.21) (0.22) (0.35) (0.23) 
New birth 1.22 1.01 2.64*** 1.27 1.06 2.94*** 
 (0.28) (0.36) (0.55) (0.35) (0.40) (0.65) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.76** 0.99 1.84** 1.78** 0.99 1.99** 
 (0.39) (0.29) (0.50) (0.43) (0.30) (0.58) 
5-10 1.20 0.81 1.23 1.09 0.79 1.28 
 (0.24) (0.20) (0.31) (0.23) (0.21) (0.35) 
Age 1.00 1.04 0.78*** 1.00 0.91 0.78** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00*** 1.00 1.00 1.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.53*** 1.27 1.19 1.58*** 1.23 1.25 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) 
Public sector 1.02 0.18*** 0.57*** 1.00 0.18*** 0.57*** 
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2) 
      
ISCED 5-7 0.98 0.70 1.03 0.96 0.67 0.97 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.21) 
ISCED 3 0.90 0.92 1.07 0.96 0.92 1.22 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.22) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none) 
   
   
One 0.98 0.97 0.81 1.05 0.97 0.80 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
Two 1.08 1.14 0.93 1.18 1.18 0.86 
 (0.25) (0.31) (0.26) (0.28) (0.35) (0.27) 
Three or more 1.34 0.96 2.05** 1.35 1.13 1.93* 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.68) (0.42) (0.48) (0.70) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary) 
      
Legislators/managers 0.32*** 0.74 1.14 0.41* 0.79 1.36 
 (0.14) (0.29) (0.36) (0.21) (0.35) (0.45) 
Professionals 2.01*** 1.11 1.19 2.22*** 1.31 1.18 
 (0.51) (0.43) (0.36) (0.61) (0.53) (0.37) 
Assc. professionals 0.99 0.37*** 0.79 1.19 0.45** 0.84 
 (0.22) (0.12) (0.19) (0.28) (0.15) (0.21) 
Clerks 0.86 1.06 0.82 1.06 1.27 0.81 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.29) (0.19) 
Service/sales 1.23 0.97 1.43* 1.47* 1.11 1.31 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.29) (0.31) (0.25) (0.30) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.75 1.22 0.86 0.80 1.21 1.00 
 (0.26) (0.40) (0.30) (0.32) (0.46) (0.38) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    3.10** 1.30 1.16 
    (1.70) (0.78) (0.67) 
Unemployed/inactive    1.54 1.55 1.11 
    (0.90) (0.90) (0.65) 
Pseudo R-square   0.7626 0.7623 
Log pseudolikelihood -4017.4919 -3321.7239 
N 12,208 10,081 
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Table A 4-30 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (IE) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.09 2.26** 2.38*** 0.70 1.76 2.03** 
 (0.22) (0.92) (0.66) (0.18) (0.80) (0.72) 
4-8 1.43* 1.05 1.69* 1.41 0.65 1.44 
 (0.31) (0.49) (0.50) (0.34) (0.35) (0.54) 
New birth 1.29 3.67* 1.83 1.34 6.82* 1.90 
 (0.32) (2.88) (0.76) (0.39) (7.01) (0.97) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.47 1.26 1.47 1.48 0.96 1.54 
 (0.44) (0.90) (0.59) (0.48) (0.82) (0.70) 
5-10 0.97 0.95 2.03** 0.85 0.88 2.36** 
 (0.27) (0.56) (0.64) (0.26) (0.60) (0.84) 
Age 1.06 2.58*** 1.03 0.98 2.67*** 0.88 
 (0.12) (0.72) (0.15) (0.13) (1.00) (0.16) 
Age squared 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Married 1.47 1.32 3.02*** 1.51 1.18 3.16*** 
 (0.38) (0.55) (0.84) (0.41) (0.59) (1.06) 
Public sector 0.79 0.17*** 0.40*** 0.84 0.13*** 0.44** 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) (0.15) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 0.59* 0.64 0.96 0.51** 0.45 0.99 
 (0.16) (0.33) (0.32) (0.16) (0.30) (0.39) 
ISCED 3 0.89 1.66 0.71 0.86 1.80 0.89 
 (0.20) (0.73) (0.17) (0.21) (0.86) (0.24) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 2.24*** 0.18** 1.09 2.01** 0.21** 0.87 
 (0.67) (0.13) (0.39) (0.64) (0.17) (0.37) 
Two 2.72*** 0.31** 1.51 2.33** 0.27* 1.31 
 (0.86) (0.19) (0.55) (0.77) (0.18) (0.55) 
Three or more 2.80*** 0.30 0.87 2.65*** 0.36 0.75 
 (0.97) (0.22) (0.39) (0.99) (0.30) (0.38) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.40* 0.27* 0.44** 0.30** 0.52 0.50 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.39) (0.22) 
Professionals 0.77 0.41 0.28*** 0.83 0.71 0.31** 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.12) (0.31) (0.49) (0.15) 
Assc. professionals 0.89 0.50 0.44** 0.90 0.56 0.47 
 (0.29) (0.42) (0.17) (0.33) (0.60) (0.22) 
Clerks 0.76 0.40** 0.30*** 0.68 0.45 0.25*** 
 (0.22) (0.16) (0.11) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) 
Service/sales 0.98 0.93 0.82 0.95 0.90 0.74 
 (0.28) (0.53) (0.22) (0.29) (0.47) (0.24) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.47 0.16** 0.61 0.42 0.18* 0.79 
 (0.24) (0.13) (0.30) (0.24) (0.16) (0.42) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    7.46*** 18.95** 2.71 
    (5.35) (26.89) (2.12) 
Unemployed/inactive    9.77*** 5.19 4.76* 
    (7.66) (6.73) (4.02) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7257 0.7257 
Log pseudolikelihood -1625.7445 -1241.8505 
N 4,275 3,266 
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Table A 4-31 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (IT) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.05 8.14*** 2.27*** 0.94 10.06*** 1.81*** 
 (0.19) (2.10) (0.34) (0.19) (3.43) (0.35) 
4-8 1.40** 2.81*** 1.18 1.38* 3.46*** 1.17 
 (0.24) (0.87) (0.20) (0.25) (1.41) (0.23) 
New birth 1.98** 3.24** 1.84* 2.28** 3.90** 1.97* 
 (0.65) (1.57) (0.65) (0.88) (2.20) (0.76) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.24 0.95 1.03 1.01 0.83 1.20 
 (0.33) (0.42) (0.32) (0.29) (0.45) (0.42) 
5-10 1.39 1.38 1.19 1.36 1.55 1.25 
 (0.31) (0.49) (0.28) (0.30) (0.62) (0.33) 
Age 1.12 0.99 0.87** 1.09 1.00 0.86* 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) (0.09) (0.16) (0.08) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00 1.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.34* 0.86 2.39*** 1.32* 0.73 2.15*** 
 (0.21) (0.18) (0.40) (0.22) (0.18) (0.41) 
Public sector 0.88 0.71 0.52*** 0.84 0.83 0.54*** 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.09) (0.14) (0.22) (0.10) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.80** 0.73 0.76 1.65* 0.59 0.71 
 (0.46) (0.25) (0.22) (0.43) (0.24) (0.23) 
ISCED 3 1.32 0.72 1.02 1.31 0.72 1.11 
 (0.25) (0.17) (0.16) (0.26) (0.19) (0.19) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 0.97 0.60 0.74 1.01 0.67 0.70* 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.24) (0.15) 
Two 0.82 0.94 0.74 0.88 0.92 0.71 
 (0.21) (0.39) (0.20) (0.23) (0.44) (0.21) 
Three or more 1.09 1.55 0.71 1.06 1.19 0.67 
 (0.39) (0.80) (0.33) (0.38) (0.75) (0.36) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.15*** 0.00*** 0.93 0.17** 0.00*** 0.83 
 (0.11) (0.00) (0.37) (0.14) (0.00) (0.39) 
Professionals 1.18 0.29*** 0.58* 0.97 0.29*** 0.58* 
 (0.31) (0.12) (0.17) (0.27) (0.13) (0.19) 
Assc. professionals 0.79 0.50** 0.31*** 0.88 0.45** 0.22*** 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.09) (0.23) (0.17) (0.07) 
Clerks 0.50*** 0.60* 0.52*** 0.62* 0.62 0.49*** 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.11) (0.16) (0.20) (0.12) 
Service/sales 0.82 0.60* 0.90 0.89 0.63 0.88 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.69 0.49** 0.71* 0.86 0.48** 0.74 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.23) (0.17) (0.16) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    3.59* 1.16 - 
    (2.73) (1.31)  
Unemployed/inactive    1.03 2.61 - 
    (0.81) (2.65)  
Pseudo R-square 0.7656 0.7794 
Log pseudolikelihood -3822.331 -3021.2176 
N 11,764 9,879 
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Table A 4-32 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (GR) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 0.81 2.21*** 1.28 0.73 3.05*** 1.13 
 (0.22) (0.48) (0.23) (0.21) (0.84) (0.27) 
4-8 1.25 1.39 1.00 1.21 1.46 1.09 
 (0.31) (0.36) (0.19) (0.34) (0.48) (0.24) 
New birth 1.01 0.99 1.97* 0.93 0.30 1.21 
 (0.59) (0.57) (0.77) (0.67) (0.31) (0.62) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.19 0.95 0.99 0.82 1.02 0.94 
 (0.47) (0.36) (0.31) (0.34) (0.43) (0.34) 
5-10 1.62 1.06 1.15 1.50 0.81 0.89 
 (0.50) (0.30) (0.27) (0.47) (0.28) (0.30) 
Age 1.20 1.10 1.07 1.14 1.08 1.06 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.09) (0.18) (0.16) (0.11) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.24 1.14 2.30*** 1.32 0.89 2.14*** 
 (0.36) (0.24) (0.51) (0.44) (0.22) (0.55) 
Public sector 1.40 0.23*** 0.32*** 1.29 0.22*** 0.40*** 
 (0.32) (0.08) (0.08) (0.35) (0.09) (0.11) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.29 0.51** 0.75 1.54 0.47** 0.64 
 (0.56) (0.14) (0.19) (0.68) (0.17) (0.20) 
ISCED 3 1.04 0.72* 0.88 1.02 0.69 0.86 
 (0.30) (0.14) (0.17) (0.34) (0.16) (0.19) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 0.85 0.78 1.11 1.03 0.94 1.08 
 (0.29) (0.21) (0.23) (0.39) (0.30) (0.26) 
Two 1.03 0.86 0.78 1.32 0.92 0.78 
 (0.35) (0.25) (0.19) (0.45) (0.33) (0.23) 
Three or more 0.56 0.92 1.54 0.96 1.33 2.11* 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.54) (0.70) (0.71) (0.86) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.31** 0.20*** 1.80** 0.23** 0.26*** 1.44 
 (0.17) (0.07) (0.48) (0.15) (0.11) (0.48) 
Professionals 1.92 0.29*** 0.93 1.28 0.25** 1.11 
 (0.96) (0.14) (0.38) (0.68) (0.15) (0.53) 
Assc. professionals 0.41 0.29** 1.74 0.48 0.22* 2.10* 
 (0.28) (0.15) (0.63) (0.34) (0.17) (0.89) 
Clerks 0.58 0.50** 1.04 0.50 0.63 1.38 
 (0.26) (0.15) (0.33) (0.26) (0.22) (0.51) 
Service/sales 1.31 0.71 1.48 1.21 0.63 1.66 
 (0.53) (0.18) (0.43) (0.52) (0.20) (0.53) 
Skilled agr./craft 1.84* 1.08 2.33*** 1.76 1.08 1.87** 
 (0.66) (0.27) (0.57) (0.68) (0.31) (0.55) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    1.46 0.63 0.06*** 
    (1.37) (0.47) (0.04) 
Unemployed/inactive    0.66 0.43 0.28** 
    (0.65) (0.26) (0.16) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7640 0.7898 
Log pseudolikelihood -2317.3725 -1696.0493 
N 7,083 5,819 
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Table A 4-33 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (ES) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) 
Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.51* 5.76*** 2.45*** 1.16 4.80*** 1.40 
 (0.34) (1.38) (0.45) (0.28) (1.45) (0.34) 
4-8 1.99*** 3.07*** 0.95 2.08*** 2.63*** 0.89 
 (0.50) (0.80) (0.22) (0.58) (0.85) (0.24) 
New birth 1.63 1.63 0.71 1.81 1.46 0.73 
 (0.57) (0.57) (0.30) (0.77) (0.63) (0.36) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.38 0.92 0.79 1.05 0.91 0.82 
 (0.56) (0.27) (0.21) (0.50) (0.32) (0.26) 
5-10 1.18 0.97 0.97 1.18 0.94 1.03 
 (0.43) (0.25) (0.23) (0.45) (0.27) (0.26) 
Age 1.04 1.08 0.89 1.05 1.11 0.91 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.84 0.98 2.49*** 0.76 1.20 2.23*** 
 (0.22) (0.16) (0.47) (0.22) (0.24) (0.47) 
Public sector 0.44*** 1.02 0.80 0.47** 1.07 0.79 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.24) (0.22) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2) 
      
ISCED 5-7 0.69 0.54** 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.62 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
ISCED 3 0.79 0.85 0.62** 0.76 0.95 0.59** 
 (0.22) (0.16) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none) 
   
   
One 1.93 1.11 1.19 2.47* 0.99 1.14 
 (0.89) (0.24) (0.22) (1.29) (0.25) (0.24) 
Two 1.24 0.81 1.04 1.38 0.67 1.02 
 (0.58) (0.23) (0.27) (0.71) (0.22) (0.30) 
Three or more 1.34 0.94 0.54 1.67 0.60 0.47 
 (0.80) (0.38) (0.23) (1.13) (0.31) (0.23) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary) 
      
Legislators/managers 0.50** 0.18*** 1.30 0.53 0.14*** 1.59* 
 (0.17) (0.08) (0.32) (0.21) (0.08) (0.44) 
Professionals 1.80 0.50* 0.49* 1.80 0.34** 0.60 
 (0.67) (0.18) (0.21) (0.77) (0.15) (0.29) 
Assc. professionals 0.40** 0.66 0.31*** 0.37** 0.65 0.32** 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.12) (0.15) (0.23) (0.15) 
Clerks 0.55* 0.88 0.46** 0.68 0.79 0.66 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.14) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) 
Service/sales 0.81 0.77 0.88 0.70 0.74 1.03 
 (0.20) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.21) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.54* 0.83 1.25 0.67 0.77 1.44 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.27) (0.24) (0.23) (0.36) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    1.19 0.25 0.36 
    (0.93) (0.24) (0.36) 
Unemployed/inactive    0.39 0.55 0.82 
    (0.32) (0.49) (0.79) 
Pseudo R-square   0.7279 0.7488 
Log pseudolikelihood    -3507.684 -2611.2267 
N 9,298 7,499 
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Table A 4-34 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (PT) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.47 4.68*** 1.17 1.47 3.66*** 0.91 
 (0.42) (1.28) (0.23) (0.49) (1.17) (0.26) 
4-8 0.88 1.73* 0.54*** 0.82 1.71* 0.63* 
 (0.31) (0.50) (0.12) (0.31) (0.54) (0.16) 
New birth 1.51 1.18 0.24*** 1.60 1.13 0.23** 
 (0.91) (0.51) (0.12) (1.10) (0.54) (0.14) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.54 1.71 1.84* 1.72 2.05* 2.18* 
 (0.79) (0.59) (0.59) (0.97) (0.78) (0.92) 
5-10 0.72 0.79 0.86 0.58 0.95 1.03 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.31) (0.35) 
Age 1.37** 1.17 1.14 1.58*** 1.26* 1.34** 
 (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) 
Age squared 1.00** 1.00 1.00 0.99*** 1.00* 1.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.39 0.63** 1.83*** 1.19 0.58** 2.10*** 
 (0.37) (0.14) (0.43) (0.34) (0.14) (0.53) 
Public sector 0.98 0.70 0.47*** 0.98 0.70 0.61* 
 (0.35) (0.21) (0.12) (0.48) (0.20) (0.17) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.19 0.45** 1.04 1.89 0.50 1.52 
 (0.83) (0.18) (0.81) (1.91) (0.26) (1.04) 
ISCED 3 1.39 0.68 1.09 1.42 0.83 1.13 
 (0.61) (0.20) (0.35) (0.63) (0.29) (0.40) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 0.86 0.86 0.73 0.90 0.72 0.52*** 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.15) (0.31) (0.23) (0.13) 
Two 0.78 0.96 0.79 0.73 0.81 0.67 
 (0.34) (0.31) (0.26) (0.36) (0.28) (0.24) 
Three or more 0.62 1.29 1.49 0.54 1.19 0.39 
 (0.34) (0.52) (0.77) (0.35) (0.52) (0.25) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.18** 0.36 1.66 0.29* 0.41 1.20 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.51) (0.20) (0.26) (0.42) 
Professionals 1.85 0.62 0.62 0.81 0.13** 0.23 
 (1.40) (0.36) (0.61) (0.92) (0.13) (0.21) 
Assc. professionals 0.87 1.15 1.19 0.27 0.88 0.97 
 (0.55) (0.43) (0.62) (0.25) (0.39) (0.58) 
Clerks 0.25* 0.75 1.07 0.40 0.60 1.33 
 (0.19) (0.28) (0.39) (0.31) (0.29) (0.50) 
Service/sales 0.76 0.84 1.82** 0.93 0.82 1.79** 
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.46) (0.35) (0.22) (0.46) 
Skilled agr./craft 1.16 1.29 1.76** 1.65 1.40 1.63* 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.40) (0.53) (0.39) (0.41) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    8.06** - 0.64 
    (8.49)  (0.43) 
Unemployed/inactive    1.41 - 1.32 
    (1.52)  (0.80) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7930   0.8110 
Log pseudolikelihood -3101.7178 -2361.9865 
N 10,807 9,013 
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Table A 4-35 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (DE) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 0.97 5.73*** 3.35*** 0.84 5.13*** 4.55*** 
 (0.21) (1.14) (1.09) (0.20) (1.33) (1.68) 
4-8 1.08 2.02*** 1.22 0.97 1.64* 1.45 
 (0.27) (0.47) (0.44) (0.23) (0.45) (0.61) 
New birth 0.46 0.18 2.70*** 0.47 0.32 2.88*** 
 (0.28) (0.19) (0.84) (0.33) (0.36) (1.11) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.71* 2.44** 10.82*** 1.78 1.85 10.67*** 
 (0.53) (1.05) (3.84) (0.64) (1.01) (4.50) 
5-10 1.23 2.32*** 2.49** 1.07 2.30*** 2.41** 
 (0.29) (0.60) (0.91) (0.31) (0.73) (1.04) 
Age 1.22** 1.00 0.96 1.27* 0.84 0.97 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.14) 
Age squared 1.00* 1.00 1.00 1.00* 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.73*** 1.04 1.15 1.95*** 1.18 1.51 
 (0.33) (0.17) (0.27) (0.41) (0.22) (0.42) 
Public sector 0.88 1.03 1.17 1.20 1.05 1.16 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.27) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.05 0.68 0.93 1.03 0.74 0.99 
 (0.37) (0.20) (0.27) (0.36) (0.25) (0.32) 
ISCED 3 1.16 0.99 1.10 1.18 1.14 0.99 
 (0.34) (0.21) (0.26) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 1.63* 1.12 0.99 1.37 1.17 0.92 
 (0.41) (0.23) (0.27) (0.33) (0.28) (0.28) 
Two 1.28 0.87 0.75 1.05 0.80 0.69 
 (0.38) (0.26) (0.28) (0.34) (0.29) (0.29) 
Three or more 1.13 0.79 0.64 1.09 0.45 0.58 
 (0.58) (0.36) (0.32) (0.58) (0.23) (0.34) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 1.53 0.28*** 0.80 1.08 0.35** 0.83 
 (0.74) (0.11) (0.35) (0.55) (0.16) (0.42) 
Professionals 2.08* 0.46** 0.85 1.55 0.58 0.86 
 (0.81) (0.16) (0.34) (0.63) (0.21) (0.39) 
Assc. professionals 1.63 0.42*** 0.86 1.37 0.44*** 0.93 
 (0.55) (0.09) (0.27) (0.46) (0.11) (0.33) 
Clerks 1.50 0.58** 0.65 1.40 0.53** 0.69 
 (0.61) (0.15) (0.21) (0.53) (0.16) (0.26) 
Service/sales 2.73*** 0.57** 0.74 2.17** 0.66 0.65 
 (0.88) (0.15) (0.23) (0.71) (0.20) (0.23) 
Skilled agr./craft 1.01 0.79 0.74 0.88 0.79 0.47* 
 (0.41) (0.22) (0.30) (0.39) (0.26) (0.20) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    4.81*** 0.25** 0.74 
    (2.05) (0.15) (0.39) 
Unemployed/inactive    1.05 1.83 2.83** 
    (0.54) (0.81) (1.32) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7388 0.7614 
Log pseudolikelihood -4080.8528 -3100.1943 
N 11,269 9,372 
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Table A 4-36 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (UK) 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 0.95 1.19 0.78 0.86 1.01 0.65** 
 (0.16) (0.44) (0.14) (0.16) (0.41) (0.13) 
4-8 0.91 0.85 0.55*** 0.92 0.59 0.52*** 
 (0.15) (0.34) (0.11) (0.18) (0.28) (0.12) 
New birth 2.02*** 6.39** 1.85** 1.67* 4.27 2.49** 
 (0.50) (5.64) (0.57) (0.50) (4.13) (0.92) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 2.16*** 0.63 3.34*** 2.15*** 0.63 3.12*** 
 (0.50) (0.48) (1.06) (0.55) (0.47) (1.18) 
5-10 1.24 1.62 1.64 1.16 1.25 2.00* 
 (0.25) (0.73) (0.58) (0.25) (0.61) (0.80) 
Age 1.12* 1.00 0.81** 1.03 0.86 0.90 
 (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.58*** 0.51** 1.53*** 1.64*** 0.36*** 1.43** 
 (0.22) (0.13) (0.24) (0.25) (0.12) (0.25) 
Public sector 0.74** 0.49** 0.56*** 0.79 0.44** 0.53*** 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 0.95 1.11 1.33* 0.85 1.06 1.15 
 (0.13) (0.31) (0.22) (0.12) (0.33) (0.21) 
ISCED 3 0.92 0.95 1.29 0.98 1.37 1.17 
 (0.17) (0.39) (0.26) (0.20) (0.57) (0.28) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 1.50** 0.81 0.74 1.29 0.99 0.65* 
 (0.26) (0.36) (0.18) (0.24) (0.47) (0.17) 
Two 1.48** 1.17 0.78 1.18 1.37 0.58 
 (0.30) (0.53) (0.24) (0.26) (0.72) (0.21) 
Three or more 1.35 0.52 0.99 1.06 1.00 0.64 
 (0.40) (0.43) (0.41) (0.34) (0.83) (0.31) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.52** 0.53 0.68 0.87 0.41* 0.88 
 (0.14) (0.23) (0.18) (0.25) (0.21) (0.27) 
Professionals 0.57** 0.49 0.72 0.85 0.47 1.12 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.36) 
Assc. professionals 0.95 0.36* 0.54** 1.42 0.39 0.72 
 (0.23) (0.20) (0.16) (0.37) (0.23) (0.25) 
Clerks 0.94 0.79 0.47*** 1.31 0.66 0.69 
 (0.20) (0.29) (0.12) (0.31) (0.28) (0.20) 
Service/sales 1.24 0.98 0.93 1.57* 0.85 1.41 
 (0.28) (0.40) (0.25) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.41* 1.08 0.53 0.38 1.59 0.73 
 (0.22) (0.64) (0.26) (0.30) (1.00) (0.44) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    1.37 - - 
    (0.92)   
Unemployed/inactive    0.70 - - 
    (0.44)   
Pseudo R-square 0.7272   0.7471 
Log pseudolikelihood -2879.255 -2196.8351 
N 7,613 6,265 
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Table A 4-37 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (AT) 
Source: ECHP 1995-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 2.06*** 3.64*** 1.71* 2.00** 2.49*** 1.98 
 (0.47) (1.02) (0.55) (0.60) (0.79) (0.87) 
4-8 2.04*** 1.50 1.02 1.92** 0.82 1.11 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.27) (0.51) (0.33) (0.37) 
New birth 2.29** 0.90 4.03*** 3.30*** 0.65 4.11*** 
 (0.80) (0.54) (1.66) (1.41) (0.43) (2.10) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 2.73*** 3.04* 10.72*** 1.85 7.25*** 8.72*** 
 (1.01) (1.75) (5.10) (0.81) (4.73) (5.17) 
5-10 1.68* 0.82 0.86 1.88* 1.57 0.46 
 (0.50) (0.41) (0.44) (0.64) (0.81) (0.35) 
Age 1.11 0.94 0.83 1.01 0.96 0.65*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.10) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00 1.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.52* 0.77 1.60* 1.58* 0.81 2.17** 
 (0.34) (0.21) (0.45) (0.39) (0.26) (0.72) 
Public sector 0.67* 0.27*** 1.07 0.81 0.22*** 1.02 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.30) (0.22) (0.11) (0.35) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.35 1.21 0.41 0.93 1.38 0.61 
 (0.47) (0.94) (0.27) (0.39) (1.14) (0.41) 
ISCED 3 0.81 0.75 0.92 0.76 0.80 0.78 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.25) (0.20) (0.31) (0.28) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 1.50 0.79 1.29 1.43 0.70 1.36 
 (0.46) (0.33) (0.50) (0.51) (0.36) (0.73) 
Two 2.11** 1.98 1.63 2.46** 1.41 2.44 
 (0.69) (1.18) (0.75) (0.91) (0.99) (1.45) 
Three or more 1.44 3.62* 0.97 2.12 2.94 1.23 
 (0.73) (2.45) (0.54) (1.06) (2.27) (0.88) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.09** 0.44 0.66 0.15** 0.61 1.49 
 (0.09) (0.32) (0.61) (0.14) (0.48) (1.60) 
Professionals 0.64 0.05** 0.76 0.75 0.00*** 0.02*** 
 (0.29) (0.06) (0.65) (0.41) (0.00) (0.03) 
Assc. professionals 0.70 0.29** 1.12 0.70 0.18** 1.37 
 (0.24) (0.16) (0.48) (0.27) (0.12) (0.84) 
Clerks 0.57* 0.77 1.28 0.61 0.92 1.59 
 (0.18) (0.29) (0.49) (0.21) (0.37) (0.91) 
Service/sales 0.69 0.55 1.70 0.70 0.48 2.39 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.64) (0.23) (0.22) (1.29) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.36*** 0.20*** 2.17** 0.38** 0.19*** 1.86 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.82) (0.17) (0.11) (1.06) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    2.41 - - 
    (2.90)   
Unemployed/inactive    0.99 - - 
    (1.21)   
Pseudo R-square   0.7821 0.8133 
Log pseudolikelihood -1585.0173 -1062.8067 
N 5,248 4,107 
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Table A 4-38 Multinomial logit estimates of exiting full-time employment (FI) 
Source: ECHP 1996-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: seven dummies for years in full-time work. 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
 
 Part-time Unemployed Inactive Part-time Unemployed Inactive 
Number of years in current job 
(ref: 9-24) Model 1 Model 2 
1-3 1.08 14.78*** 2.22*** 0.95 7.76*** 1.17 
 (0.29) (4.60) (0.56) (0.36) (2.84) (0.43) 
4-8 1.31 2.14** 2.27** 1.33 2.54** 2.14* 
 (0.33) (0.82) (0.79) (0.43) (1.11) (0.96) 
New birth 1.19 3.42** 3.37*** 1.30 7.67*** 3.50*** 
 (0.46) (1.75) (1.01) (0.65) (4.71) (1.27) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 
11-17 or none)       
0-4 1.46 0.97 1.32 1.61 0.42 1.09 
 (0.56) (0.46) (0.87) (0.73) (0.24) (0.80) 
5-10 1.16 1.14 0.90 1.33 1.30 0.70 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.66) (0.56) (0.51) (0.58) 
Age 0.83 1.24 0.80* 0.76 1.24 0.69** 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.10) (0.13) (0.20) (0.11) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00* 1.00 1.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.32 0.64* 1.41 1.07 0.84 1.51 
 (0.35) (0.16) (0.31) (0.33) (0.21) (0.42) 
Public sector 1.23 1.79** 1.62** 1.07 1.65* 1.58* 
 (0.29) (0.45) (0.32) (0.28) (0.44) (0.39) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)       
ISCED 5-7 1.91** 0.74 0.55* 1.82 0.58* 0.59 
 (0.62) (0.22) (0.18) (0.73) (0.19) (0.22) 
ISCED 3 1.41 1.34 0.85 1.49 0.92 0.99 
 (0.44) (0.35) (0.29) (0.57) (0.25) (0.39) 
Number of children under 17 in 
the household (ref: none)       
One 0.71 1.09 0.57 0.84 1.11 0.71 
 (0.25) (0.33) (0.29) (0.37) (0.40) (0.38) 
Two 1.21 1.08 1.22 1.06 0.73 1.75 
 (0.43) (0.37) (0.95) (0.49) (0.27) (1.52) 
Three or more 1.18 0.89 1.00 1.70 0.83 1.30 
 (0.58) (0.39) (0.76) (1.01) (0.43) (1.11) 
Occupation (ref: 
operatives/elementary)       
Legislators/managers 0.35 0.52 0.25** 0.20* 0.65 0.23** 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.16) (0.18) (0.47) (0.17) 
Professionals 1.02 0.32*** 0.80 0.81 0.48 0.47 
 (0.53) (0.13) (0.32) (0.45) (0.23) (0.22) 
Assc. professionals 0.90 0.56* 1.02 0.82 0.56 0.85 
 (0.47) (0.19) (0.41) (0.45) (0.22) (0.38) 
Clerks 0.75 0.79 0.89 0.51 0.68 0.52 
 (0.41) (0.29) (0.36) (0.30) (0.31) (0.25) 
Service/sales 1.48 0.68 0.68 0.96 0.86 0.47* 
 (0.76) (0.24) (0.25) (0.52) (0.34) (0.20) 
Skilled agr./craft 0.93 0.80 0.85 0.39 0.59 0.65 
 (0.52) (0.33) (0.39) (0.25) (0.32) (0.35) 
Activity last wave (ref: full-time)       
Part-time    1.38 0.67 1.05 
    (1.30) (0.51) (1.16) 
Unemployed/inactive    0.82 1.91 1.95 
    (0.77) (1.02) (2.06) 
Pseudo R-square 0.7967 0.8227 
Log pseudolikelihood -2280.4975 -1521.5366 
N 8,093 6,192 
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Table A 4-39 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (DK) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 1.38 2.02* 1.54 1.70* 
 (0.48) (0.610 (0.55) (0.51) 
4-8 1.13 2.19* 0.97 2.21*** 
 (0.38) (0.68) (0.34) (0.65) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.50 0.27* 0.16*** 0.68 
 (0.27) (0.15) (0.09) (0.31) 
Full-time to part-time 0.66 0.71 0.63 0.85 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) 
Part-time to full-time 0.97 0.48* 0.94 0.49** 
 (0.30) (0.17) (0.29) (0.17) 
Changes employer 59.38*** 108.55*** 56.63*** 124.22*** 
 (20.52) (34.44) (19.99) (39.51) 
Age 1.00 0.93 0.85 0.99 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.04 0.86 1.03 0.82 
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.20) (0.16) 
Public sector 0.65* 0.53** 0.66** 0.45*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.12 1.17 0.89 0.96 
 (0.32) (0.40) (0.28) (0.29) 
ISCED 3 1.35 1.51 1.17 1.33 
 (0.38) (0.52) (0.36) (0.39) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 0.91 1.67 0.67 1.80* 
 (0.26) (0.61) (0.20) (0.62) 
Two or more 1.01 1.58 0.87 1.80 
 (0.36) (0.69) (0.33) (0.73) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.86 0.90 1.15 0.79 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.47) (0.30) 
5-10 1.42 1.11 1.74 1.06 
 (0.53) (0.47) (0.67) (0.43) 
New birth 1.46 1.02 1.21 1.41 
 (0.45) (0.33) (0.38) (0.46) 
Pseudo R-square 0.3697 0.3779 
Log pseudolikelihood -1563.3014 -1549.6988 
N 7,353 7,353 
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Table A 4-40 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (NL) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.83* 0.74*** 0.77** 0.64*** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
4-8 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.80* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.73*** 0.67*** 0.82* 0.77** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
Full-time to part-time 1.27 1.46** 1.11 1.68*** 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.26) 
Part-time to full-time 1.55*** 1.07 1.66*** 1.00 
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.25) (0.17) 
Changes employer 4.71*** 5.39*** 4.46*** 5.38*** 
 (0.47) (0.53) (0.47) (0.54) 
Age 1.15** 1.21*** 1.16** 1.24*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Age squared 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00** 1.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.97 0.97 0.95 1.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Public sector 0.89 0.99 0.82** 0.92 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2) 
    
ISCED 5-7 0.85 0.85 0.69*** 0.76** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
ISCED 3 1.14 0.75*** 1.20** 0.74*** 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none) 
  
  
One 1.26 0.97 1.34* 1.01 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) 
Two or more 0.98 0.80 0.99 0.84 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.91 1.27 0.82 0.95 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.16) (0.20) 
5-10 1.03 0.94 0.98 0.93 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
New birth 0.87 0.92 0.82 1.10 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0683 0.0691 
Log pseudolikelihood -6787.0504 -6064.9112 
N 11,463 11,463 
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Table A 4-41 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (BE) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.63*** 0.68** 0.69** 0.68** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
4-8 0.88 1.08 0.96 1.00 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.90 0.83 0.87 0.83 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Full-time to part-time 1.25 1.08 1.36 1.20 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.33) (0.29) 
Part-time to full-time 1.15 1.26 1.25 1.03 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.24) 
Changes employer 6.39*** 4.91*** 5.84*** 4.87*** 
 (1.11) (0.78) (1.04) (0.77) 
Age 1.14 1.08 1.15* 1.09 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00* 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.78* 0.85 0.83 0.88 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Public sector 0.93 1.18 0.98 1.19 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.30 0.98 1.10 0.85 
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.19) (0.13) 
ISCED 3 1.10 0.87 1.03 0.80 
 (0.20) (0.14) (0.18) (0.12) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 0.94 1.12 0.96 1.19 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) 
Two or more 0.97 0.96 0.82 0.95 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.87 0.84 0.92 0.86 
 (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.19) 
5-10 0.96 0.85 0.98 0.84 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) 
New birth 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.68 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.18) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0550 0.0519 
Log pseudolikelihood -3265.3427 -3247.6833 
N 5,835 5,835 
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Table A 4-42 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (FR) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 1.53** 0.88 1.48** 0.79 
 (0.30) (0.17) (0.29) (0.15) 
4-8 1.33 0.95 1.23 0.87 
 (0.26) (0.20) (0.24) (0.18) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.29*** 0.51** 0.35*** 0.44*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) 
Full-time to part-time 0.87 0.72 0.72 0.92 
 (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) 
Part-time to full-time 1.05 0.96 1.16 0.90 
 (0.30) (0.24) (0.32) (0.24) 
Changes employer 16.40*** 22.03*** 16.88*** 22.41*** 
 (2.73) (3.61) (2.77) (3.79) 
Age 1.12 1.02 1.06 0.95 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.04 1.11 1.13 0.99 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) 
Public sector 0.83 0.94 0.79 0.88 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.07 1.20 1.01 0.91 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19) 
ISCED 3 1.34 0.91 1.55** 0.77 
 (0.25) (0.18) (0.27) (0.15) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 1.22 0.92 1.15 0.99 
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.29) (0.24) 
Two or more 0.65 0.73 0.70 0.77 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.86 1.27 0.63 1.28 
 (0.28) (0.41) (0.21) (0.39) 
5-10 1.13 1.24 1.02 1.22 
 (0.30) (0.32) (0.27) (0.31) 
New birth 1.35 0.70 1.88** 0.57* 
 (0.41) (0.23) (0.59) (0.19) 
Pseudo R-square 0.1881 0.1914 
Log pseudolikelihood -2522.4559 -2509.4901 
N 14,585 14,585 
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Table A 4-43 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (IE) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.67** 0.64** 0.67* 0.67** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) 
4-8 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.93 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.60*** 0.66** 0.60** 0.64** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Full-time to part-time 1.32 1.03 1.26 0.93 
 (0.34) (0.29) (0.34) (0.29) 
Part-time to full-time 1.22 1.57* 1.17 1.35 
 (0.30) (0.42) (0.30) (0.38) 
Changes employer 6.62*** 7.26*** 5.34*** 6.35*** 
 (1.27) (1.29) (1.06) (1.25) 
Age 0.99 1.33*** 1.02 1.34*** 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00*** 1.00 1.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.74 0.78 0.70* 0.85 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) 
Public sector 0.79 0.63*** 0.72* 0.59*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.22 1.67** 1.37 1.90*** 
 (0.27) (0.38) (0.30) (0.44) 
ISCED 3 1.13 1.13 1.22 1.22 
 (0.21) (0.24) (0.22) (0.27) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 1.60** 1.01 1.44 0.84 
 (0.37) (0.22) (0.34) (0.21) 
Two or more 1.98** 0.88 1.81** 0.70 
 (0.52) (0.24) (0.50) (0.22) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.48*** 0.81 0.58** 1.09 
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.16) (0.30) 
5-10 0.67* 0.87 0.64* 1.02 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.26) 
New birth 1.41 1.50 1.22 1.22 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.32) (0.34) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0930 0.0812 
Log pseudolikelihood -3023.3591 -2906.7245 
N 5.955 5,955 
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Table A 4-44 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (IT) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.81 0.68*** 0.97 0.79 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) 
4-8 1.25* 1.19 1.67*** 1.60*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.25) (0.25) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.57** 0.62** 0.45*** 0.59** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) 
Full-time to part-time 1.18 1.98*** 1.16 2.11*** 
 (0.22) (0.30) (0.24) (0.34) 
Part-time to full-time 2.12*** 1.61*** 1.91*** 1.51** 
 (0.34) (0.28) (0.34) (0.29) 
Changes employer 4.58*** 5.51*** 4.02*** 4.64*** 
 (0.58) (0.68) (0.60) (0.63) 
Age 1.12* 1.15** 1.07 1.21** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.84 0.89 0.76* 0.76* 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Public sector 1.19 1.06 1.75*** 1.44*** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.25) (0.20) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 0.96 1.18 2.45*** 3.34*** 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.50) (0.69) 
ISCED 3 0.88 0.95 2.12*** 2.56*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.33) (0.43) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 0.89 1.09 0.92 1.10 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) 
Two or more 0.82 1.04 0.89 1.01 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 1.34 1.18 1.67** 1.28 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.39) (0.30) 
5-10 1.14 1.06 1.24 1.29 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.25) 
New birth 1.33 0.90 1.09 1.03 
 (0.30) (0.23) (0.29) (0.29) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0500 0.0745 
Log pseudolikelihood -6538.0869 -4864.0077 
N 13,486 13,486 
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Table A 4-45 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (GR) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.40*** 0.56*** 0.47*** 0.55*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
4-8 0.65** 0.83 0.72* 0.89 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.20) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.24** 0.26** 0.21** 0.15** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) 
Full-time to part-time 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.88 
 (0.29) (0.23) (0.30) (0.30) 
Part-time to full-time 0.95 0.83 1.02 0.70 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.29) 
Changes employer 12.06*** 9.76*** 12.86*** 11.06*** 
 (2.49) (1.84) (2.70) (2.16) 
Age 0.94 1.03 1.05 1.18 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.71* 0.72* 0.78 0.79 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) 
Public sector 1.20 1.53** 1.25 1.45** 
 (0.21) (0.27) (0.22) (0.26) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.15 1.14 1.32 1.46 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.33) (0.35) 
ISCED 3 1.56** 1.13 1.99*** 1.66** 
 (0.34) (0.24) (0.47) (0.40) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 1.17 1.29 1.09 1.11 
 (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27) 
Two or more 1.35 1.41 1.19 1.26 
 (0.37) (0.40) (0.34) (0.39) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.94 1.01 0.95 1.05 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.33) (0.39) 
5-10 1.09 1.05 1.05 1.03 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.31) 
New birth 1.62 1.31 1.57 1.13 
 (0.53) (0.51) (0.53) (0.45) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0920 0.1071 
Log pseudolikelihood -2601.1577 -2425.6 
N 7,661 7,661 
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Table A 4-46 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (ES) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.72** 0.62*** 0.60*** 0.65*** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
4-8 1.35** 1.04 1.10 1.11 
 (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.52*** 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
Full-time to part-time 0.88 1.72** 0.83 1.07 
 (0.22) (0.40) (0.20) (0.24) 
Part-time to full-time 1.55** 2.18** 1.18 1.80 
 (0.32) (0.79) (0.26) (0.70) 
Changes employer 4.96*** 4.31*** 4.72*** 3.92*** 
 (0.59) (0.55) (0.58) (0.52) 
Age 0.99 1.19** 0.94 1.12 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.06 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Public sector 0.72** 0.78* 0.66*** 0.70** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.76*** 1.72*** 1.69*** 1.70*** 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) 
ISCED 3 1.98*** 1.45*** 1.76*** 1.50*** 
 (0.26) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 0.97 0.84 1.07 0.95 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) 
Two or more 0.91 0.83 1.15 0.96 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.22) (0.20) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.98 0.90 0.93 0.83 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) 
5-10 1.11 0.90 1.01 0.83 
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) 
New birth 0.78 1.03 0.81 1.10 
 (0.20) (0.27) (0.21) (0.29) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0656 0.0568 
Log pseudolikelihood -5591.1449 -5449.1555 
N 10,648 10,648 
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Table A 4-47 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (PT) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.66** 1.06 0.52*** 0.88 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.18) 
4-8 0.93 1.13 0.82 1.10 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.73 1.05 0.52*** 0.88 
 (0.22) (0.31) (0.13) (0.18) 
Full-time to part-time 1.62 1.49 0.82 1.10 
 (0.56) (0.53) (0.17) (0.23) 
Part-time to full-time 1.66 1.98** 0.23** 0.37 
 (0.53) (0.67) (0.16) (0.30) 
Changes employer 6.27*** 5.68*** 0.55 0.74 
 (1.02) (0.90) (0.29) (0.40) 
Age 1.17** 1.23*** 0.71 0.79 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.36) (0.44) 
Age squared 1.00** 1.00*** 5.32*** 4.48*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (1.03) (0.91) 
Married 1.05 0.99 1.19* 1.15 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) 
Public sector 1.70*** 1.77*** 1.00* 1.00 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.03 0.98 1.86** 1.94*** 
 (0.24) (0.20) (0.49) (0.42) 
ISCED 3 1.54** 1.31 2.39*** 2.23*** 
 (0.29) (0.24) (0.51) (0.45) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 1.07 0.94 1.17 0.96 
 (0.21) (0.15) (0.30) (0.20) 
Two or more 0.89 0.95 1.01 0.95 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.28) (0.26) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.61* 0.79 0.58* 1.01 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.30) 
5-10 0.80 0.82 0.75 0.89 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.27) 
New birth 1.43 1.34 1.53 1.05 
 (0.45) (0.32) (0.53) (0.31) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0645 0.0659 
Log pseudolikelihood -5999.9273   -4625.1972   
N 11,679 11,679 
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Table A 4-48 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (DE) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.77* 0.73* 0.81 0.71** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
4-8 0.93 0.80 1.02 0.81 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.87 0.84 0.89 0.80 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) 
Full-time to part-time 1.03 2.01*** 0.76 1.88*** 
 (0.24) (0.39) (0.17) (0.35) 
Part-time to full-time 1.31 1.34 1.47** 1.23 
 (0.25) (0.35) (0.28) (0.34) 
Changes employer 5.23*** 4.29*** 5.08*** 4.69*** 
 (0.60) (0.56) (0.59) (0.61) 
Age 1.18** 1.11 1.18** 1.09 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) 
Age squared 1.00* 1.00 1.00* 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.98 0.91 1.14 1.09 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) 
Public sector 0.78 0.77* 0.78 0.72** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.28 1.15 0.78 0.82 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.15) (0.16) 
ISCED 3 1.11 0.95 1.01 0.88 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 1.06 1.12 1.14 1.26 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) 
Two or more 0.94 0.96 1.01 1.18 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.95 0.53** 0.90 0.48** 
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.22) (0.14) 
5-10 0.88 0.79 0.79 0.69* 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) 
New birth 0.38 0.57 0.63 0.09*** 
 (0.24) (0.51) (0.40) (0.08) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0660 0.0706 
Log pseudolikelihood -6271.5081 -6128.1623 
N 14,207 14,207 
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Table A 4-49 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (UK) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 1.04 1.12 1.17 1.00 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) 
4-8 1.14 1.14 1.31* 0.97 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.15) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.71*** 0.90 0.62*** 0.72** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) 
Full-time to part-time 1.18 1.27* 0.67** 1.66*** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.23) 
Part-time to full-time 1.49*** 1.69*** 1.59*** 0.93 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.23) (0.17) 
Changes employer 6.45*** 5.84*** 5.82*** 5.09*** 
 (0.56) (0.51) (0.56) (0.48) 
Age 1.02 1.13** 0.98 1.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.96 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) 
Public sector 0.86 0.97 0.84 0.86 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 0.75*** 0.88 0.64*** 0.79** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
ISCED 3 0.82 0.87 0.90 0.74** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 1.11 1.01 0.99 0.94 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Two or more 1.00 0.81 1.12 0.98 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.96 0.95 1.05 0.92 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18) 
5-10 0.97 0.86 1.01 1.01 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) 
New birth 1.10 1.06 0.99 1.00 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) 
Pseudo R-square 0.1098 0.1021 
Log pseudolikelihood -6341.1833 -5503.8429 
N 10,951 10,951 
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Table A 4-50 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (AT) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1995-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 0.81 0.79 0.96 0.86 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16) 
4-8 0.94 0.85 0.85 0.91 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.77 0.59*** 0.63** 0.41*** 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) 
Full-time to part-time 1.54* 1.66** 0.95 1.62* 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.26) (0.41) 
Part-time to full-time 1.20 0.77 1.15 0.64 
 (0.28) (0.21) (0.28) (0.18) 
Changes employer 4.19*** 4.56*** 3.84*** 3.58*** 
 (0.77) (0.83) (0.80) (0.71) 
Age 1.12 1.13 1.08 1.20* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 1.08 0.95 1.12 0.91 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) 
Public sector 1.39** 1.54*** 1.48*** 1.47*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.07 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
ISCED 3 1.04 0.86 0.88 0.73 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 0.96 1.27 1.04 1.20 
 (0.20) (0.28) (0.22) (0.29) 
Two or more 0.69 1.09 0.77 1.01 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.19) (0.25) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 1.02 1.29 0.82 1.39 
 (0.30) (0.38) (0.24) (0.44) 
5-10 0.89 0.86 0.77 0.80 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) 
New birth 0.98 0.48* 1.20 0.40** 
 (0.37) (0.18) (0.47) (0.18) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0449 0.0457 
Log pseudolikelihood -3644.8657   -3323.9595 
N 6,897 6,897 
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Table A 4-51 Multinomial logit estimates of occupational transitions (FI) 
Reference category: remaining in the occupation of the same ranking. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls: four dummies for years in the risk set (one, two, three, four or more waves). 
Statistical significance: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. 
Source: ECHP 1996-2001 (women aged 25-55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by skill by occupational wage 
 Move up Move down Move up Move down 
Number of years in current job (ref: 9-24)     
1-3 1.25 1.12 1.38 1.11 
 (0.24) (0.19) (0.28) (0.19) 
4-8 1.25 1.18 1.21 1.35 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.30) 
Switching hours (ref: stays full-time)     
Stays part-time 0.52 0.16*** 0.49 0.10*** 
 (0.22) (0.09) (0.23) (0.07) 
Full-time to part-time 0.93 3.73*** 0.63 3.52*** 
 (0.33) (1.24) (0.28) (1.26) 
Part-time to full-time 1.84** 1.38 2.45*** 0.85 
 (0.55) (0.52) (0.75) (0.40) 
Changes employer 5.61*** 4.91*** 4.69*** 5.26*** 
 (0.99) (0.89) (0.90) (0.95) 
Age 1.22* 1.36*** 1.32*** 1.36*** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Age squared 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00** 1.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.90 0.95 0.82 0.94 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) 
Public sector 0.66*** 0.71** 0.68*** 0.65*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Highest level of education  
(ref: ISCED 0-2)     
ISCED 5-7 0.98 0.92 1.08 1.07 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.26) (0.25) 
ISCED 3 0.72 0.76 0.89 1.04 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.21) (0.24) 
Number of children under 17 in the household 
(ref: none)     
One 0.87 0.77 1.04 0.80 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.24) (0.18) 
Two or more 0.71 0.73 0.83 0.82 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) 
Age of the youngest child (ref: 11-17 or none)     
0-4 0.83 1.14 0.77 1.12 
 (0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (0.31) 
5-10 1.06 0.91 1.06 0.85 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.26) (0.20) 
New birth 1.76* 1.25 1.92* 0.95 
 (0.56) (0.42) (0.66) (0.36) 
Pseudo R-square 0.0809 0.0793 
Log pseudolikelihood -3159.1303 -2957.394   
N 8,659 8,659 
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Annex 5 Annex for Chapter 5 
 
Table A 5-1 Mean and median gender log wage gaps for full-time employees      
Country Mean gender log wage gap  Median gender log wage gap  
PL 0.03 0.04 
GR 0.03 0.05 
PT 0.03 0.08 
SI 0.04 0.03 
IT 0.04 0.03 
IE 0.06 0.06 
FR 0.07 0.08 
HU 0.08 0.07 
ES 0.08 0.09 
BE 0.08 0.08 
NL 0.12 0.09 
LU 0.12 0.16 
DE 0.15 0.10 
DK 0.16 0.13 
IS 0.17 0.17 
AT 0.17 0.16 
UK 0.17 0.18 
FI 0.18 0.15 
SK 0.21 0.23 
LT 0.21 0.25 
LV 0.21 0.25 
SE 0.22 0.15 
CZ 0.23 0.21 
NO 0.25 0.17 
CY 0.33 0.32 
EE 0.34 0.40 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 5-2 Descriptive statistics for each quintile of full-time employees’ 
earnings distributions in Britain (column %) 
 Men Women 
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  
Hourly wage  6.10 8.63 11.00 14.45 24.74 5.30 7.38 9.44 12.52 21.57 
Work experience, 
years  
12.07 13.30 13.27 13.16 13.29 11.01 11.98 11.62 11.23 12.13 
Non-labour income 
(1000s) 
15.59 15.64 16.23 18.14 17.41 22.25 21.97 24.18 21.78 25.09 
Highest level of 
education 
          
     Degree 8.56 8.08 15.24 26.00 51.10 6.62 8.50 20.47 39.15 65.48 
    Other higher 36.96 45.09 48.95 43.65 35.08  33.63 37.59 46.27 38.30 24.23 
     A-levels 11.82 11.60 8.48 10.72 8.75 12.48 16.84 8.82 8.07 4.42 
     O-levels 20.99 19.61 19.39 13.02 3.88  23.08 23.82 16.53 8.26 5.75 
     Other secondary 9.68 6.29 5.59 3.85 0.76 10.82 4.95 7.72 4.36 0.12 
     No formal secondary 
or higher    qualification 
12.00 9.33 2.36 2.77 0.42  13.36 8.30 0.19 1.85 0.00 
Married (or de facto 
married) 
47.63 60.58 61.89 65.57 73.18 58.37 51.09 52.52 44.40 54.67 
Managerial duties 25.23 30.10 39.76 52.38 77.87 26.36 32.12 44.42 50.91 68.95 
Size of firm           
     Under 25 37.33 35.75 22.38 24.61 17.33  50.13 31.73 31.38 20.62 16.93 
     25-199 35.70 39.75 39.83 35.79 36.67 29.90 40.43 43.01 41.06 47.50  
     200 or over 26.97 24.50 37.79 39.59 46.00 19.96 27.83 25.60 38.31 35.57 
Private sector 83.90 83.66 79.36 71.52 74.93 71.57 55.27 52.81 45.91 32.50 
Child(ren) present           
Occupational category            
     Managers 6.41 10.21 11.49 27.88 43.63 9.77 9.09 16.22 18.32 18.82  
     Professionals 3.66 5.23 8.89 20.42 28.59 0.00 2.18 10.12 20.05 52.76 
     Technicians and  
     Associate 
Professionals 
6.51 7.25 22.24 22.25 17.90 6.93 11.94 17.13 34.19 20.61 
     Admin/Secretarial 5.74 7.44 5.86 3.87 3.07 18.20 36.39 31.28 22.57 5.45 
     Skilled Trades 21.36 26.58 25.26 15.52 2.74  7.22 5.09 1.03 0.00 0.00 
     Personal Services 2.43 2.33 1.83 0.48 0.15 17.40 18.79 13.52 2.23 1.26 
     Sales and 
Customer 
     Services 
4.98 2.47 2.64 0.03 0.80  17.09 9.24 6.09 0.71 0.74  
     Operatives 23.38 23.02 14.41 8.24 2.85  7.78 5.17 1.85 1.06 0.35  
     Elementary 25.53 15.48 7.37 1.31 0.26 15.61 2.11 2.76 0.87 0.00  
Age of youngest child 
in household 
          
    No children under 
16 
66.57 59.31 55.02 51.86 43.98 32.36 37.28 34.11 25.59 33.91 
     5 years or younger 15.17 17.28 22.29 24.67 33.81  8.94 9.51 13.14 8.44 10.82 
     6-11 years 12.88 14.29 14.25 13.83 14.55 10.79 12.27 13.05 8.10 16.02 
     12-15 years 5.37 9.12 8.45 9.65 7.66 12.64 15.49 7.91 9.06 7.07 
Disagree that family 
suffers if mother works 
full-time 
41.33 43.45 39.44 38.14 38.01 47.80 51.53 52.43 58.07 58.55  
           
No. observations  350 350 350 348 349 257 257 257 256 256 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, Wave 15. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 5-3 Descriptive statistics for each quintile of full-time employees’ 
earnings distribution in Italy (column %) 
 Men Women 
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  
Hourly wage  6.52 8.64 10.06 11.93 18.89 5.99 7.98 9.62 11.86 18.69 
Work experience, years  13.75 17.23 17.59 18.86 19.35 12.82 13.99 15.96 16.46 16.56 
Log non-labour income 9.44 9.33 9.30 9.42 9.63 9.88 9.89 10.02 9.95 10.13 
Highest level of 
education 
          
     Lower secondary or 
below 
57.47 55.94 47.40 38.16 17.51 
49.20 38.29 27.06 12.38 3.21 
     Secondary/further 34.80 37.96 42.72 47.62 44.86 42.08 49.52 53.84 57.27 40.49 
     University 7.72 6.10 9.88 14.23 37.63 8.72 12.19 19.09 30.35 56.30 
Born outside EU-25 13.58 10.99 7.11 4.69 1.65 13.44 10.06 4.60 1.88 1.80 
Married 50.86 60.87 68.32 69.85 78.38 50.91 55.89 59.83 65.62 69.38 
Managerial duties 15.90 19.47 23.18 32.28 56.39 10.41 15.41 18.86 23.78 25.55 
Size of firm           
   10 or fewer 44.59 31.76 24.55 17.95 16.19 48.50 36.32 29.45 17.53 12.53  
    11-149 37.39 36.28 37.85 34.96 27.12  32.61 34.80 32.54 36.76 37.02 
    50 or over 18.03 31.95 37.60 47.09 56.70 18.89 28.88 38.01 45.71 50.45 
On permanent contract 75.87 91.53 92.33 94.14 94.87  75.93 84.08 88.86 93.61 87.76 
Occupational category            
   Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
2.50 0.77 0.76 1.13 5.84  
0.60 0.75 1.28 0.81 2.48  
    Professionals 4.38 3.23 4.86 7.41 25.18 3.06 3.80 8.01 11.04 40.19 
    Technicians and 
associate 
     professionals 
9.36 12.41 19.68 26.09 31.67 
14.39 22.86 33.82 52.00 43.93 
     Clerks 8.27 10.85 15.21 16.29 11.49 13.26 23.67 25.81 21.84 8.82 
     Service workers and 
shop    and market sales 
workers 
10.85 8.16 6.32 8.29 4.96 
22.70 18.76 9.74 5.30 1.42 
     Skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers / 
Craft and related trades 
35.26 33.43 23.56 17.47 8.76 
15.17 6.55 4.73 2.71 1.28 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and 
assemblers 
16.30 19.57 19.84 16.78 8.99 
10.79 11.20 7.77 3.15 0.74  
     Elementary 13.08 11.59 9.77 6.53 3.12 20.02 12.40 8.83 3.15 1.14 
Age of youngest child in 
household 
          
    No children under 16 61.32 58.87 53.41 55.83 47.55 70.25 69.47 62.99 61.43 53.85 
    One child aged 0-4 9.38 8.18 7.26 8.00 8.79  7.51 9.64 8.80 6.64 7.75 
    One child aged 5-10  6.81 6.84 8.38 6.85 7.77 6.26 4.99 5.07 3.59 7.35 
    One child aged 11-15  7.06 8.31 9.34 11.07 12.25  6.01 7.44 10.31 11.17 11.09 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 
8.08 9.14 12.29 8.25 9.01 
4.02 4.63 6.17 8.27 6.62 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-10 
5.65 7.49 7.86 7.92 12.35 
4.86 2.97 5.71 7.36 10.92  
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 11-15 
1.70 1.17 1.47 2.06 2.28 
1.10 0.87 0.96 1.54 2.41 
           
No. observations  1224 1381 1054 1218 1216 833 838 771 768 802 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 5-4 Descriptive statistics for each quintile of full-time employees’ 
earnings distribution in Spain (column %) 
 Men Women 
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  
Hourly wage  5.38 7.32 9.08 11.69 19.42 4.95 6.57 8.30 11.13 18.67 
Work experience, years  16.12 16.93 18.35 19.64 20.01 13.08 13.84 14.71 15.82 18.13 
Log non-labour income 9.28 9.15 9.23 9.23 9.34 9.71 9.73 9.85 9.90 9.92 
Highest level of 
education 
          
     Lower secondary or 
below 
61.08 52.74 37.61 33.96 11.29 45.85 37.60 23.09 10.82 2.35 
     Secondary/further 23.05 23.99 30.43 26.20 19.54 31.20 30.04 30.27 22.63 9.54 
     University 15.87 23.27 31.97 39.84 69.17  22.95 32.36 46.64 66.55 88.11 
Born outside EU-25 10.95 8.28 6.25 4.67 2.61 14.13 14.35 3.06 1.92 0.98 
Married 48.10 54.37 62.62 71.20 82.12 49.44 53.69 59.18 64.24 75.50 
Managerial duties 16.44 20.78 28.96 36.67 57.60 9.93 16.06 22.10 28.85 38.67 
Size of firm           
   10 or fewer 44.90 32.49 27.92 20.93 15.56 49.49 44.14 25.60 22.16 17.45 
    11-149 36.78 41.67 33.76 29.00 25.25 30.03 32.27 31.21 27.58 36.21 
    50 or over 18.32 25.84 38.32 50.07 59.19  20.48 23.59 43.19 50.25 46.34 
On permanent contract 61.35 69.96 83.04 85.67 93.58 65.10 74.82 73.71 85.79 90.48 
Occupational category            
   Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
0.38 0.83 0.38 2.92 11.05 0.02 0.47 0.87 1.83 4.42 
    Professionals 1.57 4.56 7.59 14.33 37.95 2.61 3.51 10.59 25.77 60.98 
    Technicians and 
associate 
     professionals 
6.02 10.21 14.01 15.91 17.04 5.86 8.25 17.91 22.35 14.02 
     Clerks 5.26 6.60 11.88 12.23 10.19 19.15 27.29 36.42 32.04 15.62 
     Service workers and 
shop    and market sales 
workers 
13.21 11.24 10.85 9.67 6.55 34.82 31.76 16.42 10.89 2.73 
     Skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers / 
Craft and related trades 
31.14 38.60 29.63 22.32 8.36 8.78 6.40 4.84 2.66 0.48 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and 
assemblers 
12.58 14.16 15.53 16.62 5.68 3.03 2.41 1.15 0.66 0.86 
     Elementary 29.85 13.80 10.12 6.00 3.19 25.73 19.89 11.81 3.81 0.90 
Age of youngest child in 
household 
          
    No children under 16 62.66 62.64 61.18 56.67 46.75 63.38 69.45 64.81 63.59 48.31 
    One child aged 0-4 8.41 10.01 9.35 9.37 8.98 8.17 9.71 8.81 5.53 9.21 
    One child aged 5-10  7.60 5.80 7.18 7.35 5.99 6.40 6.34 6.49 6.28 7.14 
    One child aged 11-15  8.91 8.40 6.93 9.37 8.71  9.91 4.86 6.79 8.42 9.61 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 
6.29 6.39 6.96 9.51 14.00 5.39 3.58 5.74 8.17 11.93 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-10 
5.27 5.31 7.24 6.36 13.02 4.86 4.99 5.41 6.40 11.74 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 11-15 
0.87 1.46 1.17 1.36 2.55 1.90 1.06 1.96 1.61 2.07 
           
No. observations  774 773 791 757 772 553 535 544 544 543 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 
Individual cross-sectional weights used 
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Table A 5-5 Descriptive statistics for each quintile of full-time employees’ 
earnings distribution in Poland (column %) 
 Men Women 
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  
Hourly wage  1.65 2.20 2.72 3.59 6.32 1.59 2.04 2.62 3.62 6.43 
Work experience, years  15.33 15.64 18.25 17.76 17.48 14.49 15.70 16.49 17.73 17.78 
Log non-labour income 8.45 8.46 8.47 8.51 8.71 8.79 8.77 8.88 8.88 8.98 
Highest level of 
education 
          
     Lower secondary or 
below 
9.71 8.37 5.37 3.47 1.76 7.04 5.97 2.21 1.21 0.11 
     Secondary/further 85.82 79.77 80.21 71.82 48.45 82.59 73.92 65.56 46.62 19.01 
     University 4.47 11.87 14.42 24.71 49.79 10.37 20.11 32.23 52.17 80.87 
Born outside EU-25 0.35 0.17 0.39 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.00 
Married 67.05 71.03 75.76 82.25 86.07 73.22 71.17 76.18 78.60 80.00 
Managerial duties 7.09 14.06 19.40 30.06 46.14  7.14 13.51 19.70 27.84 30.96 
Size of firm           
   10 or fewer 41.76 42.27 33.28 28.62 28.74 46.07 37.55 35.08 31.12 28.29 
    11-149 36.89 25.27 23.32 17.71 17.90 27.29 24.30 23.87 25.94 29.22 
    50 or over 21.35 32.45 43.40 53.67 53.36 26.63 38.15 41.05 42.95 42.49 
On permanent contract 62.77 72.81 77.25 86.07 91.36 63.70 77.99 85.72 89.73 94.56 
Occupational category            
   Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
0.65 2.27 2.78 4.84 15.96  1.24 1.09 3.56 5.81 11.62 
    Professionals 1.99 4.91 6.84 16.26 32.27 5.44 9.66 29.15 44.43 64.32 
    Technicians and 
associate 
     professionals 
4.93 9.59 10.98 16.65 17.45 6.72 20.61 20.08 26.50 16.13 
     Clerks 5.11 6.33 7.70 6.28 2.93 11.84 16.65 20.72 13.37 5.43 
     Service workers and 
shop    and market sales 
workers 
10.71 7.92 6.58 4.18 1.63  29.93 17.63 7.81 3.07 0.69 
     Skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers / 
Craft and related trades 
41.38 38.68 32.69 30.40 15.91 12.99 9.01 7.17 1.58 0.32 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and 
assemblers 
18.55 23.02 26.86 19.79 12.49 5.57 6.52 4.03 4.16 1.28  
     Elementary 16.68 7.28 5.56 1.60 1.36 26.27 18.83 7.48 1.08 0.20 
Age of youngest child in 
household 
          
    No children under 16 50.48 49.39 50.69 46.77 45.43 49.68 55.27 57.46 53.94 56.42 
    One child aged 0-4 10.19 11.34 8.32 10.78 10.30 7.49 8.60 6.64 7.75 9.06 
    One child aged 5-10  8.99 8.64 9.98 9.31 11.07 9.84 9.62 9.85 8.97 8.25 
    One child aged 11-15  9.29 9.55 10.18 10.22 12.55 13.81 10.71 11.29 13.30 10.86 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 
9.75 9.84 9.92 10.16 9.43 4.37 5.71 5.11 6.63 5.60 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-10 
7.46 8.39 8.16 8.93 9.56 9.18 6.85 7.43 6.19 8.61 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 11-15 
3.84 2.85 2.76 3.82 1.66 5.63 3.24 2.21 3.22 1.20 
           
No. observations  869 753 775 802 796 774 606 706 657 681 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 5-6 Descriptive statistics for each quintile of full-time employees’ 
earnings distribution in France (column %) 
 Men Women 
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  
Hourly wage  9.27 11.12 13.26 16.37 24.79 8.93 10.39 12.08 14.63 21.85 
Work experience, years  15.77 17.75 19.36 19.53 20.67 14.63 16.03 17.58 18.70 20.01 
Log non-labour income 9.14 9.13 9.14 9.24 9.43 9.39 9.49 9.37 9.54 9.43 
Highest level of 
education 
          
     Lower secondary or 
below 
27.06 23.48 21.83 14.04 5.90 22.52 16.92 15.11 7.21 5.75 
     Secondary/further 54.31 57.05 55.68 41.49 34.66 51.93 52.43 48.39 37.55 16.46 
     University 18.63 19.46 22.49 44.47 59.43 25.55 30.65 36.49 55.23 77.78 
Born outside EU-25 5.16 7.53 5.29 6.23 6.47 3.96 3.28 3.41 2.48 5.67 
Married 38.00 51.41 53.71 59.59 68.89 43.84 44.41 42.95 51.02 54.59 
Managerial duties 22.10 28.17 34.35 48.34 58.95 20.05 22.27 29.22 33.18 48.01 
Size of firm           
   10 or fewer 24.33 18.39 12.25 10.70 7.93 24.98 22.17 22.20 13.21 11.31 
    11-149 34.90 30.27 27.34 22.89 18.45 32.34 26.95 26.31 28.17 19.46 
    50 or over 40.76 51.34 60.41 66.41 73.62 42.68 50.88 51.49 58.63 69.22  
On permanent contract 89.55 91.33 97.69 97.06 98.14 86.99 90.58 94.70 96.62 98.28 
Occupational category            
   Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
1.14 2.62 2.80 11.92 24.78 0.32 1.65 3.72 7.37 23.16  
    Professionals 3.31 2.96 9.15 23.23 35.35  4.81 6.78 7.66 19.47 36.84 
    Technicians and 
associate 
     professionals 
17.90 20.42 23.03 28.44 21.56 14.82 19.07 27.89 40.60 29.68 
     Clerks 7.76 10.50 7.70 4.47 3.27 30.67 30.32 31.57 20.38 4.53 
     Service workers and 
shop    and market sales 
workers 
7.42 8.79 8.77 5.12 1.39 22.57 20.31 17.61 8.93 3.83 
     Skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers / 
Craft and related trades 
29.96 29.40 23.26 12.77 7.06 2.38 1.85 1.24 0.77 0.21 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and 
assemblers 
20.88 19.68 20.02 11.87 5.79 6.48 8.57 3.21 0.83 0.61 
     Elementary 11.62 5.64 5.27 2.20 0.80 17.95 11.44 7.10 1.64 1.15 
Age of youngest child in 
household 
          
    No children under 16 60.73 49.23 54.00 50.73 45.69 60.31 61.31 61.15 59.90 61.82 
    One child aged 0-4 10.05 9.08 6.27 9.88 6.57  9.27 10.97 8.33 9.64 7.14 
    One child aged 5-10  5.52 7.49 3.41 5.74 4.68 7.32 5.70 4.23 4.47 5.45 
    One child aged 11-15  4.24 7.95 8.20 9.43 13.13 7.40 9.25 10.77 8.66 10.11 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 
12.08 13.83 14.14 12.82 12.14 5.41 6.41 6.86 5.78  
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-10 
6.56 10.96 12.10 9.38 15.44 8.05 4.84 6.10 8.66 9.75 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 11-15 
0.82 1.47 1.89 2.01 2.34  2.24 1.52 2.56 2.90 0.48 
           
No. observations  555 555 554 555 554 376 376 376 376 376 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 
Individual cross-sectional weights used 
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Table A 5-7 Descriptive statistics for each quintile of full-time employees’ 
earnings distribution in Czech Republic (column %) 
 Men Women 
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  
Hourly wage  2.27 3.07 3.73 4.55 7.45 1.85 2.37 2.95 3.66 5.33 
Work experience, years  18.04 18.79 17.68 17.45 18.41 20.69 19.11 18.59 18.43 17.94 
Age 8.66 8.70 8.62 8.68 8.69 9.00 8.92 9.04 8.97 9.20 
Highest level of 
education 
          
     Lower secondary or 
below 
9.56 5.24 1.97 2.27 0.75 14.47 9.07 4.77 1.42 0.16 
     Secondary/further 86.78 88.99 84.16 76.75 54.63 82.89 87.88 85.74 78.60 58.75  
     University 3.65 5.77 13.87 20.98 44.61 2.64 3.06 9.50 19.98 41.09 
Born outside EU-25 0.85 0.35 0.57 1.39 0.31 0.64 0.58 0.83 0.53 0.58 
Married 51.10 62.67 64.28 69.84 75.65 75.16 65.96 67.48 67.81 65.71 
Managerial duties 8.76 12.89 20.45 31.13 51.74 5.34 9.09 12.16 15.39 29.76 
Size of firm           
   10 or fewer 26.48 16.51 11.99 9.41 8.41 32.49 24.89 19.74 16.39 12.18 
    11-149 40.02 43.21 41.87 40.76 31.01 37.26 34.73 37.05 39.82 39.62 
    50 or over 33.50 40.29 46.14 49.83 60.57 30.25 40.38 43.21 43.78 48.20  
On permanent contract 85.65 91.60 93.57 96.49 93.23 86.61 88.87 93.44 93.78 94.88 
Occupational category            
   Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
2.08 2.02 3.27 6.72 15.99 0.74 0.24 2.20 3.29 5.57  
    Professionals 3.36 2.93 7.89 11.09 23.48 1.26 2.96 7.07 12.99 28.40 
    Technicians and 
associate 
     professionals 
6.78 13.32 22.30 27.42 30.40 9.64 19.40 37.22 47.99 44.73 
     Clerks 4.17 5.01 5.42 3.13 3.68 9.04 14.81 21.32 18.88 15.27 
     Service workers and 
shop    and market sales 
workers 
10.52 7.41 5.12 8.64 5.74 35.63 23.58 10.98 6.01 3.12 
     Skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers / 
Craft and related trades 
40.42 41.63 34.70 28.49 13.79 15.76 15.26 9.52 5.30 1.08 
     Plant and machine 
operatives and 
assemblers 
24.17 24.20 18.32 13.92 6.77  8.70 12.20 6.19 4.40 1.45  
     Elementary 8.50 3.47 2.99 0.60 0.15 19.22 11.55 5.50 1.14 0.38 
Age of youngest child in 
household 
          
    No children under 16 67.40 62.75 56.38 54.45 53.68  65.88 66.13 65.67 67.21 73.47  
    One child aged 0-4 4.62 8.69 6.60 10.26 9.16 1.13 3.10 2.11 1.07 2.43 
    One child aged 5-10  6.18 5.97 7.66 5.79 6.69 6.91 8.98 8.03 9.08 6.59 
    One child aged 11-15  6.18 8.39 10.40 10.42 9.23  13.50 9.52 11.48 13.94 9.21  
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 0-4 
6.24 7.02 6.31 8.40 11.13  1.02 1.20 1.16 0.93 1.91 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 5-10 
6.18 4.89 10.81 8.26 7.69  8.41 7.22 9.71 5.30 4.02 
    2 or more children, 
youngest aged 11-15 
3.19 2.29 1.84 2.41 2.41 3.14 3.84 1.84 2.48 2.38 
           
No. observations  626 626 653 599 626 534 533 540 529 530 
Source: EU-SILC 2007 
Individual cross-sectional weights used 
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Figure A 5-1 Unadjusted gender log wage gaps in 25 countries 
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Annex 6 Annex for Chapter 6 
 
Table A 6-1 Occupational distributions of male and female employees in 25 
countries (combined full-time and part-time employees) 
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 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
AT 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.13 0.28 0.12 0.27 0.23 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.16 
BE 0.10 0.04 0.19 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.30 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.14 
CZ 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.31 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.09 
DE 0.06 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.35 0.10 0.22 0.06 0.17 0.24 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.09 
DK 0.07 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.22 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.05 
EE 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.33 0.05 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.10 
ES 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.25 0.10 0.21 0.26 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.18 
FI 0.11 0.05 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.25 0.24 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.07 
FR 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.22 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.21 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.15 
GR 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.24 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.27 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.14 
HU 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.34 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.10 
IE 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.15 0.08 
IS 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.30 0.14 0.21 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.06 
IT 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.12 0.19 0.08 0.14 0.24 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.12 
LT 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.28 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.31 0.12 0.23 0.03 0.09 0.12 
LU 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.27 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.21 
LV 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.22 0.29 0.09 0.23 0.04 0.13 0.14 
NL 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.05 
NO 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.30 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.28 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.04 
PL 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.32 0.08 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.13 
PT 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.22 0.37 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.20 
SE 0.05 0.03 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.26 0.19 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.05 
SI 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.11 
SK 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.08 
UK 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.08 
Source: EU-SILC 2007  
Individual cross-sectional weights used 
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Table A 6-2   Occupational distributions of full-time male and female employees 
in 25 countries  
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 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
AT 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.12 
BE 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.32 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.09 
CZ 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.31 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.31 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.08 
DE 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.25 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.04 
DK 0.08 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.22 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.05 
EE 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.33 0.06 0.22 0.12 0.05 0.09 
ES 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.26 0.10 0.20 0.26 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.14 
FI 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.06 
FR 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.23 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.10 
GR 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.26 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.06 0.11 
HU 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.34 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.10 
IE 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.06 
IS 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.31 0.14 0.21 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.06 
IT 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.33 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.10 
LT 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.29 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.12 0.23 0.03 0.09 0.12 
LU 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.16 
LV 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.22 0.29 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.13 
NL 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.19 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.03 
NO 0.14 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.31 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.03 
PL 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.28 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.33 0.08 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.12 
PT 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.22 0.37 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.17 
SE 0.05 0.04 0.23 0.29 0.20 0.25 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.03 
SI 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.11 
SK 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.27 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.07 
UK 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.05 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 6-3   Female share of 8 occupational groups in 25 countries (full-time 
and part-time employees combined) 
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AT 0.17 0.56 0.32 0.65 0.66 0.14 0.07 0.56 0.46 
BE 0.25 0.51 0.53 0.62 0.56 0.12 0.10 0.63 0.47 
CZ 0.26 0.48 0.58 0.76 0.68 0.22 0.25 0.69 0.48 
DE 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.09 0.09 0.55 0.47 
DK 0.30 0.48 0.61 0.76 0.77 0.11 0.25 0.32 0.49 
EE 0.39 0.68 0.71 0.84 0.81 0.15 0.36 0.65 0.52 
ES 0.24 0.51 0.44 0.67 0.60 0.12 0.09 0.49 0.43 
FI 0.31 0.51 0.63 0.81 0.78 0.11 0.19 0.51 0.50 
FR 0.38 0.47 0.50 0.75 0.73 0.09 0.19 0.66 0.49 
GR 0.21 0.53 0.55 0.62 0.48 0.10 0.04 0.61 0.43 
HU 0.45 0.61 0.68 0.73 0.61 0.20 0.31 0.59 0.50 
IE 0.44 0.57 0.45 0.75 0.72 0.05 0.28 0.37 0.51 
IS 0.43 0.59 0.59 0.83 0.57 0.13 0.03 0.51 0.50 
IT 0.29 0.49 0.55 0.54 0.58 0.16 0.23 0.48 0.43 
LT 0.48 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.72 0.29 0.13 0.58 0.51 
LU 0.33 0.40 0.46 0.58 0.56 0.03 0.10 0.71 0.43 
LV 0.45 0.67 0.64 0.87 0.79 0.24 0.15 0.52 0.51 
NL 0.25 0.48 0.55 0.67 0.70 0.07 0.07 0.49 0.47 
NO 0.34 0.51 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.07 0.14 0.59 0.48 
PL 0.43 0.66 0.55 0.67 0.68 0.17 0.15 0.58 0.47 
PT 0.46 0.59 0.50 0.64 0.72 0.25 0.23 0.68 0.49 
SE 0.40 0.52 0.56 0.70 0.74 0.08 0.16 0.63 0.50 
SI 0.34 0.61 0.56 0.70 0.65 0.14 0.30 0.56 0.49 
SK 0.37 0.66 0.65 0.75 0.67 0.19 0.23 0.58 0.51 
UK 0.38 0.48 0.57 0.80 0.74 0.07 0.16 0.42 0.51 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 6-4   Occupational distributions of employees in 25 countries (combined 
full-time and part-time employees) 
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N
 
AT 3.06 8.29 16.75 19.95 18.98 14.7 5.35 12.93 4,830 
BE 6.76 20.18 13.75 22.79 9.14 10.17 6.75 10.46 4,394 
CZ 4 10.12 24.87 9.33 12.17 20.86 12.22 6.43 6,757 
DE 4.08 13.45 27.59 15.3 11.07 14.08 6.86 7.58 8,921 
DK 5.4 17.35 24.08 11.15 13.54 12.43 7.69 8.37 4,842 
EE 12.21 16.07 13.03 5.26 10.87 18.63 15.97 7.96 4,342 
ES 2.05 14.7 12.02 15.87 14.89 16.46 7.95 16.06 8,663 
FI 8.42 21.96 16.91 7.48 15.84 13.6 8.81 6.98 6,821 
FR 6.22 12.47 21.21 14.38 12.99 11.87 9.81 11.05 7,593 
GR 1.51 18.98 9.47 17.17 17.87 17.11 8.14 9.76 2,889 
HU 4.85 13.41 14.43 10.1 13.69 21.72 13.05 8.75 6,078 
IE 13.81 21.74 5.79 16.21 15.78 9.24 5.76 11.66 2,849 
IS 15.41 25.47 17.73 6.74 13.35 12.23 3.38 5.69 2,519 
IT 1.74 9.93 23.81 15.17 10.57 16.35 11.67 10.75 12,216 
LT 8.31 20.79 9.69 6.05 10.75 20.82 12.65 10.94 3,633 
LU 5.87 16.25 24.49 12.51 9.96 11.65 6.33 12.95 3,518 
LV 5.79 13.46 16.72 4.65 14.49 18.48 12.98 13.42 3,064 
NL 8.75 21.5 22.32 14.89 11.56 9.61 6.13 5.23 8,542 
NO 10.84 16.38 25.43 7.1 18.69 11.18 7.12 3.26 4,813 
PL 4.41 18.76 13.39 8.46 11.6 20.84 12.16 10.37 9,550 
PT 2.4 10.74 11.03 10.97 14.94 24.96 10.88 14.08 2,863 
SE 3.87 23.38 21.96 9.25 17.47 10.45 9.87 3.75 5,544 
SI 3.85 14.42 20.39 10.85 12.4 13.61 14.67 9.81 9,498 
SK 4.88 14.09 22.78 8.91 12.84 15.96 13.19 7.35 4,973 
UK 16.01 17.15 14.82 14.79 15.37 7.05 5.53 9.28 5,432 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 6-5 Square root-index separately by part-time and full-time status 
 S (part-time employees) S (full-time employees) 
AT 0.148 0.157 
BE 0.162 0.126 
CZ 0.260 0.203 
DE 0.136 0.155 
DK 0.161 0.173 
EE 0.310 0.253 
ES 0.196 0.175 
FI 0.173 0.209 
FR 0.146 0.166 
GR 0.344 0.203 
HU 0.316 0.175 
IE 0.247 0.175 
IS 0.356 0.175 
IT 0.097 0.142 
LT 0.537 0.253 
LU 0.291 0.226 
LV 0.598 0.232 
NL 0.150 0.160 
NO 0.219 0.157 
PL 0.225 0.214 
PT 0.510 0.216 
SE 0.109 0.163 
SI 0.269 0.175 
SK 0.304 0.222 
UK 0.112 0.162 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
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Table A 6-6   Occupational distributions of full-time male and female employees 
with lower secondary education or below, in 25 countries 
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 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
AT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.30 0.23 0.09 0.16 0.02 0.47 0.48 
BE 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.27 0.08 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.43 
CZ 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.18 0.37 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.30 0.41 
DE 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.09 0.24 0.30 0.03 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.30 
DK 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.19 0.05 0.27 0.14 0.24 0.17 
EE 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.33 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.17 0.27 
ES 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.33 0.37 0.09 0.19 0.03 0.25 0.42 
FI 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.33 0.35 0.07 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.20 
FR 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.26 0.28 0.04 0.26 0.07 0.16 0.42 
GR 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.28 0.44 0.13 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.48 
HU 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.32 0.17 0.30 0.24 0.27 0.41 
IE 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.45 0.27 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.18 
IS 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.34 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.15 0.15 
IT 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.23 0.37 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.27 
LT 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.15 0.41 0.29 0.16 0.04 0.33 0.47 
LU 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.31 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.12 0.57 
LV 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.37 0.11 0.28 0.09 0.30 0.36 
NL 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.33 0.05 0.29 0.28 0.03 0.25 0.02 0.14 0.19 
NO 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.48 0.24 0.02 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.09 
PL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.43 0.13 0.23 0.10 0.25 0.55 
PT 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.29 0.48 0.21 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.29 
SE 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.35 0.31 0.04 0.29 0.11 0.07 0.25 
SI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.44 
SK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.30 0.19 0.39 0.44 
UK 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.40 0.17 0.02 0.33 0.07 0.25 0.30 
Source: EU-SILC 2007. 
Individual cross-sectional weights used. 
 
  
Figure A 6-1  Square root index S, employees with lower secondary education or 
below (z-scores) 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55, lower secondary education.  
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Figure A 6-2  Square root index S, employees with upper secondary education 
(z-scores) 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55, upper secondary education.  
 
Figure A 6-3 Square root index S, employees with higher education (z-scores) 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55, higher education.  
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Figure A 6-4  Square root index S, employees with higher education and 
average gender role attitudes 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2007, employees aged 25-55, higher education; EVS 1999 adults aged 25-55. 
R=-0.23. 
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